EVPN LOOP PREVENTION BASED ON TRUSTED MAC
draft-glendon-bess-evpn-trusted-mac-00

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Last updated 2019-07-23
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Network Working Group                                             G. Liu
Internet-Draft                                                   H. Wang
Intended status: Standards Track                     Huawei Technologies
Expires: January 25, 2020                                  July 24, 2019

               EVPN LOOP PREVENTION BASED ON TRUSTED MAC
                 draft-glendon-bess-evpn-trusted-mac-00

Abstract

   A principal feature of EVPN is the ability to support mac duplication
   detection based on mac mobility extened community.  This draft
   specifies a mechanism of valid loop prevention based on trusted mac
   to avoid servce interruption of the specifed source or destination
   mac address due to "black- holing".

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 25, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Situation Anyalisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Alternative Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Design Requirement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.4.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Trusted MAC Capability negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Trusted MAC Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Flag Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Trusted MAC Generation and Delivery . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Application Senario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Trusted MAC and Sticky MAC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Trusted MAC and Dynamic MAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.3.  Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   A principal feature of EVPN is the ability to support mac duplication
   dection based on mac mobility extened community.  The mac duplication
   detection is proposed in EVPN [RFC7432] . The draft draft-snr-bess-
   evpn-loop-protect re-uses and enhances the MAC duplication solution
   specified in EVPN [RFC7432].  This draft is a further enhancement for
   RFC7432 and draft-snr-bess-evpn-loop-protect.  Trusted mac is
   proposed to avoid servce interruption of the specifed source or
   destination mac address due to "black- holing".

1.1.  Situation Anyalisis

   Based on [RFC7432], when the mac duplication threshold is met(mac
   moving for 5 times in 180 minutes in default), the PE MUST alert the
   operator and stop sending and processing any BGP mac/ip advertisement
   routes for that mac address, but the other PEs in the EVI will
   forward the traffic for the duplicated mac address to one of the PEs
   that have advertised it.  In order to prevent loop and not just

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