Security Implications of the Use of IPv6 Extension Headers with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-02

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2012-01-12 (latest revision 2011-06-08)
Replaced by draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers, rfc6980
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man)                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                                   UK CPNI
Updates: 3971, 4861 (if approved)                       January 12, 2012
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 15, 2012

  Security Implications of the Use of IPv6 Extension Headers with IPv6
                           Neighbor Discovery
                draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-02

Abstract

   This document analyzes the security implications of using IPv6
   Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages.  It updates
   RFC 4861 such that use of the IPv6 Fragmentation Header is forbidden
   in all Neighbor Discovery messages, thus allowing for simple and
   effective counter-measures for Neighbor Discovery attacks.  Finally,
   it discusses the security implications of using IPv6 fragmentation
   with SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), and provides advice such that
   the aforementioned security implications are mitigated.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, and it may not be
   published except as an Internet-Draft.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 15, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Gont                      Expires July 15, 2012                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        ND and IPv6 Extension Headers         January 2012

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Traditional Neighbor Discovery and IPv6 Fragmentation  . . . .  5
   3.  SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) and IPv6 Fragmentation  . . .  6
   4.  Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix A.  Changes from previous versions of the draft (to
                be removed by the RFC Editor before publication
                of this document as a RFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     A.1.  Changes from draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-01 . . . 12
     A.2.  Changes from draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-00 . . . 12
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Gont                      Expires July 15, 2012                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft        ND and IPv6 Extension Headers         January 2012

1.  Introduction

   The Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) is specified in RFC 4861
   [RFC4861] and RFC 4862 [RFC4862].  It is used by both hosts and
   routers.  Its functions include Neighbor Discovery (ND), Router
   Discovery (RD), Address Autoconfiguration, Address Resolution,
   Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD), Duplicate Address Detection
   (DAD), and Redirection.

   Many of the possible attacks against the Neighbor Discovery Protocol
   are discussed in detail in [RFC3756].  In order to mitigate the
   aforementioned possible attacks, the SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
   was standardized.  SEND employs a number of mechanisms to certify the
   origin of Neighbor Discovery packets and the authority of routers,
   and to protect Neighbor Discovery packets from being the subject of
   modification or replay attacks.

   However, a number of factors, such as the use of trust anchors and
   the unavailability of SEND implementations for many widely-deployed
   operating systems, make SEND hard to deploy [Gont-DEEPSEC2011].
Show full document text