Security Implications of the Use of IPv6 Extension Headers with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-03
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Fernando Gont | ||
| Last updated | 2012-12-10 (Latest revision 2012-06-13) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document analyzes the security implications of using IPv6 Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages. It updates RFC 4861 such that use of the IPv6 Fragmentation Header is forbidden in all Neighbor Discovery messages, thus allowing for simple and effective counter-measures for Neighbor Discovery attacks. Finally, it discusses the security implications of using IPv6 fragmentation with SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), and provides advice such that the aforementioned security implications are mitigated.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)