Security Implications of the Use of IPv6 Extension Headers with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-03

 
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Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2012-12-10 (latest revision 2012-06-13)
Replaced by draft-ietf-6man-nd-extension-headers
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-6man-nd-extension-headers-03.txt

Abstract

This document analyzes the security implications of using IPv6 Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages. It updates RFC 4861 such that use of the IPv6 Fragmentation Header is forbidden in all Neighbor Discovery messages, thus allowing for simple and effective counter-measures for Neighbor Discovery attacks. Finally, it discusses the security implications of using IPv6 fragmentation with SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), and provides advice such that the aforementioned security implications are mitigated.

Authors

Fernando Gont (fernando@gont.com.ar)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)