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Secure Session Layer Services
draft-hares-i2nsf-slss-00

Document Type Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Expired & archived
Authors Susan Hares , Robert Moskowitz
Last updated 2016-03-21
Replaced by draft-hares-i2nsf-ssls
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Replaced by draft-hares-i2nsf-ssls
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:

Abstract

Each I2NSF agent and I2NSF client needs to provide application level support for management traffic during periods of DDoS and network security attacks to deal with congestion (burst and/or continuous), high error rates and packet loss due to the attacks, and the inability to utilize a transport protocol (E.g. TCP) due to a specific protocol attack. This application level support needs to be able to select the key management system and provide "chunking" of data (in order to fit in reduced effective MTUs), compression of data (in order to fit into reduced bandwidth), small security envelope )in order to maximize room for mangement payload), and fragmentation and reassembly at the application layer for those protocols which do not support fragmentation/reassembly (E.g. UDP or SMS). The application layer needs to be able to turn off this features if the system detects these features are no longer needed. This draft specifies a security session layer services(SSLs) which provide these features in terms of an API, and the component features (interface to key management systems, data compression, chunking of data, secure session envelope (SSE) to send data, and fragmentation and reassembly, and ability to detect existence of attack).

Authors

Susan Hares
Robert Moskowitz

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)