Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Device Attestation Extension
draft-ietf-acme-device-attest-02
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Brandon Weeks , Ganesh Mallaya , Sven Rajala , Corey Bonnell | ||
| Last updated | 2026-04-10 (Latest revision 2026-03-26) | ||
| Replaces | draft-acme-device-attest | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | In WG Last Call | |
| Document shepherd | Mike Ounsworth | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2025-12-08 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Deb Cooley | ||
| Send notices to | mike@ounsworth.ca | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Reviews assigned |
draft-ietf-acme-device-attest-02
ACME Working Group B. Weeks
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track G. Mallaya
Expires: 27 September 2026
S. Rajala
C. Bonnell
26 March 2026
Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Device Attestation
Extension
draft-ietf-acme-device-attest-02
Abstract
This document specifies new identifiers and a challenge for the
Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol which
allows validating the identity of a device using attestation.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 September 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Permanent Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Representation in Order resources . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Representation in Certificate Signing Requests and X.509
Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Hardware Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Representation in Order resources . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Representation in Certificate Signing Requests and X.509
Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Device Attestation Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Enterprise PKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1.1. External Account Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. ACME Identifier Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. ACME Validation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.3. New Error Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555]
standard specifies methods for validating control over identifiers,
such as domain names. It is also useful to be able to validate
properties of the device requesting the certificate, such as the
identity of the device and whether the certificate key is protected
by a secure cryptoprocessor.
Many operating systems and device vendors offer functionality
enabling a device to generate a cryptographic attestation of their
identity, such as:
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* Android Key Attestation
(https://source.android.com/security/keystore/attestation)
* Chrome OS Verified Access (https://developers.google.com/chrome/
verified-access/overview)
* Trusted Platform Module
(https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/trusted-platform-
module-tpm-summary/)
* Managed Device Attestation for Apple Devices
(https://support.apple.com/en-om/guide/deployment/dep28afbde6a/
web)
Using ACME and device attestation to issue client certificates for
enterprise PKI is to be a common use case. The following variances
to the ACME specification are described in this document:
* Addition of permanent-identifier [RFC4043] and hardware-module
[RFC4108] identifier types.
* Addition of the device-attest-01 challenge type to prove control
of the permanent-identifier and hardware-module identifier types.
* The challenge response payload contains a serialized WebAuthn
attestation statement format instead of an empty JSON object ({}).
* Accounts and external account binding being used as a mechanism to
pre-authenticate requests to an enterprise CA.
This document does not specify the attestation verification
procedures. Section 13 of [WebAuthn] gives some guidance, however
verification procedures are complex and may require changes to
address future security issues.
Efforts are underway within the Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (RATS)
working group to define a set of standard formats and protocols for
attestation. An explicit aim of this document is to support vendor
specific formats and protocols that are widely deployed at
publication time of this specification.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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3. Permanent Identifier
A new identifier type, "permanent-identifier" is introduced to
represent the identity of a device assigned by the manufacturer,
typically a serial number. Additionally, the assigner of the
identifier MAY also be specified. The name of this identifier type
was chosen to align with [RFC4043]. This specification does not
prescribe the lifetime of the identifier, which is at the discretion
of the Assigner Authority.
Although [RFC4043] permits any valid UTF-8 string to be used as the
identifier, this specification mandates that identifiers MUST NOT
contain the forward-slash "/" (UTF-8: U+002F) character. This
restriction is required to make the ABNF production rule for the
permanent-identifier-value unambiguous.
3.1. Representation in Order resources
The identifier's value field contains a UTF-8 string representation
of the identity of the device. In addition to the value being a
valid UTF-8 string, the value MUST match the permanent-identifier-
value production rule as defined in this ABNF [RFC5234] syntax:
``` assigner-value = ("0" / "1" / "2") 1_("." 1_DIGIT) device-
identifier-value = 1*(%x00-2E / %x30-FF)
permanent-identifier-value = device-identifier-value ["/" assigner-
value] ```
A valid permanent-identifier-value value is a UTF-8 string that
contains an identity consisting of one or more characters without any
forward-slash "/" (UTF-8: U+002F) characters. Optionally, a forward-
slash "/" character and "dotted-decimal" object identifier
identifying the assigner may follow the identity.
Example identifier without an assigner:
{ "type": "permanent-identifier", "value": "ABCDEF123456" }
Example identifier with an assigner:
{ "type": "permanent-identifier", "value": "ABCDEF123456/1.2.3.4" }
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3.2. Representation in Certificate Signing Requests and X.509
Certificates
The identity is included in the Subject Alternative Name Extension
using the identifierValue field of the PermanentIdentifier form
described in [RFC4043]. Although [RFC4043] permits the requester to
include the identifierValue in a serialNumber subject attribute, this
specification mandates that the identifierValue field of the
PermanentIdentifier MUST be present and MUST contain the identifier.
The value of the identifierValue field of the PermanentIdentifier
MUST be an octet-for-octet match of the device-identifier-value value
as encoded in the Order resource. If the assigner-value value is
included in the identifier as encoded in the Order resource, then the
assigner field of the PermanentIdentifier MUST be the encoding of the
"dotted-decimal" object identifier encoded as the assigner-value
value.
To ensure that the identifier as presented in the Order resource and
CSR match, the Server MUST perform the logical equivalent of
extracting the device-identifier-value and assigner-value values from
the CSR and reconstructing the UTF-8 representation of the
identifier. The Server MUST then ensure that the UTF-8
representation and the identifier presented in the Order resource are
an octet-for-octet match and reject the Order otherwise.
[RFC8555] section 7.4 mandates that "The CSR MUST indicate the exact
same set of requested identifiers as the initial newOrder request".
However, there are some environments where the Server requires
validation of the identifier but does not include the identifier in
certificates due to privacy concerns. To support privacy-preserving
certificates, Clients MAY omit this identifier in the certificate
signing request (CSR). Similarly, if the Server wishes to issue
privacy-preserving certificates, it MAY reject CSRs containing a
PermanentIdentifier in the subjectAltName extension.
4. Hardware Module
A new identifier type, "hardware-module" is introduced to represent
the identity of the secure crypto-processor that generated the
certificate key. The identity is modeled after the
HardwareModuleName form described in [RFC4108]. It consists of two
components: an OBJECT IDENTIFIER to represent the type of hardware
module, and a serial number that identifies the specific hardware
module.
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Although [RFC4108] specifies that serial numbers can be represented
as any sequence of bytes, this specification requires that serial
numbers MUST be representable as valid UTF-8 strings consisting of at
least one code point and MUST NOT contain a forward-slash "/" (UTF-8:
U+002F) character. These restriction ensures that serial numbers can
be included in hardware-module identifier string values and that the
ABNF production rule for the value is unambiguous.
4.1. Representation in Order resources
The identifier's value field contains a UTF-8 string representation
of the identity of the hardware module. In addition to the value
being a valid UTF-8 string, the value MUST match the hardware-module-
value production rule as defined in this ABNF [RFC5234] syntax:
``` hw-type-value = ("0" / "1" / "2") 1_("." 1_DIGIT) hw-serial-num-
value = 1*(%x00-2E / %x30-FF)
hardware-module-value = hw-serial-num-value ["/" hw-type-value] ```
A valid hardware-module-value value is a UTF-8 string that contains a
serial number consisting of one or more characters without any
forward-slash "/" (UTF-8: U+002F) characters. Optionally, a forward-
slash "/" character and "dotted-decimal" object identifier
identifying the hardware type may follow the serial number.
Example identifier with the type of the hardware module represented
using the OBJECT IDENTIFIER "1.2.3.4" and a serial number of "ABCD":
{ "type": "hardware-module", "value": "ABCD/1.2.3.4" }
Example identifier with no type specified and a serial number of
"ABCD":
{ "type": "hardware-module", "value": "ABCD" }
4.2. Representation in Certificate Signing Requests and X.509
Certificates
The hardware module identity is included in the Subject Alternate
Name Extension using the HardwareModuleName form described in
[RFC4108]. The HardwareModuleName is encoded as an otherName with
the OID id-on-hardwareModuleName (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4) and consists of:
* hwType: An OBJECT IDENTIFIER that identifies the type of hardware
module
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* hwSerialNum: An OCTET STRING containing the hardware module serial
number
The value of the hwSerialNum field of the HardwareModuleName MUST be
an octet-for-octet match of the hw-serial-num-value value as encoded
in the Order resource. If the hw-type-value value is included in the
identifier as encoded in the Order resource, then the hwType field of
the HardwareModuleName MUST be the encoding of the "dotted-decimal"
object identifier encoded as the hw-type-value value.
To ensure that the identifier as presented in the Order resource and
CSR match, the Server MUST perform the logical equivalent of
extracting the hw-serial-num-value and hw-type-value values from the
CSR and reconstructing the UTF-8 representation of the identifier.
The Server MUST then ensure that the UTF-8 representation and the
identifier presented in the Order resource are an octet-for-octet
match and reject the Order otherwise.
[RFC8555] section 7.4 mandates that "The CSR MUST indicate the exact
same set of requested identifiers as the initial newOrder request".
However, there are some environments where the Server requires
validation of the identifier but does not include the identifier in
certificates due to privacy concerns. To support privacy-preserving
certificates, Clients MAY omit this identifier in the certificate
signing request (CSR). Similarly, if the Server wishes to issue
privacy-preserving certificates, it MAY reject CSRs containing a
HardwareModuleName in the subjectAltName extension.
5. Device Attestation Challenge
The Client can prove control over a permanent identifier of a device
by providing an attestation statement containing the identifier of
the device.
The device-attest-01 ACME challenge object has the following format:
type (required, string): The string "device-attest-01".
token (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies
the challenge.
{
"type": "device-attest-01",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/Rg5dV14Gh1Q",
"status": "pending",
"token": "evaGxfADs6pSRb2LAv9IZf17Dt3juxGJ-PCt92wr-oA"
}
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A Client fulfills this challenge by constructing a key authorization
(Section 8.1 of [RFC8555]) from the "token" value provided in the
challenge and the Client's account key. The Client then generates a
WebAuthn attestation object using the key authorization as the
challenge.
This specification borrows the WebAuthn _attestation object_
representation as described in Section 6.5.4 of [WebAuthn] for
encapsulating attestation formats, but with these modifications:
* The key authorization is used to form _attToBeSigned_. This
replaces the concatenation of _authenticatorData_ and
_clientDataHash_. _attToBeSigned_ is hashed using an algorithm
specified by the attestation format.
* The _authData_ field is unused and SHOULD be omitted.
A Client responds with the response object containing the WebAuthn
attestation object in the "attObj" field to acknowledge that the
challenge can be validated by the Server.
On receiving a response, the Server constructs and stores the key
authorization from the challenge's "token" value and the current
Client account key.
To validate a device attestation challenge, the Server performs the
following steps:
1. Perform the verification procedures described in Section 6 of
[WebAuthn].
2. Verify that key authorization conveyed by _attToBeSigned_ matches
the key authorization stored by the Server.
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POST /acme/chall/Rg5dV14Gh1Q
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
"nonce": "SS2sSl1PtspvFZ08kNtzKd",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/Rg5dV14Gh1Q"
}),
"payload": base64url({
"attObj": base64url(/* WebAuthn attestation object */),
}),
"signature": "Q1bURgJoEslbD1c5...3pYdSMLio57mQNN4"
}
The webauthn payload MAY contain any identifiers registered in
"WebAuthn Attestation Statement Format Identifiers" and any
extensions registered in "WebAuthn Extension Identifiers"
[IANA-Webauthn], [RFC8809].
6. Operational Considerations
Although this document focuses guidance on implementing new type and
challenge for certificate issuance using ACME, it does not define a
New Protocol, a Protocol Extension, or an architecture.
6.1. Enterprise PKI
ACME was originally envisioned for issuing certificates in the Web
PKI, however this extension will primarily be useful in enterprise
PKI. The subsection below covers some operational considerations for
an ACME-based enterprise CA.
6.1.1. External Account Binding
An enterprise CA likely only wants to receive requests from
authorized devices. It is RECOMMENDED that the Server require a
value for the "externalAccountBinding" field to be present in
"newAccount" requests.
If an enterprise CA desires to limit the number of certificates that
can be requested with a given account, including limiting an account
to a single certificate. After the desired number of certificates
have been issued to an account, the Server MAY revoke the account as
described in Section 7.1.2 of [RFC8555].
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7. Security Considerations
Please reference [RFC8555] for other security considerations.
See Section 13 of [WebAuthn] for additional security considerations
related to attestation statement formats, including certificate
revocation.
Key attestation statements may include a variety of information in
addition to the public key being attested. While not described in
this document, the Server MAY use any policy when evaluating this
information. This evaluation can result in rejection of a
certificate request that features a verifiable key attestation for
the public key contained in the request. For example, an attestation
statement may indicate use of an unacceptable firmware version.
The "token" value MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy. It MUST
NOT contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet, including
padding characters ("="). See [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis],
Appendix C.1 for additional information on randomness requirements.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. ACME Identifier Types
The "ACME Identifier Types" registry is to be updated to include the
following entries:
+======================+===========+
| Label | Reference |
+======================+===========+
| permanent-identifier | RFC XXXX |
+----------------------+-----------+
| hardware-module | RFC XXXX |
+----------------------+-----------+
Table 1
8.2. ACME Validation Method
The "ACME Validation Methods" registry is to be updated to include
the following entry:
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+==================+======================+======+===========+
| Label | Identifier Type | ACME | Reference |
+==================+======================+======+===========+
| device-attest-01 | permanent-identifier | Y | RFC XXXX |
+------------------+----------------------+------+-----------+
Table 2
8.3. New Error Types
This document adds the following entries to the ACME Error Type
registry:
+=========================+===========================+===========+
| Type | Description | Reference |
+=========================+===========================+===========+
| badAttestationStatement | The attestation statement | RFC XXXX |
| | is unacceptable (e.g. not | |
| | signed by an attestation | |
| | authority trusted by the | |
| | CA) | |
+-------------------------+---------------------------+-----------+
Table 3
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-14, 13 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-14>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4043] Pinkas, D. and T. Gindin, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Permanent Identifier", RFC 4043,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4043, May 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4043>.
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[RFC4108] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to
Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4108, August 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4108>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555>.
[RFC8809] Hodges, J., Mandyam, G., and M. Jones, "Registries for Web
Authentication (WebAuthn)", RFC 8809,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8809, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8809>.
[WebAuthn] Hodges, J., Jones, J., Jones, M. B., Kumar, A., and E.
Lundberg, "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public
Key Credentials Level 2", April 2021,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/>.
9.2. Informative References
[IANA-Webauthn]
"IANA Registries for Web Authentication (WebAuthn)", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/webauthn/
webauthn.xhtml>.
Acknowledgments
We thank the participants on the ACME Working Group mailing list for
their insightful feedback and comments. In particular, the authors
extend sincere appreciation to Mike Ounsworth, Deb Cooley, Aaron
Gable, Richard Barnes, and Herman Slatman for their reviews and
suggestions, which greatly improved the quality of this document.
Authors' Addresses
Brandon Weeks
Email: me@brandonweeks.com
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Ganesh Mallaya
Email: ganesh.mallaya@appviewx.com
Sven Rajala
Email: sven.rajala@keyfactor.com
Corey Bonnell
Email: corey.bonnell@digicert.com
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