Babel Cryptographic Authentification
draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (babel WG)
Last updated 2018-08-16
Replaces draft-do-babel-hmac
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Network Working Group                                              C. Do
Internet-Draft                                            W. Kolodziejak
Obsoletes: 7298 (if approved)                              J. Chroboczek
Updates: 6126bis (if approved)         IRIF, University of Paris-Diderot
Intended status: Standards Track                         August 16, 2018
Expires: February 17, 2019

                  Babel Cryptographic Authentification
                        draft-ietf-babel-hmac-00

Abstract

   This document describes a cryptographic authentication mechanism for
   the Babel routing protocol that has provisions for replay avoidance.
   This document updates RFC 6126bis and obsoletes RFC 7298.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 17, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Do, et al.              Expires February 17, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Babel Cryptographic Authentification       August 2018

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Assumptions and security properties . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conceptual overview of the protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  The Interface Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  The Neighbour table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Protocol Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  HMAC computation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Packet Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Packet Reception  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Packet Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  HMAC TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.2.  PC TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Challenge Request TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.4.  Challenge Reply TLV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Informational References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Use of the packet trailer  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix B.  Incremental deployment and key rotation  . . . . . .  13
   Appendix C.  Implicit indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   By default, the Babel routing protocol trusts the information
   contained in every UDP packet it receives on the Babel port.  An
   attacker can redirect traffic to itself or to a different node in the
   network, causing a variety of potential issues.  In particular, an
   attacker might:

   o  spoof a Babel packet, and redirect traffic by announcing a smaller
      metric, a larger seqno, or a longer prefix;

   o  spoof a malformed packet, which could cause an insufficiently
      robust implementation to crash or interfere with the rest of the
      network;

   o  replay a previously captured Babel packet, which could cause
      traffic to be redirected or otherwise interfere with the network.
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