CAPPORT Architecture
draft-ietf-capport-architecture-08
Internet Engineering Task Force K. Larose
Internet-Draft Agilicus
Intended status: Informational D. Dolson
Expires: 12 November 2020
H. Liu
Google
11 May 2020
CAPPORT Architecture
draft-ietf-capport-architecture-08
Abstract
This document describes a CAPPORT architecture. DHCP or Router
Advertisements, an optional signaling protocol, and an HTTP API are
used to provide the solution. The role of Provisioning Domains
(PvDs) is described.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 November 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Larose, et al. Expires 12 November 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft CAPPORT Architecture May 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. User Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Provisioning Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. DHCP or Router Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.2. Provisioning Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Captive Portal API Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Captive Portal Enforcement Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5. Captive Portal Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6. Component Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. User Equipment Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Recommended Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Uniquely Identify User Equipment . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.2. Hard to Spoof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.3. Visible to the API Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.4. Visible to the Enforcement Device . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Evaluating Types of Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4. Example Identifier Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4.1. Physical Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4.2. IP Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5. Context-free URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Solution Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. Initial Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Conditions About to Expire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. Handling of Changes in Portal URI . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Trusting the Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. Authenticated APIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.3. Secure APIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.4. Risks Associated with the Signaling Protocol . . . . . . 17
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