Group OSCORE - Secure Group Communication for CoAP
draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-14
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (core WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Marco Tiloca , Göran Selander , Francesca Palombini , John Preuß Mattsson , Jiye Park | ||
| Last updated | 2022-04-02 (Latest revision 2022-03-07) | ||
| Replaces | draft-tiloca-core-multicast-oscoap | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Proposed Standard | ||
| Formats | plain text html xml htmlized pdfized bibtex | ||
| Additional resources |
Working Group Repo
Mailing list discussion |
||
| Stream | WG state | WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up | |
| Document shepherd | Christian Amsüss | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | christian@amsuess.com |
draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-14
CoRE Working Group M. Tiloca
Internet-Draft RISE AB
Intended status: Standards Track G. Selander
Expires: 8 September 2022 F. Palombini
J. Mattsson
Ericsson AB
J. Park
Universitaet Duisburg-Essen
7 March 2022
Group OSCORE - Secure Group Communication for CoAP
draft-ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm-14
Abstract
This document defines Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful
Environments (Group OSCORE), providing end-to-end security of CoAP
messages exchanged between members of a group, e.g., sent over IP
multicast. In particular, the described approach defines how OSCORE
is used in a group communication setting to provide source
authentication for CoAP group requests, sent by a client to multiple
servers, and for protection of the corresponding CoAP responses.
Group OSCORE also defines a pairwise mode where each member of the
group can efficiently derive a symmetric pairwise key with any other
member of the group for pairwise OSCORE communication.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 September 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. Common Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.1. AEAD Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.2. ID Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1.3. Group Manager Authentication Credential . . . . . . . 12
2.1.4. Signature Encryption Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.5. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.6. Group Encryption Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.7. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. Sender Context and Recipient Context . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3. Authentication Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4. Pairwise Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.1. Derivation of Pairwise Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2. ECDH with Montgomery Coordinates . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.3. Usage of Sequence Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.4. Security Context for Pairwise Mode . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5. Update of Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.1. Loss of Mutable Security Context . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.2. Exhaustion of Sender Sequence Number . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.3. Retrieving New Security Context Parameters . . . . . 23
3. The Group Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1. Support for Additional Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2. Management of Group Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.1. Recycling of Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3. Responsibilities of the Group Manager . . . . . . . . . . 32
4. The COSE Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1. Countersignature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.1.1. Keystream Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.1.2. Clarifications on Using a Countersignature . . . . . 36
4.2. The 'kid' and 'kid context' parameters . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3. external_aad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5. OSCORE Header Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.1. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1.1. Examples in Group Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.1.2. Examples in Pairwise Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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6. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1. Supporting Observe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2. Update of Replay Window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.3. Message Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7. Message Reception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8. Message Processing in Group Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8.1. Protecting the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.1.1. Supporting Observe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.2. Verifying the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.2.1. Supporting Observe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3. Protecting the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3.1. Supporting Observe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.4. Verifying the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.4.1. Supporting Observe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
8.5. External Signature Checkers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
9. Message Processing in Pairwise Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9.1. Pre-Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.2. Main Differences from OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
9.3. Protecting the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.4. Verifying the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.5. Protecting the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
9.6. Verifying the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
10. Challenge-Response Synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
11. Implementation Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
12.1. Security of the Group Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
12.2. Security of the Pairwise Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
12.4. Management of Group Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . 67
12.5. Update of Security Context and Key Rotation . . . . . . 68
12.5.1. Late Update on the Sender . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
12.5.2. Late Update on the Recipient . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12.6. Collision of Group Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
12.7. Cross-group Message Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
12.7.1. Attack Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
12.7.2. Attack Prevention in Group Mode . . . . . . . . . . 71
12.8. Prevention of Group Cloning Attack . . . . . . . . . . . 72
12.9. Group OSCORE for Unicast Requests . . . . . . . . . . . 73
12.10. End-to-end Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
12.11. Master Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
12.12. Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
12.13. Message Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
12.14. Client Aliveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
12.15. Cryptographic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
12.16. Message Segmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
12.17. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
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13.1. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix A. Assumptions and Security Objectives . . . . . . . . 84
A.1. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.2. Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Appendix B. List of Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Appendix C. Example of Group Identifier Format . . . . . . . . . 90
Appendix D. Set-up of New Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix E. Document Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
E.1. Version -13 to -14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
E.2. Version -12 to -13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
E.3. Version -11 to -12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
E.4. Version -10 to -11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
E.5. Version -09 to -10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
E.6. Version -08 to -09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
E.7. Version -07 to -08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
E.8. Version -06 to -07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
E.9. Version -05 to -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
E.10. Version -04 to -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
E.11. Version -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
E.12. Version -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
E.13. Version -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
E.14. Version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
1. Introduction
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] is a web
transfer protocol specifically designed for constrained devices and
networks [RFC7228]. Group communication for CoAP
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] addresses use cases where deployed
devices benefit from a group communication model, for example to
reduce latencies, improve performance, and reduce bandwidth
utilization. Use cases include lighting control, integrated building
control, software and firmware updates, parameter and configuration
updates, commissioning of constrained networks, and emergency
multicast (see Appendix B). Group communication for CoAP
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] mainly uses UDP/IP multicast as the
underlying data transport.
Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
[RFC8613] describes a security protocol based on the exchange of
protected CoAP messages. OSCORE builds on CBOR Object Signing and
Encryption (COSE)
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] and
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provides end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay protection and
binding of response to request between a sender and a recipient,
independent of the transport layer also in the presence of
intermediaries. To this end, a CoAP message is protected by
including its payload (if any), certain options, and header fields in
a COSE object, which replaces the authenticated and encrypted fields
in the protected message.
This document defines Group OSCORE, a security protocol for Group
communication for CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], providing the
same end-to-end security properties as OSCORE in the case where CoAP
requests have multiple recipients. In particular, the described
approach defines how OSCORE is used in a group communication setting
to provide source authentication for CoAP group requests, sent by a
client to multiple servers, and for protection of the corresponding
CoAP responses. Group OSCORE also defines a pairwise mode where each
member of the group can efficiently derive a symmetric pairwise key
with any other member of the group for pairwise OSCORE communication.
Just like OSCORE, Group OSCORE is independent of the transport layer
and works wherever CoAP does.
As with OSCORE, it is possible to combine Group OSCORE with
communication security on other layers. One example is the use of
transport layer security, such as DTLS
[RFC6347][I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], between one client and one proxy (and
vice versa), or between one proxy and one server (and vice versa).
This prevents observers from accessing addressing information
conveyed in CoAP options that would not be protected by Group OSCORE,
but would be protected by DTLS. These options include Uri-Host, Uri-
Port and Proxy-Uri. Note that DTLS does not define how to secure
messages sent over IP multicast.
Group OSCORE defines two modes of operation, that can be used
independently or together:
* In the group mode, Group OSCORE requests and responses are
digitally signed with the private key of the sender and the
signature is embedded in the protected CoAP message. The group
mode supports all COSE signature algorithms as well as signature
verification by intermediaries. This mode is defined in
Section 8.
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* In the pairwise mode, two group members exchange OSCORE requests
and responses (typically) over unicast, and the messages are
protected with symmetric keys. These symmetric keys are derived
from Diffie-Hellman shared secrets, calculated with the asymmetric
keys of the sender and recipient, allowing for shorter integrity
tags and therefore lower message overhead. This mode is defined
in Section 9.
Both modes provide source authentication of CoAP messages. The
application decides what mode to use, potentially on a per-message
basis. Such decisions can be based, for instance, on pre-configured
policies or dynamic assessing of the target recipient and/or
resource, among other things. One important case is when requests
are protected with the group mode, and responses with the pairwise
mode. Since such responses convey shorter integrity tags instead of
bigger, full-fledged signatures, this significantly reduces the
message overhead in case of many responses to one request.
A special deployment of Group OSCORE is to use pairwise mode only.
For example, consider the case of a constrained-node network
[RFC7228] with a large number of CoAP endpoints and the objective to
establish secure communication between any pair of endpoints with a
small provisioning effort and message overhead. Since the total
number of security associations that needs to be established grows
with the square of the number of endpoints, it is desirable to
restrict the amount of secret keying material provided to each
endpoint. Moreover, a key establishment protocol would need to be
executed for each security association. One solution to this is to
deploy Group OSCORE, with the endpoints being part of a group, and
use the pairwise mode. This solution assumes a trusted third party
called Group Manager (see Section 3). However, it has the benefit of
providing a single shared secret, while distributing only the public
keys of group members or a subset of those. After that, a CoAP
endpoint can locally derive the OSCORE Security Context for the other
endpoint in the group, and protect CoAP communications with very low
overhead [I-D.ietf-lwig-security-protocol-comparison].
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
described in CoAP [RFC7252] including "endpoint", "client", "server",
"sender" and "recipient"; group communication for CoAP
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[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]; CBOR [RFC8949]; COSE
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] and
related countersignatures [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign].
Readers are also expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts
for protection and processing of CoAP messages through OSCORE, such
as "Security Context" and "Master Secret", defined in [RFC8613].
Terminology for constrained environments, such as "constrained
device" and "constrained-node network", is defined in [RFC7228].
This document refers also to the following terminology.
* Keying material: data that is necessary to establish and maintain
secure communication among endpoints. This includes, for
instance, keys and IVs [RFC4949].
* Authentication credential: set of information associated with an
entity, including that entity's public key and parameters
associated with the public key. Examples of authentication
credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) and CWT Claims Sets (CCSs)
[RFC8392], X.509 certificates [RFC7925] and C509 certificates
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]. Further details about
authentication credentials are provided in Section 2.3.
* Group: a set of endpoints that share group keying material and
security parameters (Common Context, see Section 2). That is,
unless otherwise specified, the term group used in this document
refers to a "security group" (see Section 2.1 of
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]), not to be confused with "CoAP
group" or "application group".
* Group Manager: entity responsible for a group. Each endpoint in a
group communicates securely with the respective Group Manager,
which is neither required to be an actual group member nor to take
part in the group communication. The full list of
responsibilities of the Group Manager is provided in Section 3.3.
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* Silent server: member of a group that never sends protected
responses in reply to requests. For CoAP group communications,
requests are normally sent without necessarily expecting a
response. A silent server may send unprotected responses, as
error responses reporting an OSCORE error. Note that an endpoint
can implement both a silent server and a client, i.e., the two
roles are independent. An endpoint acting only as a silent server
performs only Group OSCORE processing on incoming requests.
Silent servers maintain less keying material and in particular do
not have a Sender Context for the group. Since silent servers do
not have a Sender ID, they cannot support the pairwise mode.
* Group Identifier (Gid): identifier assigned to the group, unique
within the set of groups of a given Group Manager.
* Birth Gid: with respect to a group member, the Gid obtained by
that group member upon (re-)joining the group.
* Group request: CoAP request message sent by a client in the group
to all servers in that group.
* Key Generation Number: an integer value identifying the current
version of the keying material used in a group.
* Source authentication: evidence that a received message in the
group originated from a specific identified group member. This
also provides assurance that the message was not tampered with by
anyone, be it a different legitimate group member or an endpoint
which is not a group member.
2. Security Context
As per the terminology in Section 1.1, this document refers to a
group as a set of endpoints sharing keying material and security
parameters for executing the Group OSCORE protocol. Each endpoint of
a group is aware of whether the group uses the group mode, or the
pairwise mode, or both. Then, an endpoint can use any mode it
supports if also used in the group.
All members of a group maintain a Security Context as defined in
Section 3 of [RFC8613] and extended as defined in this section. How
the Security Context is established by the group members is out of
scope for this document, but if there is more than one Security
Context applicable to a message, then the endpoints MUST be able to
tell which Security Context was latest established.
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The default setting for how to manage information about the group,
including the Security Context, is described in terms of a Group
Manager (see Section 3). In particular, the Group Manager indicates
whether the group uses the group mode, the pairwise mode, or both of
them, as part of the group data provided to candidate group members
when joining the group.
The remainder of this section provides further details about the
Security Context of Group OSCORE. In particular, each endpoint which
is member of a group maintains a Security Context as defined in
Section 3 of [RFC8613], extended as follows (see Figure 1).
* One Common Context, shared by all the endpoints in the group.
Several new parameters are included in the Common Context.
If a Group Manager is used for maintaining the group, the Common
Context is extended with the authentication credential of the
Group Manager, including the Group Manager's public key. When
processing messages, the authentication credential of the Group
Manager is included in the external additional authenticated data
(see Section 4.3).
If the group uses the group mode, the Common context is extended
with the following new parameters.
- Signature Encryption Algorithm and Signature Algorithm. These
relate to the encryption/decryption operations and to the
computation/verification of countersignatures, respectively,
when a message is protected with the group mode (see
Section 8).
- Group Encryption Key, used to perform encryption/decryption of
countersignatures, when a message is protected with the group
mode (see Section 8).
If the group uses the pairwise mode, the Common Context is
extended with a Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm used for
agreement on a static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret, from
which pairwise keys are derived (see Section 2.4.1) to protect
messages with the pairwise mode (see Section 9).
* One Sender Context, extended with the endpoint's private key and
authentication credential including the endpoint's public key.
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The private key is used to sign messages protected with the group
mode, or for deriving pairwise keys in pairwise mode (see
Section 2.4). The authentication credential is used for deriving
pairwise keys in pairwise mode, and is included in the external
additional authenticated data when processing outgoing messages
(see Section 9).
If the endpoint supports the pairwise mode, the Sender Context is
also extended with the Pairwise Sender Keys associated with the
other endpoints (see Section 2.4).
The Sender Context is omitted if the endpoint is configured
exclusively as silent server.
* One Recipient Context for each other endpoint from which messages
are received. It is not necessary to maintain Recipient Contexts
associated with endpoints from which messages are not (expected to
be) received. The Recipient Context is extended with the
authentication credential of the other endpoint, including that
endpoint's public key.
The public key is used to verify the signature of messages
protected with the group mode from the other endpoint and for
deriving the pairwise keys in pairwise mode (see Section 2.4).
The authentication credential is used for deriving pairwise keys
in pairwise mode, and is included in the external additional
authenticated data when processing incoming messages from the
other endpoint (see Section 9).
If the endpoint supports the pairwise mode, then the Recipient
Context is also extended with the Pairwise Recipient Key
associated with the other endpoint (see Section 2.4).
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+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Context Component | New Information Elements |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Common Context | Group Manager Authentication Credential |
| | * Signature Encryption Algorithm |
| | * Signature Algorithm |
| | * Group Encryption Key |
| | ^ Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Sender Context | Endpoint's own private key |
| | Endpoint's own authentication credential |
| | ^ Pairwise Sender Keys for the other endpoints |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| Each | Other endpoint's authentication credential |
| Recipient Context | ^ Pairwise Recipient Key for the other endpoint |
+-------------------+-------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Additions to the OSCORE Security Context. The optional
elements labeled with * (with ^) are present only if the group
uses the group mode (the pairwise mode).
2.1. Common Context
The Common Context may be acquired from the Group Manager (see
Section 3). The following sections define how the Common Context is
extended, compared to [RFC8613].
2.1.1. AEAD Algorithm
AEAD Algorithm identifies the COSE AEAD algorithm to use for
encryption, when messages are protected using the pairwise mode (see
Section 9). This algorithm MUST provide integrity protection. This
parameter is immutable once the Common Context is established, and it
is not relevant if the group uses only the group mode.
2.1.2. ID Context
The ID Context parameter (see Sections 3.1 and 3.3 of [RFC8613]) in
the Common Context SHALL contain the Group Identifier (Gid) of the
group. The choice of the Gid format is application specific. An
example of specific formatting of the Gid is given in Appendix C.
The application needs to specify how to handle potential collisions
between Gids (see Section 12.6).
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2.1.3. Group Manager Authentication Credential
Group Manager Authentication Credential specifies the authentication
credential of the Group Manager, including the Group Manager's public
key. This is included in the external additional authenticated data
when processing messages (see Section 4.3).
Each group member MUST obtain the authentication credential of the
Group Manager with a valid proof-of-possession of the corresponding
private key, for instance from the Group Manager itself when joining
the group. Further details on the provisioning of the Group
Manager's authentication credential to the group members are out of
the scope of this document.
2.1.4. Signature Encryption Algorithm
Signature Encryption Algorithm identifies the algorithm to use for
encryption, when messages are protected using the group mode (see
Section 8). This algorithm MAY provide integrity protection. This
parameter is immutable once the Common Context is established.
This algorithm is not used to encrypt the countersignature in
messages protected using the group mode, for which the method defined
in Section 4.1 is used.
2.1.5. Signature Algorithm
Signature Algorithm identifies the digital signature algorithm used
to compute a countersignature on the COSE object (see Sections 3.2
and 3.3 of [I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]), when messages are protected
using the group mode (see Section 8). This parameter is immutable
once the Common Context is established.
2.1.6. Group Encryption Key
Group Encryption Key specifies the encryption key for deriving a
keystream to encrypt/decrypt a countersignature, when a message is
protected with the group mode (see Section 8).
The Group Encryption Key is derived as defined for Sender/Recipient
Keys in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613], with the following differences.
* The 'id' element of the 'info' array is the empty byte string.
* The 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array takes the value of
Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context (see
Section 2.1.5).
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* The 'type' element of the 'info' array is "Group Encryption Key".
The label is an ASCII string and does not include a trailing NUL
byte.
* L and the 'L' element of the 'info' array are the size of the key
for the Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context
(see Section 2.1.5), in bytes.
2.1.7. Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm identifies the elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman algorithm used to derive a static-static Diffie-
Hellman shared secret, from which pairwise keys are derived (see
Section 2.4.1) to protect messages with the pairwise mode (see
Section 9). This parameter is immutable once the Common Context is
established.
2.2. Sender Context and Recipient Context
OSCORE specifies the derivation of Sender Context and Recipient
Context, specifically of Sender/Recipient Keys and Common IV, from a
set of input parameters (see Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]).
The derivation of Sender/Recipient Keys and Common IV defined in
OSCORE applies also to Group OSCORE, with the following extensions
compared to Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613].
* If the group uses (also) the group mode, the 'alg_aead' element of
the 'info' array takes the value of Signature Encryption Algorithm
from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5).
* If the group uses only the pairwise mode, the 'alg_aead' element
of the 'info' array takes the value of AEAD Algorithm from the
Common Context (see Section 2.1.1).
The Sender ID SHALL be unique for each endpoint in a group with a
certain tuple (Master Secret, Master Salt, Group Identifier), see
Section 3.3 of [RFC8613].
For Group OSCORE, the Sender Context and Recipient Context
additionally contain asymmetric keys, as described previously in
Section 2. The private key of the sender and the authentication
credential including the corresponding public key can, for example,
be generated by the endpoint or provisioned during manufacturing.
With the exception of the authentication credential of the sender
endpoint and the possibly associated pairwise keys, a receiver
endpoint can derive a complete Security Context from a received Group
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OSCORE message and the Common Context. The authentication
credentials in the Recipient Contexts can be retrieved from the Group
Manager (see Section 3) upon joining the group. An authentication
credential can alternatively be acquired from the Group Manager at a
later time, for example the first time a message is received from a
particular endpoint in the group (see Section 8.2 and Section 8.4).
For severely constrained devices, it may be not feasible to
simultaneously handle the ongoing processing of a recently received
message in parallel with the retrieval of the sender endpoint's
authentication credential. Such devices can be configured to drop a
received message for which there is no (complete) Recipient Context,
and retrieve the sender endpoint's authentication credential in order
to have it available to verify subsequent messages from that
endpoint.
An endpoint admits a maximum amount of Recipient Contexts for a same
Security Context, e.g., due to memory limitations. After reaching
that limit, the creation of a new Recipient Context results in an
overflow. When this happens, the endpoint has to delete a current
Recipient Context to install the new one. It is up to the
application to define policies for selecting the current Recipient
Context to delete. If the new Recipient Context has been installed
after the endpoint has experienced the overflow above, then the
Recipient Context is initialized with an invalid Replay Window, and
accordingly requires the endpoint to take appropriate actions (see
Section 2.5.1.2).
2.3. Authentication Credentials
In a group, the following MUST hold for the authentication credential
of each endpoint as well as for the authentication credential of the
Group Manager.
* All authentication credentials MUST be encoded according to the
same format used in the group. The used format MUST provide the
public key as well as the comprehensive set of information related
to the public key algorithm, including, e.g., the used elliptic
curve (when applicable).
* All authentication credentials and the public key specified
therein MUST be for the public key algorithm used in the group and
aligned with the possible associated parameters used in the group,
e.g., the used elliptic curve (when applicable).
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If the group uses (also) the group mode, the public key algorithm
is the Signature Algorithm used in the group. If the group uses
only the pairwise mode, the public key algorithm is the Pairwise
Key Agreement Algorithm used in the group.
If the authentication credentials are X.509 certificates [RFC7925]
or C509 certificates [I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert], the public
key algorithm is fully described by the "algorithm" field of the
"SubjectPublicKeyInfo" structure, and by the
"subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm" element, respectively.
If authentication credentials are CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) or CWT
Claims Sets (CCSs) [RFC8392], the public key algorithm is fully
described by a COSE key type and its "kty" and "crv" parameters.
Authentication credentials are used to derive pairwise keys (see
Section 2.4.1) and are included in the external additional
authenticated data when processing messages (see Section 4.3). In
both these cases, an endpoint in a group MUST treat authentication
credentials as opaque data, i.e., by considering the same binary
representation made available to other endpoints in the group,
possibly through a designated trusted source (e.g., the Group
Manager).
For example, an X.509 certificate is provided as its direct binary
serialization. If C509 certificates or CWTs are used as
authentication credentials, each is provided as the binary
serialization of a (possibly tagged) CBOR array. If CCSs are used as
authentication credentials, each is provided as the binary
serialization of a CBOR map.
If authentication credentials are CWTs, then the untagged CWT
associated with an entity is stored in the Security Context and used
as authentication credential for that entity.
If authentication credentials are X.509 / C509 certificates or CWTs
and the authentication credential associated with an entity is
provided within a chain or a bag, then only the end-entity
certificate or end-entity untagged CWT is stored in the Security
Context and used as authentication credential for that entity.
Storing whole authentication credentials rather than only a subset of
those may result in a non-negligible storage overhead. On the other
hand, it also ensures that authentication credentials are correctly
used in a simple, flexible and non-error-prone way, also taking into
account future credential formats as entirely new or extending
existing ones. In particular, it is ensured that:
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* When used to derive pairwise keys and when included in the
external additional authenticated data, authentication credentials
can also specify possible metadata and parameters related to the
included public key. Besides the public key algorithm, these
comprise other relevant pieces of information such as key usage,
expiration time, issuer and subject.
* All endpoints using another endpoint's authentication credential
use exactly the same binary serialization, as obtained and
distributed by the credential provider (e.g., the Group Manager)
and as originally crafted by the credential issuer. In turn, this
does not require to define and maintain canonical subsets of
authentication credentials and their corresponding encoding, and
spares endpoints from error-prone re-encoding operations.
Depending on the particular deployment and the intended group size,
limiting the storage overhead of endpoints in a group can be an
incentive for system/network administrators to prefer using a compact
format of authentication credentials in the first place.
2.4. Pairwise Keys
Certain signature schemes, such as EdDSA and ECDSA, support a secure
combined signature and encryption scheme. This section specifies the
derivation of "pairwise keys", for use in the pairwise mode defined
in Section 9.
Group OSCORE keys used for both signature and encryption MUST be used
only for purposes related to Group OSCORE. These include the
processing of messages with Group OSCORE, as well as performing
proof-of-possession of private keys, e.g., upon joining a group
through the Group Manager (see Section 3).
2.4.1. Derivation of Pairwise Keys
Using the Group OSCORE Security Context (see Section 2), a group
member can derive AEAD keys, to protect point-to-point communication
between itself and any other endpoint X in the group by means of the
AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1). The key
derivation of these so-called pairwise keys follows the same
construction as in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613]:
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Pairwise Sender Key = HKDF(Sender Key, IKM-Sender, info, L)
Pairwise Recipient Key = HKDF(Recipient Key, IKM-Recipient, info, L)
with
IKM-Sender = Sender Auth Cred | Recipient Auth Cred | Shared Secret
IKM-Recipient = Recipient Auth Cred | Sender Auth Cred | Shared Secret
where:
* The Pairwise Sender Key is the AEAD key for processing outgoing
messages addressed to endpoint X.
* The Pairwise Recipient Key is the AEAD key for processing incoming
messages from endpoint X.
* HKDF is the OSCORE HKDF algorithm [RFC8613] from the Common
Context.
* The Sender Key from the Sender Context is used as salt in the
HKDF, when deriving the Pairwise Sender Key.
* The Recipient Key from the Recipient Context associated with
endpoint X is used as salt in the HKDF, when deriving the Pairwise
Recipient Key.
* Sender Auth Cred is the endpoint's own authentication credential
from the Sender Context.
* Recipient Auth Cred is the endpoint X's authentication credential
from the Recipient Context associated with the endpoint X.
* The Shared Secret is computed as a cofactor Diffie-Hellman shared
secret, see Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A], using the Pairwise
Key Agreement Algorithm. The endpoint uses its private key from
the Sender Context and the other endpoint's public key included in
Recipient Auth Cred. Note the requirement of validation of public
keys in Section 12.15. For X25519 and X448, the procedure is
described in Section 5 of [RFC7748] using public keys mapped to
Montgomery coordinates, see Section 2.4.2.
* IKM-Sender is the Input Keying Material (IKM) used in the HKDF for
the derivation of the Pairwise Sender Key. IKM-Sender is the byte
string concatenation of Sender Auth Cred, Recipient Auth Cred and
the Shared Secret. The authentication credentials Sender Auth
Cred and Recipient Auth Cred are binary encoded as defined in
Section 2.3.
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* IKM-Recipient is the Input Keying Material (IKM) used in the HKDF
for the derivation of the Pairwise Recipient Key. IKM-Recipient is
the byte string concatenation of Recipient Auth Cred, Sender Auth
Cred and the Shared Secret. The authentication credentials
Recipient Auth Cred and Sender Auth Cred are binary encoded as
defined in Section 2.3.
* info and L are as defined in Section 3.2.1 of [RFC8613]. That is:
- The 'alg_aead' element of the 'info' array takes the value of
AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1).
- L and the 'L' element of the 'info' array are the size of the
key for the AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context (see
Section 2.1.1), in bytes.
If EdDSA asymmetric keys are used, the Edward coordinates are mapped
to Montgomery coordinates using the maps defined in Sections 4.1 and
4.2 of [RFC7748], before using the X25519 and X448 functions defined
in Section 5 of [RFC7748]. For further details, see Section 2.4.2.
ECC asymmetric keys in Montgomery or Weirstrass form are used
directly in the key agreement algorithm without coordinate mapping.
After establishing a partially or completely new Security Context
(see Section 2.5 and Section 3.2), the old pairwise keys MUST be
deleted. Since new Sender/Recipient Keys are derived from the new
group keying material (see Section 2.2), every group member MUST use
the new Sender/Recipient Keys when deriving new pairwise keys.
As long as any two group members preserve the same asymmetric keys,
their Diffie-Hellman shared secret does not change across updates of
the group keying material.
2.4.2. ECDH with Montgomery Coordinates
2.4.2.1. Curve25519
The y-coordinate of the other endpoint's Ed25519 public key is
decoded as specified in Section 5.1.3 of [RFC8032]. The Curve25519
u-coordinate is recovered as u = (1 + y) / (1 - y) (mod p) following
the map in Section 4.1 of [RFC7748]. Note that the mapping is not
defined for y = 1, and that y = -1 maps to u = 0 which corresponds to
the neutral group element and thus will result in a degenerate shared
secret. Therefore implementations MUST abort if the y-coordinate of
the other endpoint's Ed25519 public key is 1 or -1 (mod p).
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The private signing key byte strings (= the lower 32 bytes used for
generating the public key, see step 1 of Section 5.1.5 of [RFC8032])
are decoded the same way for signing in Ed25519 and scalar
multiplication in X25519. Hence, to compute the shared secret the
endpoint applies the X25519 function to the Ed25519 private signing
key byte string and the encoded u-coordinate byte string as specified
in Section 5 of [RFC7748].
2.4.2.2. Curve448
The y-coordinate of the other endpoint's Ed448 public key is decoded
as specified in Section 5.2.3. of [RFC8032]. The Curve448
u-coordinate is recovered as u = y^2 * (d * y^2 - 1) / (y^2 - 1) (mod
p) following the map from "edwards448" in Section 4.2 of [RFC7748],
and also using the relation x^2 = (y^2 - 1)/(d * y^2 - 1) from the
curve equation. Note that the mapping is not defined for y = 1 or
-1. Therefore implementations MUST abort if the y-coordinate of the
peer endpoint's Ed448 public key is 1 or -1 (mod p).
The private signing key byte strings (= the lower 57 bytes used for
generating the public key, see step 1 of Section 5.2.5 of [RFC8032])
are decoded the same way for signing in Ed448 and scalar
multiplication in X448. Hence, to compute the shared secret the
endpoint applies the X448 function to the Ed448 private signing key
byte string and the encoded u-coordinate byte string as specified in
Section 5 of [RFC7748].
2.4.3. Usage of Sequence Numbers
When using any of its Pairwise Sender Keys, a sender endpoint
including the 'Partial IV' parameter in the protected message MUST
use the current fresh value of the Sender Sequence Number from its
Sender Context (see Section 2.2). That is, the same Sender Sequence
Number space is used for all outgoing messages protected with Group
OSCORE, thus limiting both storage and complexity.
On the other hand, when combining group and pairwise communication
modes, this may result in the Partial IV values moving forward more
often. This can happen when a client engages in frequent or long
sequences of one-to-one exchanges with servers in the group, by
sending requests over unicast. In turn, this contributes to a sooner
exhaustion of the Sender Sequence Number space of the client, which
would then require to take actions for deriving a new Sender Context
before resuming communications in the group (see Section 2.5.2).
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2.4.4. Security Context for Pairwise Mode
If the pairwise mode is supported, the Security Context additionally
includes Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm and the pairwise keys, as
described at the beginning of Section 2.
The pairwise keys as well as the shared secrets used in their
derivation (see Section 2.4.1) may be stored in memory or recomputed
every time they are needed. The shared secret changes only when a
public/private key pair used for its derivation changes, which
results in the pairwise keys also changing. Additionally, the
pairwise keys change if the Sender ID changes or if a new Security
Context is established for the group (see Section 2.5.3). In order
to optimize protocol performance, an endpoint may store the derived
pairwise keys for easy retrieval.
In the pairwise mode, the Sender Context includes the Pairwise Sender
Keys to use with the other endpoints (see Figure 1). In order to
identify the right key to use, the Pairwise Sender Key for endpoint X
may be associated with the Recipient ID of endpoint X, as defined in
the Recipient Context (i.e., the Sender ID from the point of view of
endpoint X). In this way, the Recipient ID can be used to lookup for
the right Pairwise Sender Key. This association may be implemented in
different ways, e.g., by storing the pair (Recipient ID, Pairwise
Sender Key) or linking a Pairwise Sender Key to a Recipient Context.
2.5. Update of Security Context
It is RECOMMENDED that the immutable part of the Security Context is
stored in non-volatile memory, or that it can otherwise be reliably
accessed throughout the operation of the group, e.g., after a device
reboots. However, also immutable parts of the Security Context may
need to be updated, for example due to scheduled key renewal, new or
re-joining members in the group, or the fact that the endpoint
changes Sender ID (see Section 2.5.3).
On the other hand, the mutable parts of the Security Context are
updated by the endpoint when executing the security protocol, but may
nevertheless become outdated, e.g., due to loss of the mutable
Security Context (see Section 2.5.1) or exhaustion of Sender Sequence
Numbers (see Section 2.5.2).
If it is not feasible or practically possible to store and maintain
up-to-date the mutable part in non-volatile memory (e.g., due to
limited number of write operations), the endpoint MUST be able to
detect a loss of the mutable Security Context and MUST accordingly
take the actions defined in Section 2.5.1.
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2.5.1. Loss of Mutable Security Context
An endpoint may lose its mutable Security Context, e.g., due to a
reboot (see Section 2.5.1.1) or to an overflow of Recipient Contexts
(see Section 2.5.1.2).
In such a case, the endpoint needs to prevent the re-use of a nonce
with the same AEAD key, and to handle incoming replayed messages.
2.5.1.1. Reboot and Total Loss
In case a loss of the Sender Context and/or of the Recipient Contexts
is detected (e.g., following a reboot), the endpoint MUST NOT protect
further messages using this Security Context to avoid reusing an AEAD
nonce with the same AEAD key.
In particular, before resuming its operations in the group, the
endpoint MUST retrieve new Security Context parameters from the Group
Manager (see Section 2.5.3) and use them to derive a new Sender
Context (see Section 2.2). Since this includes a newly derived
Sender Key, a server will not reuse the same pair (key, nonce), even
when using the Partial IV of (old re-injected) requests to build the
AEAD nonce for protecting the corresponding responses.
From then on, the endpoint MUST use the latest installed Sender
Context to protect outgoing messages. Also, newly created Recipient
Contexts will have a Replay Window which is initialized as valid.
If not able to establish an updated Sender Context, e.g., because of
lack of connectivity with the Group Manager, the endpoint MUST NOT
protect further messages using the current Security Context and MUST
NOT accept incoming messages from other group members, as currently
unable to detect possible replays.
An adversary may leverage the above to perform a Denial of Service
attack and prevent some group members from communicating altogether.
That is, the adversary can first block the communication path between
the Group Manager and some individual group members. This can be
achieved, for instance, by injecting fake responses to DNS queries
for the Group Manager hostname, or by removing a network link used
for routing traffic towards the Group Manager. Then, the adversary
can induce a reboot for some endpoints in the group, e.g., by
triggering a short power outage. After that, such endpoints that
have lost their Sender Context and/or Recipient Contexts following
the reboot would not be able to obtain new Security Context
parameters from the Group Manager, as specified above. Thus, they
would not be able to further communicate in the group until
connectivity with the Group Manager is restored.
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2.5.1.2. Overflow of Recipient Contexts
After reaching the maximum amount of Recipient Contexts, an endpoint
will experience an overflow when installing a new Recipient Context,
as it requires to first delete an existing one (see Section 2.2).
Every time this happens, the Replay Window of the new Recipient
Context is initialized as not valid. Therefore, the endpoint MUST
take the following actions, before accepting request messages from
the client associated with the new Recipient Context.
If it is not configured as silent server, the endpoint MUST either:
* Retrieve new Security Context parameters from the Group Manager
and derive a new Sender Context, as defined in Section 2.5.1.1; or
* When receiving a first request to process with the new Recipient
Context, use the approach specified in Section 10 and based on the
Echo Option for CoAP [RFC9175], if supported. In particular, the
endpoint MUST use its Partial IV when generating the AEAD nonce
and MUST include the Partial IV in the response message conveying
the Echo Option. If the endpoint supports the CoAP Echo Option,
it is RECOMMENDED to take this approach.
If it is configured exclusively as silent server, the endpoint MUST
wait for the next group rekeying to occur, in order to derive a new
Security Context and re-initialize the Replay Window of each
Recipient Contexts as valid.
2.5.2. Exhaustion of Sender Sequence Number
An endpoint can eventually exhaust the Sender Sequence Number, which
is incremented for each new outgoing message including a Partial IV.
This is the case for group requests, Observe notifications [RFC7641]
and, optionally, any other response.
Implementations MUST be able to detect an exhaustion of Sender
Sequence Number, after the endpoint has consumed the largest usable
value. If an implementation's integers support wrapping addition,
the implementation MUST treat Sender Sequence Number as exhausted
when a wrap-around is detected.
Upon exhausting the Sender Sequence Numbers, the endpoint MUST NOT
use this Security Context to protect further messages including a
Partial IV.
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The endpoint SHOULD inform the Group Manager, retrieve new Security
Context parameters from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3), and
use them to derive a new Sender Context (see Section 2.2).
From then on, the endpoint MUST use its latest installed Sender
Context to protect outgoing messages.
2.5.3. Retrieving New Security Context Parameters
The Group Manager can assist an endpoint with an incomplete Sender
Context to retrieve missing data of the Security Context and thereby
become fully operational in the group again. The two main options
for the Group Manager are described in this section: i) assignment of
a new Sender ID to the endpoint (see Section 2.5.3.1); and ii)
establishment of a new Security Context for the group (see
Section 2.5.3.2). The update of the Replay Window in each of the
Recipient Contexts is discussed in Section 6.2.
As group membership changes, or as group members get new Sender IDs
(see Section 2.5.3.1) so do the relevant Recipient IDs that the other
endpoints need to keep track of. As a consequence, group members may
end up retaining stale Recipient Contexts, that are no longer useful
to verify incoming secure messages.
The Recipient ID ('kid') SHOULD NOT be considered as a persistent and
reliable identifier of a group member. Such an indication can be
achieved only by using that member's public key, when verifying
countersignatures of received messages (in group mode), or when
verifying messages integrity-protected with pairwise keying material
derived from authentication credentials and associated asymmetric
keys (in pairwise mode).
Furthermore, applications MAY define policies to: i) delete
(long-)unused Recipient Contexts and reduce the impact on storage
space; as well as ii) check with the Group Manager that an
authentication credential with the public key included therein is
currently the one associated with a 'kid' value, after a number of
consecutive failed verifications.
2.5.3.1. New Sender ID for the Endpoint
The Group Manager may assign a new Sender ID to an endpoint, while
leaving the Gid, Master Secret and Master Salt unchanged in the
group. In this case, the Group Manager MUST assign a Sender ID that
has not been used in the group since the latest time when the current
Gid value was assigned to the group (see Section 3.2).
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Having retrieved the new Sender ID, and potentially other missing
data of the immutable Security Context, the endpoint can derive a new
Sender Context (see Section 2.2). When doing so, the endpoint resets
the Sender Sequence Number in its Sender Context to 0, and derives a
new Sender Key. This is in turn used to possibly derive new Pairwise
Sender Keys.
From then on, the endpoint MUST use its latest installed Sender
Context to protect outgoing messages.
The assignment of a new Sender ID may be the result of different
processes. The endpoint may request a new Sender ID, e.g., because
of exhaustion of Sender Sequence Numbers (see Section 2.5.2). An
endpoint may request to re-join the group, e.g., because of losing
its mutable Security Context (see Section 2.5.1), and is provided
with a new Sender ID together with the latest immutable Security
Context.
For the other group members, the Recipient Context corresponding to
the old Sender ID becomes stale (see Section 3.2).
2.5.3.2. New Security Context for the Group
The Group Manager may establish a new Security Context for the group
(see Section 3.2). The Group Manager does not necessarily establish
a new Security Context for the group if one member has an outdated
Security Context (see Section 2.5.3.1), unless that was already
planned or required for other reasons.
All the group members need to acquire new Security Context parameters
from the Group Manager. Once having acquired new Security Context
parameters, each group member performs the following actions.
* From then on, it MUST NOT use the current Security Context to
start processing new messages for the considered group.
* It completes any ongoing message processing for the considered
group.
* It derives and install a new Security Context. In particular:
- It re-derives the keying material stored in its Sender Context
and Recipient Contexts (see Section 2.2). The Master Salt used
for the re-derivations is the updated Master Salt parameter if
provided by the Group Manager, or the empty byte string
otherwise.
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- It resets its Sender Sequence Number in its Sender Context to
0.
- It re-initializes the Replay Window of each Recipient Context.
- For each ongoing observation where it is an observer client and
that it wants to keep active, it resets to 0 the Notification
Number of each associated server (see Section 6.1).
From then on, it can resume processing new messages for the
considered group. In particular:
* It MUST use its latest installed Sender Context to protect
outgoing messages.
* It SHOULD use its latest installed Recipient Contexts to process
incoming messages, unless application policies admit to
temporarily retain and use the old, recent, Security Context (see
Section 12.5.1).
The distribution of a new Gid and Master Secret may result in
temporarily misaligned Security Contexts among group members. In
particular, this may result in a group member not being able to
process messages received right after a new Gid and Master Secret
have been distributed. A discussion on practical consequences and
possible ways to address them, as well as on how to handle the old
Security Context, is provided in Section 12.5.
3. The Group Manager
As with OSCORE, endpoints communicating with Group OSCORE need to
establish the relevant Security Context. Group OSCORE endpoints need
to acquire OSCORE input parameters, information about the group(s)
and about other endpoints in the group(s). This document is based on
the existence of an entity called Group Manager and responsible for
the group, but it does not mandate how the Group Manager interacts
with the group members. The list of responsibilities of the Group
Manager is compiled in Section 3.3.
A possible Group Manager to use is specified in
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], where the join process is based
on the ACE framework for authentication and authorization in
constrained environments [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
The Group Manager assigns an integer Key Generation Number to each of
its groups, identifying the current version of the keying material
used in that group. The first Key Generation Number assigned to
every group MUST be 0. Separately for each group, the value of the
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Key Generation Number increases strictly monotonically, each time the
Group Manager distributes new keying material to that group (see
Section 3.2). That is, if the current Key Generation Number for a
group is X, then X+1 will denote the keying material distributed and
used in that group immediately after the current one.
The Group Manager assigns unique Group Identifiers (Gids) to the
groups under its control. Also, for each group, the Group Manager
assigns unique Sender IDs (and thus Recipient IDs) to the respective
group members. According to a hierarchical approach, the Gid value
assigned to a group is associated with a dedicated space for the
values of Sender ID and Recipient ID of the members of that group.
When an endpoint (re-)joins a group, it is provided also with the
current Gid to use in the group.
The Group Manager maintains records of the authentication credentials
of endpoints in a group, and provides information about the group and
its members to other group members and to external entities with
selected roles (see Section 3.1). Upon endpoints' joining, the Group
Manager collects such authentication credentials and MUST verify
proof-of-possession of the respective private key.
An endpoint acquires group data such as the Gid and OSCORE input
parameters including its own Sender ID from the Group Manager, and
provides information about its authentication credential to the Group
Manager, for example upon joining the group.
Furthermore, when joining the group or later on as a group member, an
endpoint can retrieve from the Group Manager the authentication
credential of the Group Manager as well as the authentication
credential and other information associated with other members of the
group, with which it can derive the corresponding Recipient Context.
Together with the requested authentication credentials, the Group
Manager MUST provide the Sender ID of the associated group members
and the current Key Generation Number in the group. An application
can configure a group member to asynchronously retrieve information
about Recipient Contexts, e.g., by Observing [RFC7641] a resource at
the Group Manager to get updates on the group membership.
3.1. Support for Additional Entities
The Group Manager MAY serve additional entities acting as signature
checkers, e.g., intermediary gateways. These entities do not join a
group as members, but can retrieve authentication credentials of
group members and other selected group data from the Group Manager,
in order to solely verify countersignatures of messages protected in
group mode (see Section 8.5).
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In order to verify countersignatures of messages in a group, a
signature checker needs to retrieve the following information about
that group from the Group Manager.
* The current ID Context (Gid) used in the group.
* The authentication credentials of the group members and the
authentication credential of the Group Manager.
If the signature checker is provided with a CWT for a given
entity, then the authentication credential associated with that
entity that the signature checker stores and uses is the untagged
CWT.
If the signature checker is provided with a chain or a bag of
X.509 / C509 certificates or of CWTs for a given entity, then the
authentication credential associated with that entity that the
signature checker stores and uses is just the end-entity
certificate or end-entity untagged CWT.
* The current Group Encryption Key (see Section 2.1.6).
* The identifiers of the algorithms used in the group (see
Section 2), i.e.: i) Signature Encryption Algorithm and Signature
Algorithm; and ii) AEAD Algorithm and Pairwise Key Agreement
Algorithm, if the group uses also the pairwise mode.
A signature checker MUST be authorized before it can retrieve such
information. To this end, the same method mentioned above based on
the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] can be used.
3.2. Management of Group Keying Material
In order to establish a new Security Context for a group, the Group
Manager MUST generate and assign to the group a new Group Identifier
(Gid) and a new value for the Master Secret parameter. When doing
so, a new value for the Master Salt parameter MAY also be generated
and assigned to the group. When establishing the new Security
Context, the Group Manager should preserve the current value of the
Sender ID of each group member.
The specific group key management scheme used to distribute new
keying material is out of the scope of this document. A simple group
key management scheme is defined in
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]. When possible, the delivery of
rekeying messages should use a reliable transport, in order to reduce
chances of group members missing a rekeying instance.
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The set of group members should not be assumed as fixed, i.e., the
group membership is subject to changes, possibly on a frequent basis.
The Group Manager MUST rekey the group when one or more endpoints
leave the group. An endpoint may leave the group at own initiative,
or may be evicted from the group by the Group Manager, e.g., in case
an endpoint is compromised, or is suspected to be compromised. In
either case, rekeying the group excludes such endpoints from future
communications in the group, and thus preserves forward security. If
a network node is compromised or suspected to be compromised, the
Group Manager MUST evict from the group all the endpoints hosted by
that node that are member of the group and rekey the group
accordingly.
If required by the application, the Group Manager MUST rekey the
group also before one or more new joining endpoints are added to the
group, thus preserving backward security.
The establishment of the new Security Context for the group takes the
following steps.
1. The Group Manager MUST increment the Key Generation Number for
the group by 1.
2. The Group Manager MUST build a set of stale Sender IDs including:
* The Sender IDs that, during the current Gid, were both
assigned to an endpoint and subsequently relinquished (see
Section 2.5.3.1).
* The current Sender IDs of the group members that the upcoming
group rekeying aims to exclude from future group
communications, if any.
3. The Group Manager rekeys the group, by distributing:
* The new keying material, i.e., the new Master Secret, the new
Gid and (optionally) the new Master Salt.
* The new Key Generation Number from step 1.
* The set of stale Sender IDs from step 2.
Further information may be distributed, depending on the specific
group key management scheme used in the group.
When receiving the new group keying materal, a group member considers
the received stale Sender IDs and performs the following actions.
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* The group member MUST remove every authentication credential
associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of group members'
authentication credentials used in the group.
* The group member MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used
in the group whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender
ID.
After that, the group member installs the new keying material and
derives the corresponding new Security Context.
A group member might miss one group rekeying or more consecutive
instances. As a result, the group member will retain old group
keying material with Key Generation Number GEN_OLD. Eventually, the
group member can notice the discrepancy, e.g., by repeatedly failing
to verify incoming messages, or by explicitly querying the Group
Manager for the current Key Generation Number. Once the group member
gains knowledge of having missed a group rekeying, it MUST delete the
old keying material it stores.
Then, the group member proceeds according to the following steps.
1. The group member retrieves from the Group Manager the current
group keying material, together with the current Key Generation
Number GEN_NEW. The group member MUST NOT install the obtained
group keying material yet.
2. The group member asks the Group Manager for the set of stale
Sender IDs.
3. If no exact indication can be obtained from the Group Manager,
the group member MUST remove all the authentication credentials
from its list of group members' authentication credentials used
in the group and MUST delete all its Recipient Contexts used in
the group.
Otherwise, the group member MUST remove every authentication
credential associated with a stale Sender ID from its list of
group members' authentication credentials used in the group, and
MUST delete each of its Recipient Contexts used in the group
whose corresponding Recipient ID is a stale Sender ID.
4. The group member installs the current group keying material, and
derives the corresponding new Security Context.
Alternatively, the group member can re-join the group. In such a
case, the group member MUST take one of the following two actions.
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* The group member performs steps 2 and 3 above. Then, the group
member re-joins the group.
* The group member re-joins the group with the same roles it
currently has in the group, and, during the re-joining process, it
asks the Group Manager for the authentication credentials of all
the current group members.
Then, given Z the set of authentication credentials received from
the Group Manager, the group member removes every authentication
credential which is not in Z from its list of group members'
authentication credentials used in the group, and deletes each of
its Recipient Contexts used in the group that does not include any
of the authentication credentials in Z.
By removing authentication credentials and deleting Recipient
Contexts associated with stale Sender IDs, it is ensured that a
recipient endpoint storing the latest group keying material does not
store the authentication credentials of sender endpoints that are not
current group members. This in turn allows group members to rely on
stored authentication credentials to confidently assert the group
membership of sender endpoints, when receiving incoming messages
protected in group mode (see Section 8).
3.2.1. Recycling of Identifiers
This section specifies how the Group Manager handles and possibly
reassigns Gid values and Sender ID values in a group.
3.2.1.1. Recycling of Group Identifiers
Since the Gid value changes every time a group is rekeyed, it can
happen that, after several rekeying instances, the whole space of Gid
values has been used for the group in question. When this happens,
the Group Manager has no available Gid values to use that have never
been assigned to the group during the group's lifetime.
The occurrence of such an event and how long it would take to occur
depend on the format and encoding of Gid values used in the group
(see, e.g., Appendix C), as well as on the frequency of rekeying
instances yielding a change of Gid value. Independently for each
group under its control, the Group Manager can take one of the two
following approaches.
* The Group Manager does not reassign Gid values. That is, once the
whole space of Gid values has been used for a group, the Group
Manager terminates the group and may re-establish a new group.
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* While the Gid value changes every time a group is rekeyed, the
Group Manager can reassign Gid values previously used during a
group's lifetime. By doing so, the group can continue to exist
even once the whole space of Gid values has been used.
The Group Manager MAY support and use this approach. In such a
case, the Group Manager MUST take additional actions when handling
Gid values and rekeying the group, as specified below.
When a node (re-)joins the group and it is provided with the
current Gid to use in the group, the Group Manager considers such
a Gid as the Birth Gid of that endpoint for that group. For each
group member, the Group Manager MUST store the latest
corresponding Birth Gid until that member leaves the group. In
case the endpoint has in fact re-joined the group, the newly
determined Birth Gid overwrites the one currently stored.
When establishing a new Security Context for the group, the Group
Manager takes the additional following step between steps 1 and 2
of Section 3.2.
A. The Group Manager MUST check if the new Gid to be distributed
is equal to the Birth Gid of any of the current group members. If
any of such "elder members" is found in the group, then:
- The Group Manager MUST evict the elder members from the group.
That is, the Group Manager MUST terminate their membership and
MUST rekey the group in such a way that the new keying material
is not provided to those evicted elder members.
This ensures that an Observe notification [RFC7641] can never
successfully match against the Observe requests of two
different observations. In fact, the excluded elder members
would eventually re-join the group, thus terminating any of
their ongoing (long-lasting) observations (see Section 6.1).
Therefore, it is ensured by construction that no observer
client can have two different ongoing observations such that
the two respective Observe requests were protected using the
same Partial IV, Gid and Sender ID.
- Until a further following group rekeying, the Group Manager
MUST store the list of those latest-evicted elder members. If
any of those endpoints re-joins the group before a further
following group rekeying occurs, the Group Manager MUST NOT
rekey the group upon their re-joining. When one of those
endpoints re-joins the group, the Group Manager can rely, e.g.,
on the ongoing secure communication association to recognize
the endpoint as included in the stored list.
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3.2.1.2. Recycling of Sender IDs
From the moment when a Gid is assigned to a group until the moment a
new Gid is assigned to that same group, the Group Manager MUST NOT
reassign a Sender ID within the group. This prevents to reuse a
Sender ID ('kid') with the same Gid, Master Secret and Master Salt.
Within this restriction, the Group Manager can assign a Sender ID
used under an old Gid value (including under a same, recycled Gid
value), thus avoiding Sender ID values to irrecoverably grow in size.
Even when an endpoint joining a group is recognized as a current
member of that group, e.g., through the ongoing secure communication
association, the Group Manager MUST assign a new Sender ID different
than the one currently used by the endpoint in the group, unless the
group is rekeyed first and a new Gid value is established.
3.2.1.3. Relation between Identifiers and Keying Material
Figure 2 overviews the different identifiers and keying material
components, considering their relation and possible reuse across
group rekeying.
Components changed in lockstep
upon a group rekeying
+----------------------------+ * Changing a kid does not
| | need changing the Group ID
| Master Group |<--> kid1
| Secret <---> o <---> ID | * A kid is not reassigned
| ^ |<--> kid2 under the ongoing usage of
| | | the current Group ID
| | |<--> kid3
| v | * Upon changing the Group ID,
| Master Salt | ... ... every current kid should
| (optional) | be preserved for efficient
| | key rollover
| The Key Generation Number |
| is incremented by 1 | * After changing Group ID, an
| | unused kid can be assigned,
+----------------------------+ even if it was used before
the Group ID change
Figure 2: Relations among keying material components.
3.3. Responsibilities of the Group Manager
The Group Manager is responsible for performing the following tasks:
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1. Creating and managing OSCORE groups. This includes the
assignment of a Gid to every newly created group, ensuring
uniqueness of Gids within the set of its OSCORE groups and,
optionally, the secure recycling of Gids.
2. Defining policies for authorizing the joining of its OSCORE
groups.
3. Handling the join process to add new endpoints as group members.
4. Establishing the Common Context part of the Security Context,
and providing it to authorized group members during the join
process, together with the corresponding Sender Context.
5. Updating the Key Generation Number and the Gid of its OSCORE
groups, upon renewing the respective Security Context.
6. Generating and managing Sender IDs within its OSCORE groups, as
well as assigning and providing them to new endpoints during the
join process, or to current group members upon request of
renewal or re-joining. This includes ensuring that:
* Each Sender ID is unique within each of the OSCORE groups;
* Each Sender ID is not reassigned within the same group since
the latest time when the current Gid value was assigned to
the group. That is, the Sender ID is not reassigned even to
a current group member re-joining the same group, without a
rekeying happening first.
7. Defining communication policies for each of its OSCORE groups,
and signaling them to new endpoints during the join process.
8. Renewing the Security Context of an OSCORE group upon membership
change, by revoking and renewing common security parameters and
keying material (rekeying).
9. Providing the management keying material that a new endpoint
requires to participate in the rekeying process, consistently
with the key management scheme used in the group joined by the
new endpoint.
10. Assisting a group member that has missed a group rekeying
instance to understand which authentication credentials and
Recipient Contexts to delete, as associated with former group
members.
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11. Acting as key repository, in order to handle the authentication
credentials of the members of its OSCORE groups, and providing
such authentication credentials to other members of the same
group upon request. The actual storage of authentication
credentials may be entrusted to a separate secure storage device
or service.
12. Validating that the format and parameters of authentication
credentials of group members are consistent with the public key
algorithm and related parameters used in the respective OSCORE
group.
The Group Manager specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]
provides these functionalities.
4. The COSE Object
Building on Section 5 of [RFC8613], this section defines how to use
COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct] to wrap and protect data in
the original message. OSCORE uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0
structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
(AEAD) algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, the following
modifications apply for both the group mode and the pairwise mode of
Group OSCORE.
4.1. Countersignature
When protecting a message in group mode, the 'unprotected' field MUST
additionally include the following parameter:
* COSE_CounterSignature0: its value is set to the encrypted
countersignature of the COSE object, namely ENC_SIGNATURE. That
is:
- The countersignature of the COSE object, namely SIGNATURE, is
computed by the sender as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-countersign], by using its private key and
according to the Signature Algorithm in the Security Context.
In particular, the Countersign_structure contains the context
text string "CounterSignature0", the external_aad as defined in
Section 4.3 of this document, and the ciphertext of the COSE
object as payload.
- The encrypted countersignature, namely ENC_SIGNATURE, is
computed as
ENC_SIGNATURE = SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
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where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.
4.1.1. Keystream Derivation
The following defines how an endpoint derives the keystream
KEYSTREAM, used to encrypt/decrypt the countersignature of an
outgoing/incoming message M protected in group mode.
The keystream SHALL be derived as follows, by using the HKDF
Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 3.2 of [RFC8613]),
which consists of composing the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand steps
[RFC5869].
KEYSTREAM = HKDF(salt, IKM, info, L)
The input parameters of HKDF are as follows.
* salt takes as value the Partial IV (PIV) used to protect M. Note
that, if M is a response, salt takes as value either: i) the fresh
Partial IV generated by the server and included in the response;
or ii) the same Partial IV of the request generated by the client
and not included in the response.
* IKM is the Group Encryption Key from the Common Context (see
Section 2.1.6).
* info is the serialization of a CBOR array consisting of (the
notation follows [RFC8610]):
info = [
id : bstr,
id_context : bstr,
type : bool,
L: uint
]
where:
* id is the Sender ID of the endpoint that generated PIV.
* id_context is the ID Context (Gid) used when protecting M.
Note that, in case of group rekeying, a server might use a
different Gid when protecting a response, compared to the Gid that
it used to verify (that the client used to protect) the request,
see Section 8.3.
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* type is the CBOR simple value "true" (0xf5) if M is a request, or
the CBOR simple value "false" (0xf4) otherwise.
* L is the size of the countersignature, as per Signature Algorithm
from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5), in bytes.
4.1.2. Clarifications on Using a Countersignature
Note that the literature commonly refers to a countersignature as a
signature computed by an entity A over a document already protected
by a different entity B.
However, the COSE_Countersignature0 structure belongs to the set of
abbreviated countersignatures defined in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-countersign], which were designed primarily to deal
with the problem of encrypted group messaging, but where it is
required to know who originated the message.
Since the parameters for computing or verifying the abbreviated
countersignature generated by A are provided by the same context used
to describe the security processing performed by B and to be
countersigned, these structures are applicable also when the two
entities A and B are actually the same one, like the sender of a
Group OSCORE message protected in group mode.
4.2. The 'kid' and 'kid context' parameters
The value of the 'kid' parameter in the 'unprotected' field of
response messages MUST be set to the Sender ID of the endpoint
transmitting the message, if the request was protected in group mode.
That is, unlike in [RFC8613], the 'kid' parameter is always present
in responses to a request that was protected in group mode.
The value of the 'kid context' parameter in the 'unprotected' field
of requests messages MUST be set to the ID Context, i.e., the Group
Identifier value (Gid) of the group. That is, unlike in [RFC8613],
the 'kid context' parameter is always present in requests.
4.3. external_aad
The external_aad of the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) is
different compared to OSCORE [RFC8613], and is defined in this
section.
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The same external_aad structure is used in group mode and pairwise
mode for authenticated encryption/decryption (see Section 5.3 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]), as well as in group mode for
computing and verifying the countersignature (see Section 4.4 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]).
In particular, the external_aad includes also the Signature
Algorithm, the Signature Encryption Algorithm, the Pairwise Key
Agreement Algorithm, the value of the 'kid context' in the COSE
object of the request, the OSCORE option of the protected message,
the sender's authentication credential, and the Group Manager's
authentication credential.
The external_aad SHALL be a CBOR array wrapped in a bstr object as
defined below, following the notation of [RFC8610]:
external_aad = bstr .cbor aad_array
aad_array = [
oscore_version : uint,
algorithms : [alg_aead : int / tstr / null,
alg_signature_enc : int / tstr / null,
alg_signature : int / tstr / null,
alg_pairwise_key_agreement : int / tstr / null],
request_kid : bstr,
request_piv : bstr,
options : bstr,
request_kid_context : bstr,
OSCORE_option: bstr,
sender_cred: bstr,
gm_cred: bstr / null
]
Figure 3: external_aad
Compared with Section 5.4 of [RFC8613], the aad_array has the
following differences.
* The 'algorithms' array is extended as follows.
The parameter 'alg_aead' MUST be set to the CBOR simple value
"null" (0xf6) if the group does not use the pairwise mode,
regardless whether the endpoint supports the pairwise mode or not.
Otherwise, this parameter MUST encode the value of AEAD Algorithm
from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.1), as per Section 5.4 of
[RFC8613].
Furthermore, the 'algorithms' array additionally includes:
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- 'alg_signature_enc', which specifies Signature Encryption
Algorithm from the Common Context (see Section 2.1.5). This
parameter MUST be set to the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) if
the group does not use the group mode, regardless whether the
endpoint supports the group mode or not. Otherwise, this
parameter MUST encode the value of Signature Encryption
Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text string, consistently with
the "Value" field in the "COSE Algorithms" Registry for this
AEAD algorithm.
- 'alg_signature', which specifies Signature Algorithm from the
Common Context (see Section 2.1.5). This parameter MUST be set
to the CBOR simple value "null" (0xf6) if the group does not
use the group mode, regardless whether the endpoint supports
the group mode or not. Otherwise, this parameter MUST encode
the value of Signature Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text
string, consistently with the "Value" field in the "COSE
Algorithms" Registry for this signature algorithm.
- 'alg_pairwise_key_agreement', which specifies Pairwise Key
Agreement Algorithm from the Common Context (see
Section 2.1.5). This parameter MUST be set to the CBOR simple
value "null" (0xf6) if the group does not use the pairwise
mode, regardless whether the endpoint supports the pairwise
mode or not. Otherwise, this parameter MUST encode the value
of Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm as a CBOR integer or text
string, consistently with the "Value" field in the "COSE
Algorithms" Registry for this HKDF algorithm.
* The new element 'request_kid_context' contains the value of the
'kid context' in the COSE object of the request (see Section 4.2).
In case Observe [RFC7641] is used, this enables endpoints to
safely keep an observation active beyond a possible change of Gid
(i.e., of ID Context), following a group rekeying (see
Section 3.2). In fact, it ensures that every notification
cryptographically matches with only one observation request,
rather than with multiple ones that were protected with different
keying material but share the same 'request_kid' and 'request_piv'
values.
* The new element 'OSCORE_option', containing the value of the
OSCORE Option present in the protected message, encoded as a
binary string. This prevents the attack described in Section 12.7
when using the group mode, as further explained in Section 12.7.2.
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Note for implementation: this construction requires the OSCORE
option of the message to be generated and finalized before
computing the ciphertext of the COSE_Encrypt0 object (when using
the group mode or the pairwise mode) and before calculating the
countersignature (when using the group mode). Also, the aad_array
needs to be large enough to contain the largest possible OSCORE
option.
* The new element 'sender_cred', containing the sender's
authentication credential. This parameter MUST be set to a CBOR
byte string, which encodes the sender's authentication credential
in its original binary representation made available to other
endpoints in the group (see Section 2.3).
* The new element 'gm_cred', containing the Group Manager's
authentication credential. If no Group Manager maintains the
group, this parameter MUST encode the CBOR simple value "null"
(0xf6). Otherwise, this parameter MUST be set to a CBOR byte
string, which encodes the Group Manager's authentication
credential in its original binary representation made available to
other endpoints in the group (see Section 2.3). This prevents the
attack described in Section 12.8.
5. OSCORE Header Compression
The OSCORE header compression defined in Section 6 of [RFC8613] is
used, with the following differences.
* The payload of the OSCORE message SHALL encode the ciphertext of
the COSE_Encrypt0 object. In the group mode, the ciphertext above
is concatenated with the value of the COSE_CounterSignature0 of
the COSE object, computed as described in Section 4.1.
* This document defines the usage of the sixth least significant
bit, called "Group Flag", in the first byte of the OSCORE option
containing the OSCORE flag bits. This flag bit is specified in
Section 13.1.
* The Group Flag MUST be set to 1 if the OSCORE message is protected
using the group mode (see Section 8).
* The Group Flag MUST be set to 0 if the OSCORE message is protected
using the pairwise mode (see Section 9). The Group Flag MUST also
be set to 0 for ordinary OSCORE messages processed according to
[RFC8613].
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5.1. Examples of Compressed COSE Objects
This section covers a list of OSCORE Header Compression examples of
Group OSCORE used in group mode (see Section 5.1.1) or in pairwise
mode (see Section 5.1.2).
The examples assume that the COSE_Encrypt0 object is set (which means
the CoAP message and cryptographic material is known). Note that the
examples do not include the full CoAP unprotected message or the full
Security Context, but only the input necessary to the compression
mechanism, i.e., the COSE_Encrypt0 object. The output is the
compressed COSE object as defined in Section 5 and divided into two
parts, since the object is transported in two CoAP fields: OSCORE
option and payload.
The examples assume that the plaintext (see Section 5.3 of [RFC8613])
is 6 bytes long, and that the AEAD tag is 8 bytes long, hence
resulting in a ciphertext which is 14 bytes long. When using the
group mode, the COSE_CounterSignature0 byte string as described in
Section 4 is assumed to be 64 bytes long.
5.1.1. Examples in Group Mode
* Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
0x25, Partial IV = 5 and kid context = 0x44616c.
* Before compression (96 bytes):
[
h'',
{ 4:h'25', 6:h'05', 10:h'44616c', 11:h'de9e ... f1' },
h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
* After compression (85 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00111001 = 0x39 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x39 05 03 44 61 6c 25 (7 bytes)
Payload: 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 de9e ... f1
(14 bytes + size of the encrypted countersignature)
* Response with ciphertext = 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b, kid =
0x52 and no Partial IV.
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* Before compression (88 bytes):
[
h'',
{ 4:h'52', 11:h'ca1e ... b3' },
h'60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b'
]
* After compression (80 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00101000 = 0x28 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x28 52 (2 bytes)
Payload: 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b ca1e ... b3
(14 bytes + size of the encrypted countersignature)
5.1.2. Examples in Pairwise Mode
* Request with ciphertext = 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9, kid =
0x25, Partial IV = 5 and kid context = 0x44616c.
* Before compression (29 bytes):
[
h'',
{ 4:h'25', 6:h'05', 10:h'44616c' },
h'aea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9'
]
* After compression (21 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00011001 = 0x19 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x19 05 03 44 61 6c 25 (7 bytes)
Payload: 0xaea0155667924dff8a24e4cb35b9 (14 bytes)
* Response with ciphertext = 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b and no
Partial IV.
* Before compression (18 bytes):
[
h'',
{},
h'60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b'
]
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* After compression (14 bytes):
Flag byte: 0b00000000 = 0x00 (1 byte)
Option Value: 0x (0 bytes)
Payload: 0x60b035059d9ef5667c5a0710823b (14 bytes)
6. Message Binding, Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection
The requirements and properties described in Section 7 of [RFC8613]
also apply to Group OSCORE. In particular, Group OSCORE provides
message binding of responses to requests, which enables absolute
freshness of responses that are not notifications, relative freshness
of requests and notification responses, and replay protection of
requests. In addition, the following holds for Group OSCORE.
6.1. Supporting Observe
When Observe [RFC7641] is used, a client maintains for each ongoing
observation one Notification Number for each different server. Then,
separately for each server, the client uses the associated
Notification Number to perform ordering and replay protection of
notifications received from that server (see Section 8.4.1).
Group OSCORE allows to preserve an observation active indefinitely,
even in case the group is rekeyed, with consequent change of ID
Context, or in case the observer client obtains a new Sender ID.
As defined in Section 8 when discussing support for Observe, this is
achieved by the client and server(s) storing the 'kid' and 'kid
context' used in the original Observe request, throughout the whole
duration of the observation.
Upon leaving the group or before re-joining the group, a group member
MUST terminate all the ongoing observations that it has started in
the group as observer client.
6.2. Update of Replay Window
Sender Sequence Numbers seen by a server as Partial IV values in
request messages can spontaneously increase at a fast pace, for
example when a client exchanges unicast messages with other servers
using the Group OSCORE Security Context. As in OSCORE [RFC8613], a
server always needs to accept such increases and accordingly updates
the Replay Window in each of its Recipient Contexts.
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As discussed in Section 2.5.1, a newly created Recipient Context
would have an invalid Replay Window, if its installation has required
to delete another Recipient Context. Hence, the server is not able
to verify if a request from the client associated with the new
Recipient Context is a replay. When this happens, the server MUST
validate the Replay Window of the new Recipient Context, before
accepting messages from the associated client (see Section 2.5.1).
Furthermore, when the Group Manager establishes a new Security
Context for the group (see Section 2.5.3.2), every server re-
initializes the Replay Window in each of its Recipient Contexts.
6.3. Message Freshness
When receiving a request from a client for the first time, the server
is not synchronized with the client's Sender Sequence Number, i.e.,
it is not able to verify if that request is fresh. This applies to a
server that has just joined the group, with respect to already
present clients, and recurs as new clients are added as group
members.
During its operations in the group, the server may also lose
synchronization with a client's Sender Sequence Number. This can
happen, for instance, if the server has rebooted or has deleted its
previously synchronized version of the Recipient Context for that
client (see Section 2.5.1).
If the application requires message freshness, e.g., according to
time- or event-based policies, the server has to (re-)synchronize
with a client's Sender Sequence Number before delivering request
messages from that client to the application. To this end, the
server can use the approach in Section 10 based on the Echo Option
for CoAP [RFC9175], as a variant of the approach defined in
Appendix B.1.2 of [RFC8613] applicable to Group OSCORE.
7. Message Reception
Upon receiving a protected message, a recipient endpoint retrieves a
Security Context as in [RFC8613]. An endpoint MUST be able to
distinguish between a Security Context to process OSCORE messages as
in [RFC8613] and a Group OSCORE Security Context to process Group
OSCORE messages as defined in this document.
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To this end, an endpoint can take into account the different
structure of the Security Context defined in Section 2, for example
based on the presence of Signature Algorithm and/or Pairwise Key
Agreement Algorithm in the Common Context. Alternatively
implementations can use an additional parameter in the Security
Context, to explicitly signal that it is intended for processing
Group OSCORE messages.
If either of the following conditions holds, a recipient endpoint
MUST discard the incoming protected message:
* The Group Flag is set to 0, and the recipient endpoint retrieves a
Security Context which is both valid to process the message and
also associated with an OSCORE group, but the endpoint does not
support the pairwise mode.
* The Group Flag is set to 1, and the recipient endpoint retrieves a
Security Context which is both valid to process the message and
also associated with an OSCORE group, but the endpoint does not
support the group mode.
* The Group Flag is set to 1, and the recipient endpoint can not
retrieve a Security Context which is both valid to process the
message and also associated with an OSCORE group.
As per Section 6.1 of [RFC8613], this holds also when retrieving a
Security Context which is valid but not associated with an OSCORE
group. Future specifications may define how to process incoming
messages protected with a Security Contexts as in [RFC8613], when
the Group Flag bit is set to 1.
Otherwise, if a Security Context associated with an OSCORE group and
valid to process the message is retrieved, the recipient endpoint
processes the message with Group OSCORE, using the group mode (see
Section 8) if the Group Flag is set to 1, or the pairwise mode (see
Section 9) if the Group Flag is set to 0.
Note that, if the Group Flag is set to 0, and the recipient endpoint
retrieves a Security Context which is valid to process the message
but is not associated with an OSCORE group, then the message is
processed according to [RFC8613].
8. Message Processing in Group Mode
When using the group mode, messages are protected and processed as
specified in [RFC8613], with the modifications described in this
section. The security objectives of the group mode are discussed in
Appendix A.2.
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The Group Manager indicates that the group uses (also) the group
mode, as part of the group data provided to candidate group members
when joining the group.
During all the steps of the message processing, an endpoint MUST use
the same Security Context for the considered group. That is, an
endpoint MUST NOT install a new Security Context for that group (see
Section 2.5.3.2) until the message processing is completed.
The group mode MUST be used to protect group requests intended for
multiple recipients or for the whole group. This includes both
requests directly addressed to multiple recipients, e.g., sent by the
client over multicast, as well as requests sent by the client over
unicast to a proxy, that forwards them to the intended recipients
over multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]. For encryption and
decryption operations, the Signature Encryption Algorithm from the
Common Context is used.
As per [RFC7252][I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], group requests sent
over multicast MUST be Non-confirmable, and thus are not
retransmitted by the CoAP messaging layer. Instead, applications
should store such outgoing messages for a predefined, sufficient
amount of time, in order to correctly perform potential
retransmissions at the application layer. According to Section 5.2.3
of [RFC7252], responses to Non-confirmable group requests SHOULD also
be Non-confirmable, but endpoints MUST be prepared to receive
Confirmable responses in reply to a Non-confirmable group request.
Confirmable group requests are acknowledged when sent over non-
multicast transports, as specified in [RFC7252].
Furthermore, endpoints in the group locally perform error handling
and processing of invalid messages according to the same principles
adopted in [RFC8613]. However, a recipient MUST stop processing and
reject any message which is malformed and does not follow the format
specified in Section 4 of this document, or which is not
cryptographically validated in a successful way.
In either case, it is RECOMMENDED that a server does not send back
any error message in reply to a received request, if any of the two
following conditions holds:
* The server is not able to identify the received request as a group
request, i.e., as sent to all servers in the group.
* The server identifies the received request as a group request.
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This prevents servers from replying with multiple error messages to a
client sending a group request, so avoiding the risk of flooding and
possibly congesting the network.
8.1. Protecting the Request
A client transmits a secure group request as described in Section 8.1
of [RFC8613], with the following modifications.
* In step 2, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as
described in Section 4 of this document.
* In step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as
described in Section 4 of this document. The encoding of the
compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 5 of
this document. In particular, the Group Flag MUST be set to 1.
The Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be
used.
* In step 5, the countersignature is computed and the format of the
OSCORE message is modified as described in Section 4 and Section 5
of this document. In particular the payload of the OSCORE message
includes also the encrypted countersignature (see Section 4.1).
8.1.1. Supporting Observe
If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds for each newly
started observation.
* If the client intends to keep the observation active beyond a
possible change of Sender ID, the client MUST store the value of
the 'kid' parameter from the original Observe request, and retain
it for the whole duration of the observation. Even in case the
client is individually rekeyed and receives a new Sender ID from
the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3.1), the client MUST NOT
update the stored value associated with a particular Observe
request.
* If the client intends to keep the observation active beyond a
possible change of ID Context following a group rekeying (see
Section 3.2), then the following applies.
- The client MUST store the value of the 'kid context' parameter
from the original Observe request, and retain it for the whole
duration of the observation. Upon establishing a new Security
Context with a new Gid as ID Context (see Section 2.5.3.2), the
client MUST NOT update the stored value associated with a
particular Observe request.
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- The client MUST store an invariant identifier of the group,
which is immutable even in case the Security Context of the
group is re-established. For example, this invariant
identifier can be the "group name" in
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore], where it is used for
joining the group and retrieving the current group keying
material from the Group Manager.
After a group rekeying, such an invariant information makes it
simpler for the observer client to retrieve the current group
keying material from the Group Manager, in case the client has
missed both the rekeying messages and the first observe
notification protected with the new Security Context (see
Section 8.3.1).
8.2. Verifying the Request
Upon receiving a secure group request with the Group Flag set to 1,
following the procedure in Section 7, a server proceeds as described
in Section 8.2 of [RFC8613], with the following modifications.
* In step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object follows
Section 5 of this document. In particular:
- If the server discards the request due to not retrieving a
Security Context associated with the OSCORE group, the server
MAY respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message. When
doing so, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age option with value
zero, and MAY include a descriptive string as diagnostic
payload.
- If the received 'kid context' matches an existing ID Context
(Gid) but the received 'kid' does not match any Recipient ID in
this Security Context, then the server MAY create a new
Recipient Context for this Recipient ID and initialize it
according to Section 3 of [RFC8613], and also retrieve the
authentication credential associated with the Recipient ID to
be stored in the new Recipient Context. Such a configuration
is application specific. If the application does not specify
dynamic derivation of new Recipient Contexts, then the server
SHALL stop processing the request.
* In step 4, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as
described in Section 4 of this document.
* In step 6, the server also verifies the countersignature, by using
the public key from the client's authentication credential stored
in the associated Recipient Context. In particular:
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- If the server does not have the public key of the client yet,
the server MUST stop processing the request and MAY respond
with a 5.03 (Service Unavailable) response. The response MAY
include a Max-Age Option, indicating to the client the number
of seconds after which to retry. If the Max-Age Option is not
present, a retry time of 60 seconds will be assumed by the
client, as default value defined in Section 5.10.5 of
[RFC7252].
- The server MUST perform signature verification before
decrypting the COSE object, as defined below. Implementations
that cannot perform the two steps in this order MUST ensure
that no access to the plaintext is possible before a successful
signature verification and MUST prevent any possible leak of
time-related information that can yield side-channel attacks.
- The server retrieves the encrypted countersignature
ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload, and computes the
original countersignature SIGNATURE as
SIGNATURE = ENC_SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.
The server verifies the original countersignature SIGNATURE.
- If the signature verification fails, the server SHALL stop
processing the request, SHALL NOT update the Replay Window, and
MAY respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) response. The server MAY
set an Outer Max-Age option with value zero. The diagnostic
payload MAY contain a string, which, if present, MUST be
"Decryption failed" as if the decryption had failed.
- When decrypting the COSE object using the Recipient Key, the
Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be
used.
* Additionally, if the used Recipient Context was created upon
receiving this group request and the message is not verified
successfully, the server MAY delete that Recipient Context. Such
a configuration, which is specified by the application, mitigates
attacks that aim at overloading the server's storage.
A server SHOULD NOT process a request if the received Recipient ID
('kid') is equal to its own Sender ID in its own Sender Context. For
an example where this is not fulfilled, see Section 7.2.1 of
[I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications].
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8.2.1. Supporting Observe
If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds for each newly
started observation.
* The server MUST store the value of the 'kid' parameter from the
original Observe request, and retain it for the whole duration of
the observation. The server MUST NOT update the stored value of a
'kid' parameter associated with a particular Observe request, even
in case the observer client is individually rekeyed and starts
using a new Sender ID received from the Group Manager (see
Section 2.5.3.1).
* The server MUST store the value of the 'kid context' parameter
from the original Observe request, and retain it for the whole
duration of the observation, beyond a possible change of ID
Context following a group rekeying (see Section 3.2). That is,
upon establishing a new Security Context with a new Gid as ID
Context (see Section 2.5.3.2), the server MUST NOT update the
stored value associated with the ongoing observation.
8.3. Protecting the Response
If a server generates a CoAP message in response to a Group OSCORE
request, then the server SHALL follow the description in Section 8.3
of [RFC8613], with the modifications described in this section.
Note that the server always protects a response with the Sender
Context from its latest Security Context, and that establishing a new
Security Context resets the Sender Sequence Number to 0 (see
Section 3.2).
* In step 2, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as
described in Section 4 of this document.
* In step 3, if the server is using a different Security Context for
the response compared to what was used to verify the request (see
Section 3.2), then the server MUST include its Sender Sequence
Number as Partial IV in the response and use it to build the AEAD
nonce to protect the response. This prevents the AEAD nonce from
the request from being reused.
* In step 4, the encryption of the COSE object is modified as
described in Section 4 of this document. The encoding of the
compressed COSE object is modified as described in Section 5 of
this document. In particular, the Group Flag MUST be set to 1.
The Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be
used.
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If the server is using a different ID Context (Gid) for the
response compared to what was used to verify the request (see
Section 3.2), then the new ID Context MUST be included in the 'kid
context' parameter of the response.
The server can obtain a new Sender ID from the Group Manager, when
individually rekeyed (see Section 2.5.3.1) or when re-joining the
group. In such a case, the server can help the client to
synchronize, by including the 'kid' parameter in a response
protected in group mode, even when the request was protected in
pairwise mode (see Section 9.3).
That is, when responding to a request protected in pairwise mode,
the server SHOULD include the 'kid' parameter in a response
protected in group mode, if it is replying to that client for the
first time since the assignment of its new Sender ID.
* In step 5, the countersignature is computed and the format of the
OSCORE message is modified as described in Section 4 and Section 5
of this document. In particular the payload of the OSCORE message
includes also the encrypted countersignature (see Section 4.1).
8.3.1. Supporting Observe
If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds when
protecting notifications for an ongoing observation.
* The server MUST use the stored value of the 'kid' parameter from
the original Observe request (see Section 8.2.1), as value for the
'request_kid' parameter in the external_aad structure (see
Section 4.3).
* The server MUST use the stored value of the 'kid context'
parameter from the original Observe request (see Section 8.2.1),
as value for the 'request_kid_context' parameter in the
external_aad structure (see Section 4.3).
Furthermore, the server may have ongoing observations started by
Observe requests protected with an old Security Context. After
completing the establishment of a new Security Context, the server
MUST protect the following notifications with the Sender Context of
the new Security Context.
For each ongoing observation, the server can help the client to
synchronize, by including also the 'kid context' parameter in
notifications following a group rekeying, with value set to the ID
Context (Gid) of the new Security Context.
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If there is a known upper limit to the duration of a group rekeying,
the server SHOULD include the 'kid context' parameter during that
time. Otherwise, the server SHOULD include it until the Max-Age has
expired for the last notification sent before the installation of the
new Security Context.
8.4. Verifying the Response
Upon receiving a secure response message with the Group Flag set to
1, following the procedure in Section 7, the client proceeds as
described in Section 8.4 of [RFC8613], with the following
modifications.
Note that a client may receive a response protected with a Security
Context different from the one used to protect the corresponding
request, and that, upon the establishment of a new Security Context,
the client re-initializes its Replay Windows in its Recipient
Contexts (see Section 3.2).
* In step 2, the decoding of the compressed COSE object is modified
as described in Section 5 of this document. In particular, a
'kid' may not be present, if the response is a reply to a request
protected in pairwise mode. In such a case, the client assumes
the response 'kid' to be the Recipient ID for the server to which
the request protected in pairwise mode was intended for.
If the response 'kid context' matches an existing ID Context (Gid)
but the received/assumed 'kid' does not match any Recipient ID in
this Security Context, then the client MAY create a new Recipient
Context for this Recipient ID and initialize it according to
Section 3 of [RFC8613], and also retrieve the authentication
credential associated with the Recipient ID to be stored in the
new Recipient Context. If the application does not specify
dynamic derivation of new Recipient Contexts, then the client
SHALL stop processing the response.
* In step 3, the Additional Authenticated Data is modified as
described in Section 4 of this document.
* In step 5, the client also verifies the countersignature, by using
the public key from the server's authentication credential stored
in the associated Recipient Context. In particular:
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- The client MUST perform signature verification before
decrypting the COSE object, as defined below. Implementations
that cannot perform the two steps in this order MUST ensure
that no access to the plaintext is possible before a successful
signature verification and MUST prevent any possible leak of
time-related information that can yield side-channel attacks.
- The client retrieves the encrypted countersignature
ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload, and computes the
original countersignature SIGNATURE as
SIGNATURE = ENC_SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.
The client verifies the original countersignature SIGNATURE.
- If the verification of the countersignature fails, the server
SHALL stop processing the response, and SHALL NOT update the
Notification Number associated with the server if the response
is an Observe notification [RFC7641].
- After a successful verification of the countersignature, the
client performs also the following actions if the response is
not an Observe notification.
o In case the request was protected in pairwise mode and the
'kid' parameter is present in the response, the client
checks whether this received 'kid' is equal to the expected
'kid', i.e., the known Recipient ID for the server to which
the request was intended for.
o In case the request was protected in pairwise mode and the
'kid' parameter is not present in the response, the client
checks whether the server that has sent the response is the
same one to which the request was intended for. This can be
done by checking that the public key used to verify the
countersignature of the response is equal to the public key
included in the authentication credential Recipient Auth
Cred, which was taken as input to derive the Pairwise Sender
Key used for protecting the request (see Section 2.4.1).
In either case, if the client determines that the response has
come from a different server than the expected one, then the
client SHALL discard the response and SHALL NOT deliver it to
the application. Otherwise, the client hereafter considers the
received 'kid' as the current Recipient ID for the server.
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- When decrypting the COSE object using the Recipient Key, the
Signature Encryption Algorithm from the Common Context MUST be
used.
* Additionally, if the used Recipient Context was created upon
receiving this response and the message is not verified
successfully, the client MAY delete that Recipient Context. Such
a configuration, which is specified by the application, mitigates
attacks that aim at overloading the client's storage.
8.4.1. Supporting Observe
If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, the following holds when verifying
notifications for an ongoing observation.
* The client MUST use the stored value of the 'kid' parameter from
the original Observe request (see Section 8.1.1), as value for the
'request_kid' parameter in the external_aad structure (see
Section 4.3).
* The client MUST use the stored value of the 'kid context'
parameter from the original Observe request (see Section 8.1.1),
as value for the 'request_kid_context' parameter in the
external_aad structure (see Section 4.3).
This ensures that the client can correctly verify notifications, even
in case it is individually rekeyed and starts using a new Sender ID
received from the Group Manager (see Section 2.5.3.1), as well as
when it installs a new Security Context with a new ID Context (Gid)
following a group rekeying (see Section 3.2).
* The ordering and the replay protection of notifications received
from a server are performed as per Sections 4.1.3.5.2 and 7.4.1 of
[RFC8613], by using the Notification Number associated with that
server for the observation in question. In addition, the client
performs the following actions for each ongoing observation.
- When receiving the first valid notification from a server, the
client MUST store the current kid "kid1" of that server for the
observation in question. If the 'kid' field is included in the
OSCORE option of the notification, its value specifies "kid1".
If the Observe request was protected in pairwise mode (see
Section 9.3), the 'kid' field may not be present in the OSCORE
option of the notification (see Section 4.2). In this case,
the client assumes "kid1" to be the Recipient ID for the server
to which the Observe request was intended for.
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- When receiving another valid notification from the same server
- which can be identified and recognized through the same
public key used to verify the countersignature and included in
the server's authentication credential - the client determines
the current kid "kid2" of the server as above for "kid1", and
MUST check whether "kid2" is equal to the stored "kid1". If
"kid1" and "kid2" are different, the client MUST cancel or re-
register the observation in question.
Note that, if "kid2" is different from "kid1" and the 'kid'
field is omitted from the notification - which is possible if
the Observe request was protected in pairwise mode - then the
client will compute a wrong keystream to decrypt the
countersignature (i.e., by using "kid1" rather than "kid2" in
the 'id' field of the 'info' array in Section 4.1.1), thus
subsequently failing to verify the countersignature and
discarding the notification.
This ensures that the client remains able to correctly perform the
ordering and replay protection of notifications, even in case a
server legitimately starts using a new Sender ID, as received from
the Group Manager when individually rekeyed (see Section 2.5.3.1) or
when re-joining the group.
8.5. External Signature Checkers
When receiving a message protected in group mode, a signature checker
(see Section 3.1) proceeds as follows.
* The signature checker retrieves the encrypted countersignature
ENC_SIGNATURE from the message payload, and computes the original
countersignature SIGNATURE as
SIGNATURE = ENC_SIGNATURE XOR KEYSTREAM
where KEYSTREAM is derived as per Section 4.1.1.
* The signature checker verifies the original countersignature
SIGNATURE, by using the public key of the sender endpoint as
included in that endpoint's authentication credential. The
signature checker determines the right authentication credential
based on the ID Context (Gid) and the Sender ID of the sender
endpoint.
Note that the following applies when attempting to verify the
countersignature of a response message.
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* The response may not include a Partial IV and/or an ID Context.
In such a case, the signature checker considers the same values
from the corresponding request, i.e., the request matching with
the response by CoAP Token value.
* The response may not include a Sender ID. This can happen when
the response protected in group mode matches a request protected
in pairwise mode (see Section 9.1), with a case in point provided
by [I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore]. In such a case, the
signature checker needs to use other means (e.g., source
addressing information of the server endpoint) to identify the
correct authentication credential including the public key to use
for verifying the countersignature of the response.
The particular actions following a successful or unsuccessful
verification of the countersignature are application specific and out
of the scope of this document.
9. Message Processing in Pairwise Mode
When using the pairwise mode of Group OSCORE, messages are protected
and processed as in [RFC8613], with the modifications described in
this section. The security objectives of the pairwise mode are
discussed in Appendix A.2.
The pairwise mode takes advantage of an existing Security Context for
the group mode to establish a Security Context shared exclusively
with any other member. In order to use the pairwise mode in a group
that uses also the group mode, the signature scheme of the group mode
MUST support a combined signature and encryption scheme. This can
be, for example, signature using ECDSA, and encryption using AES-CCM
with a key derived with ECDH. For encryption and decryption
operations, the AEAD Algorithm from the Common Context is used (see
Section 2.1.1).
The pairwise mode does not support the use of additional entities
acting as verifiers of source authentication and integrity of group
messages, such as intermediary gateways (see Section 3).
An endpoint implementing only a silent server does not support the
pairwise mode.
If the signature algorithm used in the group supports ECDH (e.g.,
ECDSA, EdDSA), the pairwise mode MUST be supported by endpoints that
use the CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175] and/or block-wise transfers
[RFC7959], for instance for responses after the first block-wise
request, which possibly targets all servers in the group and includes
the CoAP Block2 option (see Section 3.8 of
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[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]). This prevents the attack described
in Section 12.9, which leverages requests sent over unicast to a
single group member and protected with the group mode.
Senders cannot use the pairwise mode to protect a message intended
for multiple recipients. In fact, the pairwise mode is defined only
between two endpoints and the keying material is thus only available
to one recipient.
However, a sender can use the pairwise mode to protect a message sent
to (but not intended for) multiple recipients, if interested in a
response from only one of them. For instance, this is useful to
support the address discovery service defined in Section 9.1, when a
single 'kid' value is indicated in the payload of a request sent to
multiple recipients, e.g., over multicast.
The Group Manager indicates that the group uses (also) the pairwise
mode, as part of the group data provided to candidate group members
when joining the group.
9.1. Pre-Conditions
In order to protect an outgoing message in pairwise mode, the sender
needs to know the authentication credential and the Recipient ID for
the recipient endpoint, as stored in the Recipient Context associated
with that endpoint (see Section 2.4.4).
Furthermore, the sender needs to know the individual address of the
recipient endpoint. This information may not be known at any given
point in time. For instance, right after having joined the group, a
client may know the authentication credential and Recipient ID for a
given server, but not the addressing information required to reach it
with an individual, one-to-one request.
To make addressing information of individual endpoints available,
servers in the group MAY expose a resource to which a client can send
a group request targeting a set of servers, identified by their 'kid'
values specified in the request payload. The specified set may be
empty, hence identifying all the servers in the group. Further
details of such an interface are out of scope for this document.
9.2. Main Differences from OSCORE
The pairwise mode protects messages between two members of a group,
essentially following [RFC8613], but with the following notable
differences.
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* The 'kid' and 'kid context' parameters of the COSE object are used
as defined in Section 4.2 of this document.
* The external_aad defined in Section 4.3 of this document is used
for the encryption process.
* The Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys used as Sender/Recipient keys
are derived as defined in Section 2.4 of this document.
9.3. Protecting the Request
When using the pairwise mode, the request is protected as defined in
Section 8.1 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in
Section 9.2 of this document. The following difference also applies.
* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in
Section 8.1.1 of this document holds.
9.4. Verifying the Request
Upon receiving a request with the Group Flag set to 0, following the
procedure in Section 7, the server MUST process it as defined in
Section 8.2 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in
Section 9.2 of this document. The following differences also apply.
* If the server discards the request due to not retrieving a
Security Context associated with the OSCORE group or to not
supporting the pairwise mode, the server MAY respond with a 4.01
(Unauthorized) error message or a 4.02 (Bad Option) error message,
respectively. When doing so, the server MAY set an Outer Max-Age
option with value zero, and MAY include a descriptive string as
diagnostic payload.
* If a new Recipient Context is created for this Recipient ID, new
Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are also derived (see
Section 2.4.1). The new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are
deleted if the Recipient Context is deleted as a result of the
message not being successfully verified.
* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in
Section 8.2.1 of this document holds.
9.5. Protecting the Response
When using the pairwise mode, a response is protected as defined in
Section 8.3 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in
Section 9.2 of this document. The following differences also apply.
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* If the server is using a different Security Context for the
response compared to what was used to verify the request (see
Section 3.2), then the server MUST include its Sender Sequence
Number as Partial IV in the response and use it to build the AEAD
nonce to protect the response. This prevents the AEAD nonce from
the request from being reused.
* If the server is using a different ID Context (Gid) for the
response compared to what was used to verify the request (see
Section 3.2), then the new ID Context MUST be included in the 'kid
context' parameter of the response.
* The server can obtain a new Sender ID from the Group Manager, when
individually rekeyed (see Section 2.5.3.1) or when re-joining the
group. In such a case, the server can help the client to
synchronize, by including the 'kid' parameter in a response
protected in pairwise mode, even when the request was also
protected in pairwise mode.
That is, when responding to a request protected in pairwise mode,
the server SHOULD include the 'kid' parameter in a response
protected in pairwise mode, if it is replying to that client for
the first time since the assignment of its new Sender ID.
* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in
Section 8.3.1 of this document holds.
9.6. Verifying the Response
Upon receiving a response with the Group Flag set to 0, following the
procedure in Section 7, the client MUST process it as defined in
Section 8.4 of [RFC8613], with the differences summarized in
Section 9.2 of this document. The following differences also apply.
* The client may receive a response protected with a Security
Context different from the one used to protect the corresponding
request. Also, upon the establishment of a new Security Context,
the client re-initializes its Replay Windows in its Recipient
Contexts (see Section 2.2).
* The same as described in Section 8.4 holds with respect to
handling the 'kid' parameter of the response, when received as a
reply to a request protected in pairwise mode. The client can
also in this case check whether the replying server is the
expected one, by relying on the server's public key. However,
since the response is protected in pairwise mode, the public key
is not used for verifying a countersignature as in Section 8.4.
Instead, the expected server's authentication credential - namely
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Recipient Auth Cred and including the server's public key - was
taken as input to derive the Pairwise Recipient Key used to
decrypt and verify the response (see Section 2.4.1).
* If a new Recipient Context is created for this Recipient ID, new
Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are also derived (see
Section 2.4.1). The new Pairwise Sender/Recipient Keys are
deleted if the Recipient Context is deleted as a result of the
message not being successfully verified.
* If Observe [RFC7641] is supported, what is defined in
Section 8.4.1 of this document holds. The client can also in this
case identify a server to be the same one across a change of
Sender ID, by relying on the server's public key. As to the
expected server's authentication credential, the same holds as
specified above for non-notification responses.
10. Challenge-Response Synchronization
This section describes how a server endpoint can synchronize with
Sender Sequence Numbers of client endpoints in the group. Similarly
to what is defined in Appendix B.1.2 of [RFC8613], the server
performs a challenge-response exchange with a client, by using the
Echo Option for CoAP specified in Section 2 of [RFC9175].
Upon receiving a request from a particular client for the first time,
the server processes the message as described in this document, but,
even if valid, does not deliver it to the application. Instead, the
server replies to the client with an OSCORE protected 4.01
(Unauthorized) response message, including only the Echo Option and
no diagnostic payload. The Echo option value SHOULD NOT be reused;
when it is reused, it MUST be highly unlikely to have been recently
used with this client. Since this response is protected with the
Security Context used in the group, the client will consider the
response valid upon successfully decrypting and verifying it.
The server stores the Echo Option value included in the response
together with the pair (gid,kid), where 'gid' is the Group Identifier
of the OSCORE group and 'kid' is the Sender ID of the client in the
group. These are specified in the 'kid context' and 'kid' fields of
the OSCORE Option of the request, respectively. After a group
rekeying has been completed and a new Security Context has been
established in the group, which results also in a new Group
Identifier (see Section 3.2), the server MUST delete all the stored
Echo values associated with members of the group.
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Upon receiving a 4.01 (Unauthorized) response that includes an Echo
Option and originates from a verified group member, the client sends
a request as a unicast message addressed to the same server, echoing
the Echo Option value. The client MUST NOT send the request
including the Echo Option over multicast.
If the group uses also the group mode and the used Signature
Algorithm supports ECDH (e.g., ECDSA, EdDSA), the client MUST use the
pairwise mode to protect the request, as per Section 9.3. Note that,
as defined in Section 9, endpoints that are members of such a group
and that use the Echo Option MUST support the pairwise mode.
The client does not necessarily resend the same group request, but
can instead send a more recent one, if the application permits it.
This allows the client to not retain previously sent group requests
for full retransmission, unless the application explicitly requires
otherwise. In either case, the client uses a fresh Sender Sequence
Number value from its own Sender Context. If the client stores group
requests for possible retransmission with the Echo Option, it should
not store a given request for longer than a preconfigured time
interval. Note that the unicast request echoing the Echo Option is
correctly treated and processed, since the 'kid context' field
including the Group Identifier of the OSCORE group is still present
in the OSCORE Option as part of the COSE object (see Section 4).
Upon receiving the unicast request including the Echo Option, the
server performs the following verifications.
* If the server does not store an Echo Option value for the pair
(gid,kid), it considers: i) the time t1 when it has established
the Security Context used to protect the received request; and ii)
the time t2 when the request has been received. Since a valid
request cannot be older than the Security Context used to protect
it, the server verifies that (t2 - t1) is less than the largest
amount of time acceptable to consider the request fresh.
* If the server stores an Echo Option value for the pair (gid,kid)
associated with that same client in the same group, the server
verifies that the option value equals that same stored value
previously sent to that client.
If the verifications above fail, the server MUST NOT process the
request further and MAY send a 4.01 (Unauthorized) response including
an Echo Option, hence performing a new challenge-response exchange.
If the verifications above are successful, the server proceeds as
follows. In case the Replay Window in the Recipient Context
associated with the client has not been set yet, the server updates
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the Replay Window to mark the current Sender Sequence Number from the
latest received request as seen (but all newer ones as new), and
delivers the message as fresh to the application. Otherwise, the
server discards the verification result and treats the message as
fresh or as a replay, according to the existing Replay Window.
A server should not deliver requests from a given client to the
application until one valid request from that same client has been
verified as fresh, as conveying an echoed Echo Option. A server may
perform the challenge-response described above at any time, if
synchronization with Sender Sequence Numbers of clients is lost,
e.g., after a device reboot. A client has to be ready to perform the
challenge-response based on the Echo Option if a server starts it.
It is the role of the server application to define under what
circumstances Sender Sequence Numbers lose synchronization. This can
include experiencing a "large enough" gap D = (SN2 - SN1), between
the Sender Sequence Number SN1 of the latest accepted group request
from a client and the Sender Sequence Number SN2 of a group request
just received from that client. However, a client may send several
unicast requests to different group members as protected with the
pairwise mode, which may result in the server experiencing the gap D
in a relatively short time. This would induce the server to perform
more challenge-response exchanges than actually needed.
In order to ameliorate this, the server may rely on a trade-off
between the Sender Sequence Number gap D and a time gap T = (t2 -
t1), where t1 is the time when the latest group request from a client
was accepted and t2 is the time when the latest group request from
that client has been received, respectively. Then, the server can
start a challenge-response when experiencing a time gap T larger than
a given, preconfigured threshold. Also, the server can start a
challenge-response when experiencing a Sender Sequence Number gap D
greater than a different threshold, computed as a monotonically
increasing function of the currently experienced time gap T.
The challenge-response approach described in this section provides an
assurance of absolute message freshness. However, it can result in
an impact on performance which is undesirable or unbearable,
especially in large groups where many endpoints at the same time
might join as new members or lose synchronization.
Endpoints configured as silent servers are not able to perform the
challenge-response described above, as they do not store a Sender
Context to secure the 4.01 (Unauthorized) response to the client.
Thus, silent servers should adopt alternative approaches to achieve
and maintain synchronization with Sender Sequence Numbers of clients.
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Since requests including the Echo Option are sent over unicast, a
server can be victim of the attack discussed in Section 12.9, in case
such requests are protected with the group mode. Instead, protecting
those requests with the pairwise mode prevents the attack above. In
fact, only the exact server involved in the challenge-response
exchange is able to derive the pairwise key used by the client to
protect the request including the Echo Option.
In either case, an internal on-path adversary would not be able to
mix up the Echo Option value of two different unicast requests, sent
by a same client to any two different servers in the group. In fact,
even if the group mode was used, this would require the adversary to
forge the countersignature of both requests. As a consequence, each
of the two servers remains able to selectively accept a request with
the Echo Option only if it is waiting for that exact integrity-
protected Echo Option value, and is thus the intended recipient.
11. Implementation Compliance
Like in [RFC8613], HKDF SHA-256 is the mandatory to implement HKDF.
An endpoint may support only the group mode, or only the pairwise
mode, or both.
For endpoints that support the group mode, the following applies.
* For endpoints that use authenticated encryption, the AEAD
algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 4.2 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] is mandatory to implement as
Signature Encryption Algorithm (see Section 2.1.4).
* For many constrained IoT devices it is problematic to support more
than one signature algorithm. Existing devices can be expected to
support either EdDSA or ECDSA. In order to enable as much
interoperability as we can reasonably achieve, the following
applies with respect to the Signature Algorithm (see
Section 2.1.5).
Less constrained endpoints SHOULD implement both: the EdDSA
signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve Ed25519
[RFC8032]; and the ECDSA signature algorithm together with the
elliptic curve P-256.
Constrained endpoints SHOULD implement: the EdDSA signature
algorithm together with the elliptic curve Ed25519 [RFC8032]; or
the ECDSA signature algorithm together with the elliptic curve
P-256.
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* Endpoints that implement the ECDSA signature algorithm MAY use
"deterministic ECDSA" as specified in [RFC6979]. Pure
deterministic elliptic-curve signature algorithms such as
deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have the advantage of not requiring
access to a source of high-quality randomness. However, these
signature algorithms have been shown vulnerable to some side-
channel and fault injection attacks due to their determinism,
which can result in extracting a device's private key. As
suggested in Section 2.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs],
this can be addressed by combining both randomness and determinism
[I-D.mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise].
For endpoints that support the pairwise mode, the following applies.
* The AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-16-64-128 defined in Section 4.2 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] is mandatory to implement as AEAD
Algorithm (see Section 2.1.1).
* The ECDH-SS + HKDF-256 algorithm specified in Section 6.3.1 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs] is mandatory to implement as
Pairwise Key Agreement Algorithm (see Section 2.1.7).
* In order to enable as much interoperability as we can reasonably
achieve in the presence of constrained devices (see above), the
following applies.
Less constrained endpoints SHOULD implement both the X25519 curve
[RFC7748] and the P-256 curve as ECDH curves.
Constrained endpoints SHOULD implement the X25519 curve [RFC7748]
or the P-256 curve as ECDH curve.
Constrained IoT devices may alternatively represent Montgomery curves
and (twisted) Edwards curves [RFC7748] in the short-Weierstrass form
Wei25519, with which the algorithms ECDSA25519 and ECDH25519 can be
used for signature operations and Diffie-Hellman secret calculation,
respectively [I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations].
12. Security Considerations
The same threat model discussed for OSCORE in Appendix D.1 of
[RFC8613] holds for Group OSCORE. In addition, when using the group
mode, source authentication of messages is explicitly ensured by
means of countersignatures, as discussed in Section 12.1.
Note that, even if an endpoint is authorized to be a group member and
to take part in group communications, there is a risk that it behaves
inappropriately. For instance, it can forward the content of
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messages in the group to unauthorized entities. However, in many use
cases, the devices in the group belong to a common authority and are
configured by a commissioner (see Appendix B), which results in a
practically limited risk and enables a prompt detection/reaction in
case of misbehaving.
The same considerations on supporting Proxy operations discussed for
OSCORE in Appendix D.2 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE.
The same considerations on protected message fields for OSCORE
discussed in Appendix D.3 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE.
The same considerations on uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs for
OSCORE discussed in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE.
This is further discussed in Section 12.3 of this document.
The same considerations on unprotected message fields for OSCORE
discussed in Appendix D.5 of [RFC8613] hold for Group OSCORE, with
the following differences. First, the 'kid context' of request
messages is part of the Additional Authenticated Data, thus safely
enabling to keep observations active beyond a possible change of ID
Context (Gid), following a group rekeying (see Section 4.3). Second,
the countersignature included in a Group OSCORE message protected in
group mode is computed also over the value of the OSCORE option,
which is also part of the Additional Authenticated Data used in the
signing process. This is further discussed in Section 12.7 of this
document.
As discussed in Section 6.2.3 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], Group
OSCORE addresses security attacks against CoAP listed in Sections
11.2-11.6 of [RFC7252], especially when run over IP multicast.
The rest of this section first discusses security aspects to be taken
into account when using Group OSCORE. Then it goes through aspects
covered in the security considerations of OSCORE (see Section 12 of
[RFC8613]), and discusses how they hold when Group OSCORE is used.
12.1. Security of the Group Mode
The group mode defined in Section 8 relies on commonly shared group
keying material to protect communication within a group. Using the
group mode has the implications discussed below. The following
refers to group members as the endpoints in the group storing the
latest version of the group keying material.
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* Messages are encrypted at a group level (group-level data
confidentiality), i.e., they can be decrypted by any member of the
group, but not by an external adversary or other external
entities.
* If the used encryption algorithm provides integrity protection,
then it also ensures group authentication and proof of group
membership, but not source authentication. That is, it ensures
that a message sent to a group has been sent by a member of that
group, but not necessarily by the alleged sender. In fact, any
group member is able to derive the Sender Key used by the actual
sender endpoint, and thus can compute a valid authentication tag.
Therefore, the message content could originate from any of the
current group members.
Furthermore, if the used encryption algorithm does not provide
integrity protection, then it does not ensure any level of message
authentication or proof of group membership.
On the other hand, proof of group membership is always ensured by
construction through the strict management of the group keying
material (see Section 3.2). That is, the group is rekeyed in case
of members' leaving, and the current group members are informed of
former group members. Thus, a current group member storing the
latest group keying material does not store the authentication
credential of any former group member.
This allows a recipient endpoint to rely on the stored
authentication credentials and public keys included therin, in
order to always confidently assert the group membership of a
sender endpoint when processing an incoming message, i.e., to
assert that the sender endpoint was a group member when it signed
the message. In turn, this prevents a former group member to
possibly re-sign and inject in the group a stored message that was
protected with old keying material.
* Source authentication of messages sent to a group is ensured
through a countersignature, which is computed by the sender using
its own private key and then appended to the message payload.
Also, the countersignature is encrypted by using a keystream
derived from the group keying material (see Section 4.1). This
ensures group privacy, i.e., an attacker cannot track an endpoint
over two groups by linking messages between the two groups, unless
being also a member of those groups.
The security properties of the group mode are summarized below.
1. Asymmetric source authentication, by means of a countersignature.
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2. Symmetric group authentication, by means of an authentication tag
(only for encryption algorithms providing integrity protection).
3. Symmetric group confidentiality, by means of symmetric
encryption.
4. Proof of group membership, by strictly managing the group keying
material, as well as by means of integrity tags when using an
encryption algorithm that provides also integrity protection.
5. Group privacy, by encrypting the countersignature.
The group mode fulfills the security properties above while also
displaying the following benefits. First, the use of an encryption
algorithm that does not provide integrity protection results in a
minimal communication overhead, by limiting the message payload to
the ciphertext and the encrypted countersignature. Second, it is
possible to deploy semi-trusted entities such as signature checkers
(see Section 3.1), which can break property 5, but cannot break
properties 1, 2 and 3.
12.2. Security of the Pairwise Mode
The pairwise mode defined in Section 9 protects messages by using
pairwise symmetric keys, derived from the static-static Diffie-
Hellman shared secret computed from the asymmetric keys of the sender
and recipient endpoint (see Section 2.4).
The used encryption algorithm MUST provide integrity protection.
Therefore, the pairwise mode ensures both pairwise data-
confidentiality and source authentication of messages, without using
countersignatures. Furthermore, the recipient endpoint achieves
proof of group membership for the sender endpoint, since only current
group members have the required keying material to derive a valid
Pairwise Sender/Recipient Key.
The long-term storing of the Diffie-Hellman shared secret is a
potential security issue. In fact, if the shared secret of two group
members is leaked, a third group member can exploit it to impersonate
any of those two group members, by deriving and using their pairwise
key. The possibility of such leakage should be contemplated, as more
likely to happen than the leakage of a private key, which could be
rather protected at a significantly higher level than generic memory,
e.g., by using a Trusted Platform Module. Therefore, there is a
trade-off between the maximum amount of time a same shared secret is
stored and the frequency of its re-computing.
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12.3. Uniqueness of (key, nonce)
The proof for uniqueness of (key, nonce) pairs in Appendix D.4 of
[RFC8613] is also valid in group communication scenarios. That is,
given an OSCORE group:
* Uniqueness of Sender IDs within the group is enforced by the Group
Manager. In fact, from the moment when a Gid is assigned to a
group until the moment a new Gid is assigned to that same group,
the Group Manager does not reassign a Sender ID within the group
(see Section 3.2).
* The case A in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] concerns all group
requests and responses including a Partial IV (e.g., Observe
notifications). In this case, same considerations from [RFC8613]
apply here as well.
* The case B in Appendix D.4 of [RFC8613] concerns responses not
including a Partial IV (e.g., single response to a group request).
In this case, same considerations from [RFC8613] apply here as
well.
As a consequence, each message encrypted/decrypted with the same
Sender Key is processed by using a different (ID_PIV, PIV) pair.
This means that nonces used by any fixed encrypting endpoint are
unique. Thus, each message is processed with a different (key,
nonce) pair.
12.4. Management of Group Keying Material
The approach described in this document should take into account the
risk of compromise of group members. In particular, this document
specifies that a key management scheme for secure revocation and
renewal of Security Contexts and group keying material MUST be
adopted.
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore] specifies a simple rekeying
scheme for renewing the Security Context in a group.
Alternative rekeying schemes which are more scalable with the group
size may be needed in dynamic, large groups where endpoints can join
and leave at any time, in order to limit the impact on performance
due to the Security Context and keying material update.
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12.5. Update of Security Context and Key Rotation
A group member can receive a message shortly after the group has been
rekeyed, and new security parameters and keying material have been
distributed by the Group Manager.
This may result in a client using an old Security Context to protect
a request, and a server using a different new Security Context to
protect a corresponding response. As a consequence, clients may
receive a response protected with a Security Context different from
the one used to protect the corresponding request.
In particular, a server may first get a request protected with the
old Security Context, then install the new Security Context, and only
after that produce a response to send back to the client. In such a
case, as specified in Section 8.3, the server MUST protect the
potential response using the new Security Context. Specifically, the
server MUST include its Sender Sequence Number as Partial IV in the
response and use it to build the AEAD nonce to protect the response.
This prevents the AEAD nonce from the request from being reused with
the new Security Context.
The client will process that response using the new Security Context,
provided that it has installed the new security parameters and keying
material before the message processing.
In case block-wise transfer [RFC7959] is used, the same
considerations from Section 10.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]
hold.
Furthermore, as described below, a group rekeying may temporarily
result in misaligned Security Contexts between the sender and
recipient of a same message.
12.5.1. Late Update on the Sender
In this case, the sender protects a message using the old Security
Context, i.e., before having installed the new Security Context.
However, the recipient receives the message after having installed
the new Security Context, and is thus unable to correctly process it.
A possible way to ameliorate this issue is to preserve the old,
recent, Security Context for a maximum amount of time defined by the
application. By doing so, the recipient can still try to process the
received message using the old retained Security Context as a second
attempt. This makes particular sense when the recipient is a client,
that would hence be able to process incoming responses protected with
the old, recent, Security Context used to protect the associated
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group request. Instead, a recipient server would better and more
simply discard an incoming group request which is not successfully
processed with the new Security Context.
This tolerance preserves the processing of secure messages throughout
a long-lasting key rotation, as group rekeying processes may likely
take a long time to complete, especially in large groups. On the
other hand, a former (compromised) group member can abusively take
advantage of this, and send messages protected with the old retained
Security Context. Therefore, a conservative application policy
should not admit the retention of old Security Contexts.
12.5.2. Late Update on the Recipient
In this case, the sender protects a message using the new Security
Context, but the recipient receives that message before having
installed the new Security Context. Therefore, the recipient would
not be able to correctly process the message and hence discards it.
If the recipient installs the new Security Context shortly after that
and the sender endpoint retransmits the message, the former will
still be able to receive and correctly process the message.
In any case, the recipient should actively ask the Group Manager for
an updated Security Context according to an application-defined
policy, for instance after a given number of unsuccessfully decrypted
incoming messages.
12.6. Collision of Group Identifiers
In case endpoints are deployed in multiple groups managed by
different non-synchronized Group Managers, it is possible for Group
Identifiers of different groups to coincide.
This does not impair the security of the AEAD algorithm. In fact, as
long as the Master Secret is different for different groups and this
condition holds over time, AEAD keys are different among different
groups.
In case multiple groups use the same IP multicast address, the entity
assigning that address may help limiting the chances to experience
such collisions of Group Identifiers. In particular, it may allow
the Group Managers of those groups using the same IP multicast
address to share their respective list of assigned Group Identifiers
currently in use.
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12.7. Cross-group Message Injection
A same endpoint is allowed to and would likely use the same pair
(private key, authentication credential) in multiple OSCORE groups,
possibly administered by different Group Managers.
When a sender endpoint sends a message protected in pairwise mode to
a recipient endpoint in an OSCORE group, a malicious group member may
attempt to inject the message to a different OSCORE group also
including the same endpoints (see Section 12.7.1).
This practically relies on altering the content of the OSCORE option,
and having the same MAC in the ciphertext still correctly validating,
which has a success probability depending on the size of the MAC.
As discussed in Section 12.7.2, the attack is practically infeasible
if the message is protected in group mode, thanks to the
countersignature also bound to the OSCORE option through the
Additional Authenticated Data used in the signing process (see
Section 4.3).
12.7.1. Attack Description
Let us consider:
* Two OSCORE groups G1 and G2, with ID Context (Group ID) Gid1 and
Gid2, respectively. Both G1 and G2 use the AEAD cipher AES-CCM-
16-64-128, i.e., the MAC of the ciphertext is 8 bytes in size.
* A sender endpoint X which is member of both G1 and G2, and uses
the same pair (private key, authentication credential) in both
groups. The endpoint X has Sender ID Sid1 in G1 and Sender ID
Sid2 in G2. The pairs (Sid1, Gid1) and (Sid2, Gid2) identify the
same authentication credential of X in G1 and G2, respectively.
* A recipient endpoint Y which is member of both G1 and G2, and uses
the same pair (private key, authentication credential) in both
groups. The endpoint Y has Sender ID Sid3 in G1 and Sender ID
Sid4 in G2. The pairs (Sid3, Gid1) and (Sid4, Gid2) identify the
same authentication credential of Y in G1 and G2, respectively.
* A malicious endpoint Z is also member of both G1 and G2. Hence, Z
is able to derive the Sender Keys used by X in G1 and G2.
When X sends a message M1 addressed to Y in G1 and protected in
pairwise mode, Z can intercept M1, and attempt to forge a valid
message M2 to be injected in G2, making it appear as still sent by X
to Y and valid to be accepted.
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More in detail, Z intercepts and stops message M1, and forges a
message M2 by changing the value of the OSCORE option from M1 as
follows: the 'kid context' is set to G2 (rather than G1); and the
'kid' is set to Sid2 (rather than Sid1). Then, Z injects message M2
as addressed to Y in G2.
Upon receiving M2, there is a probability equal to 2^-64 that Y
successfully verifies the same unchanged MAC by using the Pairwise
Recipient Key associated with X in G2.
Note that Z does not know the pairwise keys of X and Y, since it does
not know and is not able to compute their shared Diffie-Hellman
secret. Therefore, Z is not able to check offline if a performed
forgery is actually valid, before sending the forged message to G2.
12.7.2. Attack Prevention in Group Mode
When a Group OSCORE message is protected with the group mode, the
countersignature is computed also over the value of the OSCORE
option, which is part of the Additional Authenticated Data used in
the signing process (see Section 4.3).
That is, other than over the ciphertext, the countersignature is
computed over: the ID Context (Gid) and the Partial IV, which are
always present in group requests; as well as the Sender ID of the
message originator, which is always present in group requests as well
as in responses to requests protected in group mode.
Since the signing process takes as input also the ciphertext of the
COSE_Encrypt0 object, the countersignature is bound not only to the
intended OSCORE group, hence to the triplet (Master Secret, Master
Salt, ID Context), but also to a specific Sender ID in that group and
to its specific symmetric key used for AEAD encryption, hence to the
quartet (Master Secret, Master Salt, ID Context, Sender ID).
This makes it practically infeasible to perform the attack described
in Section 12.7.1, since it would require the adversary to
additionally forge a valid countersignature that replaces the
original one in the forged message M2.
If, hypothetically, the countersignature did not cover the OSCORE
option:
* The attack described in Section 12.7.1 would still be possible
against response messages protected in group mode, since the same
unchanged countersignature from message M1 would be also valid in
message M2.
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* A simplification would also be possible in performing the attack,
since Z is able to derive the Sender/Recipient Keys of X and Y in
G1 and G2. That is, Z can also set a convenient Partial IV in the
response, until the same unchanged MAC is successfully verified by
using G2 as 'request_kid_context', Sid2 as 'request_kid', and the
symmetric key associated with X in G2.
Since the Partial IV is 5 bytes in size, this requires 2^40
operations to test all the Partial IVs, which can be done in real-
time. The probability that a single given message M1 can be used
to forge a response M2 for a given request would be equal to 2^-
24, since there are more MAC values (8 bytes in size) than Partial
IV values (5 bytes in size).
Note that, by changing the Partial IV as discussed above, any
member of G1 would also be able to forge a valid signed response
message M2 to be injected in the same group G1.
12.8. Prevention of Group Cloning Attack
Both when using the group mode and the pairwise mode, the message
protection covers also the Group Manager's authentication credential.
This is included in the Additional Authenticated Data used in the
signing process and/or in the integrity-protected encryption process
(see Section 4.3).
By doing so, an endpoint X member of a group G1 cannot perform the
following attack.
1. X sets up a group G2 where it acts as Group Manager.
2. X makes G2 a "clone" of G1, i.e., G1 and G2 use the same
algorithms and have the same Master Secret, Master Salt and ID
Context.
3. X collects a message M sent to G1 and injects it in G2.
4. Members of G2 accept M and believe it to be originated in G2.
The attack above is effectively prevented, since message M is
protected by including the authentication credential of G1's Group
Manager in the Additional Authenticated Data. Therefore, members of
G2 do not successfully verify and decrypt M, since they correctly use
the authentication credential of X as Group Manager of G2 when
attempting to.
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12.9. Group OSCORE for Unicast Requests
If a request is intended to be sent over unicast as addressed to a
single group member, it is NOT RECOMMENDED for the client to protect
the request by using the group mode as defined in Section 8.1.
This does not include the case where the client sends a request over
unicast to a proxy, to be forwarded to multiple intended recipients
over multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]. In this case, the
client MUST protect the request with the group mode, even though it
is sent to the proxy over unicast (see Section 8).
If the client uses the group mode with its own Sender Key to protect
a unicast request to a group member, an on-path adversary can, right
then or later on, redirect that request to one/many different group
member(s) over unicast, or to the whole OSCORE group over multicast.
By doing so, the adversary can induce the target group member(s) to
perform actions intended for one group member only. Note that the
adversary can be external, i.e., (s)he does not need to also be a
member of the OSCORE group.
This is due to the fact that the client is not able to indicate the
single intended recipient in a way which is secure and possible to
process for Group OSCORE on the server side. In particular, Group
OSCORE does not protect network addressing information such as the IP
address of the intended recipient server. It follows that the
server(s) receiving the redirected request cannot assert whether that
was the original intention of the client, and would thus simply
assume so.
The impact of such an attack depends especially on the REST method of
the request, i.e., the Inner CoAP Code of the OSCORE request message.
In particular, safe methods such as GET and FETCH would trigger
(several) unintended responses from the targeted server(s), while not
resulting in destructive behavior. On the other hand, non safe
methods such as PUT, POST and PATCH/iPATCH would result in the target
server(s) taking active actions on their resources and possible
cyber-physical environment, with the risk of destructive consequences
and possible implications for safety.
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A client can instead use the pairwise mode as defined in Section 9.3,
in order to protect a request sent to a single group member by using
pairwise keying material (see Section 2.4). This prevents the attack
discussed above by construction, as only the intended server is able
to derive the pairwise keying material used by the client to protect
the request. A client supporting the pairwise mode SHOULD use it to
protect requests sent to a single group member over unicast, instead
of using the group mode. For an example where this is not fulfilled,
see Section 7.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications].
With particular reference to block-wise transfers [RFC7959],
Section 3.8 of [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] points out that, while
an initial request including the CoAP Block2 option can be sent over
multicast, any other request in a transfer has to occur over unicast,
individually addressing the servers in the group.
Additional considerations are discussed in Section 10, with respect
to requests including a CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175] that have to be
sent over unicast, as a challenge-response method for servers to
achieve synchronization of clients' Sender Sequence Number.
12.10. End-to-end Protection
The same considerations from Section 12.1 of [RFC8613] hold for Group
OSCORE.
Additionally, (D)TLS and Group OSCORE can be combined for protecting
message exchanges occurring over unicast. However, it is not
possible to combine (D)TLS and Group OSCORE for protecting message
exchanges where messages are (also) sent over multicast.
12.11. Master Secret
Group OSCORE derives the Security Context using the same construction
as OSCORE, and by using the Group Identifier of a group as the
related ID Context. Hence, the same required properties of the
Security Context parameters discussed in Section 3.3 of [RFC8613]
hold for this document.
With particular reference to the OSCORE Master Secret, it has to be
kept secret among the members of the respective OSCORE group and the
Group Manager responsible for that group. Also, the Master Secret
must have a good amount of randomness, and the Group Manager can
generate it offline using a good random number generator. This
includes the case where the Group Manager rekeys the group by
generating and distributing a new Master Secret. Randomness
requirements for security are described in [RFC4086].
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12.12. Replay Protection
As in OSCORE [RFC8613], also Group OSCORE relies on Sender Sequence
Numbers included in the COSE message field 'Partial IV' and used to
build AEAD nonces.
Note that the Partial IV of an endpoint does not necessarily grow
monotonically. For instance, upon exhaustion of the endpoint Sender
Sequence Number, the Partial IV also gets exhausted. As discussed in
Section 2.5.3, this results either in the endpoint being individually
rekeyed and getting a new Sender ID, or in the establishment of a new
Security Context in the group. Therefore, uniqueness of (key, nonce)
pairs (see Section 12.3) is preserved also when a new Security
Context is established.
Since one-to-many communication such as multicast usually involves
unreliable transports, the simplification of the Replay Window to a
size of 1 suggested in Section 7.4 of [RFC8613] is not viable with
Group OSCORE, unless exchanges in the group rely only on unicast
messages.
As discussed in Section 6.2, a Replay Window may be initialized as
not valid, following the loss of mutable Security Context
Section 2.5.1. In particular, Section 2.5.1.1 and Section 2.5.1.2
define measures that endpoints need to take in such a situation,
before resuming to accept incoming messages from other group members.
12.13. Message Freshness
As discussed in Section 6.3, a server may not be able to assert
whether an incoming request is fresh, in case it does not have or has
lost synchronization with the client's Sender Sequence Number.
If freshness is relevant for the application, the server may
(re-)synchronize with the client's Sender Sequence Number at any
time, by using the approach described in Section 10 and based on the
CoAP Echo Option [RFC9175], as a variant of the approach defined in
Appendix B.1.2 of [RFC8613] applicable to Group OSCORE.
12.14. Client Aliveness
Building on Section 12.5 of [RFC8613], a server may use the CoAP Echo
Option [RFC9175] to verify the aliveness of the client that
originated a received request, by using the approach described in
Section 10 of this document.
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12.15. Cryptographic Considerations
The same considerations from Section 12.6 of [RFC8613] about the
maximum Sender Sequence Number hold for Group OSCORE.
As discussed in Section 2.5.2, an endpoint that experiences an
exhaustion of its own Sender Sequence Numbers MUST NOT protect
further messages including a Partial IV, until it has derived a new
Sender Context. This prevents the endpoint to reuse the same AEAD
nonces with the same Sender Key.
In order to renew its own Sender Context, the endpoint SHOULD inform
the Group Manager, which can either renew the whole Security Context
by means of group rekeying, or provide only that endpoint with a new
Sender ID value. In either case, the endpoint derives a new Sender
Context, and in particular a new Sender Key.
Additionally, the same considerations from Section 12.6 of [RFC8613]
hold for Group OSCORE, about building the AEAD nonce and the secrecy
of the Security Context parameters.
The group mode uses the "encrypt-then-sign" construction, i.e., the
countersignature is computed over the COSE_Encrypt0 object (see
Section 4.1). This is motivated by enabling additional entities
acting as signature checkers (see Section 3.1), which do not join a
group as members but are allowed to verify countersignatures of
messages protected in group mode without being able to decrypt them
(see Section 8.5).
If the encryption algorithm used in group mode provides integrity
protection, countersignatures of COSE_Encrypt0 with short
authentication tags do not provide the security properties associated
with the same algorithm used in COSE_Sign (see Section 6 of
[I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]). To provide 128-bit security against
collision attacks, the tag length MUST be at least 256-bits. A
countersignature of a COSE_Encrypt0 with AES-CCM-16-64-128 provides
at most 32 bits of integrity protection.
The derivation of pairwise keys defined in Section 2.4.1 is
compatible with ECDSA and EdDSA asymmetric keys, but is not
compatible with RSA asymmetric keys.
For the public key translation from Ed25519 (Ed448) to X25519 (X448)
specified in Section 2.4.1, variable time methods can be used since
the translation operates on public information. Any byte string of
appropriate length is accepted as a public key for X25519 (X448) in
[RFC7748]. It is therefore not necessary for security to validate
the translated public key (assuming the translation was successful).
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The security of using the same key pair for Diffie-Hellman and for
signing (by considering the ECDH procedure in Section 2.4 as a Key
Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)) is demonstrated in [Degabriele] and
[Thormarker].
Applications using ECDH (except X25519 and X448) based KEM in
Section 2.4 are assumed to verify that a peer endpoint's public key
is on the expected curve and that the shared secret is not the point
at infinity. The KEM in [Degabriele] checks that the shared secret
is different from the point at infinity, as does the procedure in
Section 5.7.1.2 of [NIST-800-56A] which is referenced in Section 2.4.
Extending Theorem 2 of [Degabriele], [Thormarker] shows that the same
key pair can be used with X25519 and Ed25519 (X448 and Ed448) for the
KEM specified in Section 2.4. By symmetry in the KEM used in this
document, both endpoints can consider themselves to have the
recipient role in the KEM - as discussed in Section 7 of [Thormarker]
- and rely on the mentioned proofs for the security of their key
pairs.
Theorem 3 in [Degabriele] shows that the same key pair can be used
for an ECDH based KEM and ECDSA. The KEM uses a different KDF than
in Section 2.4, but the proof only depends on that the KDF has
certain required properties, which are the typical assumptions about
HKDF, e.g., that output keys are pseudorandom. In order to comply
with the assumptions of Theorem 3, received public keys MUST be
successfully validated, see Section 5.6.2.3.4 of [NIST-800-56A]. The
validation MAY be performed by a trusted Group Manager. For
[Degabriele] to apply as it is written, public keys need to be in the
expected subgroup. For this we rely on cofactor DH, Section 5.7.1.2
of [NIST-800-56A] which is referenced in Section 2.4.
HashEdDSA variants of Ed25519 and Ed448 are not used by COSE, see
Section 2.2 of [I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], and are not covered
by the analysis in [Thormarker]. Hence, they MUST NOT be used with
the public keys used to derive pairwise keys as specified in this
document.
12.16. Message Segmentation
The same considerations from Section 12.7 of [RFC8613] hold for Group
OSCORE.
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12.17. Privacy Considerations
Group OSCORE ensures end-to-end integrity protection and encryption
of the message payload and all options that are not used for proxy
operations. In particular, options are processed according to the
same class U/I/E that they have for OSCORE. Therefore, the same
privacy considerations from Section 12.8 of [RFC8613] hold for Group
OSCORE, with the following addition.
* When protecting a message in group mode, the countersignature is
encrypted by using a keystream derived from the group keying
material (see Section 4.1 and Section 4.1.1). This ensures group
privacy. That is, an attacker cannot track an endpoint over two
groups by linking messages between the two groups, unless being
also a member of those groups.
Furthermore, the following privacy considerations hold about the
OSCORE option, which may reveal information on the communicating
endpoints.
* The 'kid' parameter, which is intended to help a recipient
endpoint to find the right Recipient Context, may reveal
information about the Sender Endpoint. When both a request and
the corresponding responses include the 'kid' parameter, this may
reveal information about both a client sending a request and all
the possibly replying servers sending their own individual
response.
* The 'kid context' parameter, which is intended to help a recipient
endpoint to find the right Security Context, reveals information
about the sender endpoint. In particular, it reveals that the
sender endpoint is a member of a particular OSCORE group, whose
current Group ID is indicated in the 'kid context' parameter.
When receiving a group request, each of the recipient endpoints can
reply with a response that includes its Sender ID as 'kid' parameter.
All these responses will be matchable with the request through the
Token. Thus, even if these responses do not include a 'kid context'
parameter, it becomes possible to understand that the responder
endpoints are in the same group of the requester endpoint.
Furthermore, using the approach described in Section 10 to achieve
Sender Sequence Number synchronization with a client may reveal when
a server device goes through a reboot. This can be mitigated by the
server device storing the precise state of the Replay Window of each
known client on a clean shutdown.
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Finally, the approach described in Section 12.6 to prevent collisions
of Group Identifiers from different Group Managers may reveal
information about events in the respective OSCORE groups. In
particular, a Group Identifier changes when the corresponding group
is rekeyed. Thus, Group Managers might use the shared list of Group
Identifiers to infer the rate and patterns of group membership
changes triggering a group rekeying, e.g., due to newly joined
members or evicted (compromised) members. In order to alleviate this
privacy concern, it should be hidden from the Group Managers which
exact Group Manager has currently assigned which Group Identifiers in
its OSCORE groups.
13. IANA Considerations
Note to RFC Editor: Please replace "[This Document]" with the RFC
number of this document and delete this paragraph.
This document has the following actions for IANA.
13.1. OSCORE Flag Bits Registry
IANA is asked to add the following value entry to the "OSCORE Flag
Bits" registry within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
Parameters" registry group.
+--------------+------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| Bit Position | Name | Description | Reference |
+--------------+------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
| 2 | Group Flag | For using a Group OSCORE | [This |
| | | Security Context, set to 1 | Document] |
| | | if the message is protected | |
| | | with the group mode | |
+--------------+------------+-----------------------------+-----------+
14. References
14.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]
Dijk, E., Wang, C., and M. Tiloca, "Group Communication
for the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-groupcomm-bis-
06, 7 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
ietf-core-groupcomm-bis-06.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-countersign]
Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "CBOR Object Signing and
Encryption (COSE): Countersignatures", Work in Progress,
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Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-countersign-05, 23 June
2021, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-
countersign-05.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Initial Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs-12, 24 September 2020,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-
rfc8152bis-algs-12.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct-15, 1 February 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-
rfc8152bis-struct-15.txt>.
[NIST-800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography - NIST
Special Publication 800-56A, Revision 3", April 2018,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC6979] Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
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[RFC7641] Hartke, K., "Observing Resources in the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7641,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7641, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641>.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC9175] Amsüss, C., Preuß Mattsson, J., and G. Selander,
"Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP): Echo, Request-
Tag, and Token Processing", RFC 9175,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9175, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9175>.
14.2. Informative References
[Degabriele]
Degabriele, J.P., Lehmann, A., Paterson, K.G., Smart,
N.P., and M. Strefler, "On the Joint Security of
Encryption and Signature in EMV", December 2011,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/615>.
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[I-D.amsuess-core-cachable-oscore]
Amsüss, C. and M. Tiloca, "Cacheable OSCORE", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-amsuess-core-cachable-
oscore-04, 6 March 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/
draft-amsuess-core-cachable-oscore-04.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm]
Palombini, F. and M. Tiloca, "Key Provisioning for Group
Communication using ACE", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-15, 23 December 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-key-
groupcomm-15.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore]
Tiloca, M., Park, J., and F. Palombini, "Key Management
for OSCORE Groups in ACE", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore-13, 7 March
2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-key-
groupcomm-oscore-13.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-46, 8 November 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-
authz-46.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-core-observe-multicast-notifications]
Tiloca, M., Höglund, R., Amsüss, C., and F. Palombini,
"Observe Notifications as CoAP Multicast Responses", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-observe-
multicast-notifications-03, 7 March 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-core-observe-
multicast-notifications-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert]
Mattsson, J. P., Selander, G., Raza, S., Höglund, J., and
M. Furuhed, "CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509
Certificates)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-03, 10 January 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-cose-cbor-
encoded-cert-03.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-lwig-curve-representations]
Struik, R., "Alternative Elliptic Curve Representations",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
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representations-23, 21 January 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lwig-curve-
representations-23.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-lwig-security-protocol-comparison]
Mattsson, J. P., Palombini, F., and M. Vucinic,
"Comparison of CoAP Security Protocols", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lwig-security-protocol-
comparison-05, 2 November 2020,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lwig-security-
protocol-comparison-05.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-
dtls13-43, 30 April 2021, <https://www.ietf.org/internet-
drafts/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-43.txt>.
[I-D.mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise]
Mattsson, J. P., Thormarker, E., and S. Ruohomaa,
"Deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA Signatures with Additional
Randomness", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
mattsson-cfrg-det-sigs-with-noise-04, 15 February 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-mattsson-cfrg-det-
sigs-with-noise-04.txt>.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>.
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[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7925] Tschofenig, H., Ed. and T. Fossati, "Transport Layer
Security (TLS) / Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
Profiles for the Internet of Things", RFC 7925,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7925, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7925>.
[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[Thormarker]
Thormarker, E., "On using the same key pair for Ed25519
and an X25519 based KEM", April 2021,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/509>.
Appendix A. Assumptions and Security Objectives
This section presents a set of assumptions and security objectives
for the approach described in this document. The rest of this
section refers to three types of groups:
* Application group, i.e., a set of CoAP endpoints that share a
common pool of resources.
* Security group, as defined in Section 1.1 of this document. There
can be a one-to-one or a one-to-many relation between security
groups and application groups, and vice versa.
* CoAP group, i.e., a set of CoAP endpoints where each endpoint is
configured to receive one-to-many CoAP requests, e.g., sent to the
group's associated IP multicast address and UDP port as defined in
[I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis]. An endpoint may be a member of
multiple CoAP groups. There can be a one-to-one or a one-to-many
relation between application groups and CoAP groups. Note that a
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device sending a CoAP request to a CoAP group is not necessarily
itself a member of that group: it is a member only if it also has
a CoAP server endpoint listening to requests for this CoAP group,
sent to the associated IP multicast address and port. In order to
provide secure group communication, all members of a CoAP group as
well as all further endpoints configured only as clients sending
CoAP (multicast) requests to the CoAP group have to be member of a
security group. There can be a one-to-one or a one-to-many
relation between security groups and CoAP groups, and vice versa.
A.1. Assumptions
The following points are assumed to be already addressed and are out
of the scope of this document.
* Multicast communication topology: this document considers both
1-to-N (one sender and multiple recipients) and M-to-N (multiple
senders and multiple recipients) communication topologies. The
1-to-N communication topology is the simplest group communication
scenario that would serve the needs of a typical Low-power and
Lossy Network (LLN). Examples of use cases that benefit from
secure group communication are provided in Appendix B.
In a 1-to-N communication model, only a single client transmits
data to the CoAP group, in the form of request messages; in an
M-to-N communication model (where M and N do not necessarily have
the same value), M clients transmit data to the CoAP group.
According to [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis], any possible proxy
entity is supposed to know about the clients. Also, every client
expects and is able to handle multiple response messages
associated with a same request sent to the CoAP group.
* Group size: security solutions for group communication should be
able to adequately support different and possibly large security
groups. The group size is the current number of members in a
security group. In the use cases mentioned in this document, the
number of clients (normally the controlling devices) is expected
to be much smaller than the number of servers (i.e., the
controlled devices). A security solution for group communication
that supports 1 to 50 clients would be able to properly cover the
group sizes required for most use cases that are relevant for this
document. The maximum group size is expected to be in the range
of 2 to 100 devices. Security groups larger than that should be
divided into smaller independent groups. One should not assume
that the set of members of a security group remains fixed. That
is, the group membership is subject to changes, possibly on a
frequent basis.
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* Communication with the Group Manager: an endpoint must use a
secure dedicated channel when communicating with the Group
Manager, also when not registered as a member of the security
group.
* Provisioning and management of Security Contexts: a Security
Context must be established among the members of the security
group. A secure mechanism must be used to generate, revoke and
(re-)distribute keying material, communication policies and
security parameters in the security group. The actual
provisioning and management of the Security Context is out of the
scope of this document.
* Multicast data security ciphersuite: all members of a security
group must use the same ciphersuite to provide authenticity,
integrity and confidentiality of messages in the group. The
ciphersuite is specified as part of the Security Context.
* Backward security: a new device joining the security group should
not have access to any old Security Contexts used before its
joining. This ensures that a new member of the security group is
not able to decrypt confidential data sent before it has joined
the security group. The adopted key management scheme should
ensure that the Security Context is updated to ensure backward
confidentiality. The actual mechanism to update the Security
Context and renew the group keying material in the security group
upon a new member's joining has to be defined as part of the group
key management scheme.
* Forward security: entities that leave the security group should
not have access to any future Security Contexts or message
exchanged within the security group after their leaving. This
ensures that a former member of the security group is not able to
decrypt confidential data sent within the security group anymore.
Also, it ensures that a former member is not able to send
protected messages to the security group anymore. The actual
mechanism to update the Security Context and renew the group
keying material in the security group upon a member's leaving has
to be defined as part of the group key management scheme.
A.2. Security Objectives
The approach described in this document aims at fulfilling the
following security objectives:
* Data replay protection: group request messages or response
messages replayed within the security group must be detected.
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* Data confidentiality: messages sent within the security group
shall be encrypted.
* Group-level data confidentiality: the group mode provides group-
level data confidentiality since messages are encrypted at a group
level, i.e., in such a way that they can be decrypted by any
member of the security group, but not by an external adversary or
other external entities.
* Pairwise data confidentiality: the pairwise mode especially
provides pairwise data confidentiality, since messages are
encrypted using pairwise keying material shared between any two
group members, hence they can be decrypted only by the intended
single recipient.
* Source message authentication: messages sent within the security
group shall be authenticated. That is, it is essential to ensure
that a message is originated by a member of the security group in
the first place, and in particular by a specific, identifiable
member of the security group.
* Message integrity: messages sent within the security group shall
be integrity protected. That is, it is essential to ensure that a
message has not been tampered with, either by a group member, or
by an external adversary or other external entities which are not
members of the security group.
* Message ordering: it must be possible to determine the ordering of
messages coming from a single sender. In accordance with OSCORE
[RFC8613], this results in providing absolute freshness of
responses that are not notifications, as well as relative
freshness of group requests and notification responses. It is not
required to determine ordering of messages from different senders.
Appendix B. List of Use Cases
Group Communication for CoAP [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] provides
the necessary background for multicast-based CoAP communication, with
particular reference to low-power and lossy networks (LLNs) and
resource constrained environments. The interested reader is
encouraged to first read [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] to understand
the non-security related details. This section discusses a number of
use cases that benefit from secure group communication, and refers to
the three types of groups from Appendix A. Specific security
requirements for these use cases are discussed in Appendix A.
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* Lighting control: consider a building equipped with IP-connected
lighting devices, switches, and border routers. The lighting
devices acting as servers are organized into application groups
and CoAP groups, according to their physical location in the
building. For instance, lighting devices in a room or corridor
can be configured as members of a single application group and
corresponding CoAP group. Those lighting devices together with
the switches acting as clients in the same room or corridor can be
configured as members of the corresponding security group.
Switches are then used to control the lighting devices by sending
on/off/dimming commands to all lighting devices in the CoAP group,
while border routers connected to an IP network backbone (which is
also multicast-enabled) can be used to interconnect routers in the
building. Consequently, this would also enable logical groups to
be formed even if devices with a role in the lighting application
may be physically in different subnets (e.g., on wired and
wireless networks). Connectivity between lighting devices may be
realized, for instance, by means of IPv6 and (border) routers
supporting 6LoWPAN [RFC4944][RFC6282]. Group communication
enables synchronous operation of a set of connected lights,
ensuring that the light preset (e.g., dimming level or color) of a
large set of luminaires are changed at the same perceived time.
This is especially useful for providing a visual synchronicity of
light effects to the user. As a practical guideline, events
within a 200 ms interval are perceived as simultaneous by humans,
which is necessary to ensure in many setups. Devices may reply
back to the switches that issue on/off/dimming commands, in order
to report about the execution of the requested operation (e.g.,
OK, failure, error) and their current operational status. In a
typical lighting control scenario, a single switch is the only
entity responsible for sending commands to a set of lighting
devices. In more advanced lighting control use cases, a M-to-N
communication topology would be required, for instance in case
multiple sensors (presence or day-light) are responsible to
trigger events to a set of lighting devices. Especially in
professional lighting scenarios, the roles of client and server
are configured by the lighting commissioner, and devices strictly
follow those roles.
* Integrated building control: enabling Building Automation and
Control Systems (BACSs) to control multiple heating, ventilation
and air-conditioning units to predefined presets. Controlled
units can be organized into application groups and CoAP groups in
order to reflect their physical position in the building, e.g.,
devices in the same room can be configured as members of a single
application group and corresponding CoAP group. As a practical
guideline, events within intervals of seconds are typically
acceptable. Controlled units are expected to possibly reply back
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to the BACS issuing control commands, in order to report about the
execution of the requested operation (e.g., OK, failure, error)
and their current operational status.
* Software and firmware updates: software and firmware updates often
comprise quite a large amount of data. This can overload a Low-
power and Lossy Network (LLN) that is otherwise typically used to
deal with only small amounts of data, on an infrequent base.
Rather than sending software and firmware updates as unicast
messages to each individual device, multicasting such updated data
to a larger set of devices at once displays a number of benefits.
For instance, it can significantly reduce the network load and
decrease the overall time latency for propagating this data to all
devices. Even if the complete whole update process itself is
secured, securing the individual messages is important, in case
updates consist of relatively large amounts of data. In fact,
checking individual received data piecemeal for tampering avoids
that devices store large amounts of partially corrupted data and
that they detect tampering hereof only after all data has been
received. Devices receiving software and firmware updates are
expected to possibly reply back, in order to provide a feedback
about the execution of the update operation (e.g., OK, failure,
error) and their current operational status.
* Parameter and configuration update: by means of multicast
communication, it is possible to update the settings of a set of
similar devices, both simultaneously and efficiently. Possible
parameters are related, for instance, to network load management
or network access controls. Devices receiving parameter and
configuration updates are expected to possibly reply back, to
provide a feedback about the execution of the update operation
(e.g., OK, failure, error) and their current operational status.
* Commissioning of Low-power and Lossy Network (LLN) systems: a
commissioning device is responsible for querying all devices in
the local network or a selected subset of them, in order to
discover their presence, and be aware of their capabilities,
default configuration, and operating conditions. Queried devices
displaying similarities in their capabilities and features, or
sharing a common physical location can be configured as members of
a single application group and corresponding CoAP group. Queried
devices are expected to reply back to the commissioning device, in
order to notify their presence, and provide the requested
information and their current operational status.
* Emergency multicast: a particular emergency related information
(e.g., natural disaster) is generated and multicast by an
emergency notifier, and relayed to multiple devices. The latter
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may reply back to the emergency notifier, in order to provide
their feedback and local information related to the ongoing
emergency. This kind of setups should additionally rely on a
fault-tolerant multicast algorithm, such as Multicast Protocol for
Low-Power and Lossy Networks (MPL).
Appendix C. Example of Group Identifier Format
This section provides an example of how the Group Identifier (Gid)
can be specifically formatted. That is, the Gid can be composed of
two parts, namely a Group Prefix and a Group Epoch.
For each group, the Group Prefix is constant over time and is
uniquely defined in the set of all the groups associated with the
same Group Manager. The choice of the Group Prefix for a given
group's Security Context is application specific. The size of the
Group Prefix directly impact on the maximum number of distinct groups
under the same Group Manager.
The Group Epoch is set to 0 upon the group's initialization, and is
incremented by 1 each time new keying material, together with a new
Gid, is distributed to the group in order to establish a new Security
Context (see Section 3.2).
As an example, a 3-byte Gid can be composed of: i) a 1-byte Group
Prefix '0xb1' interpreted as a raw byte string; and ii) a 2-byte
Group Epoch interpreted as an unsigned integer ranging from 0 to
65535. Then, after having established the Common Context 61532 times
in the group, its Gid will assume value '0xb1f05c'.
Using an immutable Group Prefix for a group assumes that enough time
elapses before all possible Group Epoch values are used, i.e., before
the Group Manager terminates the group or starts reassigning Gid
values to the group (see Section 3.2). Thus, the expected highest
rate for addition/removal of group members and consequent group
rekeying should be taken into account for a proper dimensioning of
the Group Epoch size.
As discussed in Section 12.6, if endpoints are deployed in multiple
groups managed by different non-synchronized Group Managers, it is
possible that Group Identifiers of different groups coincide at some
point in time. In this case, a recipient has to handle coinciding
Group Identifiers, and has to try using different Security Contexts
to process an incoming message, until the right one is found and the
message is correctly verified. Therefore, it is favorable that Group
Identifiers from different Group Managers have a size that result in
a small probability of collision. How small this probability should
be is up to system designers.
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Appendix D. Set-up of New Endpoints
An endpoint joins a group by explicitly interacting with the
responsible Group Manager. When becoming members of a group,
endpoints are not required to know how many and what endpoints are in
the same group.
Communications between a joining endpoint and the Group Manager rely
on the CoAP protocol and must be secured. Specific details on how to
secure communications between joining endpoints and a Group Manager
are out of the scope of this document.
The Group Manager must verify that the joining endpoint is authorized
to join the group. To this end, the Group Manager can directly
authorize the joining endpoint, or expect it to provide authorization
evidence previously obtained from a trusted entity. Further details
about the authorization of joining endpoints are out of scope.
In case of successful authorization check, the Group Manager
generates a Sender ID assigned to the joining endpoint, before
proceeding with the rest of the join process. That is, the Group
Manager provides the joining endpoint with the keying material and
parameters to initialize the Security Context, including its own
authentication credential (see Section 2). The actual provisioning
of keying material and parameters to the joining endpoint is out of
the scope of this document.
As mentioned in Section 3, the Group Manager and the join process can
be as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore].
Appendix E. Document Updates
RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.
E.1. Version -13 to -14
* Replaced "node" with "endpoint" where appropriate.
* Replaced "owning" with "storing" (of keying material).
* Distinction between "authentication credential" and "public key".
* Considerations on storing whole authentication credentials.
* Considerations on Denial of Service.
* Recycling of Group IDs by tracking the "Birth Gid" of each group
member is now optional to support and use for the Group Manager.
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* Fine-grained suppression of error responses.
* Changed section title "Mandatory-to-Implement Compliance
Requirements" to "Implementation Compliance".
* "Challenge-Response Synchronization" moved to the document body.
* RFC 7641 and draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag as normative
references.
* Clarifications and editorial improvements.
E.2. Version -12 to -13
* Fixes in the derivation of the Group Encryption Key.
* Added Mandatory-to-Implement compliance requirements.
* Changed UCCS to CCS.
E.3. Version -11 to -12
* No mode of operation is mandatory to support.
* Revised parameters of the Security Context, COSE object and
external_aad.
* Revised management of keying material for the Group Manager.
* Informing of former members when rekeying the group.
* Admit encryption-only algorithms in group mode.
* Encrypted countersignature through a keystream.
* Added public key of the Group Manager as key material and
protected data.
* Clarifications about message processing, especially notifications.
* Guidance for message processing of external signature checkers.
* Updated derivation of pairwise keys, with more security
considerations.
* Termination of ongoing observations as client, upon leaving or
before re-joining the group.
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* Recycling Group IDs by tracking the "Birth Gid" of each group
member.
* Expanded security and privacy considerations about the group mode.
* Removed appendices on skipping signature verification and on COSE
capabilities.
* Fixes and editorial improvements.
E.4. Version -10 to -11
* Loss of Recipient Contexts due to their overflow.
* Added diagram on keying material components and their relation.
* Distinction between anti-replay and freshness.
* Preservation of Sender IDs over rekeying.
* Clearer cause-effect about reset of SSN.
* The GM provides public keys of group members with associated
Sender IDs.
* Removed 'par_countersign_key' from the external_aad.
* One single format for the external_aad, both for encryption and
signing.
* Presence of 'kid' in responses to requests protected with the
pairwise mode.
* Inclusion of 'kid_context' in notifications following a group
rekeying.
* Pairwise mode presented with OSCORE as baseline.
* Revised examples with signature values.
* Decoupled growth of clients' Sender Sequence Numbers and loss of
synchronization for server.
* Sender IDs not recycled in the group under the same Gid.
* Processing and description of the Group Flag bit in the OSCORE
option.
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* Usage of the pairwise mode for multicast requests.
* Clarifications on synchronization using the Echo option.
* General format of context parameters and external_aad elements,
supporting future registered COSE algorithms (new Appendix).
* Fixes and editorial improvements.
E.5. Version -09 to -10
* Removed 'Counter Signature Key Parameters' from the Common
Context.
* New parameters in the Common Context covering the DH secret
derivation.
* New countersignature header parameter from draft-ietf-cose-
countersign.
* Stronger policies non non-recycling of Sender IDs and Gid.
* The Sender Sequence Number is reset when establishing a new
Security Context.
* Added 'request_kid_context' in the aad_array.
* The server can respond with 5.03 if the client's public key is not
available.
* The observer client stores an invariant identifier of the group.
* Relaxed storing of original 'kid' for observer clients.
* Both client and server store the 'kid_context' of the original
observation request.
* The server uses a fresh PIV if protecting the response with a
Security Context different from the one used to protect the
request.
* Clarifications on MTI algorithms and curves.
* Removed optimized requests.
* Overall clarifications and editorial revision.
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E.6. Version -08 to -09
* Pairwise keys are discarded after group rekeying.
* Signature mode renamed to group mode.
* The parameters for countersignatures use the updated COSE
registries. Newly defined IANA registries have been removed.
* Pairwise Flag bit renamed as Group Flag bit, set to 1 in group
mode and set to 0 in pairwise mode.
* Dedicated section on updating the Security Context.
* By default, sender sequence numbers and replay windows are not
reset upon group rekeying.
* An endpoint implementing only a silent server does not support the
pairwise mode.
* Separate section on general message reception.
* Pairwise mode moved to the document body.
* Considerations on using the pairwise mode in non-multicast
settings.
* Optimized requests are moved as an appendix.
* Normative support for the signature and pairwise mode.
* Revised methods for synchronization with clients' sender sequence
number.
* Appendix with example values of parameters for countersignatures.
* Clarifications and editorial improvements.
E.7. Version -07 to -08
* Clarified relation between pairwise mode and group communication
(Section 1).
* Improved definition of "silent server" (Section 1.1).
* Clarified when a Recipient Context is needed (Section 2).
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* Signature checkers as entities supported by the Group Manager
(Section 2.3).
* Clarified that the Group Manager is under exclusive control of Gid
and Sender ID values in a group, with Sender ID values under each
Gid value (Section 2.3).
* Mitigation policies in case of recycled 'kid' values
(Section 2.4).
* More generic exhaustion (not necessarily wrap-around) of sender
sequence numbers (Sections 2.5 and 10.11).
* Pairwise key considerations, as to group rekeying and Sender
Sequence Numbers (Section 3).
* Added reference to static-static Diffie-Hellman shared secret
(Section 3).
* Note for implementation about the external_aad for signing
(Sectino 4.3.2).
* Retransmission by the application for group requests over
multicast as Non-confirmable (Section 7).
* A server MUST use its own Partial IV in a response, if protecting
it with a different context than the one used for the request
(Section 7.3).
* Security considerations: encryption of pairwise mode as
alternative to group-level security (Section 10.1).
* Security considerations: added approach to reduce the chance of
global collisions of Gid values from different Group Managers
(Section 10.5).
* Security considerations: added implications for block-wise
transfers when using the signature mode for requests over unicast
(Section 10.7).
* Security considerations: (multiple) supported signature algorithms
(Section 10.13).
* Security considerations: added privacy considerations on the
approach for reducing global collisions of Gid values
(Section 10.15).
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* Updates to the methods for synchronizing with clients' sequence
number (Appendix E).
* Simplified text on discovery services supporting the pairwise mode
(Appendix G.1).
* Editorial improvements.
E.8. Version -06 to -07
* Updated abstract and introduction.
* Clarifications of what pertains a group rekeying.
* Derivation of pairwise keying material.
* Content re-organization for COSE Object and OSCORE header
compression.
* Defined the Pairwise Flag bit for the OSCORE option.
* Supporting CoAP Observe for group requests and responses.
* Considerations on message protection across switching to new
keying material.
* New optimized mode based on pairwise keying material.
* More considerations on replay protection and Security Contexts
upon key renewal.
* Security considerations on Group OSCORE for unicast requests, also
as affecting the usage of the Echo option.
* Clarification on different types of groups considered
(application/security/CoAP).
* New pairwise mode, using pairwise keying material for both
requests and responses.
E.9. Version -05 to -06
* Group IDs mandated to be unique under the same Group Manager.
* Clarifications on parameter update upon group rekeying.
* Updated external_aad structures.
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* Dynamic derivation of Recipient Contexts made optional and
application specific.
* Optional 4.00 response for failed signature verification on the
server.
* Removed client handling of duplicated responses to multicast
requests.
* Additional considerations on public key retrieval and group
rekeying.
* Added Group Manager responsibility on validating public keys.
* Updates IANA registries.
* Reference to RFC 8613.
* Editorial improvements.
E.10. Version -04 to -05
* Added references to draft-dijk-core-groupcomm-bis.
* New parameter Counter Signature Key Parameters (Section 2).
* Clarification about Recipient Contexts (Section 2).
* Two different external_aad for encrypting and signing
(Section 3.1).
* Updated response verification to handle Observe notifications
(Section 6.4).
* Extended Security Considerations (Section 8).
* New "Counter Signature Key Parameters" IANA Registry
(Section 9.2).
E.11. Version -03 to -04
* Added the new "Counter Signature Parameters" in the Common Context
(see Section 2).
* Added recommendation on using "deterministic ECDSA" if ECDSA is
used as countersignature algorithm (see Section 2).
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* Clarified possible asynchronous retrieval of keying material from
the Group Manager, in order to process incoming messages (see
Section 2).
* Structured Section 3 into subsections.
* Added the new 'par_countersign' to the aad_array of the
external_aad (see Section 3.1).
* Clarified non reliability of 'kid' as identity identifier for a
group member (see Section 2.1).
* Described possible provisioning of new Sender ID in case of
Partial IV wrap-around (see Section 2.2).
* The former signature bit in the Flag Byte of the OSCORE option
value is reverted to reserved (see Section 4.1).
* Updated examples of compressed COSE object, now with the sixth
less significant bit in the Flag Byte of the OSCORE option value
set to 0 (see Section 4.3).
* Relaxed statements on sending error messages (see Section 6).
* Added explicit step on computing the countersignature for outgoing
messages (see Sections 6.1 and 6.3).
* Handling of just created Recipient Contexts in case of
unsuccessful message verification (see Sections 6.2 and 6.4).
* Handling of replied/repeated responses on the client (see
Section 6.4).
* New IANA Registry "Counter Signature Parameters" (see
Section 9.1).
E.12. Version -02 to -03
* Revised structure and phrasing for improved readability and better
alignment with draft-ietf-core-object-security.
* Added discussion on wrap-Around of Partial IVs (see Section 2.2).
* Separate sections for the COSE Object (Section 3) and the OSCORE
Header Compression (Section 4).
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* The countersignature is now appended to the encrypted payload of
the OSCORE message, rather than included in the OSCORE Option (see
Section 4).
* Extended scope of Section 5, now titled " Message Binding,
Sequence Numbers, Freshness and Replay Protection".
* Clarifications about Non-confirmable messages in Section 5.1
"Synchronization of Sender Sequence Numbers".
* Clarifications about error handling in Section 6 "Message
Processing".
* Compacted list of responsibilities of the Group Manager in
Section 7.
* Revised and extended security considerations in Section 8.
* Added IANA considerations for the OSCORE Flag Bits Registry in
Section 9.
* Revised Appendix D, now giving a short high-level description of a
new endpoint set-up.
E.13. Version -01 to -02
* Terminology has been made more aligned with RFC7252 and draft-
ietf-core-object-security: i) "client" and "server" replace the
old "multicaster" and "listener", respectively; ii) "silent
server" replaces the old "pure listener".
* Section 2 has been updated to have the Group Identifier stored in
the 'ID Context' parameter defined in draft-ietf-core-object-
security.
* Section 3 has been updated with the new format of the Additional
Authenticated Data.
* Major rewriting of Section 4 to better highlight the differences
with the message processing in draft-ietf-core-object-security.
* Added Sections 7.2 and 7.3 discussing security considerations
about uniqueness of (key, nonce) and collision of group
identifiers, respectively.
* Minor updates to Appendix A.1 about assumptions on multicast
communication topology and group size.
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* Updated Appendix C on format of group identifiers, with practical
implications of possible collisions of group identifiers.
* Updated Appendix D.2, adding a pointer to draft-palombini-ace-key-
groupcomm about retrieval of nodes' public keys through the Group
Manager.
* Minor updates to Appendix E.3 about Challenge-Response
synchronization of sequence numbers based on the Echo option from
draft-ietf-core-echo-request-tag.
E.14. Version -00 to -01
* Section 1.1 has been updated with the definition of group as
"security group".
* Section 2 has been updated with:
- Clarifications on establishment/derivation of Security
Contexts.
- A table summarizing the the additional context elements
compared to OSCORE.
* Section 3 has been updated with:
- Examples of request and response messages.
- Use of CounterSignature0 rather than CounterSignature.
- Additional Authenticated Data including also the signature
algorithm, while not including the Group Identifier any longer.
* Added Section 6, listing the responsibilities of the Group
Manager.
* Added Appendix A (former section), including assumptions and
security objectives.
* Appendix B has been updated with more details on the use cases.
* Added Appendix C, providing an example of Group Identifier format.
* Appendix D has been updated to be aligned with draft-palombini-
ace-key-groupcomm.
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Acknowledgments
The authors sincerely thank Christian Amsuess, Stefan Beck, Rolf
Blom, Carsten Bormann, Esko Dijk, Martin Gunnarsson, Klaus Hartke,
Rikard Hoeglund, Richard Kelsey, Dave Robin, Jim Schaad, Ludwig
Seitz, Peter van der Stok and Erik Thormarker for their feedback and
comments.
The work on this document has been partly supported by VINNOVA and
the Celtic-Next project CRITISEC; the H2020 project SIFIS-Home (Grant
agreement 952652); the SSF project SEC4Factory under the grant
RIT17-0032; and the EIT-Digital High Impact Initiative ACTIVE.
Authors' Addresses
Marco Tiloca
RISE AB
Isafjordsgatan 22
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: marco.tiloca@ri.se
Göran Selander
Ericsson AB
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
Francesca Palombini
Ericsson AB
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: francesca.palombini@ericsson.com
John Preuss Mattsson
Ericsson AB
Torshamnsgatan 23
SE-16440 Stockholm Kista
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
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Jiye Park
Universitaet Duisburg-Essen
Schuetzenbahn 70
45127 Essen
Germany
Email: ji-ye.park@uni-due.de
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