Edwards-Curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC
draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa-03
Yes
(Alexey Melnikov)
(Ben Campbell)
(Kathleen Moriarty)
(Stephen Farrell)
(Terry Manderson)
No Objection
(Alia Atlas)
(Alissa Cooper)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Benoît Claise)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Jari Arkko)
(Joel Jaeggli)
(Suresh Krishnan)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 02 and is now closed.
Alexey Melnikov Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
(for -02)
Unknown
Terry Manderson Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Alia Atlas Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Benoît Claise Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Mirja Kühlewind Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2017-01-02)
Unknown
I am a little suprised to read this: "A sufficiently large quantum computer would be able to break both. " What's sufficiently large in terms of quantum comupting? Is it really already necessary to say this? And here: "Reasonable projections of the abilities of classical computers conclude that Ed25519 is perfectly safe." What's perfectly safe? However no need to change anything... was just wondering.
Suresh Krishnan Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown