Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell (SSH)
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-07

Internet Engineering Task Force                               M. Baushke
Internet-Draft                                    Juniper Networks, Inc.
Updates: 4250, 4253 (if approved)                         March 27, 2017
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: September 28, 2017

 Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell
                                 (SSH)
                   draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-07

Abstract

   This document is intended to update the recommended set of key
   exchange methods for use in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol to meet
   evolving needs for stronger security.  This RFC updates [RFC4253]
   MUST algorithms.  This RFC also notes that the [IANASSH] has replaced
   [RFC4250] as the primary reference document for SSH Protocol Assigned
   Numbers.

   This document adds recommendations for adoption of Key Exchange
   Methods which MUST, SHOULD+, SHOULD, SHOULD-, MAY, SHOULD NOT, and
   MUST NOT be implemented.  New key exchange methods will use the SHA-2
   family of hashes and are drawn from these from
   [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves] and new-modp from the
   [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2] and gss-keyex [NEWGSSAPI].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2017.

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Overview and Rationale  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Key Exchange Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  curve25519-sha256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  diffie-hellman-group1-sha1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.5.  diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.6.  diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.7.  ecdh-sha2-nistp256  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.8.  ecdh-sha2-nistp384  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.9.  gss-gex-sha1-*  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.10. gss-group1-sha1-* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.11. gss-group14-sha1-*  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.12. gss-group14-sha256-*  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.13. gss-group16-sha512-*  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.14. rsa1024-sha1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Summary Guidance for Key Exchange Method Names  . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Overview and Rationale

   Secure Shell (SSH) is a common protocol for secure communication on
   the Internet.  In [RFC4253], SSH originally defined two Key Exchange
   Method Names that MUST be implemented.  Over time, what was once
   considered secure, is no longer considered secure.  The purpose of

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 2]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

   this RFC is to recommend that some published key exchanges be adopted
   or reclassified and others retired.

   [TO BE REMOVED: Please send comments on this draft to
   curdle@ietf.org.]

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   When used in the tables in this document, these terms indicate that
   the listed algorithm MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT or MAY be
   implemented as part of a Secure Shell implementation.  Additional
   terms used in this document are:

    SHOULD+   This term means the same as SHOULD. However, it is likely
              that an algorithm marked as SHOULD+ will be promoted at
              some future time to be a MUST.
    SHOULD-   This term means the same as SHOULD. However, an algorithm
              marked as SHOULD- may be deprecated to a MAY in a future
              version of this document.

3.  Key Exchange Methods

   This memo adopts the style and conventions of [RFC4253] in specifying
   how the use of data key exchange is indicated in SSH.

   This RFC also collects Key Exchange Method Names in various existing
   RFCs [RFC4253], [RFC4419], [RFC4432], [RFC4462], [RFC5656],
   [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2], [NEWGSSAPI], and
   [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves] and provides a suggested suitability for
   implementation of MUST, SHOULD+, SHOULD, SHOULD-, SHOULD NOT, and
   MUST NOT.

   This document is intended to provide guidance as to what Key Exchange
   Algorithms are to be considered for new or updated SSH
   implementations.  This document will be superseded when one or more
   of the listed algorithms are considered too weak to continue to use
   securely, or when newer methods have been analyzed and found to be
   secure with wide enough adoption to upgrade their recommendation from
   MAY to SHOULD or MUST.

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 3]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

3.1.  curve25519-sha256

   The Curve25519 provides strong security and is efficient on a wide
   range of architectures with properties that allow better
   implementation properties compared to traditional elliptic curves.
   The use of SHA2-256 for integrity is a reasonable one for this
   method.  This Key Exchange Method has a few implementations and
   SHOULD+ be implemented in any SSH interested in using elliptic curve
   based key exchanges.

3.2.  diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1

   This set of ephemerally generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1
   which has security concerns [RFC6194].  It is recommended that these
   key exchange groups NOT be used.  This key exchange MUST NOT be
   implemented.

3.3.  diffie-hellman-group1-sha1

   This method uses [RFC2409] Oakley Group 2 (a 1024-bit MODP group) and
   SHA-1 [RFC3174].  Due to recent security concerns with SHA-1
   [RFC6194] and with MODP groups with less than 2048 bits
   [NIST-SP-800-131Ar1], this method is considered insecure.  This
   method is being moved from MUST to MUST NOT.

3.4.  diffie-hellman-group14-sha1

   This generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1 which has security
   concerns [RFC6194].  However, this group is still strong enough and
   is widely deployed.  This method is being moved from MUST to SHOULD-
   to aid in transition to stronger SHA-2 based hashes.  This method
   will transition to MUST NOT when SHA-2 alternatives are more
   generally available.

3.5.  diffie-hellman-group14-sha256

   This generated key exchange uses a 2048-bit sized MODP group along
   with a SHA-2 (SHA2-256) hash.  This represents the smallest Finite
   Field cryptography Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.  It is a
   reasonably simple transition to move from SHA-1 to SHA-2.  This
   method MUST be implemented.

3.6.  diffie-hellman-group16-sha512

   The use of FFC DH is well understood and trusted.  Adding larger
   modulus sizes and protecting with SHA2-512 should give enough head
   room to be ready for the next scare that someone has pre-computed.
   This modulus is larger than that required by [CNSA-SUITE] and should

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 4]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

   be sufficient to inter-operate with more paranoid nation-states.
   This method SHOULD+ be implemented.

3.7.  ecdh-sha2-nistp256

   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) are often implemented because
   they are smaller and faster than using large FFC primes with
   traditional Diffie-Hellman (DH).  However, given [CNSA-SUITE] and
   [safe-curves], this curve may not be as useful and strong as desired.
   The SSH development community is divided on this and many
   implementations do exist.  However, there are good implementations of
   this along with a constant-time SHA2-256 implementation.  If an
   implementer does not have a constant-time SHA2-384 implementation
   (which helps avoid side-channel attacks), then this is the correct
   ECDH to implement.  This method SHOULD- be implemented.

3.8.  ecdh-sha2-nistp384

   This ECDH method should be implemented because it is smaller and
   faster than using large FFC primes with traditional Diffie-Hellman
   (DH).  Given [CNSA-SUITE], it is considered good enough for TOP
   SECRET for now.  This really needs a constant-time implementation of
   SHA2-384 to be useful.  This method SHOULD+ be implemented.

3.9.  gss-gex-sha1-*

   This set of ephemerally generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1
   which has security concerns [RFC6194].  It is recommended that these
   key exchange groups NOT be used.  This key exchange MUST NOT be
   implemented.

3.10.  gss-group1-sha1-*

   This method suffers from the same problems of diffie-hellman-
   group1-sha1.  It uses [RFC2409] Oakley Group 2 (a 1024-bit MODP
   group) and SHA-1 [RFC3174].  Due to recent security concerns with
   SHA-1 [RFC6194] and with MODP groups with less than 2048 bits
   [NIST-SP-800-131Ar1], this method is considered insecure.  This
   method MUST NOT be implemented.

3.11.  gss-group14-sha1-*

   This generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1 which has security
   concerns [RFC6194].  If GSS-API key exchange methods are being used,
   then this one SHOULD- be implemented until such time as SHA-2
   variants may be implemented and deployed.

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 5]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

3.12.  gss-group14-sha256-*

   If the GSS-API is to be used, then this method SHOULD be implemented.

3.13.  gss-group16-sha512-*

   If the GSS-API is to be used, then this method SHOULD+ be
   implemented.

3.14.  rsa1024-sha1

   The security of RSA 1024-bit modulus keys is not good enough any
   longer.  A minimum bit size should be 2048-bit groups.  This
   generated key exchange groups uses SHA-1 which has security concerns
   [RFC6194].  This method MUST NOT be implemented.

4.  Summary Guidance for Key Exchange Method Names

   The full set of official [IANASSH] key algorithm method names not
   otherwise mentioned in this RFC MAY be implemented.

   The Implement column is the current recommendations of this RFC.  Key
   Exchange Method Names are listed alphabetically.

          Key Exchange Method Name           Reference  Implement
          ---------------------------------- ---------- ---------
          curve25519-sha256                  ssh-curves SHOULD+
          diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 RFC4419    MUST NOT
          diffie-hellman-group1-sha1         RFC4253    MUST NOT
          diffie-hellman-group14-sha1        RFC4253    SHOULD-
          diffie-hellman-group14-sha256      new-modp   MUST
          diffie-hellman-group16-sha512      new-modp   SHOULD+
          ecdh-sha2-nistp256                 RFC5656    SHOULD-
          ecdh-sha2-nistp384                 RFC5656    SHOULD+
          gss-gex-sha1-*                     RFC4462    MUST NOT
          gss-group1-sha1-*                  RFC4462    MUST NOT
          gss-group14-sha1-*                 RFC4462    SHOULD-
          gss-group14-sha256-*               gss-keyex  SHOULD
          gss-group16-sha512-*               gss-keyex  SHOULD+
          rsa1024-sha1                       RFC4432    MUST NOT

   The guidance of this RFC is that the SHA-1 algorithm hashing MUST NOT
   be used.  If it is used in implementations, it should only be
   provided for backwards compatibility, should not be used in new
   designs, and should be phased out of existing key exchanges as
   quickly as possible because of its known weaknesses.  Any key
   exchange using SHA-1 MUST NOT be in a default key exchange list if at

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 6]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

   all possible.  If they are needed for backward compatibility, they
   SHOULD be listed after all of the SHA-2 based key exchanges.

   The RFC4253 MUST diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 method SHOULD- be
   retained for compatibility with older Secure Shell implementations.
   It is intended that this key exchange method be phased out as soon as
   possible.

   It is believed that all current SSH implementations should be able to
   achieve an implementation of the "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
   method.  To that end, this is one method that MUST be implemented.

   [TO BE REMOVED: This registration should take place at the following
   location: <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-
   parameters.xhtml#ssh-parameters-16>]

5.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to the following people for review and comments: Denis Bider,
   Peter Gutmann, Damien Miller, Niels Moeller, Matt Johnston, Iwamoto
   Kouichi, Simon Josefsson, Dave Dugal, Daniel Migault, Anna Johnston.

   Thanks to the following people for code to implement inter-operable
   exchanges using some of these groups as found in an this draft:
   Darren Tucker for OpenSSH and Matt Johnston for Dropbear.  And thanks
   to Iwamoto Kouichi for information about RLogin, Tera Term (ttssh)
   and Poderosa implementations also adopting new Diffie-Hellman groups
   based on this draft.

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC4253] apply to this RFC.

   It is desirable to deprecate or remove key exchange method name that
   are considered weak.  A key exchange method may be weak because too
   few bits are used, or the hashing algorithm is considered too weak.

   The diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 is being moved from MUST to MUST NOT.
   This method used [RFC2409] Oakley Group 2 (a 1024-bit MODP group) and
   SHA-1 [RFC3174].  Due to recent security concerns with SHA-1
   [RFC6194] and with MODP groups with less than 2048 bits
   [NIST-SP-800-131Ar1], this method is no longer considered secure.

   The United States Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) at the
   National Security Agency (NSA) has published a FAQ
   [MFQ-U-OO-815099-15] suggesting that the use of Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) using the nistp256 curve and SHA-2 based hashes
   less than SHA2-384 are no longer sufficient for transport of Top

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 7]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

   Secret information.  It is for this reason that this draft moves
   ecdh-sha2-nistp256 from a MUST to MAY as a key exchange method.  This
   is the same reason that the stronger MODP groups being adopted.  As
   the MODP group14 is already present in most SSH implementations and
   most implementations already have a SHA2-256 implementation, so
   diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 is provided as an easy to implement and
   faster to use key exchange.  Small embedded applications may find
   this KEX desirable to use.

   The NSA Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) has also published
   the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA Suite)
   [CNSA-SUITE] in which the 3072-bit MODP Group 15 in [RFC3526] is
   explicitly mentioned as the minimum modulus to protect Top Secret
   communications.

   It has been observed in [safe-curves] that the NIST Elliptic Curve
   Prime Curves (P-256, P-384, and P-521) are perhaps not the best
   available for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Security.  For this
   reason, none of the [RFC5656] curves are mandatory to implement.
   However, the requirement that "every compliant SSH ECC implementation
   MUST implement ECDH key exchange" is now taken to mean that if ecdsa-
   sha2-[identifier] is implemented, then ecdh-sha2-[identifier] MUST be
   implemented.

   In a Post-Quantum Computing (PQC) world, it will be desirable to use
   larger cyclic subgroups.  To do this using Elliptic Curve
   Cryptography will require much larger prime base fields, greatly
   reducing their efficiency.  Finite Field based Cryptography already
   requires large enough base fields to accommodate larger cyclic
   subgroups.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3526]  Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
              Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
              RFC 3526, DOI 10.17487/RFC3526, May 2003,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3526>.

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 8]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

   [RFC4250]  Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
              January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [CNSA-SUITE]
              "Information Assurance by the National Security Agency",
              "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite", September
              2016, <https://www.iad.gov/iad/programs/iad-initiatives/
              cnsa-suite.cfm>.

   [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves]
              Adamantiadis, A. and S. Josefsson, "Secure Shell (SSH) Key
              Exchange Method using Curve25519 and Curve448", draft-
              ietf-curdle-ssh-curves-00 (work in progress), March 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2]
              Baushke, M., "More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-
              Hellman (DH) Key Exchange (KEX) Groups for Secure Shell
              (SSH)", draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-modp-dh-sha2-03 (work in
              progress), March 2017.

   [IANASSH]  "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority", "IANA, Secure Shell
              (SSH) Protocol Parameters", March 2017,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/
              ssh-parameters.xhtml>.

   [MFQ-U-OO-815099-15]
              "National Security Agency/Central Security Service", "CNSA
              Suite and Quantum Computing FAQ", January 2016,
              <https://www.iad.gov/iad/library/ia-guidance/ia-solutions-
              for-classified/algorithm-guidance/cnsa-suite-and-quantum-
              computing-faq.cfm>.

   [NEWGSSAPI]
              Sorce, S. and H. Kario, "GSS-API Key Exchange with SHA2",
              December 2016, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ssorce-
              gss-keyex-sha2-00>.

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017               [Page 9]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

   [NIST-SP-800-131Ar1]
              Barker, and Roginsky, "Transitions: Recommendation for the
              Transitioning of the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and
              Key Lengths", NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision
              1, November 2015,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
              NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf>.

   [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
              (IKE)", RFC 2409, DOI 10.17487/RFC2409, November 1998,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2409>.

   [RFC3174]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
              (SHA1)", RFC 3174, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3174>.

   [RFC4419]  Friedl, M., Provos, N., and W. Simpson, "Diffie-Hellman
              Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
              Protocol", RFC 4419, DOI 10.17487/RFC4419, March 2006,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4419>.

   [RFC4432]  Harris, B., "RSA Key Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4432, DOI 10.17487/RFC4432,
              March 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4432>.

   [RFC4462]  Hutzelman, J., Salowey, J., Galbraith, J., and V. Welch,
              "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface
              (GSS-API) Authentication and Key Exchange for the Secure
              Shell (SSH) Protocol", RFC 4462, DOI 10.17487/RFC4462, May
              2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4462>.

   [RFC5656]  Stebila, D. and J. Green, "Elliptic Curve Algorithm
              Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer",
              RFC 5656, DOI 10.17487/RFC5656, December 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5656>.

   [RFC6194]  Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security
              Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest
              Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>.

   [safe-curves]
              Bernstein, and Lange, "SafeCurves: choosing safe curves
              for elliptic-curve cryptography.", February 2016,
              <https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/>.

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017              [Page 10]
Internet-Draft KEX Method Updates/Recommendations for SSH     March 2017

Author's Address

   Mark D.     Baushke
   Juniper Networks, Inc.
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089-1228
   US

   Email: mdb@juniper.net
   URI:   http://www.juniper.net/

Baushke                Expires September 28, 2017              [Page 11]