Forcerenew Nonce Authentication
The information below is for an old version of the document.
|Document||Type||This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as an RFC.|
|Authors||David Miles , Wojciech Dec , James Bristow , Roberta Maglione|
|Stream||Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)|
|Stream||WG state||WG Document|
|IESG||IESG state||IESG Evaluation::AD Followup|
Needs a YES. Needs 10 more YES or NO OBJECTION positions to pass.
|Responsible AD||Ralph Droms|
|IESG note||Ted Lemon (email@example.com) is the document shepherd.|
|Send notices firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com|
dhc D. Miles Internet-Draft Google Updates: 3203 (if approved) W. Dec Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems Expires: September 10, 2012 J. Bristow Swisscom Schweiz AG R. Maglione Telecom Italia March 9, 2012 Forcerenew Nonce Authentication draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce-05 Abstract Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) FORCERENEW allows for the reconfiguration of a single host by forcing the DHCP client into a Renew state on a trigger from the DHCP server. In Forcerenew Nonce Authentication the server sends a nonce to the client in the initial DHCP ACK that is used for subsequent validation of a FORCERENEW message. This document updates RFC 3203. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2012. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Message authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Forcerenew Nonce Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol Capability Option . . . . . 4 3.1.2. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.3. Server considerations for Forcerenew Nonce Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.4. Client considerations for Forcerenew Nonce Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.1. Protocol vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 1. Introduction The DHCP Reconfigure Extension defined in [RFC3203] is a useful mechanism allowing dynamic reconfiguration of a single host triggered by the DHCP server. Its application is currently limited by a requirement that FORCERENEW message is always authenticated using procedures as described in [RFC3118]. Authentication for DHCP [RFC3118] is mandatory for FORCERENEW, however as it is currently defined [RFC3118] requires distribution of constant token or shared- secret out-of-band to DHCP clients. The motivation for making authentication mandatory in DHCP FORCERENEW was to prevent an off-network attacker from taking advantage of DHCP FORCERENEW to accurately predict the timing of a DHCP renewal. Without DHCP FORCERENEW, DHCP renewal timing is under the control of the client, and an off-network attacker has no way of predicting when it will happen, since it doesn't have access to the exchange between the DHCP client and DHCP server. However, the requirement to use the DHCP authentication described in [RFC3118] is more stringent than is required for this use case, and has limited adoption of DHCP FORCERENEW. [RFC3315] defines an authentication protocol using a nonce to prevent off-network attackers from successfully causing clients to renew. Since the off- network attacker doesn't have access to the nonce, it can't trick the client into renewing at a time of its choosing. This document defines extensions to Authentication for DHCPv4 Messages [RFC3118] to create a new authentication protocol for DHCPv4 FORCERENEW [RFC3203] messages; this method does not require out-of- band key distribution to DHCP clients. The Forcerenew Nonce is exchanged between server and client on initial DHCP ACK and is used for verification of any subsequent FORCERENEW message. This document updates [RFC3203] 2. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 3. Message authentication The FORCERENEW message MUST be authenticated using either [RFC3118] or the proposed Forcerenew Nonce Authentication protocol. Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 3.1. Forcerenew Nonce Authentication The Forcerenew nonce authentication protocol provides protection against misconfiguration of a client caused by a FORCERENEW message sent by a malicious DHCP server. In this protocol, a DHCP server sends a Forcerenew nonce to the client in the initial exchange of DHCP messages. The client records the Forcerenew nonce for use in authenticating subsequent Forcerenew messages from that server. The server then includes an HMAC computed from the Forcerenew nonce in subsequent FORCERENEW messages. Both the Forcerenew nonce sent from the server to the client and the HMAC in subsequent FORCERENEW messages are carried as the Authentication information in a DHCP Authentication option. The format of the Authentication information is defined in the following section. The Forcerenew nonce protocol is used (initiated by the server) only if the client and server are not using the authentication mechanism specified in [RFC3118] and the client and server have negotiated to use the Forcerenew Nonce Authentication protocol. 3.1.1. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol Capability Option A DHCP client indicates DHCP Forcerenew Nonce Protocol capability by including a FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) option in DHCP Discover and Request messages sent to the server. A DHCP server that does not support Forcerenew Nonce Protocol authentication SHOULD ignore the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) option. A DHCP server indicates DHCP Forcerenew Nonce Protocol preference by including a FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) option in any DHCP Offer messages sent to the client. A DHCP client MUST NOT send DHCP messages with authentication options where the protocol value is Forcerenew Nonce Authentication(<TBD>). The FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE option is a zero length option with code of <TDB> and format as follows: Code Len +-----+-----+ | TBD | 0 | +-----+-----+ The client would indicate that it supports the functionality by inserting the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE option in the DHCP Discover and Request messages. If the server supports Forcerenew nonce Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 authentication and requires Forcerenew nonce authentication, it will insert the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE option in the DHCP Offer message. Server Client Server (not selected) (selected) v v v | | | | Begins initialization | | | | | _____________/|\____________ | |/DHCPDISCOVER | DHCPDISCOVER \| | w/Forcerenew- | w/Forcerenew- | | Nonce-Capable | Nonce-Capable | | | | Determines | Determines configuration | configuration | | | |\ | /| | \__________ | _________/ | | DHCPOFFER \ | /DHCPOFFER | |w/Forcerenew \ | /w/Forcerenew| |Nonce-Capable \| /Nonce-Capable| | | | | Collects replies | | | | | Selects configuration | | | | | _____________/|\____________ | |/ DHCPREQUEST | DHCPREQUEST\ | | w/Forcerenew- | w/Forcerenew- | | Nonce-Capable | Nonce-Capable | | | | | | Commits configuration | | | | |Creates 128-bit Forcerenew Nonce | | | | | _____________/| | |/ DHCPACK | | | w/Auth-Proto= | | | Forcerenew- | | | Nonce | | | | |Client stores Forcerenew Nonce | | | | | Initialization complete | | | | . . . Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 . . . | | | | Forcerenew | | | _____________/| | |/ DHCPFORCE | | | w/Auth-Proto= | | | Forcerenew- | | | Digest(HMAC)| | | | | Client checks HMAC digest | | using stored Forcerenew Nonce | | | | | |\____________ | | | DHCPREQUEST\ | | | w/Forcerenew- | | | Nonce-Capable | | | | | | Commits configuration | | | | |Creates 128-bit Forcerenew Nonce | | | | | _____________/| | |/ DHCPACK | | | w/Auth-Proto= | | | Forcerenew- | | | Nonce | | | | | | | | | | . . . . . . | | | | Graceful shutdown | | | | | |\ ____________ | | | DHCPRELEASE \| | | | | | Discards lease | | | v v v 3.1.2. Forcerenew Nonce Protocol The Forcerenew Nonce Protocol makes use of both the DHCP authentication option defined in [RFC3118] re-using the option format and of the Reconfigure Key Authentication Protocol defined in [RFC3315]. Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 The following diagram defines the format of the DHCP authentication option: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Code | Length | Protocol | Algorithm | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | RDM | Replay Detection (64 bits) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Replay cont. | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Replay cont. | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | Authentication Information | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ The following fields are set in an DHCP authentication option for the Forcerenew Nonce Authentication Protocol: code 90 length field contains the length of the protocol protocol 3 algorithm 1 Replay Detection field is per the Replay Detection Method (RDM) Replay Detection Method (RDM) 0 Authentication Information: specified below The format of the Authentication information for the Forcerenew Nonce Authentication Protocol is: Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Value (128 bits) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | . . . . . +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type Type of data in Value field carried in this option: 1 Forcerenew nonce Value (used in ACK message) 2 HMAC-MD5 digest of the message (FORCERENEW message) Value Data as defined by field 3.1.3. Server considerations for Forcerenew Nonce Authentication The use of Forcerenew Nonce Protocol is dependent on the client indicating its capability through the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) DHCP option in any DHCP Discover or Request messages. The DHCP Discovery or Request message from the client MUST contain the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) option if the Forcerenew Nonce Protocol is to be used by the server. The absence of the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) option indicates to the server that the Forcerenew Nonce Authentication protocol is not supported and thus the server MUST NOT include a Forcerenew Nonce Protocol Authentication option in the DHCP Ack. The server indicates its support of the Forcerenew Nonce Protocol authentication by including the DHCP FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) option in the DHCP Offer message. The server SHOULD NOT include this option unless the client has indicated its capability in a DHCP Discovery message . The presence of the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TDB>) option in the DHCP offer may be used by clients to prefer Forcerenew nonce Protocol authentication-capable DHCP servers over those servers which do not support such capability. If a capable server receives a DISCOVER or REQUEST (any type) that indicates the client is capable, and the server has no previous nonce recorded, it MUST generate a nonce and include it in the ACK. The server selects a Forcerenew nonce for a client only during Request/Ack message exchange. The server records the Forcerenew nonce and transmits that nonce to the client in an Authentication Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 option in the DHCP Ack message. The server SHOULD NOT include the nonce in an ACK when responding to a renew unless a new nonce was generated. This minimizes the number of times the nonce is sent over the wire. If the server to which the DHCP Request message was sent at time T1 has not responded, the client enters the REBINDING state and attempts to contact any server. The new Server receiving the DHCP message MUST generate a new nonce. The Forcerenew nonce is 128 bits long, and MUST be a cryptographically strong random or pseudo-random number that cannot easily be predicted. The nonce is embedded as a 128-bit value of the Authentication information where type is set to 1 (Forcerenew nonce Value). To provide authentication for a Forcerenew message, the server selects a replay detection value according to the RDM selected by the server, and computes an HMAC-MD5 of the Forcerenew message, based on the procedure specified in section 21.5 of [RFC3315], using the Forcerenew nonce for the client. The server computes the HMAC-MD5, based on the procedure specified in section 21.5 of [RFC3315], over the entire DHCP Forcerenew message, including the Authentication option; the HMAC-MD5 field in the Authentication option is set to zero for the HMAC-MD5 computation. The server includes the HMAC-MD5 in the authentication information field in an Authentication option included in the Forcerenew message sent to the client with type set to 2 (HMAC-MD5 digest). 3.1.4. Client considerations for Forcerenew Nonce Authentication A client that supports this mechanism MUST indicate Forcerenew nonce Capability by including the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) DHCP option defined in Section 3.1.1 in all DHCP Discover and Request messages. DHCP servers that support Forcerenew nonce Protocol authentication MUST include the FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABLE(<TBD>) DHCP option in all DHCP Offers, allowing the client to use this capability in selecting DHCP servers should multiple Offers arrive. The client MUST validate the DHCP Ack message contains a Forcerenew Nonce in a DHCP authentication option. If the server has indicated capability for Forcerenew Nonce Protocol authentication in the DHCP OFFER and the subsequent ACK received by the client while in the selecting state omits a valid DHCP authentication option for the Forcerenew Nonce Protocol, the client MUST discard the message and return to the INIT stat Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 The client MUST record the Forcerenew Nonce from any valid ACK it receives, if the ACK contains one. To authenticate a Forcerenew message, the client computes an HMAC- MD5, based on the procedure specified in section 21.5 of [RFC3315], over the DHCP FORCERENEW message, using the Forcerenew Nonce received from the server. If this computed HMAC-MD5 matches the value in the Authentication option, the client accepts the FORCERENEW message. 4. Acknowledgements Comments are solicited and should be addressed to the DHC WG mailing list (firstname.lastname@example.org) and/or the authors. This contribution is based on work by Vitali Vinokour. Major sections of this draft use modified text from [RFC3315]. The authors wish to thank Ted Lemon, Matthew Ryan and Bernie Volz for their support. 5. IANA Considerations This document requests IANA to assign the following new DHCPv4 option code from the registry "BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options" maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters: Tag: TBD Name: FORCERENEW_NONCE_CAPABALE Data lenght: 1 Description: Forcerenew Nonce Capable Reference: this document 6. Security Considerations As in some network environments FORCERENEW can be used to snoop and spoof traffic, the FORCERENEW message MUST be authenticated using the procedures as described in [RFC3118] or the mechanism described in this document. The mechanism in [RFC3315] for DHCPv6, which this document mirrors for DHCPv4, uses a nonce to prevent an off-link attacker from successfully triggering a renewal on a client by sending DHCPFORCERENEW; since the attacker is off-link, it doesn't have the nonce, and can't force a renewal. Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 An on-link attacker can always simply watch the DHCP renewal message go out and respond to it, so this mechanism is useless for preventing on-link attacks, and hence the security of the nonce in the case of on-link attacks isn't relevant. Therefore HMAC-MD5 is by definition adequate for the purpose, and there is no need for an extensible HMAC mechanism. FORCERENEW messages failing the authentication should be silently discarded by the client. 6.1. Protocol vulnerabilities The mechanism described in this document is vulnerable to a denial of service attack through flooding a client with bogus FORCERENEW messages. The calculations involved in authenticating the bogus FORECERENEW messages may overwhelm the device on which the client is running. The mechanism described provides protection against the use of a FORCERENEW message by a malicious DHCP server to mount a denial of service or man-in-the-middle attack on a client. This protocol can be compromised by an attacker that can intercept the initial message in which the DHCP server sends the nonce to the client. 7. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3118] Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP Messages", RFC 3118, June 2001. [RFC3203] T'Joens, Y., Hublet, C., and P. De Schrijver, "DHCP reconfigure extension", RFC 3203, December 2001. [RFC3315] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Forcerenew Nonce March 2012 Authors' Addresses David Miles Google Phone: Fax: Email: URI: Wojciech Dec Cisco Systems Haarlerbergpark Haarlerbergweg 13-19 Amsterdam, NOORD-HOLLAND 1101 CH Netherlands Phone: Fax: Email: email@example.com URI: James Bristow Swisscom Schweiz AG Zentweg 9 Bern, 3050, Switzerland Phone: Fax: Email: James.Bristow@swisscom.com URI: Roberta Maglione Telecom Italia Via Reiss Romoli 274 Torino 10148 Italy Phone: Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Miles, et al. Expires September 10, 2012 [Page 12]