Forcerenew Nonce Authentication
draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce-05

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dhc WG)
Last updated 2012-03-09
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
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Send notices to dhc-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce@tools.ietf.org
dhc                                                             D. Miles
Internet-Draft                                                    Google
Updates: 3203 (if approved)                                       W. Dec
Intended status: Standards Track                           Cisco Systems
Expires: September 10, 2012                                   J. Bristow
                                                     Swisscom Schweiz AG
                                                             R. Maglione
                                                          Telecom Italia
                                                           March 9, 2012

                    Forcerenew Nonce Authentication
                   draft-ietf-dhc-forcerenew-nonce-05

Abstract

   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) FORCERENEW allows for the
   reconfiguration of a single host by forcing the DHCP client into a
   Renew state on a trigger from the DHCP server.  In Forcerenew Nonce
   Authentication the server sends a nonce to the client in the initial
   DHCP ACK that is used for subsequent validation of a FORCERENEW
   message.  This document updates RFC 3203.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Message authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Forcerenew Nonce Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       3.1.1.  Forcerenew Nonce Protocol Capability Option  . . . . .  4
       3.1.2.  Forcerenew Nonce Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.3.  Server considerations for Forcerenew Nonce
               Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.1.4.  Client considerations for Forcerenew Nonce
               Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     6.1.  Protocol vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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1.  Introduction

   The DHCP Reconfigure Extension defined in [RFC3203] is a useful
   mechanism allowing dynamic reconfiguration of a single host triggered
   by the DHCP server.  Its application is currently limited by a
   requirement that FORCERENEW message is always authenticated using
   procedures as described in [RFC3118].  Authentication for DHCP
   [RFC3118] is mandatory for FORCERENEW, however as it is currently
   defined [RFC3118] requires distribution of constant token or shared-
   secret out-of-band to DHCP clients.

   The motivation for making authentication mandatory in DHCP FORCERENEW
   was to prevent an off-network attacker from taking advantage of DHCP
   FORCERENEW to accurately predict the timing of a DHCP renewal.
   Without DHCP FORCERENEW, DHCP renewal timing is under the control of
   the client, and an off-network attacker has no way of predicting when
   it will happen, since it doesn't have access to the exchange between
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