A TLS/DTLS Profile for the Internet of Things
draft-ietf-dice-profile-11

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dice WG)
Last updated 2015-05-27
Replaces draft-hartke-dice-profile
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dice                                                  H. Tschofenig, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  ARM Ltd.
Intended status: Standards Track                              T. Fossati
Expires: November 28, 2015                                Alcatel-Lucent
                                                            May 27, 2015

             A TLS/DTLS Profile for the Internet of Things
                     draft-ietf-dice-profile-11.txt

Abstract

   A common design pattern in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments is
   the use of a constrained device that collects data via sensor or
   controls actuators for use in home automation, industrial control
   systems, smart cities and other IoT deployments.

   This document defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram
   TLS (DTLS) 1.2 profile that offers communications security for this
   data exchange thereby preventing eavesdropping, tampering, and
   message forgery.  The lack of communication security is a common
   vulnerability in Internet of Things products that can easily be
   solved by using these well-researched and widely deployed Internet
   security protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 28, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Tschofenig & Fossati    Expires November 28, 2015               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft            TLS/DTLS IoT Profile                  May 2015

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  TLS/DTLS Protocol Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Communication Models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Constrained TLS/DTLS Clients  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Constrained TLS/DTLS Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  The Ciphersuite Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  Credential Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.1.  Pre-Shared Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     6.2.  Raw Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.3.  Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  Signature Algorithm Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   8.  Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   9.  Session Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
   10. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   11. Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   12. Keep-Alive  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   13. Timeouts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   14. Random Number Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   15. Truncated MAC and Encrypt-then-MAC Extension  . . . . . . . .  36
   16. Server Name Indication (SNI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   17. Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   18. Session Hash  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   19. Re-Negotiation Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   20. Downgrading Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   21. Crypto Agility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   22. Key Length Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
   23. False Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   24. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   25. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   26. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
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