Multi Provider DNSSEC models
draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dnsop WG)
Last updated 2019-01-07
Replaces draft-huque-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec
Stream IETF
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Internet Engineering Task Force                                 S. Huque
Internet-Draft                                                   P. Aras
Intended status: Informational                                Salesforce
Expires: July 11, 2019                                      J. Dickinson
                                                                 Sinodun
                                                               J. Vcelak
                                                                     NS1
                                                               D. Blacka
                                                                Verisign
                                                         January 7, 2019

                      Multi Provider DNSSEC models
               draft-ietf-dnsop-multi-provider-dnssec-00

Abstract

   Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
   to distribute their authoritative DNS service.  Deploying DNSSEC in
   such an environment may present some challenges depending on the
   configuration and feature set in use.  This document will present
   several deployment models that may be suitable.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 11, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of

Huque, et al.             Expires July 11, 2019                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Multi Provider DNSSEC models          January 2019

   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Deployment Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Multiple Signer models  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       2.1.1.  Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider  . . . .   4
       2.1.2.  Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider  . . . . . .   4
   3.  Validating Resolver Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Signing Algorithm Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Authenticated Denial Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Single Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Mixing Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Key Rollover Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Model 1: Common KSK, Unique ZSK per provider  . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Model 2: Unique KSK and ZSK per provider  . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction and Motivation

   RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH BEFORE PUBLISHING:
   The source for this draft is maintained in GitHub at:
   https://github.com/shuque/multi-provider-dnssec

   Many enterprises today employ the service of multiple DNS providers
   to distribute their authoritative DNS service.  This allows the DNS
   service to survive a complete failure of any single provider.
   Additionally, enterprises or providers occasionally have requirements
   that preclude standard zone transfer techniques [RFC1995] [RFC5936] :
   either non-standardized DNS features are in use that are incompatible
   with zone transfer, or operationally a provider must be able to
   (re)sign DNS records using their own keys.  This document outlines
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