Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
draft-ietf-dots-requirements-10

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Last updated 2018-01-02
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DOTS                                                        A. Mortensen
Internet-Draft                                            Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational                              R. Moskowitz
Expires: July 6, 2018                                             Huawei
                                                                T. Reddy
                                                            McAfee, Inc.
                                                        January 02, 2018

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
                    draft-ietf-dots-requirements-10

Abstract

   This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of
   Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating
   attack response against DDoS attacks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 6, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

Mortensen, et al.         Expires July 6, 2018                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft              DOTS Requirements               January 2018

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Context and Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  General Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Signal Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.3.  Data Channel Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     2.4.  Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.5.  Data Model Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   3.  Congestion Control Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.1.  Signal Channel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.2.  Data Channel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Context and Motivation

   Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague
   network operators around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on
   down to enterprises and small businesses.  Attack scale and frequency
   similarly have continued to increase, in part as a result of software
   vulnerabilities leading to reflection and amplification attacks.
   High-volume attacks saturating inbound links are now common, and the
   impact of larger-scale attacks attract the attention of international
   press agencies.

   The greater impact of contemporary DDoS attacks has led to increased
   focus on coordinated attack response.  Many institutions and
   enterprises lack the resources or expertise to operate on-premises
   attack mitigation solutions themselves, or simply find themselves
   constrained by local bandwidth limitations.  To address such gaps,
   security service providers have begun to offer on-demand traffic
   scrubbing services, which aim to separate the DDoS traffic from
   legitimate traffic and forward only the latter.  Today each such
   service offers a proprietary invocation interface for subscribers to
   request attack mitigation, tying subscribers to proprietary signaling
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