Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-07
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2017-07-20
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DOTS R. Dobbins
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational D. Migault
Expires: January 21, 2018 Ericsson
S. Fouant
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
N. Teague
Verisign
L. Xia
Huawei
K. Nishizuka
NTT Communications
July 20, 2017
Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-07
Abstract
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide a
protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor
solutions/services. This document presents use cases to evaluate the
interactions expected between the DOTS components as well as DOTS
messaging exchanges. The purpose of describing use cases is to
identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate and
what are the types of information to be exchanged.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 21, 2018.
Dobbins, et al. Expires January 21, 2018 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DOTS Use Cases July 2017
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Use Cases Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Inter-domain Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. End-customer with a single upstream transit provider
offering DDoS mitigation services . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers
offering DDoS mitigation services . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. End-customer with multiple upstream transit
providers, but only a single upstream transit
provider offering DDoS mitigation services . . . . . 7
3.1.4. End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed
security service provider (MSSP) . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.5. End-customer operating an application or service with
an integrated DOTS client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.6. End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure
device with an integrated DOTS client . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.7. End-customer with an out-of-band smartphone
application featuring DOTS client capabilities . . . 9
3.1.8. MSSP as an end-customer requesting overflow DDoS
mitigation assistance from other MSSPs . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Intra-domain Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.1. Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from
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