Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17
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2019-01-10
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draft-mglt-dots-use-cases
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IETF
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Informational
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WG Consensus: Waiting for Write-Up
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Mar 2018 - Use case document to...
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Roman Danyliw
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Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>
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DOTS R. Dobbins
Internet-Draft Arbor Networks
Intended status: Informational D. Migault
Expires: July 14, 2019 Ericsson
S. Fouant
R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting
N. Teague
Verisign
L. Xia
Huawei
K. Nishizuka
NTT Communications
January 10, 2019
Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-17
Abstract
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide
protocols to facilitate interoperability across disparate DDoS
mitigation solutions. This document presents use cases which
describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components as
well as DOTS messaging exchanges. These use cases are meant to
identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate and
what are the typical information to be exchanged.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2019.
Dobbins, et al. Expires July 14, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DOTS Use Cases January 2019
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit
Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service
Provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. DDoS Orchestration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
At the time of writing, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack
mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary
communications schemes with vendor lock-in as a side-effect. This
can result in the configuration, provisioning, operation, and
activation of these solutions being a highly manual and often time-
consuming process. Additionally, coordinating multiple DDoS
mitigation solutions simultaneously is fraught with both technical
and process-related hurdles. This greatly increases operational
complexity which, in turn, can degrade the efficacy of mitigations.
The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify
protocols that facilitate interoperability between diverse DDoS
mitigation solutions and ensure greater integration in term of
mitigation requests and attack characterization patterns. As DDoS
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