Post-Quantum Enhancements to TLS-Based EAP Methods
draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls-03
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
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|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Tirumaleswar Reddy.K | ||
| Last updated | 2026-10-27 (Latest revision 2026-09-23) | ||
| Replaces | draft-reddy-emu-pqc-eap-tls | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
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draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls-03
EAP Method Update T. Reddy
Internet-Draft Nokia
Intended status: Standards Track 28 October 2026
Expires: 1 May 2027
Post-Quantum Enhancements to TLS-Based EAP Methods
draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls-03
Abstract
This document specifies the use of post-quantum cryptography in TLS-
based EAP methods, including the Extensible Authentication Protocol
with Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), EAP Tunneled TLS (EAP-TTLS),
Protected EAP (PEAP), and EAP Tunnel Method (TEAP). It also
addresses challenges related to large certificate sizes and long
certificate chains, as identified in [RFC9191], and specifies a
mechanism to reduce TLS handshake size.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the EAP Method Update
Working Group mailing list (mailto:emu@ietf.org), which is archived
at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/emu. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu/.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 May 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Data Confidentiality in TLS-Based EAP Methods . . . . . . . . 4
4. Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS-Based EAP Methods . . . . 5
5. EST Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The emergence of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC)
would break the mathematical assumptions that underpin widely
deployed public-key algorithms, rendering them insecure and obsolete.
As a result, there is an urgent need to update protocols and
infrastructure with post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms
designed to resist attacks from both quantum and classical
adversaries. The cryptographic primitives requiring replacement are
discussed in [RFC9958], and the NIST PQC Standardization process has
initially selected algorithms such as ML-KEM [FIPS203], ML-DSA
[FIPS204], and SLH-DSA [FIPS205] for usage in security protocols.
To mitigate the risks posed by a CRQC, such as the potential
compromise of encrypted data and the forging of digital signatures,
existing security protocols must be upgraded to support PQC. These
risks include "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attacks, where
adversaries capture encrypted traffic today with the intent to
decrypt it once CRQCs become available. TLS-based EAP methods are
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widely used for network access authentication in enterprise and
wireless environments. This document applies to all EAP methods that
use TLS as their underlying transport, including EAP-TLS [RFC9190],
EAP-TTLS [RFC5281], PEAP [MS-PEAP], and TEAP [RFC9930]. The use of
TLS 1.3 with EAP-TTLS and PEAP is specified in [RFC9427]. To
continue providing long-term confidentiality and authentication
guarantees, these methods must evolve to incorporate post-quantum
algorithms.
However, transitioning these protocols to support PQC introduces
practical challenges. [RFC9191] highlights issues related to large
certificates and certificate chains in EAP-TLS, which can lead to
session failures due to round-trip limitations. PQC certificates and
certificate chains tend to be significantly larger than their
traditional counterparts, further exacerbating these issues by
increasing TLS handshake sizes and the likelihood of session
failures. To address these challenges, this document specifies post-
quantum key agreement and authentication requirements for TLS-based
EAP methods, together with a mechanism that reduces TLS handshake
size for use in constrained network environments.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This document adopts terminology defined in [RFC9794]. For the
purposes of this document, it is useful to categorize cryptographic
algorithms into three distinct classes:
* Traditional Algorithm: An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based
on integer factorization, finite field discrete logarithms, or
elliptic curve discrete logarithms. In the context of TLS, an
example of a traditional key exchange algorithm is Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), which is almost exclusively used in its
ephemeral mode, referred to as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral (ECDHE).
* Post-Quantum Algorithm: An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
designed to be secure against attacks from both quantum and
classical computers. An example of a post-quantum key exchange
algorithm is the Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-
KEM).
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* Hybrid Algorithm: We distinguish between key exchanges and
signature algorithms:
- Hybrid Key Exchange: A key exchange mechanism that combines two
component algorithms
o one traditional algorithm and one post-quantum algorithm.
The resulting shared secret remains secure as long as at
least one of the component key exchange algorithms remains
unbroken.
- PQ/T Hybrid Digital Signature: A multi-algorithm digital
signature scheme composed of two or more component signature
algorithms, where at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and
at least one is a traditional algorithm.
Digital signature algorithms play a critical role in X.509
certificates, Certificate Transparency Signed Certificate Timestamps,
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) statements, and any other
mechanism that contributes signatures during a TLS handshake or in
the context of a secure communication establishment.
3. Data Confidentiality in TLS-Based EAP Methods
One of the primary threats to TLS-based EAP methods is the HNDL
attack. In this scenario, adversaries can passively capture EAP-TLS
handshakes such as those transmitted over the air in Wi-Fi networks
and store them for future decryption once CRQCs become available.
While EAP-TLS 1.3 [RFC9190] provides forward secrecy through
ephemeral key exchange and improves privacy by encrypting client
identity and reducing exposure of session metadata, these protections
rely on the security of the underlying key exchange algorithm. In
the presence of a CRQC, traditional key exchange mechanisms (e.g.,
ECDHE) would no longer provide long-term confidentiality. In such
cases, an adversary could mount an HNDL attack by passively recording
EAP-TLS handshakes and decrypting the captured traffic once quantum-
capable cryptanalysis becomes feasible. This could retroactively
expose information that TLS 1.3 is otherwise designed to protect,
including:
* The identity of the authenticated client.
* Client credentials used in certificate-based authentication (e.g.,
usernames, device or organization identifiers).
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In the case of EAP-TTLS, PEAP, and TEAP, HNDL attacks present an
additional threat. These methods typically carry legacy inner
authentication protocols within the outer TLS tunnel, such as MS-
CHAPv2. If a CRQC is used to break the outer TLS tunnel, the exposed
inner authentication exchange could enable offline password attacks,
potentially allowing an adversary to recover user credentials.
To protect against HNDL attacks, TLS-based EAP deployments that
require long-term confidentiality MUST use TLS 1.3 [RFC9846] and MUST
negotiate a post-quantum or PQ/T hybrid key agreement group.
Traditional key agreement groups alone do not provide long-term
confidentiality against an adversary equipped with a CRQC.
EAP peers and EAP servers MUST support at least one post-quantum or
PQ/T hybrid key agreement group registered in the "TLS Supported
Groups" registry. PQ/T hybrid groups combining ML-KEM with ECDHE are
constructed as described in [RFC9954] and registered in [RFC10024].
This document does not mandate a specific group. The Recommended
column of the "TLS Supported Groups" registry, defined in [RFC9847],
records current IETF guidance on the use of registered groups. At
the time of writing, X25519MLKEM768 (code point 4588) is the only PQ/
T hybrid group marked Recommended.
PQ/T hybrid key agreement is generally preferred, because the shared
secret remains secure as long as either component algorithm remains
unbroken [RFC9794]. Standalone ML-KEM key agreement may be required
for deployments subject to regulatory or compliance mandates that
require exclusive use of post-quantum cryptography. The choice is a
deployment decision and is out of scope for this document.
4. Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS-Based EAP Methods
Although a CRQC would primarily impact the confidentiality of
recorded TLS sessions, it could also pose risks to authentication
mechanisms that rely on traditional public-key algorithms with long-
lived credentials. In particular, if quantum-capable cryptanalysis
were to become practical within the validity period of a certificate,
an adversary could recover the private key corresponding to a
traditionally signed certificate and subsequently impersonate the
certificate holder in real time. The feasibility and impact of such
attacks depend on several factors, including certificate lifetimes
and key management practices.
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TLS-based EAP deployments rely on X.509 certificates issued by CAs,
and the transition to PQ certificate authentication is constrained by
the long lifecycle associated with distributing, deploying, and
validating new trust anchors. If CRQCs arrive sooner than
anticipated, deployed authentication systems may lack the agility to
transition credentials and trust anchors in a timely manner.
As a result, deployments that rely on long-lived certificates or that
require resistance to future quantum-capable adversaries face an
increased risk of authentication compromise. In such scenarios, an
on-path attacker that is able to recover a server's private key
within the certificate validity period could impersonate access
points (APs) in real time, potentially deceiving users into revealing
credentials or connecting to rogue networks.
To mitigate these risks, TLS-based EAP deployments that require
resistance to future CRQCs MUST support at least one post-quantum or
PQ/T hybrid signature scheme registered in the "TLS SignatureScheme"
registry for authentication. ML-DSA [FIPS204] is specified for use
in X.509 certificates in [RFC9881] and for authentication in TLS 1.3
in [I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa].
This document does not mandate a specific signature scheme or
parameter set. The Recommended column of the "TLS SignatureScheme"
registry, defined in [RFC9847], records current IETF guidance on the
use of registered schemes.
PQ/T hybrid authentication using composite signatures may be
preferred by deployments seeking defense in depth during the
transition, so that authentication remains secure as long as either
component algorithm remains unbroken. Composite ML-DSA is specified
for X.509 in [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] and for TLS 1.3 in
[I-D.reddy-tls-composite-mldsa]. The choice between pure post-
quantum and PQ/T hybrid authentication is a deployment decision and
is out of scope for this document.
The relatively large SLH-DSA [FIPS205] signatures may make SLH-DSA
less suitable for TLS-based EAP deployments, particularly where
handshake size and fragmentation are significant constraints.
Signature sizes are given in [RFC9958]. The end-entity certificate
and the CertificateVerify each carry a signature in every handshake,
and neither can be avoided by the mechanism in Section 5, which
removes only intermediate certificates.
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A post-quantum or PQ/T hybrid end-entity certificate does not by
itself provide post-quantum authentication. Every signature in the
path up to the trust anchor has to use a post-quantum or PQ/T hybrid
scheme, and since the trust anchor is provisioned out of band, it has
to be in place before the certificates that chain to it are issued.
The use of PQ or PQ/T hybrid certificates increases the size of
individual certificates, certificate chains, and signatures,
resulting in significantly larger handshake messages. These larger
payloads can lead to packet fragmentation, retransmissions, and
handshake delays, issues that are particularly disruptive in
constrained or lossy network environments. Section 5 describes
mitigations.
5. EST Integration
The EAP client is expected to validate the certificate presented by
the EAP server using a trust anchor that is provisioned out-of-band
prior to authentication (e.g., using EST). The intermediate
certificates are provided by the EAP server during the TLS handshake.
The EAP client relies solely on the pre-provisioned trust anchor to
build and validate the certificate chain. This model assumes a
managed deployment environment with explicitly configured trust
relationships between the EAP client and EAP server.
Certificate compression [RFC8879] provides limited benefit for
certificates containing large high-entropy post-quantum public keys
and signatures, and session resumption requires a prior full
handshake. Out-of-band provisioning of the intermediate chain can
avoid transmitting it during the first TLS authentication of a newly
provisioned device.
To further reduce handshake overhead, particularly in deployments
using large certificate chains due to post-quantum (PQ) or composite
certificates, this document specifies an optimization that leverages
the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol [RFC7030],
extended by [RFC8295]. Specifically, it allows intermediate
certificates to be retrieved in advance by using EST, thereby
avoiding the need to transmit them during each TLS handshake. The
optimization applies only when every EAP client that authenticates to
the EAP server has retrieved its intermediate certificates as part of
provisioning.
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For EAP methods that use TLS as an outer tunnel (e.g., PEAP and
TEAP), the EST optimization described in this section applies to the
certificates used in the outer TLS tunnel. The EST pre-fetching of
client intermediate certificates is relevant only when mutual TLS
authentication is used. This is always the case for EAP-TLS, and
optionally the case for EAP-TTLS and TEAP when client certificate
authentication is used in the outer tunnel.
This section defines extensions to EST to support retrieval of the
certificate chain used by an EAP server and EAP clients. The first
extension enables EAP clients to retrieve the intermediate
certificates required to build a certification path to the EAP
server's end-entity certificate.
A new path component is defined under the EST well-known URI:
GET /.well-known/est/eapservercertchain
The '/eapservercertchain' is intended for informational retrieval
only and does not require client authentication. It allows clients
to retrieve the intermediate certificate chain that the EAP server
presents during TLS handshakes. This request is performed using the
HTTPS protocol. The EST server MUST support requests without
requiring client authentication. The EST server MUST provide the
intermediate certificates of the CAs that issue EAP server
certificates.
The second extension enables EAP servers to retrieve the intermediate
certificates required to build a certification path to the EAP
clients' end-entity certificates. Rather than relying on static
configuration, the EAP server can dynamically fetch the client's
intermediate certificate chain from a trusted EST server within the
same administrative domain.
A new path component is defined under the EST well-known URI:
GET /.well-known/est/eapclientcertchain
The '/eapclientcertchain' is intended for informational retrieval
only and does not require client authentication. It allows the EAP
server to retrieve the intermediate certificate chain that the EAP
clients present during TLS handshakes. This request is performed
using the HTTPS protocol. The EST server MUST support requests
without requiring client authentication. The EST server MUST provide
the intermediate certificates of the CAs that issue EAP client
certificates.
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The response to '/eapservercertchain' and '/eapclientcertchain' uses
the format of the '/cacerts' response defined in Section 4.1.3 of
[RFC7030], as updated by [RFC8951], and carries only intermediate CA
certificates.
Retrieved intermediate certificates are used, together with any
certificates received in the TLS handshake, to construct a
certification path from the end-entity certificate to the pre-
provisioned trust anchor. Where an EAP server has certificates
issued by more than one CA, the retrieved intermediate certificates
cover all of them, and the EAP client selects those needed to
construct a path for the certificate presented in the handshake. If
no valid path can be constructed, authentication fails as for any
other certificate validation failure.
EAP clients and servers MUST authenticate the EST server using a
trust anchor obtained via a suitable bootstrapping mechanism before
retrieving intermediate certificate chains via HTTPS. Various
bootstrapping mechanisms exist for establishing this trust, such as
BRSKI [RFC8995], EST [RFC7030], or out-of-band provisioning. The
choice of bootstrapping mechanism is a deployment decision and is out
of scope for this document. Certificate chains retrieved from an
unauthenticated or untrusted EST server MUST NOT be used for TLS
chain validation.
EAP servers and clients are RECOMMENDED to cache retrieved
certificate chains. They SHOULD re-fetch them periodically,
following HTTP caching rules [RFC9111], and before cached
intermediate certificates expire.
EAP clients MAY omit intermediate certificates from the TLS handshake
only if they have been explicitly configured by the administrator to
do so. Such configuration is recommended only in deployments where
both the EAP client and EAP server support this specification and
have completed EST pre-fetching as part of provisioning. If no such
configuration is present, the EAP client MUST include the full
certificate chain in the TLS handshake. Similarly, an EAP server MAY
omit intermediate certificates from the TLS handshake only if it has
been explicitly configured by the administrator to do so.
Administrators are advised to ensure that clients in the deployment
have retrieved the server's intermediate certificates via EST as part
of their provisioning process before enabling this configuration.
EST is one transport for retrieving intermediate certificates out of
band. Device management systems can deliver the same chains, and
TEAP [RFC9930] could be extended to provision them within the tunnel
it establishes.
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Note: A TLS extension could be used to explicitly signal support for
intermediate certificate omission between peers, avoiding the need
for administrator configuration. Such a mechanism is considered a
possible future solution but is out of scope for this document.
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC7030] and [RFC8295] apply to the
EST extensions defined in Section 5. If an intermediate CA
certificate is renewed or replaced and the peer omits it from the TLS
handshake, path construction fails until the cached intermediate
certificates are refreshed.
The security considerations outlined in [I-D.ietf-uta-pqc-app] and
[RFC9958] must be carefully evaluated and taken into account for all
TLS-based EAP deployments.
7. IANA Considerations
This document defines two new path components under the EST well-
known URI '/.well-known/est/', following the extension mechanism
established by [RFC8295]: '/eapservercertchain' and
'/eapclientcertchain'. As these are sub-paths under the already-
registered '/.well-known/est/' prefix defined in [RFC7030], no new
IANA registry entries are required.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to John Mattsson, Hannes Tschofenig, Alan DeKok, Michael
Richardson, Junjun Chen, and Guilin Wang for the discussion and
comments.
References
Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa]
Hollebeek, T., Schmieg, S., and B. Westerbaan, "Use of ML-
DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-mldsa-06, 11 September 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
mldsa-06>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
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[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8295] Turner, S., "EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport)
Extensions", RFC 8295, DOI 10.17487/RFC8295, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8295>.
[RFC8951] Richardson, M., Werner, T., and W. Pan, "Clarification of
Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST): Transfer Encodings
and ASN.1", RFC 8951, DOI 10.17487/RFC8951, November 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8951>.
[RFC9190] Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190>.
[RFC9427] DeKok, A., "TLS-Based Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Types for Use with TLS 1.3", RFC 9427,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9427, June 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9427>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.
[RFC9847] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9847>.
[RFC9881] Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", RFC 9881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9881>.
[RFC9954] Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid Key
Exchange in TLS 1.3", RFC 9954, DOI 10.17487/RFC9954, July
2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9954>.
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[RFC10024] Kwiatkowski, K., Kampanakis, P., Westerbaan, B. E., and D.
Stebila, "Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key
Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3", RFC 10024,
DOI 10.17487/RFC10024, August 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024>.
Informative References
[FIPS203] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
Standard", FIPS 203, 2024.
[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard",
FIPS 204, 2024.
[FIPS205] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard",
FIPS 205, 2024.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]
Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaußner, J., and S.
Fluhrer, "Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature
Algorithm (ML-DSA) for use in X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19, 21 April 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
pq-composite-sigs-19>.
[I-D.ietf-uta-pqc-app]
Reddy.K, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Post-Quantum Cryptography
Recommendations for TLS-based Applications", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-pqc-app-03, 4
July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-uta-pqc-app-03>.
[I-D.reddy-tls-composite-mldsa]
Reddy.K, T., Hollebeek, T., Gray, J., Fluhrer, S., and D.
Van Geest, "Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-
12, 31 August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-
composite-mldsa-12>.
[MS-PEAP] Microsoft, "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible Authentication
Protocol (PEAP)", n.d., <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-
us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap/>.
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[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5281>.
[RFC8879] Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
Compression", RFC 8879, DOI 10.17487/RFC8879, December
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8879>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.
[RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9111>.
[RFC9191] Sethi, M., Preuß Mattsson, J., and S. Turner, "Handling
Large Certificates and Long Certificate Chains in TLS-
Based EAP Methods", RFC 9191, DOI 10.17487/RFC9191,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9191>.
[RFC9794] Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9794>.
[RFC9930] DeKok, A., Ed., "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol
(TEAP) Version 1", RFC 9930, DOI 10.17487/RFC9930,
February 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9930>.
[RFC9958] Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,
T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
Engineers", RFC 9958, DOI 10.17487/RFC9958, June 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9958>.
Author's Address
Tirumaleswar Reddy
Nokia
Bangalore
Karnataka
India
Email: k.tirumaleswar_reddy@nokia.com
Reddy Expires 1 May 2027 [Page 13]