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Post-Quantum Enhancements to TLS-Based EAP Methods
draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls-03

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Author Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
Last updated 2026-10-27 (Latest revision 2026-09-23)
Replaces draft-reddy-emu-pqc-eap-tls
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draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls-03
EAP Method Update                                               T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                     Nokia
Intended status: Standards Track                         28 October 2026
Expires: 1 May 2027

           Post-Quantum Enhancements to TLS-Based EAP Methods
                     draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls-03

Abstract

   This document specifies the use of post-quantum cryptography in TLS-
   based EAP methods, including the Extensible Authentication Protocol
   with Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), EAP Tunneled TLS (EAP-TTLS),
   Protected EAP (PEAP), and EAP Tunnel Method (TEAP).  It also
   addresses challenges related to large certificate sizes and long
   certificate chains, as identified in [RFC9191], and specifies a
   mechanism to reduce TLS handshake size.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the EAP Method Update
   Working Group mailing list (mailto:emu@ietf.org), which is archived
   at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/emu.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu/.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 May 2027.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Data Confidentiality in TLS-Based EAP Methods . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS-Based EAP Methods  . . . .   5
   5.  EST Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   The emergence of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC)
   would break the mathematical assumptions that underpin widely
   deployed public-key algorithms, rendering them insecure and obsolete.
   As a result, there is an urgent need to update protocols and
   infrastructure with post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms
   designed to resist attacks from both quantum and classical
   adversaries.  The cryptographic primitives requiring replacement are
   discussed in [RFC9958], and the NIST PQC Standardization process has
   initially selected algorithms such as ML-KEM [FIPS203], ML-DSA
   [FIPS204], and SLH-DSA [FIPS205] for usage in security protocols.

   To mitigate the risks posed by a CRQC, such as the potential
   compromise of encrypted data and the forging of digital signatures,
   existing security protocols must be upgraded to support PQC.  These
   risks include "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" (HNDL) attacks, where
   adversaries capture encrypted traffic today with the intent to
   decrypt it once CRQCs become available.  TLS-based EAP methods are

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   widely used for network access authentication in enterprise and
   wireless environments.  This document applies to all EAP methods that
   use TLS as their underlying transport, including EAP-TLS [RFC9190],
   EAP-TTLS [RFC5281], PEAP [MS-PEAP], and TEAP [RFC9930].  The use of
   TLS 1.3 with EAP-TTLS and PEAP is specified in [RFC9427].  To
   continue providing long-term confidentiality and authentication
   guarantees, these methods must evolve to incorporate post-quantum
   algorithms.

   However, transitioning these protocols to support PQC introduces
   practical challenges.  [RFC9191] highlights issues related to large
   certificates and certificate chains in EAP-TLS, which can lead to
   session failures due to round-trip limitations.  PQC certificates and
   certificate chains tend to be significantly larger than their
   traditional counterparts, further exacerbating these issues by
   increasing TLS handshake sizes and the likelihood of session
   failures.  To address these challenges, this document specifies post-
   quantum key agreement and authentication requirements for TLS-based
   EAP methods, together with a mechanism that reduces TLS handshake
   size for use in constrained network environments.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document adopts terminology defined in [RFC9794].  For the
   purposes of this document, it is useful to categorize cryptographic
   algorithms into three distinct classes:

   *  Traditional Algorithm: An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based
      on integer factorization, finite field discrete logarithms, or
      elliptic curve discrete logarithms.  In the context of TLS, an
      example of a traditional key exchange algorithm is Elliptic Curve
      Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), which is almost exclusively used in its
      ephemeral mode, referred to as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
      Ephemeral (ECDHE).

   *  Post-Quantum Algorithm: An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm
      designed to be secure against attacks from both quantum and
      classical computers.  An example of a post-quantum key exchange
      algorithm is the Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-
      KEM).

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   *  Hybrid Algorithm: We distinguish between key exchanges and
      signature algorithms:

      -  Hybrid Key Exchange: A key exchange mechanism that combines two
         component algorithms

         o  one traditional algorithm and one post-quantum algorithm.
            The resulting shared secret remains secure as long as at
            least one of the component key exchange algorithms remains
            unbroken.

      -  PQ/T Hybrid Digital Signature: A multi-algorithm digital
         signature scheme composed of two or more component signature
         algorithms, where at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and
         at least one is a traditional algorithm.

   Digital signature algorithms play a critical role in X.509
   certificates, Certificate Transparency Signed Certificate Timestamps,
   Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) statements, and any other
   mechanism that contributes signatures during a TLS handshake or in
   the context of a secure communication establishment.

3.  Data Confidentiality in TLS-Based EAP Methods

   One of the primary threats to TLS-based EAP methods is the HNDL
   attack.  In this scenario, adversaries can passively capture EAP-TLS
   handshakes such as those transmitted over the air in Wi-Fi networks
   and store them for future decryption once CRQCs become available.

   While EAP-TLS 1.3 [RFC9190] provides forward secrecy through
   ephemeral key exchange and improves privacy by encrypting client
   identity and reducing exposure of session metadata, these protections
   rely on the security of the underlying key exchange algorithm.  In
   the presence of a CRQC, traditional key exchange mechanisms (e.g.,
   ECDHE) would no longer provide long-term confidentiality.  In such
   cases, an adversary could mount an HNDL attack by passively recording
   EAP-TLS handshakes and decrypting the captured traffic once quantum-
   capable cryptanalysis becomes feasible.  This could retroactively
   expose information that TLS 1.3 is otherwise designed to protect,
   including:

   *  The identity of the authenticated client.

   *  Client credentials used in certificate-based authentication (e.g.,
      usernames, device or organization identifiers).

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   In the case of EAP-TTLS, PEAP, and TEAP, HNDL attacks present an
   additional threat.  These methods typically carry legacy inner
   authentication protocols within the outer TLS tunnel, such as MS-
   CHAPv2.  If a CRQC is used to break the outer TLS tunnel, the exposed
   inner authentication exchange could enable offline password attacks,
   potentially allowing an adversary to recover user credentials.

   To protect against HNDL attacks, TLS-based EAP deployments that
   require long-term confidentiality MUST use TLS 1.3 [RFC9846] and MUST
   negotiate a post-quantum or PQ/T hybrid key agreement group.
   Traditional key agreement groups alone do not provide long-term
   confidentiality against an adversary equipped with a CRQC.

   EAP peers and EAP servers MUST support at least one post-quantum or
   PQ/T hybrid key agreement group registered in the "TLS Supported
   Groups" registry.  PQ/T hybrid groups combining ML-KEM with ECDHE are
   constructed as described in [RFC9954] and registered in [RFC10024].

   This document does not mandate a specific group.  The Recommended
   column of the "TLS Supported Groups" registry, defined in [RFC9847],
   records current IETF guidance on the use of registered groups.  At
   the time of writing, X25519MLKEM768 (code point 4588) is the only PQ/
   T hybrid group marked Recommended.

   PQ/T hybrid key agreement is generally preferred, because the shared
   secret remains secure as long as either component algorithm remains
   unbroken [RFC9794].  Standalone ML-KEM key agreement may be required
   for deployments subject to regulatory or compliance mandates that
   require exclusive use of post-quantum cryptography.  The choice is a
   deployment decision and is out of scope for this document.

4.  Post-Quantum Authentication in TLS-Based EAP Methods

   Although a CRQC would primarily impact the confidentiality of
   recorded TLS sessions, it could also pose risks to authentication
   mechanisms that rely on traditional public-key algorithms with long-
   lived credentials.  In particular, if quantum-capable cryptanalysis
   were to become practical within the validity period of a certificate,
   an adversary could recover the private key corresponding to a
   traditionally signed certificate and subsequently impersonate the
   certificate holder in real time.  The feasibility and impact of such
   attacks depend on several factors, including certificate lifetimes
   and key management practices.

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   TLS-based EAP deployments rely on X.509 certificates issued by CAs,
   and the transition to PQ certificate authentication is constrained by
   the long lifecycle associated with distributing, deploying, and
   validating new trust anchors.  If CRQCs arrive sooner than
   anticipated, deployed authentication systems may lack the agility to
   transition credentials and trust anchors in a timely manner.

   As a result, deployments that rely on long-lived certificates or that
   require resistance to future quantum-capable adversaries face an
   increased risk of authentication compromise.  In such scenarios, an
   on-path attacker that is able to recover a server's private key
   within the certificate validity period could impersonate access
   points (APs) in real time, potentially deceiving users into revealing
   credentials or connecting to rogue networks.

   To mitigate these risks, TLS-based EAP deployments that require
   resistance to future CRQCs MUST support at least one post-quantum or
   PQ/T hybrid signature scheme registered in the "TLS SignatureScheme"
   registry for authentication.  ML-DSA [FIPS204] is specified for use
   in X.509 certificates in [RFC9881] and for authentication in TLS 1.3
   in [I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa].

   This document does not mandate a specific signature scheme or
   parameter set.  The Recommended column of the "TLS SignatureScheme"
   registry, defined in [RFC9847], records current IETF guidance on the
   use of registered schemes.

   PQ/T hybrid authentication using composite signatures may be
   preferred by deployments seeking defense in depth during the
   transition, so that authentication remains secure as long as either
   component algorithm remains unbroken.  Composite ML-DSA is specified
   for X.509 in [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] and for TLS 1.3 in
   [I-D.reddy-tls-composite-mldsa].  The choice between pure post-
   quantum and PQ/T hybrid authentication is a deployment decision and
   is out of scope for this document.

   The relatively large SLH-DSA [FIPS205] signatures may make SLH-DSA
   less suitable for TLS-based EAP deployments, particularly where
   handshake size and fragmentation are significant constraints.
   Signature sizes are given in [RFC9958].  The end-entity certificate
   and the CertificateVerify each carry a signature in every handshake,
   and neither can be avoided by the mechanism in Section 5, which
   removes only intermediate certificates.

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   A post-quantum or PQ/T hybrid end-entity certificate does not by
   itself provide post-quantum authentication.  Every signature in the
   path up to the trust anchor has to use a post-quantum or PQ/T hybrid
   scheme, and since the trust anchor is provisioned out of band, it has
   to be in place before the certificates that chain to it are issued.

   The use of PQ or PQ/T hybrid certificates increases the size of
   individual certificates, certificate chains, and signatures,
   resulting in significantly larger handshake messages.  These larger
   payloads can lead to packet fragmentation, retransmissions, and
   handshake delays, issues that are particularly disruptive in
   constrained or lossy network environments.  Section 5 describes
   mitigations.

5.  EST Integration

   The EAP client is expected to validate the certificate presented by
   the EAP server using a trust anchor that is provisioned out-of-band
   prior to authentication (e.g., using EST).  The intermediate
   certificates are provided by the EAP server during the TLS handshake.
   The EAP client relies solely on the pre-provisioned trust anchor to
   build and validate the certificate chain.  This model assumes a
   managed deployment environment with explicitly configured trust
   relationships between the EAP client and EAP server.

   Certificate compression [RFC8879] provides limited benefit for
   certificates containing large high-entropy post-quantum public keys
   and signatures, and session resumption requires a prior full
   handshake.  Out-of-band provisioning of the intermediate chain can
   avoid transmitting it during the first TLS authentication of a newly
   provisioned device.

   To further reduce handshake overhead, particularly in deployments
   using large certificate chains due to post-quantum (PQ) or composite
   certificates, this document specifies an optimization that leverages
   the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol [RFC7030],
   extended by [RFC8295].  Specifically, it allows intermediate
   certificates to be retrieved in advance by using EST, thereby
   avoiding the need to transmit them during each TLS handshake.  The
   optimization applies only when every EAP client that authenticates to
   the EAP server has retrieved its intermediate certificates as part of
   provisioning.

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   For EAP methods that use TLS as an outer tunnel (e.g., PEAP and
   TEAP), the EST optimization described in this section applies to the
   certificates used in the outer TLS tunnel.  The EST pre-fetching of
   client intermediate certificates is relevant only when mutual TLS
   authentication is used.  This is always the case for EAP-TLS, and
   optionally the case for EAP-TTLS and TEAP when client certificate
   authentication is used in the outer tunnel.

   This section defines extensions to EST to support retrieval of the
   certificate chain used by an EAP server and EAP clients.  The first
   extension enables EAP clients to retrieve the intermediate
   certificates required to build a certification path to the EAP
   server's end-entity certificate.

   A new path component is defined under the EST well-known URI:

   GET /.well-known/est/eapservercertchain

   The '/eapservercertchain' is intended for informational retrieval
   only and does not require client authentication.  It allows clients
   to retrieve the intermediate certificate chain that the EAP server
   presents during TLS handshakes.  This request is performed using the
   HTTPS protocol.  The EST server MUST support requests without
   requiring client authentication.  The EST server MUST provide the
   intermediate certificates of the CAs that issue EAP server
   certificates.

   The second extension enables EAP servers to retrieve the intermediate
   certificates required to build a certification path to the EAP
   clients' end-entity certificates.  Rather than relying on static
   configuration, the EAP server can dynamically fetch the client's
   intermediate certificate chain from a trusted EST server within the
   same administrative domain.

   A new path component is defined under the EST well-known URI:

   GET /.well-known/est/eapclientcertchain

   The '/eapclientcertchain' is intended for informational retrieval
   only and does not require client authentication.  It allows the EAP
   server to retrieve the intermediate certificate chain that the EAP
   clients present during TLS handshakes.  This request is performed
   using the HTTPS protocol.  The EST server MUST support requests
   without requiring client authentication.  The EST server MUST provide
   the intermediate certificates of the CAs that issue EAP client
   certificates.

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   The response to '/eapservercertchain' and '/eapclientcertchain' uses
   the format of the '/cacerts' response defined in Section 4.1.3 of
   [RFC7030], as updated by [RFC8951], and carries only intermediate CA
   certificates.

   Retrieved intermediate certificates are used, together with any
   certificates received in the TLS handshake, to construct a
   certification path from the end-entity certificate to the pre-
   provisioned trust anchor.  Where an EAP server has certificates
   issued by more than one CA, the retrieved intermediate certificates
   cover all of them, and the EAP client selects those needed to
   construct a path for the certificate presented in the handshake.  If
   no valid path can be constructed, authentication fails as for any
   other certificate validation failure.

   EAP clients and servers MUST authenticate the EST server using a
   trust anchor obtained via a suitable bootstrapping mechanism before
   retrieving intermediate certificate chains via HTTPS.  Various
   bootstrapping mechanisms exist for establishing this trust, such as
   BRSKI [RFC8995], EST [RFC7030], or out-of-band provisioning.  The
   choice of bootstrapping mechanism is a deployment decision and is out
   of scope for this document.  Certificate chains retrieved from an
   unauthenticated or untrusted EST server MUST NOT be used for TLS
   chain validation.

   EAP servers and clients are RECOMMENDED to cache retrieved
   certificate chains.  They SHOULD re-fetch them periodically,
   following HTTP caching rules [RFC9111], and before cached
   intermediate certificates expire.

   EAP clients MAY omit intermediate certificates from the TLS handshake
   only if they have been explicitly configured by the administrator to
   do so.  Such configuration is recommended only in deployments where
   both the EAP client and EAP server support this specification and
   have completed EST pre-fetching as part of provisioning.  If no such
   configuration is present, the EAP client MUST include the full
   certificate chain in the TLS handshake.  Similarly, an EAP server MAY
   omit intermediate certificates from the TLS handshake only if it has
   been explicitly configured by the administrator to do so.
   Administrators are advised to ensure that clients in the deployment
   have retrieved the server's intermediate certificates via EST as part
   of their provisioning process before enabling this configuration.

   EST is one transport for retrieving intermediate certificates out of
   band.  Device management systems can deliver the same chains, and
   TEAP [RFC9930] could be extended to provision them within the tunnel
   it establishes.

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   Note: A TLS extension could be used to explicitly signal support for
   intermediate certificate omission between peers, avoiding the need
   for administrator configuration.  Such a mechanism is considered a
   possible future solution but is out of scope for this document.

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [RFC7030] and [RFC8295] apply to the
   EST extensions defined in Section 5.  If an intermediate CA
   certificate is renewed or replaced and the peer omits it from the TLS
   handshake, path construction fails until the cached intermediate
   certificates are refreshed.

   The security considerations outlined in [I-D.ietf-uta-pqc-app] and
   [RFC9958] must be carefully evaluated and taken into account for all
   TLS-based EAP deployments.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines two new path components under the EST well-
   known URI '/.well-known/est/', following the extension mechanism
   established by [RFC8295]: '/eapservercertchain' and
   '/eapclientcertchain'.  As these are sub-paths under the already-
   registered '/.well-known/est/' prefix defined in [RFC7030], no new
   IANA registry entries are required.

Acknowledgements

   Thanks to John Mattsson, Hannes Tschofenig, Alan DeKok, Michael
   Richardson, Junjun Chen, and Guilin Wang for the discussion and
   comments.

References

Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-mldsa]
              Hollebeek, T., Schmieg, S., and B. Westerbaan, "Use of ML-
              DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-tls-mldsa-06, 11 September 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              mldsa-06>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

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   [RFC7030]  Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8295]  Turner, S., "EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport)
              Extensions", RFC 8295, DOI 10.17487/RFC8295, January 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8295>.

   [RFC8951]  Richardson, M., Werner, T., and W. Pan, "Clarification of
              Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST): Transfer Encodings
              and ASN.1", RFC 8951, DOI 10.17487/RFC8951, November 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8951>.

   [RFC9190]  Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
              Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
              RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190>.

   [RFC9427]  DeKok, A., "TLS-Based Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP) Types for Use with TLS 1.3", RFC 9427,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9427, June 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9427>.

   [RFC9846]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, July 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.

   [RFC9847]  Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
              and DTLS", RFC 9847, DOI 10.17487/RFC9847, December 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9847>.

   [RFC9881]  Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B. E.
              Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure --
              Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital
              Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", RFC 9881,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9881, October 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9881>.

   [RFC9954]  Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid Key
              Exchange in TLS 1.3", RFC 9954, DOI 10.17487/RFC9954, July
              2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9954>.

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   [RFC10024] Kwiatkowski, K., Kampanakis, P., Westerbaan, B. E., and D.
              Stebila, "Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key
              Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3", RFC 10024,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC10024, August 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024>.

Informative References

   [FIPS203]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
              Standard", FIPS 203, 2024.

   [FIPS204]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard",
              FIPS 204, 2024.

   [FIPS205]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard",
              FIPS 205, 2024.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]
              Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaußner, J., and S.
              Fluhrer, "Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature
              Algorithm (ML-DSA) for use in X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19, 21 April 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              pq-composite-sigs-19>.

   [I-D.ietf-uta-pqc-app]
              Reddy.K, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Post-Quantum Cryptography
              Recommendations for TLS-based Applications", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-uta-pqc-app-03, 4
              July 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              ietf-uta-pqc-app-03>.

   [I-D.reddy-tls-composite-mldsa]
              Reddy.K, T., Hollebeek, T., Gray, J., Fluhrer, S., and D.
              Van Geest, "Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-
              12, 31 August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-
              composite-mldsa-12>.

   [MS-PEAP]  Microsoft, "[MS-PEAP]: Protected Extensible Authentication
              Protocol (PEAP)", n.d., <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-
              us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap/>.

Reddy                      Expires 1 May 2027                  [Page 12]
Internet-Draft  PQC Enhancements to TLS-Based EAP Method    October 2026

   [RFC5281]  Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
              Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5281>.

   [RFC8879]  Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "TLS Certificate
              Compression", RFC 8879, DOI 10.17487/RFC8879, December
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8879>.

   [RFC8995]  Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.

   [RFC9111]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9111>.

   [RFC9191]  Sethi, M., Preuß Mattsson, J., and S. Turner, "Handling
              Large Certificates and Long Certificate Chains in TLS-
              Based EAP Methods", RFC 9191, DOI 10.17487/RFC9191,
              February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9191>.

   [RFC9794]  Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
              Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9794>.

   [RFC9930]  DeKok, A., Ed., "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (TEAP) Version 1", RFC 9930, DOI 10.17487/RFC9930,
              February 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9930>.

   [RFC9958]  Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,
              T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
              Engineers", RFC 9958, DOI 10.17487/RFC9958, June 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9958>.

Author's Address

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Nokia
   Bangalore
   Karnataka
   India
   Email: k.tirumaleswar_reddy@nokia.com

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