Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation-07

IDR and SIDR                                              K. Sriram, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                  USA NIST
Intended status: Standards Track                          A. Azimov, Ed.
Expires: 28 October 2022                                          Yandex
                                                           26 April 2022

        Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
           draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation-07

Abstract

   Problem definition for route leaks and enumeration of types of route
   leaks are provided in RFC 7908.  This document describes a new well-
   known Large Community that provides a way for route-leak prevention,
   detection, and mitigation.  The configuration process for this
   Community can be automated with the methodology for setting BGP roles
   that is described in ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy draft.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 October 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Community vs Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Down Only Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Route-Leak Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Only Marking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   RFC 7908 [RFC7908] provides a definition of the route-leak problem
   and enumerates several types of route leaks.  For this document, the
   definition that is applied is that a route leak occurs when a route
   received from a transit provider or a lateral peer is forwarded
   (against commonly used policy) to another transit provider or a
   lateral peer.  The commonly used policy is that a route received from
   a transit provider or a lateral peer MAY be forwarded only to
   customers.

   This document describes a solution for prevention, detection and
   mitigation of route leaks which is based on conveying route-leak
   detection information in a transitive well-known BGP Large Community
   [RFC8092].  The configuration process for the Large Community MUST be
   defined according to peering relations between ISPs.  This process
   can be automated with the methodology for setting BGP roles that is
   described in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].

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   The techniques described in this document can be incrementally
   deployed.  If a pair of ISPs and/or Internet Exchanges (IXes) deploy
   the proposed techniques, then they would detect and mitigate any
   route leaks that occur in an AS path between them even when other
   ASes in the path are not upgraded.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Peering Relationships

   As described in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] there are several
   common peering relations between eBGP neighbors:

   *  Provider - sender is a transit provider of the neighbor;

   *  Customer - sender is a customer of the neighbor;

   *  Route Server (RS) - sender is route server at an internet exchange
      (IX)

   *  RS-client - sender is client of an RS at an IX

   *  Peer - sender and neighbor are lateral (non-transit) peers;

   If a route is received from a provider, peer, or RS-client, it MUST
   follow the 'down only' rule, i.e., it MAY be advertised only to
   customers.  If a route is sent to a customer, peer, or RS-client, it
   also MUST follow the 'down only' rule at each subsequent AS in the AS
   path.

   A standardized transitive route-leak detection signal is needed that
   will prevent Autonomous Systems (ASes) from leaking and also inform a
   remote ISP (or AS) in the AS path that a received route violates the
   'down only' policy.  This signal would facilitate a way to stop the
   propagation of leaked prefixes.

   To improve reliability and cover for non-participating preceding
   neighbor, the signal should be set on both receiver and sender sides.

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3.  Community vs Attribute

   This section presents a brief discussion of the advantages and
   disadvantages of communities and BGP path attributes for the purpose
   of route-leak detection.

   A transitive path attribute is a native way to implement the route-
   leak detection signal.  Based on the way BGP protocol works, the use
   of a transitive attribute makes it more certain that the route-leak
   detection signal would pass unaltered through non-participating
   (i.e., not upgraded) BGP routers.  The main disadvantage of this
   approach is that the deployment of a new BGP attribute requires a
   software upgrade in the router OS which may delay wide adoption for
   years.

   On the other hand, BGP Communities do not require a router OS update.
   The potential disadvantage of using a Community for the route-leak
   detection signal is that it is more likely to be dropped somewhere
   along the way in the AS path.  Currently, the use of BGP Communities
   is somewhat overloaded.  BGP Communities are already used for
   numerous applications: different types of route marking, route policy
   control, blackholing, etc.  It is observed that some ASes seem to
   purposefully or accidentally remove BGP Communities on receipt,
   sometimes well-known ones.  Perhaps this issue may be mitigated with
   strong policy guidance related to the handling of Communities.

   Large Communities have much higher capacity, and therefore they are
   likely to be less overloaded.  Hence, Large Community is proposed to
   be used for route-leak detection.  This document suggests reserving
   <TBD1> class for the purpose of transitive well-known Large
   Communities that MUST NOT be stripped on ingress or egress.

   While it is not a part of this document, the route-leak detection
   signal described here can also be carried in a transitive BGP Path
   Attribute, and similar prevention and mitigation techniques as
   described here would apply (see [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy]).

   Due to frequently occurring regional and global disruptions in
   Internet connectivity, it is critical to move forward with a solution
   that is viable in the near term.  That solution would be route-leak
   detection using a well-known Large Community.

4.  Down Only Community

   This section specifies the semantics of route-leak detection
   Community and its usage.  This Community is given the specific name
   Down Only (DO) Community.  The DO Community is carried in a BGP Large
   Community with a format as shown in Figure 1.

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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   TBD1 (class for transitive well-known Large Communities)    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                   TBD2 (subclass for DO)                      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                             ASN                               |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

     Figure 1: Format of the DO Community using a BGP Large Community.

   The authors studied different options for route-leak mitigation.  The
   main options considered are (1) drop detected route leaks and (2)
   deprioritize detected route leaks.  It can be demonstrated that the
   loose mode that uses deprioritization is not safe.  Traffic
   Engineering (TE) techniques which limit prefix visibility are quite
   common.  It may happen that a more specific TE prefix is sent only to
   downstream ASes or to IX(es)/selected peers, and a control Community
   is used to restrict its propagation.  If such a more specific prefix
   is leaked, deprioritization will not stop such a route leak from
   propagating.  In addition, propagation of leaked prefixes based on
   deprioritization may result in priority loops leading to BGP wedgies
   [RFC4264] or even persistent route oscillations.

   So, the only truly safe way to implement route-leak mitigation is to
   drop detected route leaks.  The ingress and egress policies
   corresponding to 'drop detected route leaks' is described in
   Section 4.1.  This policy SHOULD be used as a default behavior.

   Nevertheless, early adopters might want to deploy only the signaling
   and perhaps use it only for diagnostics before applying any route-
   leak mitigation policy.  They are also encouraged to use slightly
   limited marking, which is described in Section 4.2.

4.1.  Route-Leak Mitigation

   This section describes the eBGP ingress and egress policies that MUST
   be used to perform route-leak prevention, detection and mitigation
   using the DO Community.  It should be noted that a route may carry
   more than one DO Communities.  Hence, in the rest of this document,
   "a route with DO Community" means "a route with one or more DO
   Communities".

   The ingress policy MUST use the following procedure:

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   1.  If a route with DO Community is received from a Customer or RS-
       client, then it is a route leak and MUST be dropped.  The
       procedure halts.

   2.  If a route with DO Community is received from a Peer (non-
       transit) and at least one DO value is not equal to the sending
       neighbor's ASN, then it is a route leak and MUST be dropped.  The
       procedure halts.

   3.  If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS, then a DO
       Community MUST be added with a value equal to the sending
       neighbor's ASN.

   The egress policy MUST use the following procedure:

   1.  A route with DO Community (i.e., DO Community was present or
       added at ingress) MUST NOT be sent to a Provider, Peer, or RS.

   2.  If a route is sent to a Customer or Peer, then a DO Community
       MUST be added with value equal to the ASN of the sender.

   The above procedures comprehensively provide route-leak prevention,
   detection and mitigation.  Policy consisting of these procedures
   SHOULD be used as a default behavior.

4.2.  Only Marking

   This section describes eBGP ingress and egress marking policies that
   MUST be used if an AS is not performing route-leak mitigation (i.e.,
   not dropping detected route leaks) as described in Section 4.1, but
   wants to use the DO Community only for marking.  The slightly limited
   DO marking (compared to that in Section 4.1) described below
   guarantees that this DO marking will not limit the leak detection
   opportunities for subsequent ASes in the AS path.

   The ingress policy MUST use the following procedure:

   1.  If a route with DO Community is received from a Customer or RS-
       client, then it is a route leak.  The procedure halts.

   2.  If a route with DO Community is received from a Peer (non-
       transit) and at least one DO value is not equal to the sending
       neighbor's ASN, then it is a route leak.  The procedure halts.

   3.  If a route is received from a Provider, Peer, or RS, then a DO
       Community MUST be added with value equal to the sending
       neighbor's ASN.

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   The egress policy MUST use the following procedure:

   1.  If a route is sent to a Customer or RS-client, then a DO
       Community MUST be added with value equal to the ASN of the
       sender.

   2.  If a route without DO Community is sent to a Peer, then a DO
       Community MUST be added with value equal to the ASN of the
       sender.  Conversely, if a route with DO Community (i.e., DO
       Community was present or added at ingress) is sent to a Peer,
       then an additional DO Community MUST NOT be added.)

   These above procedures specify setting the DO signals in a way that
   can be used to evaluate the potential impact of route-leak mitigation
   policy before deploying strict dropping of detected route leaks.

5.  Implementation Considerations

   It was observed that the majority of BGP implementations do not
   support negative match for communities like a:b:!c.  Further, it is
   observed that a route received from a compliant Peer (non-transit)
   adhering to procedures from either Section 4.1 or Section 4.2 will
   always have a single DO Community with value equal to the peer's ASN.
   Hence, it is suggested to replace the second rule from the ingress
   policies (in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2) with the following:

      In Section 4.1: If a route with DO Community is received from a
      Peer and a DO value is equal to the sending neighbor's ASN, then
      it is a valid route, otherwise it is a route leak and MUST be
      dropped.  The procedure halts.

      In Section 4.2: If a route with DO Community is received from a
      Peer and a DO value is equal to the sending neighbor's ASN, then
      it is a valid route, otherwise it is a route leak.  The procedure
      halts.

   This rule is based on a weaker assumption that a peer that is doing
   marking is also doing filtering (i.e., dropping detected leaks).
   That is why networks that do not follow the route-leak mitigation
   policy in Section 4.1 MUST carefully follow marking rules described
   in Section 4.2.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to reserve a Global Administrator ID <TBD1> for
   transitive well-known Large Community registry.  IANA is also
   requested to register a subclass <TBD2> for DO Community in this
   registry.

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7.  Security Considerations

   In specific circumstances in a state of partial adoption, route-leak
   mitigation mechanism can result in Denial of Service (DoS) for the
   victim prefix.  Such a scenario may happen only for a prefix that has
   a single path from the originator to a Tier-1 ISP and only when the
   prefix is not covered with a less specific prefix with multiple paths
   to the Tier-1 ISP.  If, in such unreliable topology, a route leak is
   injected somewhere inside this single path, then it may be dropped by
   upper tier providers in the path, thus limiting prefix visibility.
   While such anomaly is unlikely to happen, such an issue should be
   easy to debug, since it directly affects the sequence of originator's
   providers.

   With the use of BGP Community, there is often a concern that the
   Community propagates beyond its intended perimeter and causes harm
   [streibelt].  However, that concern does not apply to the DO
   Community because it is a transitive Community that must propagate as
   far as the update goes.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8092]  Heitz, J., Ed., Snijders, J., Ed., Patel, K., Bagdonas,
              I., and N. Hilliard, "BGP Large Communities Attribute",
              RFC 8092, DOI 10.17487/RFC8092, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8092>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy]
              Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K.
              Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention and Detection using Roles
              in UPDATE and OPEN Messages", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy-24, 1 April 2022,
              <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-idr-bgp-open-
              policy-24.txt>.

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   [RFC4264]  Griffin, T. and G. Huston, "BGP Wedgies", RFC 4264,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4264, November 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4264>.

   [RFC7908]  Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E.,
              and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of
              BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, June
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.

   [streibelt]
              Streibelt et al., F., "BGP Communities: Even more Worms in
              the Routing Can",  ACM IMC, October 2018,
              <https://archive.psg.com//181101.imc-communities.pdf>.

Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank John Scudder, Susan Hares, Ruediger Volk,
   Jeffrey Haas, Mat Ford, Greg Skinner for their review and comments.

Contributors

   The following people made significant contributions to this document
   and should be considered co-authors:

   Brian Dickson
   Independent
   Email: brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com

   Doug Montgomery
   USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
   Email: dougm@nist.gov

   Keyur Patel
   Arrcus
   Email: keyur@arrcus.com

   Andrei Robachevsky
   Internet Society
   Email: robachevsky@isoc.org

   Eugene Bogomazov
   Qrator Labs
   Email: eb@qrator.net

   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan
   Email: randy@psg.com

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Authors' Addresses

   Kotikalapudi Sriram (editor)
   USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899
   United States of America
   Email: ksriram@nist.gov

   Alexander Azimov (editor)
   Yandex
   Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16
   Moscow
   Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com

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