Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation-02
IDR and SIDR K. Sriram, Ed.
Internet-Draft USA NIST
Intended status: Standards Track A. Azimov, Ed.
Expires: July 28, 2020 Yandex
January 25, 2020
Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-detection-mitigation-02
Abstract
Problem definition for route leaks and enumeration of types of route
leaks are provided in [RFC7908]. This document describes a new well-
known Large Community that provides a way for route leak prevention,
detection, and mitigation. The configuration process for this
Community can be automated with the methodology for setting BGP roles
that is described in ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy draft.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 28, 2020.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Peering Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Community vs Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Down Only Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Route Leak Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Only Marking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
[RFC7908] provides a definition of the route leak problem and
enumerates several types of route leaks. For this document, the
definition that is applied is that a route leak occurs when a route
received from a transit provider or a lateral peer is forwarded
(against commonly used policy) to another transit provider or a
lateral peer. The commonly used policy is that a route received from
a transit provider or a lateral peer MAY be forwarded only to
customers.
This document describes a solution for prevention, detection and
mitigation route leaks which is based on conveying route-leak
detection information in a well-known BGP Large Community. The
configuration process for the Large Community MUST be defined
according to peering relations between ISPs. This process can be
automated with the methodology for setting BGP roles that is
described in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy].
The techniques described in this document can be incrementally
deployed. If a group of big ISPs and/or Internet Exchanges (IXes)
deploy the proposed techniques, then they would be helping each other
by blocking route leaks that can happen between them.
2. Peering Relationships
As described in [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] there are several
common peering relations between eBGP neighbors:
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o Provider - sender is a transit provider of the neighbor;
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