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Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks
draft-ietf-grow-route-leak-problem-definition-06

Yes

(Alia Atlas)
(Alissa Cooper)
(Ben Campbell)
(Joel Jaeggli)
(Kathleen Moriarty)

No Objection

(Alvaro Retana)
(Jari Arkko)
(Mirja K├╝hlewind)
(Suresh Krishnan)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 04 and is now closed.

Alia Atlas Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -05) Unknown

                            
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -05) Unknown

                            
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -05) Unknown

                            
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -04) Unknown

                            
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -05) Unknown

                            
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (2016-05-03 for -05) Unknown
- Thanks for doing this. The set of references alone seems
particularly valuable.

- section 2, does "propagation" in the definition mean
that purely faked announcement messages (ignoring RPKI for
the moment) that overlap with genuine announcements cannot
be considered route-leaks?  From the receiver POV, those
would not be distinct. It was probably already suggested
but if not, do you think would s/propagation/receipt/ or
similar be a little better?
Terry Manderson Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (2016-05-03 for -05) Unknown
Thank you for an exceptionally well formed and well written coverage of route leaks.
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -05) Unknown

                            
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2016-05-04 for -05) Unknown
Thanks for this well written document as others noted. I prefer a rewording of a somewhat choppy sentence in section 3.2 as it inaccurately quotes from the reference. The sentence says "[Mauch] observes that these are anomalies and potentially route leaks because very large ISPs such as ATT, Sprint, Verizon, and Globalcrossing do not in general buy transit services from each other." But the reference says "Example: UUNet (701) does not buy from Sprint (1239) to get to Globalcrossing (3549)." As this section in the document is "Example incidents" for Type 2, it infers this was an actual incident. But the reference itself simply says it is monitoring for this association.

Suggest to reword:
[Mauch] observes that its detection algorithm detects for these anomalies and potentially route leaks because very large ISPs do not in general buy transit services from each other.
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -05) Unknown

                            
Mirja K├╝hlewind Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -05) Unknown

                            
Suresh Krishnan Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -05) Unknown