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Neighbor Discovery Proxies (ND Proxy)

The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
Document Type
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as RFC 4389.
Authors Mohit Talwar , Dave Thaler , Chirayu Patel
Last updated 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2005-10-26)
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state (None)
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IESG IESG state RFC 4389 (Experimental)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD Margaret Cullen
Send notices to (None)
IPv6 Working Group                                       D. Thaler
INTERNET-DRAFT                                           M. Talwar
October 20, 2005                                         Microsoft
Expires April 2006                                        C. Patel
                                                 All Play, No Work

              Neighbor Discovery Proxies (ND Proxy)

Status of this Memo

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have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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Copyright Notice

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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).  All Rights Reserved.


Bridging multiple links into a single entity has several
operational advantages.  A single subnet prefix is sufficient to
support multiple physical links.  There is no need to allocate
subnet numbers to the different networks, simplifying management.
Bridging some types of media requires network-layer support,
however.  This document describes these cases and specifies the
IP-layer support that enables bridging under these circumstances.

1.  Introduction

In the IPv4 Internet today, it is common for Network Address
Translators (NATs) [NAT] to be used to easily connect one or more
leaf links to an existing network without requiring any
coordination with the network service provider.  Since NATs modify
IP addresses in packets, they are problematic for many IP
applications.  As a result, it is desirable to address the problem
(for both IPv4 and IPv6) without the need for NATs, while still
maintaining the property that no explicit cooperation from the
router is needed.

One common solution is IEEE 802 bridging, as specified in
[BRIDGE].  It is expected that whenever possible links will be
bridged at the link layer using classic bridge technology [BRIDGE]
as opposed to using the mechanisms herein.  However, classic
bridging at the data-link layer has the following limitations
(among others):

o    It requires the ports to support promiscuous mode.

o    It requires all ports to support the same type of link-layer
     addressing (in particular, IEEE 802 addressing).

As a result, two common scenarios, described below, are not
solved, and it is these two scenarios we specifically target in
this document.  While the mechanism described herein may apply to
other scenarios as well, we will concentrate our discussion on
these two scenarios.

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1.1.  SCENARIO 1: Wireless upstream

The following figure illustrates a likely example:

         |         +-------+           +--------+
   local |Ethernet |       | Wireless  | Access |
         +---------+   A   +-)))   (((-+        +--> rest of network
   hosts |         |       |   link    | Point  |
         |         +-------+           +--------+

In this scenario, the access point has assigned an IPv6 subnet
prefix to the wireless link, and uses link-layer encryption so
that wireless clients may not see each other's data.

Classic bridging requires the bridge (node A in the above diagram)
to be in promiscuous mode.  In this wireless scenario, A cannot
put its wireless interface into promiscuous mode, since one
wireless node cannot see traffic to/from other wireless nodes.

IPv4 ARP proxying has been used for some years to solve this
problem without involving NAT or requiring any change to the
access point or router.  In this document, we describe equivalent
functionality for IPv6 to remove this incentive to deploy NATs in

We also note that Prefix Delegation [PD] could also be used to
solve this scenario.  There are, however, two disadvantages to
this.  First, if an implementation already supports IPv4 ARP
proxying (which is indeed the case in a number of implementations
today), then IPv6 Prefix Delegation would result in separate IPv6
subnets on either side of the device, while a single IPv4 subnet
would span both segments.  This topological discrepancy can
complicate applications and protocols which use the concept of a
local subnet.  Secondly, the extent to which Prefix Delegation is
supported, and supported without additional charge, is up to the
service provider.  Hence, there is no guarantee that Prefix
Delegation will work without explicit configuration or additional
charge.  Bridging, on the other hand, allows the device to work
with zero configuration, regardless of the service provider's
policies, just as a NAT does.  Hence bridging avoids the incentive
to NAT IPv6 just to avoid paying for, or requiring configuration
to get, another prefix.

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1.2.  SCENARIO 2: PPP upstream

The following figure illustrates another likely example:
         |         +-------+           +--------+
   local |Ethernet |       | PPP link  |        |
         +---------+   A   +-----------+ Router +--> rest of network
   hosts |         |       |           |        |
         |         +-------+           +--------+

In this scenario, the router has assigned a /64 to the PPP link
and advertises it in an IPv6 Router Advertisement.

Classic bridging does not support non-802 media.  The PPP Bridging
Control Protocol [BCP] defines a mechanism for supporting bridging
over PPP, but it requires both ends to be configured to support
it.  Hence IPv4 connectivity is often solved by making the proxy
(node A in the above diagram) be a NAT or an IPv4 ARP Proxy.  This
document specifies a solution for IPv6 which does not involve NAT
or require any change to the router.

1.3.  Inapplicable Scenarios

This document is not applicable to scenarios with loops in the
physical topology, or where routers exist on multiple segments.
These cases are detected and proxying is disabled (see Section 6).

In addition, this document is not appropriate for scenarios where
classic bridging can be applied, or when configuration of the
router can be done.

2.  Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC
2119 [KEYWORDS].

The term "proxy interface" will be used to refer to an interface
(which could itself be a bridge interface) over which network
layer proxying is done as defined herein.

In this document we make no distinction between a "link" (in the
classic IPv6 sense) and a "subnet".  We use the term "segment" to
apply to a bridged component of the link.

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Finally, while it is possible that functionality equivalent to
that described herein may be achieved by nodes which do not
fulfill all the requirements in [NODEREQ], in the remainder of
this document we will describe behavior in terms of an IPv6 node
as defined in that document.

3.  Requirements

Proxy behavior is designed with the following requirements in

o    Support connecting multiple segments with a single subnet

o    Support media which cannot be bridged at the link-layer.

o    Do not require any changes to existing routers.  That is,
     routers on the subnet may be unaware that the subnet is being

o    Provide full connectivity between all nodes in the subnet.
     For example, if there are existing nodes (such as any routers
     on the subnet) which have addresses in the subnet prefix,
     adding a proxy must allow bridged nodes to have full
     connectivity with existing nodes on the subnet.

o    Prevent loops.

o    Also work in the absence of any routers.

o    Support nodes moving between segments.  For example, a node
     should be able to keep its address without seeing its address
     as a duplicate due to any cache maintained at the proxy.

o    Allow dynamic addition of a proxy without adversely
     disrupting the network.

o    The proxy behavior should not break any existing classic
     bridges in use on a network segment.

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3.1.  Non-requirements

The following items are not considered requirements, as they are
not met by classic bridges:

o    Show up as a hop in a traceroute.

o    Use the shortest path between two nodes on different

o    Be able to use all available interfaces simultaneously.
     Instead, bridging technology relies on disabling redundant
     interfaces to prevent loops.

o    Support connecting media on which Neighbor Discovery is not
     possible.  For example, some technologies such as [6TO4] use
     an algorithmic mapping from IPv6 address to the underlying
     link-layer (IPv4 in this case) address, and hence cannot
     support bridging arbitrary IP addresses.

The following additional items are not considered requirements for
this document:

o    Support network-layer protocols other than IPv6.  We do not
     preclude such support, but it is not specified in this

o    Support Redirects for off-subnet destinations that point to a
     router on a different segment from the redirected host.
     While this scenario may be desirable, no solution is
     currently known which does not have undesirable side effects
     outside the subnet.  As a result, this scenario is outside
     the scope of this document.

4.  Proxy Behavior

Network layer support for proxying between multiple interfaces
SHOULD be used only when classic bridging is not possible.

When a proxy interface comes up, the node puts it in "all-
multicast" mode so that it will receive all multicast packets.  It
is common for interfaces to not support full promiscuous mode
(e.g., on a wireless client), but all-multicast mode is generally
still supported.

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As with all other interfaces, IPv6 maintains a neighbor cache for
each proxy interface, which will be used as described below.

4.1.  Forwarding Packets

When a packet from any IPv6 source address other than the
unspecified address is received on a proxy interface, the neighbor
cache of that interface SHOULD be consulted to find an entry for
the source IPv6 address.  If no entry exists, one is created in
the STALE state.

When any IPv6 packet is received on a proxy interface, it must be
parsed to see whether it is known to be of a type that negotiates
link-layer addresses.  This document covers the following types:
Neighbor Solicitations, Neighbor Advertisements, Router
Advertisements, and Redirects.  These packets are ones that can
carry link-layer addresses, and hence must be proxied (as
described below) so that packets between nodes on different
segments can be received by the proxy and have the correct link-
layer address type on each segment.

When any other IPv6 multicast packet is received on a proxy
interface, in addition to any normal IPv6 behavior such as being
delivered locally, it is forwarded unchanged (other than using a
new link-layer header) out all other proxy interfaces on the same
link.  (As specified in [BRIDGE], the proxy may instead support
multicast learning and filtering but this is OPTIONAL.)  In
particular, the IPv6 Hop Limit is not updated, and no ICMP errors
(except as noted in Section 4.1.1 below) are sent as a result of
attempting this forwarding.

When any other IPv6 unicast packet is received on a proxy
interface, if it is not locally destined then it is forwarded
unchanged (other than using a new link-layer header) to the proxy
interface for which the next hop address appears in the neighbor
cache.  Again the IPv6 Hop Limit is not updated, and no ICMP
errors (except as noted in Section 4.1.1 below) are sent as a
result of attempting this forwarding.  To choose a proxy interface
to forward to, the neighbor cache is consulted, and the interface
with the neighbor entry in the "best" state is used.  In order of
least to most preferred, the states (per [ND]) are INCOMPLETE,
STALE, DELAY, PROBE, REACHABLE.  A packet is never forwarded back
out the same interface on which it arrived; such a packet is
instead silently dropped.

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If no cache entry exists (as may happen if the proxy has
previously evicted the cache entry or if the proxy is restarted),
the proxy SHOULD queue the packet and initiate Neighbor Discovery
as if the packet were being locally generated.  The proxy MAY
instead silently drop the packet.  In this case, the entry will
eventually be recreated when the sender re-attempts neighbor

The link layer header, and the link-layer address within the
payload for each forwarded packet will be modified as follows:

1)   The source address will be the address of the outgoing

2)   The destination address will be the address in the neighbor
     entry corresponding to the destination IPv6 address.

3)   The link-layer address within the payload is substituted with
     the address of the outgoing interface.

4.1.1.  Sending Packet Too Big Messages

Whenever any IPv6 packet is to be forwarded out an interface whose
MTU is smaller than the size of the packet, the ND proxy drops the
packet and sends a Packet Too Big message back to the source, as
described in [ICMPv6].

4.1.2.  Proxying Packets With Link-Layer Addresses

Once it is determined that the packet is either multicast or else
is not locally destined (if unicast), the special types enumerated
above (ARP, etc.) that carry link-layer addresses are handled by
generating a proxy packet that contains the proxy's link-layer
address on the outgoing interface instead.  Such link-layer
addresses occur in the link-layer header itself, as well as in the
payloads of some protocols.  As with all forwarded packets, the
link-layer header is new.

Section 4.1.3 enumerates the currently known cases where link-
layer addresses must be changed in payloads.  For guidance on
handling future protocols, Section 7, "Guidelines to proxy
developers", describes the scenarios in which the link-layer
address substitution in the payload should be performed.  Note

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that any change to the length of a proxied packet, such as when
the link-layer address length changes, will require a
corresponding change to the IPv6 Payload Length field.

4.1.3.  IPv6 ND Proxying

When any IPv6 packet is received on a proxy interface, it must be
parsed to see whether it is known to be one of the following
types: Neighbor Solicitation, Neighbor Advertisement, Router
Advertisement, or Redirect.  ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitations

If the received packet is an ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation (NS),
the NS is processed locally as described in section 7.2.3 of [ND]
but no NA is generated immediately.  Instead the NS is proxied as
described above and the NA will be proxied when it is received.
This ensures that the proxy does not interfere with hosts moving
from one segment to another since it never responds to an NS based
on its own cache.  ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisements

If the received packet is an ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement (NA),
the neighbor cache on the receiving interface is first updated as
if the NA were locally destined, and then the NA is proxied as
described in 4.1.2 above.  ICMPv6 Router Advertisements

The following special processing is done for IPv6 Router
Advertisements (RAs).

A new "Proxy" bit is defined in the existing Router Advertisement
flags field as follows:
where "P" indicates the location of the Proxy bit, and "Rsv
indicates the remaining reserved bits.

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The proxy determines an "upstream" proxy interface, typically
through a (zero-configuration) physical choice dictated by the
scenario (see Scenarios 1 and 2 above), or through manual

When an RA with the P bit clear arrives on the upstream interface,
the P bit is set when the RA is proxied out all other
("downstream") proxy interfaces (see section 6).

If an RA with the P bit set has arrived on a given interface
(including the upstream interface) within the last 60 minutes,
that interface MUST NOT be used as a proxy interface; i.e., proxy
functionality is disabled on that interface.

Furthermore, if any RA (regardless of the value of the P bit) has
arrived on a "downstream" proxy interface within the last 60
minutes, that interface MUST NOT be used as a proxy interface.

The RA is processed locally as well as proxied as described in
section 4.1.2, unless such proxying is disabled as noted above.  ICMPv6 Redirects

If the received packet is an ICMPv6 Redirect message, then the
proxied packet should be modified as follows.  If the proxy has a
valid (i.e., not INCOMPLETE) neighbor entry for the target address
on the same interface as the redirected host, then the TLLA option
in the proxied Redirect simply contains the link-layer address of
the target as found in the proxy's neighbor entry, since the
redirected host may reach the target address directly.  Otherwise,
if the proxy has a valid neighbor entry for the target address on
some other interface, then the TLLA option in the proxied packet
contains the link-layer address of the proxy on the sending
interface, since the redirected host must reach the target address
through the proxy.  Otherwise, the proxy has no valid neighbor
entry for the target address, and the proxied packet contains no
TLLA option, which will cause the redirected host to perform
neighbor discovery for the target address.

4.2.  Originating Packets

Locally originated packets that are sent on a proxy interface also
follow the same rules as packets received on a proxy interface.

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If no neighbor entry exists when a unicast packet is to be locally
originated, an interface can be chosen in any implementation-
specific fashion.  Once the neighbor is resolved, the actual
interface will be discovered and the packet will be sent on that
interface.  When a multicast packet is to be locally originated,
an interface can be chosen in any implementation-specific fashion,
and the packet will then be forwarded out other proxy interfaces
on the same link as described in Section 4.1 above.

5.  Example

Consider the following topology, where A and B are nodes on
separate segments which are connected by a proxy P:

      a    p1 p2    b

A and B have link-layer addresses a and b, respectively.  P has
link-layer addresses p1 and p2 on the two segments.  We now walk
through the actions that happen when A attempts to send an initial
IPv6 packet to B.

A first does a route lookup on the destination address B.  This
matches the on-link subnet prefix, and a destination cache entry
is created as well as a neighbor cache entry in the INCOMPLETE
state.  Before the packet can be sent, A needs to resolve B's
link-layer address and sends a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) to the
solicited-node multicast address for B.  The SLLA option in the
solicitation contains A's link-layer address.

P receives the solicitation (since it is receiving all link-layer
multicast packets) and processes it as it would any multicast
packet by forwarding it out to other segments on the link.
However, before actually sending the packet, it determines if the
packet being sent is one which requires proxying.  Since it is an
NS, it creates a neighbor entry for A on interface 1 and records
its link-layer address.  It also creates a neighbor entry for B
(on an arbitrary proxy interface) in the INCOMPLETE state.  Since
the packet is multicast, P then needs to proxy the NS out all
other proxy interfaces on the subnet.  Before sending the packet
out interface 2, it replaces the link-layer address in the SLLA
option with its own link-layer address, p2.

B receives this NS, processing it as usual.  Hence it creates a

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neighbor entry for A mapping it to the link-layer address p2.  It
responds with a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) sent to A containing
B's link-layer address b.  The NA is sent using A's neighbor
entry, i.e. to the link-layer address p2.

The NA is received by P, which then processes it as it would any
unicast packet; i.e., it forwards this out interface 1, based on
the neighbor cache.  However, before actually sending the packet
out, it inspects it to determine if the packet being sent is one
which requires proxying.  Since it is an NA, it updates its
neighbor entry for B to be REACHABLE and records the link-layer
address b.  P then replaces the link-layer address in the TLLA
option with its own link-layer address on the outgoing interface,
p1.  The packet is then sent out interface 1.

A receives this NA, processing it as usual.  Hence it creates a
neighbor entry for B on interface 2 in the REACHABLE state and
records the link-layer address p1.

6.  Loop Prevention

An implementation MUST ensure that loops are prevented by using
the P bit in RA's as follows.  The proxy determines an "upstream"
proxy interface, typically through a (zero-configuration) physical
choice dictated by the scenario (see Scenarios 1 and 2 above), or
through manual configuration.  As described in Section,
only the upstream interface is allowed to receive RAs, and never
from other proxies.  Proxy functionality is disabled on an
interface otherwise.  Finally, a proxy MUST wait until it has sent
two P bit RAs on a given "downstream" interface before it enables
forwarding on that interface.

7.  Guidelines to proxy developers

Proxy developers will have to accomodate protocols or protocol
options (for example, new ICMP messages) that are developed in the
future, or protocols that are not mentioned in this document (for
example, proprietary protocols). This section prescribes
guidelines that can be used by proxy developers to accomodate
protocols that are not mentioned herein.

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1)   If a link-layer address carried in the payload of the
     protocol can be used in the link-layer header of future
     messages, then the proxy should substitute it with its own
     address. For example the link-layer address in NA messages is
     used in the link-layer header for future messages, and,
     hence, the proxy substitutes it with its own address.

     For multicast packets, the link-layer address substituted
     within the payload will be different for each outgoing

2)   If the link-layer address in the payload of the protocol will
     never be used in any link-layer header, then the proxy should
     not substitute it with its own address.  No special actions
     are required for supporting these protocols.  For example,
     [DHCPv6] is in this category.

8.  IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

9.  Security Considerations

Unsecured Neighbor Discovery has a number of security issues which
are discussed in detail in [PSREQ]. RFC 3971 [SEND] defines
security mechanisms that can protect Neighbor Discovery.

Proxies are susceptible to the same kind of security issues that
plague hosts using unsecured Neighbor Discovery.  These issues
include hijacking traffic and denial-of-service within the subnet.
Malicious nodes within the subnet can take advantage of this
property, and hijack traffic.  In addition, a Neighbor Discovery
proxy is essentially a legitimate man-in-the-middle, which implies
that there is a need to distinguish proxies from unwanted man-in-
the-middle attackers.

This document does not introduce any new mechanisms for the
protection of proxy neighbor discovery.  That is, it does not
provide a mechanism from authorizing certain devices to act as
proxies, and it does not provide extensions to SEND to make it
possible to use both SEND and proxies at the same time.  We note
that RFC 2461 [ND] already defines the ability to proxy Neighbor
Advertisements, and extensions to SEND are already needed to cover

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that case, independent of this document.

Note also that the use of proxy Neighbor Discovery may render it
impossible to use SEND both on the leaf subnet and on the external
subnet.  This because the modifications performed by the proxy
will invalidate the RSA Signature Option in a secured Neighbor
Discovery message, and cause SEND-capable nodes to either discard
the messages or treat them as unsecured.  The latter is the
desired operation when SEND is used together with this
specification, and ensures that SEND nodes within this environment
can selectively downgrade themselves to unsecure Neighbor
Discovery when proxies are present.

In the following we outline some potential paths to follow when
defining a secure proxy mechanism.

It is reasonable for nodes on the leaf subnet to have a secure
relationship with the proxy, and accept ND packets from either the
owner of a specific address (normal SEND), or which it can verify
are from a trusted proxy (see below).

For nodes on the external subnet, there is a tradeoff between
security (where all nodes have a secure relationship with the
proxy) and privacy (where no nodes are aware that the proxy is a
proxy).  In the case of a point-to-point external link (Scenario
2) however, SEND may not be a requirement on that link.

Verifying that ND packets come from a trusted proxy requires an
extension to the SEND protocol and is left for future work [SPND],
but is similar to the problem of securing Router Advertisements
which is supported today.  For example, a rogue node can send a
Router Advertisement to cause a proxy to disable its proxy
behavior, and hence cause denial-of-service to other nodes; this
threat is covered in section 4.2.1 of [PSREQ].

Alternative designs might involve schemes where the right for
representing a particular host is delegated to the proxy, or where
multiple nodes can make statements on behalf of one address

10.  Appendix A: Comparison with Naive RA Proxy

It has been suggested that a simple Router Advertisement (RA)
proxy would be sufficient, where the subnet prefix in an RA is

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"stolen" by the proxy and applied to a downstream link instead of
an upstream link. Other ND messages are not proxied.

There are many problems with this approach.  First, it requires
cooperation from all nodes on the upstream link.  No node
(including the router sending the RA) can have an address in the
subnet or it will not have connectivity with nodes on the
downstream link.  This is because when a node on a downstream link
tries to do Neighbor Discovery, and the proxy does not send the NS
on the upstream link, it will never discover the neighbor on the
upstream link.  Similarly, if messages are not proxied during DAD,
conflicts can occur.

Second, if the proxy assumes that no nodes on the upstream link
have addresses in the prefix, such a proxy could not be safely
deployed without cooperation from the network administrator since
it introduces a requirement that the router itself not have an
address in the prefix.  This rules out use in situations where
bridges and Network Address Translators (NATs) are used today,
which is the problem this document is directly addressing.
Instead, where a prefix is desired for use on one or more
downstream links in cooperation with the network administrator,
Prefix Delegation [PD] should be used instead.

11.  Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank Jari Arkko for contributing portions of
the Security Considerations text.

12.  Authors' Addresses

     Dave Thaler
     Microsoft Corporation
     One Microsoft Way
     Redmond, WA  98052-6399
     Phone: +1 425 703 8835

     Mohit Talwar
     Microsoft Corporation
     One Microsoft Way
     Redmond, WA  98052-6399
     Phone: +1 425 705 3131

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     Chirayu Patel
     All Play, No Work
     Bangalore, Karnataka 560038
     Phone: +91-98452-88078

13.  Normative References

     T. Jeffree, editor, "Media Access Control (MAC) Bridges",
     ANSI/IEEE Std 802.1D, 2004,

     Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message Protocol
     (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)
     Specification", RFC 2463, December 1998.

     S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
     Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March, 1997.

[ND] Narten, T., Nordmark, E. and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
     for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 2461, December 1998.

     J. Loughney, "IPv6 Node Requirements", Work in progress,
     draft-ietf-ipv6-node-requirements-11.txt, August 2004.

14.  Informative References

     Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains via
     IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

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     Baker, F. and R. Bowen, "PPP Bridging Control Protocol
     (BCP)", RFC 1638, June 1994.

     Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.
     and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
     (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.

     Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address
     Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, January 2001.

[PD] Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic Host
     Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6", RFC 3633, December

     Nikander, P., Kempf, J. and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
     Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756, May 2004.

     Kempf, J. and C. Gentry, "Secure IPv6 Address Proxying using
     Multi-Key Cryptographically Generated Addresses (MCGAs)",
     Work in progress, draft-kempf-mobopts-ringsig-ndproxy-02.txt,
     August, 2005.

     Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B. and P. Nikander, "SEcure
     Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

     Daley, G., "Securing Proxy Neighbour Discovery Problem
     Statement", Work in progress, draft-daley-send-spnd-
     prob-01.txt, February 2005.

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15.  Full Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).  This document is
subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP
78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their

This document and the information contained herein are provided on

16.  Intellectual Property

The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed
to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology
described in this document or the extent to which any license
under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it
represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any
such rights.  Information on the procedures with respect to rights
in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use
of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository

The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention
any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other
proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required
to implement this standard.  Please address the information to the

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Table of Contents

1: Introduction .............................................    2
1.1: SCENARIO 1: Wireless upstream ..........................    3
1.2: SCENARIO 2: PPP upstream ...............................    4
1.3: Inapplicable Scenarios .................................    4
2: Terminology ..............................................    4
3: Requirements .............................................    5
3.1: Non-requirements .......................................    6
4: Proxy Behavior ...........................................    6
4.1: Forwarding Packets .....................................    7
4.1.1: Sending Packet Too Big Messages ......................    8
4.1.2: Proxying Packets With Link-Layer Addresses ...........    8
4.1.3: IPv6 ND Proxying .....................................    9 ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitations ......................    9 ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisements .....................    9 ICMPv6 Router Advertisements .......................    9 ICMPv6 Redirects ...................................   10
4.2: Originating Packets ....................................   10
5: Example ..................................................   11
6: Loop Prevention ..........................................   12
7: Guidelines to proxy developers ...........................   12
8: IANA Considerations ......................................   13
9: Security Considerations ..................................   13
10: Appendix A: Comparison with Naive RA Proxy ..............   14
11: Acknowledgements ........................................   15
12: Authors' Addresses ......................................   15
13: Normative References ....................................   16
14: Informative References ..................................   16
15: Full Copyright Statement ................................   18
16: Intellectual Property ...................................   18

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