Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
draft-ietf-jose-use-cases-01

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JOSE                                                           R. Barnes
Internet-Draft                                          BBN Technologies
Intended status: Informational                              May 26, 2013
Expires: November 27, 2013

Use Cases and Requirements for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
                    draft-ietf-jose-use-cases-01.txt

Abstract

   Many Internet applications have a need for object-based security
   mechanisms in addition to security mechanisms at the network layer or
   transport layer.  In the past, the Cryptographic Message Syntax has
   provided a binary secure object format based on ASN.1.  Over time,
   the use of binary object encodings such as ASN.1 has been overtaken
   by text-based encodings, for example JavaScript Object Notation.
   This document defines a set of use cases and requirements for a
   secure object format encoded using JavaScript Object Notation, drawn
   from a variety of application security mechanisms currently in
   development.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 27, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

Barnes                  Expires November 27, 2013               [Page 1]
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Basic Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  Security Tokens and Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  XMPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.3.  ALTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.4.  Emergency Alerting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.5.  Web Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.6.  Small Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   5.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.1.  Functional Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.2.  Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.3.  Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

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1.  Introduction

   Internet applications rest on the layered architecture of the
   Internet, and take advantage of security mechanisms at all layers.
   Many applications rely primarily on channel-based security
   technologies, which create a secure channel at the IP layer or
   transport layer over which application data can flow
   [RFC4301][RFC5246].  These mechanisms, however, cannot provide end-
   to-end security in some cases.  For example, in protocols with
   application-layer intermediaries, channel-based security protocols
   would protect messages from attackers between intermediaries, but not
   from the intermediaries themselves.  These cases require object-based
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