Authentication Indicator in Kerberos Tickets
draft-ietf-kitten-krb-auth-indicator-04

Internet Engineering Task Force                                  A. Jain
Internet-Draft                                              Georgia Tech
Updates: 4120 (if approved)                                    N. Kinder
Intended status: Standards Track                             N. McCallum
Expires: June 18, 2017                                     Red Hat, Inc.
                                                       December 15, 2016

              Authentication Indicator in Kerberos Tickets
                draft-ietf-kitten-krb-auth-indicator-04

Abstract

   This document updates RFC 4120 in order to specify an extension in
   the Kerberos protocol.  It defines a new authorization data type AD-
   AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR.  The purpose of introducing this data type
   is to include an indicator of the strength of a client's
   authentication in service tickets so that application services can
   use it as an input into policy decisions.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

Jain, et al.              Expires June 18, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft          Authentication Indicator           December 2016

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Document Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  AD Type Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   Kerberos [RFC4120] allows secure interaction among users and services
   over a network.  It supports a variety of authentication mechanisms
   using its pre-authentication framework [RFC6113].  The Kerberos
   authentication service has been architected to support password-based
   authentication as well as multi-factor authentication using one-time
   password devices, public-key cryptography and other pre-
   authentication schemes.  Implementations that offer pre-
   authentication mechanisms supporting significantly different
   strengths of client authentication may choose to keep track of the
   strength of the authentication that was used, for use as an input
   into policy decisions.

   This document specifies a new authorization data type to convey
   authentication strength information to application services.
   Elements of this type MUST appear within an AD-CAMMAC [RFC7751]
   container.

2.  Document Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3.  AD Type Specification

   The KDC MAY include authorization data of ad-type 97, wrapped in AD-
   CAMMAC, in initial credentials.  The KDC MAY copy it from a ticket-
   granting ticket into service tickets.

Jain, et al.              Expires June 18, 2017                 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft          Authentication Indicator           December 2016

   The corresponding ad-data field contains the DER encoding of the
   following ASN.1 type:

   AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String

   Each UTF8String value is a short string that indicates that a
   particular set of requirements was met during the initial
   authentication.  These strings are intended to be compared against
   known values.  They are not intended to store structured data.  Each
   string MUST be either:

   * A URI which references a Level of Assurance Profile [RFC6711]

   * A site-defined string, which MUST NOT contain a colon, whose
   meaning is determined by the realm administrator.

   Authorization data elements of type AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR MUST
   be included in an AD-CAMMAC container so that their contents can be
   verified as originating from the KDC.  Elements of type AD-
   AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR MAY safely be ignored by applications and
   KDCs that do not implement this element.

4.  Security Considerations

   Elements of type AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR are wrapped in AD-CAMMAC
   containers.  AD-CAMMAC supersedes AD-KDC-ISSUED, and allows both
   application services and the KDC to verify the authenticity of the
   contained authorization data.

   KDC implementations MUST use AD-CAMMAC verifiers as described in the
   the security considerations of RFC 7751 [RFC7751] to ensure that AD-
   AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR elements are not modified by an attacker.
   Application servers MUST validate the AD-CAMMAC container before
   making authorization decisions based on AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR
   elements.  Application servers MUST NOT make authorization decisions
   based on AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR elements which appear outside of
   AD-CAMMAC containers.

   Using multiple strings in AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR MAY lead to
   ambiguity when a service tries to make a decision based on the AD-
   AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR values.  This ambiguity can be avoided if
   indicator values are always used as a positive indication of certain
   requirements being met during the initial authentication.

Jain, et al.              Expires June 18, 2017                 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft          Authentication Indicator           December 2016

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4120, July 2005,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120>.

   [RFC6113]  Hartman, S. and L. Zhu, "A Generalized Framework for
              Kerberos Pre-Authentication", RFC 6113,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6113, April 2011,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6113>.

   [RFC7751]  Sorce, S. and T. Yu, "Kerberos Authorization Data
              Container Authenticated by Multiple Message Authentication
              Codes (MACs)", RFC 7751, DOI 10.17487/RFC7751, March 2016,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7751>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6711]  Johansson, L., "An IANA Registry for Level of Assurance
              (LoA) Profiles", RFC 6711, DOI 10.17487/RFC6711, August
              2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6711>.

Jain, et al.              Expires June 18, 2017                 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft          Authentication Indicator           December 2016

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   KerberosV5AuthenticationIndicators {
           iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
           security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4)
           authentication-indicators(9)
   } DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

   AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR ::= SEQUENCE OF UTF8String

   END

Appendix B.  Acknowledgements

   Dmitri Pal (Red Hat)
   Simo Sorce (Red Hat)
   Greg Hudson (MIT)

Authors' Addresses

   Anupam Jain
   Georgia Tech
   225 North Ave NW
   Atlanta, GA  30332
   USA

   EMail: ajain323@gatech.edu

   Nathan Kinder
   Red Hat, Inc.
   444 Castro St.
   Suite 500
   Mountain View, CA  94041
   USA

   EMail: nkinder@redhat.com

   Nathaniel McCallum
   Red Hat, Inc.
   100 East Davie Street
   Raleigh, NC  27601
   USA

   EMail: npmccallum@redhat.com

Jain, et al.              Expires June 18, 2017                 [Page 5]