A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the Kerberos V Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism
draft-ietf-kitten-krb5-gssapi-prf-04

IANA Last Call Comments:
We understand this document to have NO IANA Actions.

The document does indicate that a registry may be created in the future.
At that time the GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG minor status code should be
added to such a registry.  If such a registry were created, IANA would like to see the document creating such a registry include this status code in the initial registrations.

  1.a) Have the chairs personally reviewed this version of the Internet
        Draft (ID), and in particular, do they believe this ID is ready
        to forward to the IESG for publication?

I have reviewed this document and believe it is ready for publication.


  1.b) Has the document had adequate review from both key WG members
        and key non-WG members?  Do you have any concerns about the
        depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

The document has been given significant review and is ready for
publication.

  1.c) Do you have concerns that the document needs more review from a
        particular (broader) perspective (e.g., security, operational
        complexity, someone familiar with AAA, etc.)?

I have no concerns.

  1.d) Do you have any specific concerns/issues with this document that
        you believe the ADs and/or IESG should be aware of?  For
        example, perhaps you are uncomfortable with certain parts of the
        document, or have concerns whether there really is a need for
        it.  In any event, if your issues have been discussed in the WG
        and the WG has indicated it that it still wishes to advance the
        document, detail those concerns in the write-up.

There are no issues that I am aware of.

  1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
        represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
        others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
        agree with it?

The working group support is solid.

  1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
        discontent?  If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
        separate email to the Responsible Area Director.

There is no threat of appeal.

  1.g) Have the chairs verified that the document adheres to all of the
        ID nits? (see http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html).

ID nits has passed

  1.h) Is the document split into normative and informative references?
        Are there normative references to IDs, where the IDs are not
        also ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state?
        (note here that the RFC editor will not publish an RFC with
        normative references to IDs, it will delay publication until all
        such IDs are also ready for publication as RFCs.)

Yes.

  1.i) For Standards Track and BCP documents, the IESG approval
        announcement includes a write-up section with the following
        sections:


Technical Summary:

This document defines the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the
Kerberos V mechanism for the Generic Security Service Application
Programming Interface (GSS-API), based on the PRF defined for the
Kerberos V cryptographic framework, for keying application protocols
given an established Kerberos V GSS-API security context.


Working Group Summary:

The Kitten working group participants are uniformly supportive
of this document.  Significant effort was spent developing the
Security Considerations section.  Everyone agrees with the spirit
of the current text and wishes it could be improved.  Unfortunately,
no one could come up with better text than what we already have.



Protocol Quality:

There are no shipping implementations of this document although there
has been broad review and no concerns have been raised regarding the
ability to implement the interfaces defined.

Several vendors including MIT's Kerberos team, Heimdal and Sun
Microsystems have indicated a desire to implement the extension.

Ken Raeburn, Uri Blumenthal, Joe Salowey, Martin Rex, and
Jeffrey Hutzelman provided significant review.