Using the AES-GMAC Algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
draft-ietf-lamps-cms-aes-gmac-alg-05
Yes
Roman Danyliw
No Objection
Erik Kline
Murray Kucherawy
Éric Vyncke
(Alissa Cooper)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Barry Leiba)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Martin Duke)
(Martin Vigoureux)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 03 and is now closed.
Roman Danyliw
Yes
Erik Kline
No Objection
Murray Kucherawy
No Objection
Warren Kumari
No Objection
Comment
(2021-02-25 for -03)
Not sent
Thank you - even I understood some of it :-)
Éric Vyncke
No Objection
Alissa Cooper Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -03)
Not sent
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -03)
Not sent
Barry Leiba Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -03)
Not sent
Benjamin Kaduk Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2021-02-23 for -03)
Sent
Section 7 Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations. I think that BCP 201 is a good reference for further reading here. Section 8.2 If we're importing ASN.1 bits from RFC 5912, doesn't that make it a normative reference?
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -03)
Not sent
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2021-02-25 for -03)
Sent
Should there be any comments in the security consideration section about the security implications of using 96-bit truncated tags? I know that shorter tags have significant vulnerabilities against forgery attempts where successful forgery can be detected. John Mattsson and I wrote a paper identifying why shorter tags would be very bad in SRTP in 2015. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/477.pdf I guess the possibility to figure out if CMS forgery attempts are successful depends on what the CMS is used for.
Martin Duke Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -03)
Not sent
Martin Vigoureux Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -03)
Not sent
Robert Wilton Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2021-02-23 for -03)
Not sent
Easy to read and understand. Thank you.