Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
draft-ietf-mboned-ambi-00
Mboned J. Holland
Internet-Draft K. Rose
Intended status: Standards Track Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Expires: September 11, 2020 March 10, 2020
Asymmetric Manifest Based Integrity
draft-ietf-mboned-ambi-00
Abstract
This document defines Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI).
AMBI allows each receiver or forwarder of a stream of multicast
packets to check the integrity of the contents of each packet in the
data stream. AMBI operates by passing cryptographically verifiable
hashes of the data packets inside manifest messages, and sending the
manifests over authenticated out-of-band communication channels.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2020.
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Holland & Rose Expires September 11, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft AMBI March 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Comparison with TESLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Buffering and Validation Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. Inter-packet Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3. Packet Digests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1. Digest Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2. Pseudoheader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4. Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4.1. Manifest Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5. Transitioning to Other Manifest Streams . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2. HTTPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3. DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4. DTLS + FECFRAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Predictable Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction
Multicast transport poses security problems that are not easily
addressed by the same security mechanisms used for unicast transport.
The "Introduction" sections of the documents describing TESLA
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