Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity
draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-01

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Mboned                                                        J. Holland
Internet-Draft                                                   K. Rose
Intended status: Experimental                  Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Expires: April 26, 2019                                 October 23, 2018

                  Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity
                     draft-jholland-mboned-ambi-01

Abstract

   This document introduces Asymmetric Manifest-Based Integrity (AMBI).
   AMBI allows each receiver of a stream of multicast packets to check
   the integrity of the contents of each packet in the data stream.
   AMBI operates by employing a cryptographically-verifiable, loss-
   resilient sequence of manifests containing integrity information for
   both data and integrity packet payloads.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 26, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of

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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Comparison with TESLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Protocol Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Packet Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.2.  RTP Sequence Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.3.  SRTP Sequence Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.4.  UDP Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Anchor Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.2.  DNS-based Anchor URI Bootstrap  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.2.3.  Anchor Message YANG model . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.2.4.  Example Anchor Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     2.3.  Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.3.2.  Example Manifest Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.1.  Packet Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   Multicast transport poses security problems that are not easily
   addressed by the same security mechanisms used for unicast transport.

   The "Introduction" sections of the documents describing TESLA
   [RFC4082], and TESLA in SRTP [RFC4383], and TESLA with ALC and NORM
   [RFC5776] present excellent overviews of the challenges unique to
   multicast authentication, briefly summarized here:

   o  A MAC based on a symmetric shared secret cannot be used because
      each packet has multiple receivers that do not trust each other.

   o  Asymmetric per-packet signatures can handle only very low bit-
      rates because of the computational overhead.

   o  An asymmetric signature of a larger message comprising multiple
      packets requires reliable receipt of all such packets, something

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