Opportunistic Security in MPLS Networks
draft-ietf-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (mpls WG)
Last updated 2017-03-28
Replaces draft-farrelll-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt
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Network Working Group                                          A. Farrel
Internet-Draft                                          Juniper Networks
Intended status: Standards Track                              S. Farrell
Expires: September 29, 2017                       Trinity College Dublin
                                                          March 28, 2017

                Opportunistic Security in MPLS Networks
                draft-ietf-mpls-opportunistic-encrypt-03

Abstract

   This document describes a way to apply opportunistic security between
   adjacent nodes on an MPLS Label Switched Path (LSP) or between end
   points of an LSP.  It explains how keys may be agreed to enable
   encryption, and how key identifiers are exchanged in encrypted MPLS
   packets.  Finally, this document describes the applicability of this
   approach to opportunistic security in MPLS networks with an
   indication of the level of improved security as well as the continued
   vulnerabilities.

   This document does not describe security for MPLS control plane
   protocols.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 29, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Farrel & Farrell       Expires September 29, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         Opportunistic MPLS Security            March 2017

   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Experimental Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Existing Security Tools for MPLS Data . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.2.1.  Payload Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       1.2.2.  Link Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       1.2.3.  Encryption on Pseudowires . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     1.3.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.  Principles of Opportunistic Security  . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.1.  Why Do We Need Opportunistic Security?  . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Opportunistic Security at 10,000ft  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  What about a Man-in-the-Middle? . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.4.  OS in MPLS Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   3.  MPLS Packet Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     3.1.  MPLS Encryption Label . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.2.  Control Word  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     3.3.  Considerations for ECMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     3.4.  Backward Compatibility  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.5.  MTU Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     3.6.  Recursive Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   4.  Key Exchange For Opportunistic Security in MPLS . . . . . . .  20
     4.1.  Initiating MPLS-OS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     4.2.  MPLS G-ACh Advertisement Protocol for Key Exchange  . . .  21
     4.3.  Key Exchange Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.3.1.  Communication Channels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.3.2.  Key Exchange Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.3.3.  Key Exchange TLV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       4.3.4.  Encoding Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     4.4.  Indicating the Return Path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     4.5.  Protecting the Key Exchange Protocol Messages . . . . . .  28
   5.  Applicability of MPLS Opportunistic Security  . . . . . . . .  28
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