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Security Threats to Network-Based Localized Mobility Management (NETLMM)
draft-ietf-netlmm-threats-04

Yes

(Jari Arkko)

No Objection

(Cullen Jennings)
(Dan Romascanu)
(David Kessens)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Mark Townsley)
(Ross Callon)
(Sam Hartman)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 04 and is now closed.

Jari Arkko Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Brian Carpenter Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2006-11-16) Unknown
Grammar nits from Gen-ART review by  Francis Dupont:
Section 3.1 page 8:

 - can to trick -> can trick
 - a variety of ... which make mouting -> makes? mounting
                                              ^     ^
   (if someone finds the answer for the grammar point in the web,
    can (s)he give a pointer? I've based my comment on French,
    perhaps English is different. BTW "a large number of" is plural
    without question).

[BC - I believe I could parse this text either way.
As written, "which" refers to "barriers"; if it was
"makes", then "which" would refer to "variety. Anyway,let's
leave it to the Editor.]

 - both on-link and off-link -> either on-link or off-link?
Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
David Kessens Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Mark Townsley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Ross Callon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2006-11-15) Unknown
  From the SecDire Review by Charles Clancy:
  >
  > Overall, I think the draft provides an exhaustive list of possible 
  > security threats at every link in the chain.
  >
  > My biggest complaint with security analysis drafts of this nature is 
  > that they don't put the threats into context of actual attacker goals. 
  > In general, attackers don't want to inject traffic into some secured 
  > link for the sake of doing it.  They do it because it facilitates some 
  > larger goal, to include theft of network access, denial of access to 
  > others, or compromise of confidential data.  Perhaps it's just a matter 
  > of organization.  But, I think it would be useful to add a description 
  > of some of these higher-level attacker goals, and how all the 
  > already-described, very specific attacks can facilitate these larger 
  > attacker goals.
Sam Hartman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown