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Registry Specification for Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Security Label Formats
draft-ietf-nfsv4-lfs-registry-06

Yes

(Martin Stiemerling)
(Spencer Dawkins)

No Objection

(Alia Atlas)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Ben Campbell)
(Brian Haberman)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Jari Arkko)
(Joel Jaeggli)
(Kathleen Moriarty)
(Terry Manderson)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 02 and is now closed.

Martin Stiemerling Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -02) Unknown

                            
Spencer Dawkins Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -04) Unknown

                            
Alia Atlas Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Barry Leiba Former IESG member
(was Discuss) No Objection
No Objection (2015-04-09 for -05) Unknown
Version -05 addresses my most significant comment, and thanks very much for that.

Some non-blocking, minor comments here:

Very much a nit, but drafts have this sort of thing all the time, and we should probably say something more generally (I think I'll post to the IETF discussion list about the general point):

In the abstract...

   To allow multiple MAC mechanisms and label formats to co-exist in a
   network, this document proposes a registry of label format
   specifications.  This registry would contain label format identifiers
   and would provide for the association of each such identifier with a
   corresponding extensive document document outlining the exact syntax
   and use of the particular label format.

When the draft was written, it was "proposing" a registry, and should that registry be created it "would contain" and "would provide" things.  But it's now up for approval for RFC publication, and these characterizations are inapt; when it's published, the registry will have been created and will be providing all that.  Drafts should be written -- at least by the time they enter last call -- to have the right tone as published RFCs.  Here, I suggest these changes:

1. "proposes" -> "creates"
2. "would contain" -> "contains"
3. "would provide" -> "provides"

-- Section 5 --
As best I can tell, this question from IANA wasn't answered in the last call discussion, and it needs to be:

> Where should this new registry be located? Should it be placed at an
> existing URL? If not, should the title of the new webpage be "NFS
> Security Label Format Selection," or do you expect other registries
> that would require a different title to be placed there? Also, should
> it be filed under a new or an existing category at http://www.iana.org/protocols?

IANA will sort this out with you in any case, but it would be good for the document to say where you would like IANA to put the registry.

In Table 1, I think "Available for IANA Assignment" would be better than "Reserved for IANA Assignment", but it's a really small point.

In Section 5.2, I suggest using the full name for the registry (add the word "Security").
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Brian Haberman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown

                            
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2015-04-08 for -04) Unknown
I think there is a possibly missing security consideration in
section 4 - if two label formats "overlap" so that a value for
one could represent a (different) value for the other and if
the label format specifier is not somehow bound to the
packet/object, then some confusion attacks may be possible.
The mitigation I think is to either (maybe implicitly) bind
the format specifier into the object/label or to ensure that
label values cannot be valid for other label format
specifiers. (Note that attacks here are probably only
interesting in highly specific cases, so it's not a huge deal,
but maybe worth a mention.)
Terry Manderson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -04) Unknown