Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3 Networks
draft-ietf-nvo3-rfc7348bis-10
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (nvo3 WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Mallik Mahalingam , Dinesh Dutt , Larry Kreeger , T. Sridhar , Ali Sajassi | ||
| Last updated | 2026-09-17 (Latest revision 2026-09-16) | ||
| Replaces | draft-md-nvo3-rfc7348bis | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
| Formats | |||
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Matthew Bocci | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2026-09-22 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::External Party | |
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| Send notices to | matthew.bocci@nokia.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed |
draft-ietf-nvo3-rfc7348bis-10
Network Working Group M. Mahalingam
Internet-Draft Intuit
Obsoletes: 7348 (if approved) D. Dutt
Intended status: Informational Stardust
Expires: 20 March 2027 L. Kreeger
Arrcus
T. Sridhar
Juniper
A. Sajassi
Cisco
16 September 2026
Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for
Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3 Networks
draft-ietf-nvo3-rfc7348bis-10
Abstract
This document specifies Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
(VXLAN), which is used to address the need for overlay networks
within virtualized data centers accommodating multiple tenants. The
scheme and the related protocols can be used in networks for cloud
service providers and enterprise data centers. This document
obsoletes RFC 7348, which documented the deployed VXLAN protocol for
the benefit of the Internet community, and moves the VXLAN
specification to the IETF document stream, allowing for the creation
of extensions to VXLAN that require additions to the VXLAN header and
their registration with IANA. The format and processing described
here are fully compatible with those in RFC 7348.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 March 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Acronyms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. VXLAN Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Limitations Imposed by Spanning Tree and VLAN Ranges . . 5
3.2. Multi-tenant Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Inadequate Table Sizes at ToR Switch . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. VXLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Unicast VM-to-VM Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Broadcast Communication and Mapping to Multicast . . . . 8
4.3. Physical Infrastructure Requirements . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. IP Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. VXLAN Frame Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. VXLAN Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Inner VLAN Tag Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.1. UDP Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.2. VXLAN Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.2.1. VXLAN Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Co-Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
This document specifies Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
(VXLAN), which is used to address the need for overlay networks
within virtualized data centers accommodating multiple tenants. The
scheme and the related protocols can be used in networks for cloud
service providers and enterprise data centers.
This document obsoletes [RFC7348], which documented the deployed
VXLAN protocol for the benefit of the Internet community, and moves
the VXLAN specification to the IETF document stream, allowing for the
creation of extensions to VXLAN that require additions to the VXLAN
header and their registration with IANA. The format and processing
described here are fully compatible with those in [RFC7348].
Server virtualization has placed increased demands on the physical
network infrastructure. A physical server now has multiple Virtual
Machines (VMs), each with its own Media Access Control (MAC) address.
This requires larger MAC address tables in the switched Ethernet
network due to potential attachment of and communication among
hundreds of thousands of VMs.
In the case when the VMs in a data center are grouped according to
their Virtual LAN (VLAN), one might need thousands of VLANs to
partition the traffic according to the specific group to which the VM
may belong. The current VLAN limit of 4094 is inadequate in such
situations.
Data centers are often required to host multiple tenants, each with
their own isolated network domain. Since it is not economical to
realize this with dedicated infrastructure, network administrators
opt to implement isolation over a shared network. In such scenarios,
a common problem is that each tenant may independently assign MAC
addresses and VLAN IDs leading to potential duplication of these on
the physical network.
An important requirement for virtualized environments using a Layer 2
physical infrastructure is having the Layer 2 network scale across
the entire data center or even between data centers for efficient
allocation of compute, network, and storage resources. In such
networks, using traditional approaches like the Spanning Tree
Protocol (STP) [IEEE_802.1Q] for a loop-free topology can result in a
large number of disabled links.
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The last scenario is the case where the network operator prefers to
use IP for interconnection of the physical infrastructure (e.g., to
achieve multipath scalability through Equal-Cost Multipath (ECMP),
thus avoiding disabled links). Even in such environments, there is a
need to preserve the Layer 2 model for inter-VM communication.
The scenarios described above lead to a requirement for an overlay
network. This overlay is used to carry the MAC traffic from the
individual VMs in an encapsulated format over a logical "tunnel".
This document details a framework termed VXLAN that provides such an
encapsulation scheme to address the various requirements specified
above.
1.1. Acronyms and Definitions
ACL: Access Control List
ECMP: Equal-Cost Multipath
IGMP: Internet Group Management Protocol
IHL: Internet Header Length
MLD: Multicast Listener Discovery
MTU: Maximum Transmission Unit
PIM: Protocol Independent Multicast
SPB: Shortest Path Bridging
STP: Spanning Tree Protocol
ToR: Top of Rack
TRILL: Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
VLAN: Virtual Local Area Network
VM: Virtual Machine
VNI: VXLAN Network Identifier (or VXLAN Segment ID)
VTEP: VXLAN Tunnel End Point. An entity that originates and/or
terminates VXLAN tunnels
VXLAN: Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network
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VXLAN Segment: VXLAN Layer 2 overlay network over which VMs
communicate
VXLAN Gateway: an entity that forwards traffic between VXLANs
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. VXLAN Problem Statement
This section provides further details on the areas that VXLAN is
intended to address. The focus is on the networking infrastructure
within the data center and the issues related to them.
3.1. Limitations Imposed by Spanning Tree and VLAN Ranges
Current Layer 2 networks use the IEEE 802.1Q Spanning Tree Protocol
(STP) [IEEE_802.1Q] to avoid loops in the network due to duplicate
paths. STP blocks the use of links to avoid the replication and
looping of frames. Some data center operators see this as a problem
with Layer 2 networks in general, since with STP they are effectively
paying for more ports and links than they can really use. In
addition, resiliency due to multipathing is not available with the
STP model. Newer initiatives, such as TRILL [RFC6325] and Shortest
Path Bridging (SPB) [IEEE_802.1Q], have been proposed to help with
multipathing and surmount some of the problems with STP. STP
limitations may also be avoided by configuring servers within a rack
to be on the same Layer 3 network, with switching happening at Layer
3 both within the rack and between racks. However, this is
incompatible with a Layer 2 model for inter- VM communication.
A key characteristic of Layer 2 data center networks is their use of
Virtual LANs (VLANs) to provide broadcast isolation. A 12-bit VLAN
ID is used in the Ethernet data frames to divide the larger Layer 2
network into multiple broadcast domains. This has served well for
many data centers that require fewer than 4094 VLANs [IEEE_802.1Q].
With the growing adoption of virtualization, this upper limit is
seeing pressure. In addition, requirements for multi-tenant
environments accelerate the need for larger VLAN limits, as discussed
in Section 3.3.
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3.2. Multi-tenant Environments
Cloud computing involves on-demand, elastic provisioning of resources
for multi-tenant environments. The most common example of cloud
computing is the public cloud, where a cloud service provider offers
these elastic services to multiple customers/tenants over the same
physical infrastructure.
Isolation of network traffic by a tenant could be done via Layer 2 or
Layer 3 networks. For Layer 2 networks, VLANs are often used to
segregate traffic -- so a tenant could be identified by its own VLAN,
for example. Due to the large number of tenants that a cloud
provider might service, the 4094 VLAN limit is often inadequate. In
addition, there is often a need for multiple VLANs per tenant, which
exacerbates the issue.
A related use case is cross-pod expansion. A pod typically consists
of one or more racks of servers with associated network and storage
connectivity. Tenants may start off on a pod and, due to expansion,
require servers/VMs on other pods, especially in the case when
tenants on the other pods are not fully utilizing all their
resources. This use case requires a "stretched" Layer 2 environment
connecting the individual servers/VMs.
Layer 3 networks are not a comprehensive solution for multi-tenancy
either. Two tenants might use the same set of Layer 3 addresses
within their networks, which requires the cloud provider to provide
isolation in some other form. Further, requiring all tenants to use
IP excludes customers relying on direct Layer 2 or non-IP Layer 3
protocols for inter VM communication.
3.3. Inadequate Table Sizes at ToR Switch
Today's virtualized environments place additional demands on the MAC
address tables of Top-of-Rack (ToR) switches that connect to the
servers. Instead of just one MAC address per server link, the ToR
now has to learn the MAC addresses of the individual VMs (which could
range in the hundreds per server). This is needed because traffic
to/from the VMs to the rest of the physical network will traverse the
link between the server and the switch. A typical ToR switch could
connect to 24 or 48 servers depending upon the number of its server-
facing ports. A data center might consist of several racks, so each
ToR switch would need to maintain an address table for the
communicating VMs across the various physical servers. This places a
much larger demand on the table capacity compared to non-virtualized
environments.
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If the table overflows, the switch may stop learning new addresses
until idle entries age out, leading to significant flooding of
subsequent unknown destination frames.
4. VXLAN
VXLAN (Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network) addresses the above
requirements of the Layer 2 and Layer 3 data center network
infrastructure in the presence of VMs in a multi-tenant environment.
It runs over the existing networking infrastructure and provides a
means to "stretch" a Layer 2 network. In short, VXLAN is a Layer 2
overlay scheme on a Layer 3 network. Each overlay is termed a VXLAN
segment. Only VMs within the same VXLAN segment can communicate with
each other. Each VXLAN segment is identified through a 24-bit
segment ID, termed the "VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI)". This allows
slightly more than 16 millions VXLAN segments to coexist within the
same administrative domain.
The VNI identifies the scope of the inner MAC frame originated by the
individual VM. Thus, overlapping MAC addresses across segments can
exist but there can never be traffic "cross over" since the traffic
is isolated using the VNI. The VNI is in an outer header that
encapsulates the inner MAC frame originated by the VM. In the
following sections, the term "VXLAN segment" is used interchangeably
with the term "VXLAN overlay network".
Due to this encapsulation, VXLAN could also be called a tunneling
scheme to overlay Layer 2 networks on top of Layer 3 networks. The
tunnels are stateless, so each frame is encapsulated according to a
set of rules. The end point of the tunnel (VXLAN Tunnel End Point or
VTEP) discussed in the following sections is located within the
hypervisor on the server that hosts the VM. Thus, the VNI- and
VXLAN-related tunnel / outer header encapsulation are known only to
the VTEP -- the VM never sees it (see Figure 1 in section 5 for
encapsulation and Figure 3 in section 6 for VTEP termination on
hypervisor). Note that it is possible that VTEPs could also be on a
physical switch or physical server and could be implemented in
software or hardware. One use case where the VTEP is a physical
switch is discussed in Section 6 on VXLAN deployment scenarios.
The following sections discuss typical traffic flow scenarios in a
VXLAN environment using one type of control scheme -- data plane
learning. Here, the association of VM's MAC to VTEP's IP address is
discovered via source-address learning. Multicast is used for
carrying unknown destination, broadcast, and multicast frames.
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In addition to a learning-based control plane, there are other
schemes possible for the distribution of the VTEP IP to VM MAC
mapping information. Options could include a central authority-
/directory-based lookup by the individual VTEPs, distribution of this
mapping information to the VTEPs by the central authority, and so on.
These are sometimes characterized as push and pull models,
respectively. This document will focus on the data plane learning
scheme as the control plane for VXLAN.
4.1. Unicast VM-to-VM Communication
Consider a VM within a VXLAN overlay network. This VM is unaware of
VXLAN. To communicate with a VM on a different host, it sends a MAC
frame destined to the target as normal. The VTEP on the physical
host looks up the VNI to which this VM is associated. It then
determines if the destination MAC is on the same segment and if there
is a mapping of the destination MAC address to the remote VTEP. If
so, an outer header comprising an outer MAC, outer IP header, and
VXLAN header (see Figure 1 in Section 5 for frame format) are
prepended to the original MAC frame. The encapsulated packet is
forwarded towards the remote VTEP. Upon reception, the remote VTEP
verifies the validity of the VNI and whether or not there is a VM on
that VNI using a MAC address that matches the inner destination MAC
address. If so, the packet is stripped of its encapsulating headers
and passed on to the destination VM. The destination VM never knows
about the VNI or that the frame was transported with a VXLAN
encapsulation.
In addition to forwarding the packet to the destination VM, the
remote VTEP learns the mapping from inner source MAC to outer source
IP address. It stores this mapping in a table so that when the
destination VM sends a response packet, there is no need for an
"unknown destination" flooding of the response packet.
Determining the MAC address of the destination VM prior to the
transmission by the source VM is performed as with non-VXLAN
environments except as described in Section 4.2. Broadcast frames
are used but are encapsulated within a multicast packet, as detailed
in the Section 4.2.
4.2. Broadcast Communication and Mapping to Multicast
Consider the VM on the source host attempting to communicate with the
destination VM using IP. Assuming that they are both on the same
subnet, the VM sends out an IPv6 Neighbor Soliciation (NS) or an IPv4
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request frame. In the non-VXLAN
environment, this frame would be sent out using Ethernet broadcast
frame for ARP request (or Ethernet multicast frame for NS) across all
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switches carrying that VLAN.
With VXLAN, a header including the VXLAN VNI is inserted at the
beginning of the packet along with the IP header and UDP header.
However, this packet is sent out to the IP multicast group on which
that VXLAN overlay network is realized.
To effect this, there needs to be a mapping between the VXLAN VNI and
the IP multicast group that it will use. This mapping is done at the
management layer and provided to the individual VTEPs through a
management channel. Using this mapping, the VTEP can provide IGMP
([RFC9776] or [RFC2236]) or MLD ([RFC9777] or [RFC2710]) membership
reports to the upstream switch/router to join/leave the VXLAN-related
IP multicast groups as needed. This will enable pruning of the leaf
nodes for specific multicast traffic addresses based on whether a
member is available on this host using the specific multicast address
(see [RFC4541]). In addition, use of multicast routing protocols
like Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM see
[RFC7761]) will provide efficient multicast trees within the Layer 3
network.
The VTEP will use (*,G) joins. This is needed as the set of VXLAN
tunnel sources is unknown and may change often, as the VMs come up /
go down across different hosts. A side note here is that since each
VTEP can act as both the source and destination for multicast
packets, a protocol like bidirectional PIM (BIDIR-PIM -- see
[RFC5015]) would be more efficient.
The destination VM sends an IPv4 ARP response or IPv6 Neighbor
Advertisement (NA) message using IP unicast. This frame will be
encapsulated back to the VTEP connecting the originating VM using IP
unicast VXLAN encapsulation. This is possible since the mapping of
the NA or ARP response's destination MAC to the VXLAN tunnel end
point IP was learned earlier through the NS or ARP request.
Note that multicast frames and "unknown MAC destination" frames are
also sent using the multicast tree, similar to the broadcast frames.
4.3. Physical Infrastructure Requirements
When IP multicast is used within the network infrastructure, a
multicast routing protocol like PIM-SM can be used by the individual
Layer 3 IP routers/switches within the network. This is used to
build efficient multicast forwarding trees so that multicast frames
are only sent to those hosts that have requested to receive them.
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Similarly, there is no requirement that the actual network connecting
the source VM and destination VM should be a Layer 3 network: VXLAN
can also work over Layer 2 networks. In either case, efficient
multicast replication within the Layer 2 network can be achieved
using IGMP or MLD snooping [RFC4541].
4.4. IP Fragmentation
VTEPs MUST NOT fragment VXLAN packets. The destination VTEP MAY
discard such VXLAN fragments. A VTEP that discards received VXLAN
fragments SHOULD maintain a counter of such discards, distinguishable
from other discard reasons, and SHOULD make it available through its
management interface to help with diagnostics for MTU
misconfiguration in the underlay network.
To ensure end-to-end traffic delivery without fragmentation, it is
RECOMMENDED that the MTUs (Maximum Transmission Units) across the
physical network infrastructure be set to a value that accommodates
the larger frame size due to the encapsulation. Other techniques
such as Path MTU Discovery (see [RFC1191] and [RFC8201]) MAY
additionally be run by the VTEP across the underlay to acquire soft-
state about the tunnel path MTU. Note that such Path MTU Discovery
operates between VTEPs, on the outer IP header, and therefore does
not by itself inform tenant systems of the usable path MTU: ICMP
errors generated by intermediate routers are directed at the
encapsulating VTEP, not at the tenant system that originated the
inner packet. A VTEP that maintains tunnel path MTU state and that
is associated with a routing or forwarding function MAY, on receiving
a packet from a tenant system that would exceed the tunnel path MTU
once encapsulated, discard the packet and send an ICMP Fragmentation
Needed [RFC0792] or ICMPv6 Packet Too Big [RFC4443] message to the
tenant system, reporting the tenant-visible MTU (that is, the tunnel
path MTU less the VXLAN encapsulation overhead). General guidance on
MTU and fragmentation in tunneled topologies is given in [RFC4459].
5. VXLAN Frame Format
The VXLAN frame format is shown below. Parsing this from the bottom
of the frame -- above the outer Frame Check Sequence (FCS), there is
an inner MAC frame with its own Ethernet header with source,
destination MAC addresses along with the Ethernet type, plus an
optional VLAN. See Section 6 for further details of inner VLAN tag
handling.
The inner MAC frame is encapsulated with the following four headers
(starting from the innermost header):
VXLAN Header: This is an 8-octet field that has:
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* VXLAN Flags (16 bits): To establish an IANA-managed extension
point, this document reclassifies the first eight bits of RFC
7348's 24-bit Reserved field as additional flag bits. The
result is a 16-bit VXLAN Flags field followed by a 16-bit
Reserved-1 field. This reclassification does not change any
bit position or the size of the VXLAN header. Bits not
assigned by the VXLAN Flags registry continue to be transmitted
as zero and ignored on receipt.
Bit 4 is I flag and MUST be set to 1 for a VXLAN Network ID
(VNI) presence. The remaining 15 unassigned bits in this flag
field MUST be set to 0 by the sender and ignored by the
receiver. Although the flag field is expanded from 8 bits in
[RFC7348] to 16 bits in this document; however, no new flags
has been introduced in this document and the location of the
only flag remains the same. Thus backward compatibility is
maintained.
* VXLAN Segment ID/VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI): this is a
24-bit value used to designate the individual VXLAN overlay
network on which the communicating VMs are situated. VMs in
different VXLAN overlay networks cannot communicate with each
other.
* Reserved fields - 16 bits and 8 bits. These two reserved
fields MUST be set to 0 by the sender and ignored by the
receiver.
Outer UDP Header: This is the outer UDP header with a source port
provided by the VTEP and the destination port being the VXLAN UDP
port.
* Destination Port: IANA has assigned the value 4789 for the
VXLAN UDP port, and this value SHOULD be used by default as the
destination UDP port. Some implementations of VXLAN may have
used other values for the destination port. To enable
interoperability with these implementations, the destination
port SHOULD be configurable.
* Source Port: It is recommended that the UDP source port number
be calculated using a hash of fields from the inner packet --
one example being a hash of the inner Ethernet frame's headers.
This is to enable a level of entropy for the ECMP/load-
balancing of the VM-to-VM traffic across the VXLAN overlay.
When calculating the UDP source port number in this manner, it
is RECOMMENDED that the value be in the dynamic/private port
range 49152-65535 [RFC6335].
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* UDP Checksum: For IPv4, the UDP checksum SHOULD be transmitted
as zero. For IPv6, a VTEP SHOULD use the zero-checksum mode
defined by [RFC6935] and [RFC6936]. This mode is appropriate
for most VXLAN deployments in traffic-managed controlled
environments where avoiding a full-packet checksum is
operationally necessary and the operator accepts the residual
risk of undetected corruption. An implementation MAY provide
configuration for operations using IPv6 non-zero checksum in
deployments where that is necessary per [RFC6936].
When a packet is received with a UDP checksum of zero, it MUST
be accepted for decapsulation. Optionally, if the
encapsulating end point includes a non-zero UDP checksum, it
MUST be correctly calculated across the entire packet including
the IP pseudo-header, UDP header, VXLAN header, and
encapsulated MAC frame. When a decapsulating end point
receives a packet with a non-zero checksum, it MAY choose to
verify the checksum value. If it chooses to perform such
verification, and the verification fails, the packet MUST be
dropped. If the decapsulating destination chooses not to
perform the verification, or performs it successfully, the
packet MUST be accepted for decapsulation.
Outer IP Header: This is the outer IP header with the source IP
address indicating the IP address of the VTEP over which the
communicating VM (as represented by the inner source MAC address)
is running. The destination IP address can be a unicast or
multicast IP address (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2). When it is a
unicast IP address, it represents the IP address of the VTEP
connecting the communicating VM as represented by the inner
destination MAC address. For multicast destination IP addresses,
please refer to the scenarios detailed in Section 4.2.
Outer Ethernet Header (example): Figure 1 is an example of an inner
Ethernet frame encapsulated within an outer Ethernet + IP + UDP +
VXLAN header. The outer destination MAC address in this frame may
be the address of the target VTEP or of an intermediate Layer 3
router. The outer VLAN tag is optional. If present, it may be
used for delineating VXLAN traffic on the LAN.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Outer Ethernet Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Destination MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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| Outer Destination MAC Address | Outer Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|OptnlEthtype = C-Tag 802.1Q | Outer.VLAN Tag Information |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Ethertype = 0x0800 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Outer IPv4 Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| IHL |Type of Service| Total Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Identification |Flags| Fragment Offset |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Time to Live |Proto=17(UDP) | Header Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Source IPv4 Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Destination IPv4 Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Outer UDP Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Dest Port = VXLAN Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| UDP Length | UDP Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
VXLAN Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| VXLAN Flags | Reserved-1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) | Reserved-2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Inner Ethernet Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner Destination MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner Destination MAC Address | Inner Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|OptnlEthtype = C-Tag 802.1Q | Inner.VLAN Tag Information |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Payload:
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Ethertype of Original Payload | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Original Ethernet Payload |
| |
|(Note that the original Ethernet Frame's FCS is not included) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Frame Check Sequence:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| New FCS (Frame Check Sequence) for Outer Ethernet Frame |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 1: VXLAN Frame Format with IPv4 Outer Header
The frame format above shows tunneling of Ethernet frames using IPv4
for transport. Proto is the IPv4 protocol field and is set to 17 for
UDP. Use of VXLAN with IPv6 transport is detailed below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
Outer Ethernet Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Destination MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Destination MAC Address | Outer Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Outer Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|OptnlEthtype = C-Tag 802.1Q | Outer.VLAN Tag Information |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Ethertype = 0x86DD |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Outer IPv6 Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| Traffic Class | Flow Label |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Payload Length | NxtHdr=17(UDP)| Hop Limit |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Outer Source IPv6 Address +
| |
+ +
| |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
+ +
| |
+ Outer Destination IPv6 Address +
| |
+ +
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Outer UDP Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Port | Dest Port = VXLAN Port |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| UDP Length | UDP Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
VXLAN Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| VXLAN Flags | Reserved-1 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) | Reserved-2 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Inner Ethernet Header:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner Destination MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner Destination MAC Address | Inner Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Inner Source MAC Address |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|OptnlEthtype = C-Tag 802.1Q | Inner.VLAN Tag Information |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Payload:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Ethertype of Original Payload | |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| Original Ethernet Payload |
| |
|(Note that the original Ethernet Frame's FCS is not included) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Frame Check Sequence:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| New FCS (Frame Check Sequence) for Outer Ethernet Frame |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Figure 2: VXLAN Frame Format with IPv6 Outer Header
6. VXLAN Deployment Scenarios
VXLAN is typically deployed in data centers on virtualized hosts,
which may be spread across multiple racks. The individual racks may
be parts of a different Layer 3 network or they could be in a single
Layer 2 network. The VXLAN segments/overlay networks are overlaid on
top of these Layer 2 or Layer 3 networks.
Consider Figure 3, which depicts two virtualized servers attached to
a Layer 3 infrastructure. The servers could be in the same rack, in
different racks, or potentially across data centers within the same
administrative domain. There are four VXLAN overlay networks
identified by the VNIs 22, 34, 74, and 98. Consider the case of
VM1-1 in Server 1 and VM2-4 on Server 2, which are on the same VXLAN
overlay network identified by VNI 22. The VMs do not know about the
overlay networks and transport method since the encapsulation and
decapsulation happen transparently at the VTEPs on Servers 1 and 2.
The other overlay networks and the corresponding VMs are VM1-2 on
Server 1 and VM2-1 on Server 2, both on VNI 34; VM1-3 on Server 1 and
VM2-2 on Server 2 on VNI 74; and finally, VM1-4 on Server 1 and VM2-3
on Server 2 on VNI 98.
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+------------+-------------+
| Server 1 |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM1-1 | |VM1-2 | |
| |VNI 22 | |VNI 34 | |
| | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM1-3 | |VM1-4 | |
| |VNI 74 | |VNI 98 | |
| | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| Hypervisor VTEP (IP1) |
+--------------------------+
|
|
|
| +-------------+
| | Layer 3 |
|---| Network |
| |
+-------------+
|
|
+-----------+
|
|
+------------+-------------+
| Server 2 |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM2-1 | |VM2-2 | |
| |VNI 34 | |VNI 74 | |
| | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| |
| +----+----+ +----+----+ |
| |VM2-3 | |VM2-4 | |
| |VNI 98 | |VNI 22 | |
| | | | | |
| +---------+ +---------+ |
| Hypervisor VTEP (IP2) |
+--------------------------+
Figure 3: VXLAN Deployment - VTEPs across a Layer 3 Network
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One deployment scenario is where the tunnel termination point is a
physical server that understands VXLAN. An alternate scenario is
where nodes on a VXLAN overlay network need to communicate with nodes
on legacy networks that could be VLAN based. These nodes may be
physical nodes or virtual machines. To enable this communication, a
network can include VXLAN gateways (see Figure 4 below with a switch
acting as a VXLAN gateway) that forward traffic between VXLAN and
non-VXLAN environments.
Consider Figure 4 for the following discussion. For incoming frames
on the VXLAN connected interface, the gateway strips out the VXLAN
header and forwards it to a physical port based on the destination
MAC address of the inner Ethernet frame. Decapsulated frames with
the inner VLAN ID is discarded unless configured explicitly to be
passed on to the non-VXLAN interface. In the reverse direction,
incoming frames for the non-VXLAN interfaces are mapped to a specific
VXLAN overlay network based on the VLAN ID in the frame. Unless
configured explicitly to be passed on in the encapsulated VXLAN
frame, this VLAN ID is removed before the frame is encapsulated for
VXLAN.
These gateways that provide VXLAN tunnel termination functions could
be ToR/access switches or switches higher up in the data center
network topology -- e.g., core or even WAN edge devices. The last
case (WAN edge) could involve a Provider Edge (PE) router that
terminates VXLAN tunnels in a hybrid cloud environment. In all these
instances, note that the gateway functionality could be implemented
in software or hardware.
+---+-----+---+ +---+-----+---+
| Server 1 | | Non-VXLAN |
(VXLAN enabled)<-----+ +---->| server |
+-------------+ | | +-------------+
| |
+---+-----+---+ | | +---+-----+---+
|Server 2 | | | | Non-VXLAN |
(VXLAN enabled)<-----+ +---+-----+---+ +---->| server |
+-------------+ | |Switch acting| | +-------------+
|---| as VXLAN |-----|
+---+-----+---+ | | Gateway |
| Server 3 | | +-------------+
(VXLAN enabled)<-----+
+-------------+ |
|
+---+-----+---+ |
| Server 4 | |
(VXLAN enabled)<-----+
+-------------+
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Figure 4: VXLAN Deployment - VXLAN Gateway
6.1. Inner VLAN Tag Handling
Inner VLAN Tag Handling in VTEP and VXLAN gateway should conform to
the following:
Decapsulated VXLAN frames with the inner VLAN tag SHOULD be discarded
unless configured otherwise because VNI is sufficient to identify the
segment/VLAN. On the encapsulation side, a VTEP SHOULD not include
an inner VLAN tag on tunnel packets unless configured otherwise
because VNI is sufficient to identify the segment/VLAN. When a VLAN-
tagged packet is a candidate for VXLAN tunneling, the encapsulating
VTEP SHOULD strip the VLAN tag unless configured otherwise.
7. Security Considerations
Layer 2 networks can be attacked from 'within' by rogue end points,
either by having inappropriate access to a LAN and snooping on
traffic, by injecting spoofed packets to 'take over' another MAC
address, or by flooding and causing denial of service. A MAC-over-IP
mechanism for delivering Layer 2 traffic significantly extends this
attack surface. This can happen by rogues injecting themselves into
the network by subscribing to one or more multicast groups that carry
broadcast traffic for VXLAN segments and also by sourcing MAC-over-
UDP frames into the transport network to inject spurious traffic,
possibly to hijack MAC addresses.
This document does not incorporate specific measures against such
attacks, relying instead on other established mechanisms layered on
top of IP. This section, instead, sketches out some possible
approaches to security in the VXLAN environment.
Attacks at Layer 2 by rogue end points can be mitigated by limiting
the management and administrative scope of who deploys and manages
VMs/gateways in a VXLAN environment. In addition, such
administrative measures may be augmented by schemes like 802.1X
[IEEE_802.1X] for admission control of individual end points. Also,
the use of the UDP-based encapsulation of VXLAN enables configuration
and use of the 5-tuple-based ACL (Access Control List) functionality
in physical switches.
Tunneled traffic over the IP network can be secured with established
security mechanisms like IPsec that authenticate and optionally
encrypt VXLAN traffic. This will, of course, need to be coupled with
an authentication infrastructure for authorized end points to obtain
and distribute credentials.
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VXLAN overlay networks are designated and operated over the existing
LAN infrastructure. To ensure that VXLAN end points and their VTEPs
are authorized on the LAN, it is recommended that a VLAN be
designated for VXLAN traffic and the servers/VTEPs send VXLAN traffic
over this VLAN to provide a measure of security.
In addition, VXLAN requires proper mapping of VNIs and VM membership
in these overlay networks. It is expected that this mapping be done
and communicated to the management entity on the VTEP and the
gateways using existing secure methods.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. UDP Port
The VXLAN UDP destination port (4789) has been assigned by the IANA
in the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry for
VXLAN. See Section 5 for discussion of the port number. IANA is
asked to update the Registry with a reference to this document.
8.2. VXLAN Parameters
This document requests IANA to create a new IANA registry group
called "VXLAN Parameters".
8.2.1. VXLAN Flags
This document requests IANA to create a new registry called "VXLAN
Flags" Under "VXLAN Parameters" registry group. The registry has the
following structure:
* Bit: indicates the bit position in the VXLAN Flags field.
* Description: Includes a brief description of the flag.
* Reference: Records the document(s) that defines the flag.
New values are assigned by IETF Review [RFC8126].
Initial values of this registry are as follows:
* Bits 0-3 - Unassigned
* Bit 4 - Instance ID (I bit); where a value of 1 indicates presence
of VNI; reference: this document
* Bit 5-15 - Unassigned
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9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6936] Fairhurst, G. and M. Westerlund, "Applicability Statement
for the Use of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums",
RFC 6936, DOI 10.17487/RFC6936, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6936>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References
[IEEE_802.1Q]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks - Bridges and Bridged Networks", IEEE Std 802.1Q-
2022, 2022.
[IEEE_802.1X]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
networks -- Port-Based Network Acces Control", IEEE Std
802.1X-2010, February 2010.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC2236] Fenner, W., "Internet Group Management Protocol, Version
2", RFC 2236, DOI 10.17487/RFC2236, November 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2236>.
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[RFC2710] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast
Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2710, October 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2710>.
[RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4443>.
[RFC4459] Savola, P., "MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the-
Network Tunneling", RFC 4459, DOI 10.17487/RFC4459, April
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4459>.
[RFC4541] Christensen, M., Kimball, K., and F. Solensky,
"Considerations for Internet Group Management Protocol
(IGMP) and Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Snooping
Switches", RFC 4541, DOI 10.17487/RFC4541, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4541>.
[RFC5015] Handley, M., Kouvelas, I., Speakman, T., and L. Vicisano,
"Bidirectional Protocol Independent Multicast (BIDIR-
PIM)", RFC 5015, DOI 10.17487/RFC5015, October 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5015>.
[RFC6325] Perlman, R., Eastlake 3rd, D., Dutt, D., Gai, S., and A.
Ghanwani, "Routing Bridges (RBridges): Base Protocol
Specification", RFC 6325, DOI 10.17487/RFC6325, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6325>.
[RFC6335] Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
[RFC6935] Eubanks, M., Chimento, P., and M. Westerlund, "IPv6 and
UDP Checksums for Tunneled Packets", RFC 6935,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6935, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6935>.
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[RFC7348] Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal, P., Kreeger,
L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and C. Wright, "Virtual
eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN): A Framework for
Overlaying Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3
Networks", RFC 7348, DOI 10.17487/RFC7348, August 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7348>.
[RFC7761] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I. Kouvelas,
"Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM):
Protocol Specification (Revised)", RFC 7761,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7761, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7761>.
[RFC8201] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
for IP version 6", RFC 8201, DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, August
1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.
[RFC9776] Haberman, B., Ed., "Internet Group Management Protocol,
Version 3", STD 100, RFC 9776, DOI 10.17487/RFC9776, March
2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9776>.
[RFC9777] Haberman, B., Ed., "Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2
(MLDv2) for IPv6", STD 101, RFC 9777,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9777, March 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9777>.
Appendix A. Co-Authors
In addition to the authors listed on the front page, the following
co-authors have also contributed to this document.
Kenneth Duda: Arista Networks, kduda@arista.com
Puneet Agarwal: Marvell, puneet@marvell.com
Mike Bursell: Intel, mike.bursell@intel.com
Chris Wright: Red Hat, chrisw@redhat.com
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank: Ajit Sanzgiri for contributions to the
Security Considerations section and editorial inputs; Joseph Cheng,
Margaret Petrus, Milin Desai, Nial de Barra, Jeff Mandin, and Siva
Kollipara for their editorial reviews, inputs, and comments.
Authors' Addresses
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Mallik Mahalingam
Intuit, Inc.
2700 Coast Ave
Mountain View, CA 94043.
USA
Email: mallik.mahalingam@gmail.com
Dinesh G. Dutt
Stardust
Sunnyvale, CA 94086
USA
Email: ddutt.ietf@hobbesdutt.com
Lawrence Kreeger
Arrcus Inc.
2077 Gateway Pl #400
San Jose, CA 95110
USA
Email: kreeger@cisco.com
T. Sridhar
Juniper Networks
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
USA
Email: thsridhar@yahoo.com
Ali Sajassi
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 W. Tasman Avenue
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: sajassi@cisco.com
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