OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key Distribution
draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07

• Status
• IESG evaluation record
• IESG writeups
• Email expansions
• History

• Versions
• 00
• 01
• 02
• 03
• 04
• 05
• 06
• 07

Network Working Group                                         J. Bradley
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                                 P. Hunt
Expires: September 28, 2019                           Oracle Corporation
                                                                M. Jones
                                                               Microsoft
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                                Arm Ltd.
                                                             M. Meszaros
                                                                   GITDA
                                                          March 27, 2019

   OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key
                              Distribution
                draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07

Abstract

   RFC 6750 specified the bearer token concept for securing access to
   protected resources.  Bearer tokens need to be protected in transit
   as well as at rest.  When a client requests access to a protected
   resource it hands-over the bearer token to the resource server.

   The OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession security concept extends bearer
   token security and requires the client to demonstrate possession of a
   key when accessing a protected resource.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 28, 2019.

Bradley, et al.        Expires September 28, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  OAuth 2.0 PoP: AS-Client Key Distribution     March 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Processing Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Symmetric Key Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.1.1.  Client-to-AS Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       4.1.2.  Client-to-AS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Asymmetric Key Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.2.1.  Client-to-AS Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.2.2.  Client-to-AS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  OAuth Access Token Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.2.  OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.3.  OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The work on proof-of-possession tokens, an extended token security
   mechanisms for OAuth 2.0, is motivated in [22].  This document
   defines the ability for the client request and to obtain PoP tokens
   from the authorization server.  After successfully completing the
   exchange the client is in possession of a PoP token and the keying
   material bound to it.  Clients that access protected resources then
   need to demonstrate knowledge of the secret key that is bound to the