OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key Distribution
draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-03
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Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG)
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2017-02-24
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draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution
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IETF
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Proposed Standard
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WG Document
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Jul 2017 - Submit 'OAuth 2.0 Pr...
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Kepeng Li
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"Kepeng Li" <kepeng.lkp@alibaba-inc.com>
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Network Working Group J. Bradley
Internet-Draft Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track P. Hunt
Expires: August 28, 2017 Oracle Corporation
M. Jones
Microsoft
H. Tschofenig
ARM Limited
February 24, 2017
OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key
Distribution
draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-03
Abstract
RFC 6750 specified the bearer token concept for securing access to
protected resources. Bearer tokens need to be protected in transit
as well as at rest. When a client requests access to a protected
resource it hands-over the bearer token to the resource server.
The OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession security concept extends bearer
token security and requires the client to demonstrate possession of a
key when accessing a protected resource.
This document describes how the client obtains this keying material
from the authorization server.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2017.
Bradley, et al. Expires August 28, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft OAuth 2.0 PoP: AS-Client Key Distribution February 2017
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Audience Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Processing Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Symmetric Key Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Client-to-AS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Asymmetric Key Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Client-to-AS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Token Types and Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) Syntax . . . . . . 17
A.1. 'aud' Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. 'key' Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.3. 'alg' Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
The work on additional security mechanisms beyond OAuth 2.0 bearer
tokens [12] is motivated in [17], which also outlines use cases,
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