OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key Distribution
draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-03

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG)
Last updated 2017-02-24
Replaces draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution
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Network Working Group                                         J. Bradley
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                                 P. Hunt
Expires: August 28, 2017                              Oracle Corporation
                                                                M. Jones
                                                               Microsoft
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                             ARM Limited
                                                       February 24, 2017

   OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key
                              Distribution
                draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-03

Abstract

   RFC 6750 specified the bearer token concept for securing access to
   protected resources.  Bearer tokens need to be protected in transit
   as well as at rest.  When a client requests access to a protected
   resource it hands-over the bearer token to the resource server.

   The OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession security concept extends bearer
   token security and requires the client to demonstrate possession of a
   key when accessing a protected resource.

   This document describes how the client obtains this keying material
   from the authorization server.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2017.

Bradley, et al.          Expires August 28, 2017                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft  OAuth 2.0 PoP: AS-Client Key Distribution  February 2017

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Audience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Audience Parameter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Processing Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Symmetric Key Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Client-to-AS Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Client-to-AS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Asymmetric Key Transport  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Client-to-AS Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Client-to-AS Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Token Types and Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) Syntax . . . . . .  17
     A.1.  'aud' Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     A.2.  'key' Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     A.3.  'alg' Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   The work on additional security mechanisms beyond OAuth 2.0 bearer
   tokens [12] is motivated in [17], which also outlines use cases,
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