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Integrity, Privacy, and Security in Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) for SMTP
draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security-03

Yes

(Ted Hardie)

No Objection

(Cullen Jennings)
(Dan Romascanu)
(David Kessens)
(Jari Arkko)
(Lars Eggert)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Mark Townsley)
(Ross Callon)
(Russ Housley)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 03 and is now closed.

Ted Hardie Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
David Kessens Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Lars Eggert Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Mark Townsley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Ross Callon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Sam Hartman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2007-03-06) Unknown
I'm balloting no objection because I agree it is good to get the
current state of the WG documented.  If this were going to be a set of
requirements for future work rather than an input to those discussions
then I would have several blocking comments.  My most serious concern
is with the handling of consent.  There seems to be no mechanism
proposed to actually allow one party to give consent or to withdraw
that consent.  In the case of the sender the bypass mechanism may be
sufficient.  However I don't see how receivers meaningfully manage
consent without some standardized mechanism to do so.

I'm also concerned about message encryption.  At least in the case of
content conversion for lemonade, I argued that a mechanism to provide
gateways with message encrypting keys seemed important.  I'm not sure
the same isn't true of OPES.