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Integrity, Privacy, and Security in Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) for SMTP
draft-ietf-opes-smtp-security-03

Yes

(Ted Hardie)

No Objection

Lars Eggert
(Cullen Jennings)
(Dan Romascanu)
(David Kessens)
(Jari Arkko)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Mark Townsley)
(Ross Callon)
(Russ Housley)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 03 and is now closed.

Lars Eggert No Objection

(Ted Hardie; former steering group member) Yes

Yes ()

                            

(Cullen Jennings; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(Dan Romascanu; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(David Kessens; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(Jari Arkko; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(Magnus Westerlund; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(Mark Townsley; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(Ross Callon; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(Russ Housley; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection ()

                            

(Sam Hartman; former steering group member) No Objection

No Objection (2007-03-06)
I'm balloting no objection because I agree it is good to get the
current state of the WG documented.  If this were going to be a set of
requirements for future work rather than an input to those discussions
then I would have several blocking comments.  My most serious concern
is with the handling of consent.  There seems to be no mechanism
proposed to actually allow one party to give consent or to withdraw
that consent.  In the case of the sender the bypass mechanism may be
sufficient.  However I don't see how receivers meaningfully manage
consent without some standardized mechanism to do so.

I'm also concerned about message encryption.  At least in the case of
content conversion for lemonade, I argued that a mechanism to provide
gateways with message encrypting keys seemed important.  I'm not sure
the same isn't true of OPES.