Guidelines for Considering Operations and Management in IETF Specifications
draft-ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis-01
draft-ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis-01
Network Working Group B. Claise
Internet-Draft Everything OPS
Obsoletes: 5706 (if approved) J. Clarke
Updates: 2360 (if approved) Cisco
Intended status: Best Current Practice A. Farrel
Expires: 20 June 2026 Old Dog Consulting
S. Barguil
Nokia
C. Pignataro
Blue Fern Consulting
R. Chen
ZTE
17 December 2025
Guidelines for Considering Operations and Management in IETF
Specifications
draft-ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis-01
Abstract
New Protocols or Protocol Extensions are best designed with due
consideration of the functionality needed to operate and manage them.
Retrofitting operations and management considerations is suboptimal.
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to authors and
reviewers on what operational and management aspects should be
addressed when defining New Protocols or Protocol Extensions.
This document obsoletes RFC 5706, replacing it completely and
updating it with new operational and management techniques and
mechanisms. It also updates RFC 2360 to obsolete mandatory MIB
creation and introduces a requirement to include an "Operational
Considerations" section in new RFCs in the IETF Stream.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 June 2026.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Documentation Requirements for IETF Specifications . . . . . 8
3.1. "Operational Considerations" Section . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. "Operational Considerations" Section Boilerplate When No
New Considerations Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Placement of the "Operational Considerations" Section . . 10
4. How Will the New Protocol or Protocol Extension Fit into the
Current Environment? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. Installation and Initial Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3. Migration Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4. Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional
Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.5. Impact on Network Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.6. Impact on Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.7. Verifying Correct Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.8. Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. How Will the Protocol Be Managed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. Available Management Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.3. Management Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3.1. Information Model Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.3.2. YANG Data Model Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.4. Fault Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4.1. Liveness Detection and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4.2. Fault Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4.3. Probable Root Cause Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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5.4.4. Fault Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.5. Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.6. Accounting Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.7. Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.7.1. Monitoring the Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.7.2. Monitoring the Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.7.3. Monitoring the Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.7.4. Monitoring the Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.8. Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6. Operational and Management Tooling Considerations . . . . . . 33
6.1. AI Tooling Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A. Operational Considerations Checklist . . . . . . . . 44
A.1. Operational Fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.2. Management Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.3. Fault Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.4. Configuration Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.5. Performance Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.6. Security Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix B. Changes Since RFC 5706 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.1. TO DO LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1. Introduction
Often, when New Protocols or Protocol Extensions are developed, not
enough consideration is given to how they will be deployed, operated,
and managed. Retrofitting operations and management mechanisms is
often hard and architecturally unpleasant, and certain protocol
design choices may make deployment, operations, and management
particularly difficult or insecure. To ensure deployability, the
operational environment and manageability must be considered during
design.
This document provides guidelines to help Protocol Designers and
Working Groups (WGs) consider the operations and management
functionality for their New Protocol or Protocol Extension at an
early phase in the design process.
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This document obsoletes [RFC5706] and fully updates its content with
new operational and management techniques and mechanisms. It also
introduces a requirement for an "Operational Considerations" section,
that covers both operational and management considerations, in new
RFCs in the IETF Stream. Additionally, this document updates
Section 2.14 of RFC 2360 [BCP22] on Guide for Internet Standards
Writers. to obsolete references to mandatory MIBs and instead focus
on documenting holistic manageability and operational considerations
as described in Section 3. Further, this document removes outdated
references and aligns with current practices, protocols, and
technologies used in operating and managing devices, networks, and
services. Refer to Appendix B for more details.
1.1. This Document
This document provides a set of guidelines for considering operations
and management in an IETF technical specification with an eye toward
being flexible while also striving for interoperability.
Entirely New Protocols may require significant consideration of
expected operations and management, while Protocol Extensions to
existing, widely deployed protocols may have established de facto
operations and management practices that are already well understood.
This document does not mandate a comprehensive inventory of all
operational considerations. Instead, it guides authors to focus on
key aspects that are essential for the technology's deployability,
operation, and maintenance.
Suitable management approaches may vary for different areas, WGs, and
protocols in the IETF. This document does not prescribe a fixed
solution or format in dealing with operational and management aspects
of IETF protocols. However, these aspects should be considered for
any IETF protocol, given the IETF's role in developing technologies,
New Protocols, and Protocol Extensions to be deployed and operated in
the real-world Internet.
A WG may decide that its protocol does not need interoperable
management or a standardized Data Model, but this should be a
deliberate and documented decision, not the result of omission. This
document provides some guidelines for those considerations.
This document recognizes a distinction between management and
operational considerations, although the two are closely related.
However, for New Protocols and Protocol Extensions only an
"Operational Considerations" section is required. This section is
intended to address both management and operational aspects.
Operational considerations pertain to the deployment and functioning
of protocols within a network, regardless of whether a management
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protocol is in active use. Management considerations focus on the
use of management technologies, such as management protocols and the
design of management Data Models. Both topics should be described
within the "Operational Considerations" section.
1.2. Audience
The guidelines are intended to be useful to authors writing protocol
specifications. They outline what to consider for management and
deployment, how to document those aspects, and how to present them in
a consistent format. This document is intended to offer a flexible
set of guiding principles applicable to various circumstances. It
provides a framework for WGs to ensure that manageability
considerations are an integral part of the protocol design process,
and its use should not be misinterpreted as imposing new hurdles on
work in other areas.
Protocol Designers should consider which operations and management
needs are relevant to their protocol, document how those needs could
be addressed, and suggest (preferably standard) management protocols
and Data Models that could be used to address those needs. This is
similar to a WG that considers which security threats are relevant to
their protocol, documents (in the required Security Considerations
section, per Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security
Considerations [BCP72]) how threats should be mitigated, and then
suggests appropriate standard protocols that could mitigate the
threats.
It is not the intention that a protocol specification document should
be held up waiting for operations and management solutions to be
developed. This is particularly the case when a protocol extension
is proposed, but the base protocol is missing operations or
management solutions. However, it is the intent that new documents
should clearly articulate the operations and management of that new
work to fill any operations and management gaps.
A core principle of this document is to encourage early on
discussions rather than mandating any specific solution. It does not
impose a specific management or operational solution, imply that a
formal Data Model is needed, or imply that using a specific
management protocol is mandatory. Specifically, this document does
not require to develop solutions to accommodate identified
operational considerations within the document that specifies a New
Protocol or Protocol Extension itself.
If Protocol Designers conclude that the technology can be managed
solely by using Proprietary Interfaces or that it does not need any
structured or standardized Data Model, this might be fine, but it is
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a decision that should be explicit in a manageability discussion --
that this is how the protocol will need to be operated and managed.
Protocol Designers should avoid deferring manageability to a later
phase of the development of the specification.
When a WG considers operation and management functionality for a
protocol, the document should contain enough information for readers
to understand how the protocol will be deployed, operated, and
managed. The considerations do not need to be comprehensive and
exhaustive; focus should be on key aspects. The WG should expect
that considerations for operations and management may need to be
updated in the future, after further operational experience has been
gained.
The Ops Directorate (OpsDir) can use this document to inform their
reviews. A list of guidelines and a checklist of questions to
consider, which a reviewer can use to evaluate whether the protocol
and documentation address common operations and management needs, is
provided in [CHECKLIST].
This document is also of interest to the broader community, who wants
to understand, contribute to, and review Internet-Drafts, taking
operational considerations into account.
2. Terminology
This document does not describe interoperability requirements. As
such, it does not use the capitalized keywords defined in [BCP14].
This section defines key terms used throughout the document to ensure
clarity and consistency. Some terms are drawn from existing RFCs and
IETF Internet-Drafts, while others are defined here for the purposes
of this document. Where appropriate, references are provided for
further reading or authoritative definitions.
* Cause: See [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology].
* CLI: Command Line Interface. A human-oriented interface,
typically a Proprietary Interface, to hardware or software devices
(e.g., hosts, routers, or operating systems). The commands, their
syntax, and the precise semantics of the parameters may vary
considerably between different vendors, between products from the
same vendor, and even between different versions or releases of a
single product. No attempt at standardizing CLIs has been made by
the IETF.
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* Data Model: A set of mechanisms for representing, organizing,
storing, and handling data within a particular type of data store
or repository. This usually comprises a collection of data
structures such as lists, tables, relations, etc., a collection of
operations that can be applied to the structures such as
retrieval, update, summation, etc., and a collection of integrity
rules that define the legal states (set of values) or changes of
state (operations on values). A Data Model may be derived by
mapping the contents of an Information Model or may be developed
ab initio. Further discussion of Data Models can be found in
[RFC3444], Section 5.2, and Section 5.3.
* Fault: See [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology].
* Fault Management: The process of interpreting fault notifications
and other alerts and alarms, isolating faults, correlating them,
and deducing underlying Causes. See Section 5.4 for more
information.
* Information Model: An abstraction and representation of the
entities in a managed environment, their properties, attributes
and operations, and the way that they relate to each other. The
model is independent of any specific software usage, protocol, or
platform [RFC3444]. See Sections 5.2 and 5.3.1 for further
discussion of Information Models.
* New Protocol and Protocol Extension: These terms are used in this
document to identify entirely new protocols, new versions of
existing protocols, and extensions to protocols.
* OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance [RFC6291]
[I-D.ietf-opsawg-oam-characterization] is the term given to the
combination of:
1. Operation activities that are undertaken to keep the network
running as intended. They include monitoring of the network.
2. Administration activities that keep track of resources in the
network and how they are used. They include the bookkeeping
necessary to track networking resources.
3. Maintenance activities focused on facilitating repairs and
upgrades. They also involve corrective and preventive
measures to make the managed network run more effectively.
The broader concept of "operations and management" that is the
subject of this document encompasses OAM, in addition to other
management and provisioning tools and concepts.
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* Probable Root Cause: See [I-D.ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang]
* Problem: See [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology].
* Proprietary Interface: An interface to manage a network element
that is not standardized. As such, the user interface, syntax,
and semantics typically vary significantly between
implementations. Examples of proprietary interfaces include
Command Line Interface (CLI), management web portal and Browser
User Interface (BUI), Graphical User Interface (GUI), and vendor-
specific application programming interface (API).
* Protocol Designer: An individual, a group of people, or an IETF WG
involved in the development and specification of New Protocols or
Protocol Extensions.
3. Documentation Requirements for IETF Specifications
3.1. "Operational Considerations" Section
All Internet-Drafts that document a technical specification and are
advanced for publication as IETF RFCs are required to include an
"Operational Considerations" section. Internet-Drafts that do not
document technical specifications such as process, policy, or
administrative Internet-Drafts are not required to include such a
section.
After evaluating the operational (Section 4) and manageability
aspects (Section 5) of a New Protocol, a Protocol Extension, or an
architecture, the resulting practices and requirements should be
documented in an "Operational Considerations" section within a
specification. Since protocols are intended for operational
deployment and management within real networks, it is expected that
such considerations will be present.
It is also recommended that operational and manageability
considerations be addressed early in the protocol design process.
Consequently, early revisions of Internet-Drafts are expected to
include an "Operational Considerations" section.
An "Operational Considerations" section should include discussion of
the management and operations topics raised in this document, and
when one or more of these topics is not relevant, it would be useful
to include a simple statement explaining why the topic is not
relevant or applicable for the New Protocol or Protocol Extension.
Of course, additional relevant operational and manageability topics
should be included as well. A concise checklist of key questions is
provided in Appendix A.
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Data Models (e.g., YANG) and other schema artifacts (JSON schema,
YAML, CDDL, etc.) may be consumed out of RFCs that specify them. As
such, it is recommended that operational aspects for a data model
(and similar artifacts) are documented as part of the model itself.
Such considerations should not be duplicated in the narrative part of
a specification that includes such artifacts.
Readers may refer to the following non-exhaustive list for
examples of specifications, covering various areas, with adequate
documentation of operational considerations, including
manageability: [I-D.ietf-core-dns-over-coap], [I-D.ietf-suit-mti],
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-prr-rfc6937bis] [RFC7574], [RFC9877], and
[RFC9552].
3.2. "Operational Considerations" Section Boilerplate When No New
Considerations Exist
After a Protocol Designer has considered the manageability
requirements of a New Protocol or Protocol Extension, they may
determine that no management functionality or operational best-
practice clarifications are needed. It would be helpful to
reviewers, those who may update or write extensions to the protocol
in the future, or to those deploying the protocol, to know the
rationale regarding the decisions on manageability of the protocol at
the time of its design.
If there are no new manageability or deployment considerations, the
"Operational Considerations" section must contain the following
simple statement, followed by a brief explanation of why that is the
case.
"There are no new operations or manageability requirements introduced
by this document.
Explanation: [brief rationale goes here]"
The presence of such a section would indicate to the reader that due
consideration has been given to manageability and operations.
In cases where the specification is a Protocol Extension and the base
protocol already addresses the relevant operational and manageability
considerations, it is helpful to reference the considerations section
in the base document.
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3.3. Placement of the "Operational Considerations" Section
It is recommended that the section be placed immediately before the
Security Considerations section. Reviewers interested in such
sections will find it easily, and this placement could simplify the
development of tools to detect the presence of such a section.
4. How Will the New Protocol or Protocol Extension Fit into the Current
Environment?
Designers of a New Protocol or Protocol Extension should carefully
consider the operational aspects. To ensure that a protocol will be
practical to deploy in the real world, it is not enough to merely
define it very precisely in a well-written document. Operational
aspects will have a serious impact on the actual success of a
protocol. Such aspects include bad interactions with existing
solutions, a difficult upgrade path, difficulty of debugging
problems, difficulty configuring from a central database, or a
complicated state diagram that operations staff will find difficult
to understand. [RFC5218] provides a more detailed discussion on what
makes for a successful protocol.
BGP flap damping [RFC2439] is an example. It was designed to
block high-frequency route flaps. Some BGP implementations were
memory-constrained so often elected not to support this function,
others found a conflict where path exploration caused false flap
damping resulting in loss of reachability. As a result, flap
damping was often not enabled network-wide, contrary to the
intentions of the original designers.
4.1. Operations
Protocol Designers can analyze the operational environment and mode
of work in which the New Protocol and Protocol Extension will work.
Such an exercise need not be reflected directly by text in their
document but could help in visualizing how to apply the protocol in
the Internet environments where it will be deployed.
A key question is how the protocol can operate "out of the box". If
implementers are free to select their own defaults, the protocol
needs to operate well with any choice of values. If there are
sensible defaults, these need to be stated.
There may be a need to support both a human interface (e.g., for
troubleshooting) and a programmatic interface (e.g., for automated
monitoring and Cause analysis). The application programming
interfaces (APIs) and the human interfaces might benefit from being
similar to ensure that the information exposed by both is consistent
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when presented to an operator. It is also relevant to identify
consistent methods for determining information, such as what is
counted in specific counters.
Protocol Designers should consider what management operations are
expected to be performed as a result of the deployment of the
protocol -- for example whether write operations are permitted on
specific nodes (e.g., routers, hosts, including servers), or whether
notifications for alarms or other events will be expected.
4.2. Installation and Initial Setup
Anything that can be configured can be misconfigured. "Architectural
Principles of the Internet" [RFC1958], Section 3.8, states:
| Avoid options and parameters whenever possible. Any options and
| parameters should be configured or negotiated dynamically rather
| than manually.
To simplify configuration, Protocol Designers should consider
specifying reasonable defaults, including default modes and
parameters. For example, it could be helpful or necessary to specify
default values for modes, timers, default state of logical control
variables, default transports, and so on. Even if default values are
used, it must be possible to retrieve all the actual values or at
least an indication that known default values are being used.
Protocol Designers should consider how to enable operators to
concentrate on the configuration of the network or service
infrastructure as a whole rather than on individual devices. Of
course, how one accomplishes this is the hard part.
Protocol Designers should explain the background of chosen default
values and provide the rationale, especially when those choices may
affect operations. In many cases, as technology changes, the values
in an RFC might make less and less sense. It is very useful to
understand whether defaults are based on best current practice and
are expected to change as technologies advance or whether they have a
more universal value that should not be changed lightly. For
example, the default interface speed might be expected to change over
time due to increased speeds in the network, and cryptographic
algorithms might be expected to change over time as older algorithms
are "broken".
It is extremely important to set a sensible default value for all
parameters.
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Default values should generally favor the conservative side over the
"optimizing performance" side (e.g., the initial Round-Trip Time
(RTT) and Round-Trip Time Variance (RTTVAR) values of a TCP
connection [RFC6298]).
For those parameters that are speed-dependent, instead of using a
constant, try to set the default value as a function of the link
speed or some other relevant factors. This would help reduce the
chance of problems caused by technology advancement.
For example, where protocols involve cryptographic keys, Protocol
Designers should consider not only key generation and validation
mechanisms but also the format in which private keys are stored,
transmitted, and restored. Designers should specify any expected
consistency checks (e.g., recomputing an expanded key from the
seed) that help verify correctness and integrity. Additionally,
guidance should be given on data retention, restoration limits,
and cryptographic module interoperability when importing/exporting
private key material. Refer to
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates] for an example of how such
considerations are incorporated.
4.3. Migration Path
If the New Protocol or Protocol Extension is a new version of an
existing one, or if it is replacing another technology, the Protocol
Designer should consider how deployments should transition to the New
Protocol or Protocol Extensions. This should include coexistence
with previously deployed protocols and/or previous versions of the
same protocol, management of incompatibilities between versions,
translation between versions, and consideration of potential side
effects. A key question becomes: Are older protocols or versions
disabled, or do they coexist in the network with the New Protocol or
Protocol Extension?
Many protocols benefit from being incrementally deployable --
operators may deploy aspects of a protocol before deploying the
protocol fully. In those cases, the design considerations should
also specify whether the New Protocol or Protocol Extension requires
any changes to the existing infrastructure, particularly the network.
If so, the protocol specification should describe the nature of those
changes, where they are required, and how they can be introduced in a
manner that facilitates deployment.
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Incentivizing good security operation practices when migrating to the
New Protocol or Protocol Extension should be encouraged. For
example, patching is fundamental for security operations and can be
incentivized if Protocol Designers consider supporting cheap and fast
connection hand-offs and reconnections.
When Protocol Designers are considering how deployments should
transition to the New Protocol or Protocol Extension, impacts to
current techniques employed by operators should be documented and
mitigations included, where possible, so that consistent security
operations and management can be achieved. Refer to [RFC8170] for a
detailed discussion on transition versus coexistence.
4.4. Requirements on Other Protocols and Functional Components
Protocol Designers should consider the requirements that the New
Protocol might put on other protocols and functional components and
should also document the requirements from other protocols and
functional components that have been considered in designing the New
Protocol.
These considerations should generally remain illustrative to avoid
creating restrictions or dependencies, or potentially impacting the
behavior of existing protocols, or restricting the extensibility of
other protocols, or assuming other protocols will not be extended in
certain ways. If restrictions or dependencies exist, they should be
stated.
For example, the design of the Resource ReSerVation Protocol
(RSVP) [RFC2205] required each router to look at the RSVP PATH
message and, if the router understood RSVP, add its own address to
the message to enable automatic tunneling through non-RSVP
routers. But in reality, routers cannot look at an otherwise
normal IP packet and potentially take it off the fast path! The
initial designers overlooked that a new "deep packet inspection"
requirement was being put on the functional components of a
router. The "router alert" option ([RFC2113], [RFC2711]) was
finally developed to solve this problem, for RSVP and other
protocols that require the router to take some packets off the
fast-forwarding path. Yet, Router Alert has its own problems in
impacting router performance and security. Refer to [RFC9805] for
deprecation of the IPv6 Router Alert Option for New Protocols and
Section 4.8 of RFC 7126 [BCP186] for threats and advice related to
IPv4 Router Alert.
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4.5. Impact on Network Operation
The introduction of a New Protocol or Protocol Extensions may have an
impact on the operation of existing networks. As discussed in
Section 2.1 of [RFC6709] major extensions may have characteristics
leading to a risk of operational problems. Protocol Designers should
outline such operational impacts (which may be positive), including
scaling benefits or concerns, and interactions with other protocols.
Protocol Designers should describe the scenarios in which the New
Protocol or its extensions are expected to be applicable or
beneficial. This includes any relevant deployment environments,
network topologies, usage constraints such as limited domains
[RFC8799], or use cases that justify or constrain adoption. For
example, a New Protocol or Protocol Extension that doubles the number
of active, reachable addresses in a network might have implications
for the scalability of interior gateway protocols, and such impacts
should be evaluated accordingly. Per Section 2.15 of RFC 2360
[BCP22], New Protocol or Protocol Extension specifications should
establish the limitations on the scale of use and limits on the
resources used.
If the protocol specification requires changes to end hosts, it
should also indicate whether safeguards exist to protect networks
from potential overload. Moreover, Per Section 2.16 of RFC 2360
[BCP22], New Protocol or Protocol Extension specifications should
address any possible destabilizing events, and means by which the
protocol resists or recovers from them. For instance, a congestion
control algorithm must comply with [BCP133] to prevent congestion
collapse and ensure network stability.
A protocol could send active monitoring packets on the wire. Without
careful consideration, active monitoring might achieve high accuracy
at the cost of generating an excessive number of monitoring packets.
Protocol Designers should consider the potential impact on the
behavior of other protocols in the network and on the traffic levels
and traffic patterns that might change, including specific types of
traffic, such as multicast. Also, consider the need to install new
components that are added to the network as a result of changes in
the configuration, such as servers performing auto-configuration
operations.
Protocol Designers should consider also the impact on infrastructure
applications like DNS [RFC1034], the registries, or the size of
routing tables.
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For example, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) [RFC5321]
servers use a reverse DNS lookup to filter out incoming connection
requests: when Berkeley installed a new spam filter, their mail
server stopped functioning because of overload of the DNS cache
resolver.
The impact of New Protocols or Protocol Extensions, and the results
of new OAM tools developed for the New Protocols or Protocol
Extensions, must be considered with respect to the performance of
traffic delivery and the availability of ongoing manageability. For
example, it must be noted if the New Protocols or Protocol Extensions
or the OAM tools cause increased delay or jitter in real-time traffic
applications, or increased response time in client-server
applications. Further, if the additional traffic caused by OAM tools
and data collection could result in the management plane becoming
overwhelmed, then this must be called out, and suitable mechanisms to
rate limit the OAM must be considered. Potential options include:
document the limitations, propose solution track(s), include an
optional rate limiting feature in the specifications, or impose a
rate limiting feature in the specifications.
Consider three examples: (1) In Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
for MPLS [RFC5884] it is possible to configure very rapid BFD
transmissions (of the order of 3ms) on a very large number of
parallel Label Switched Paths (LSPs) with the result that the
management systems and end nodes may become overwhelmed -- this
can be protected by applying limits to the number of LSPs that may
be tested at once. (2) Notifications or logs from systems (through
YANG or other means) should be rate-limited so that they do not
flood the receiving management station. (3) The application of
sophisticated encryption or filtering rules needs to be considered
in the light of the additional processing they may impose on the
hardware forwarding path for traffic.
New metrics may be required to assess traffic performance. Protocol
Designers may refer to [RFC6390] for guidelines for considering new
performance metrics.
It is important to minimize the impact caused by configuration
changes. Given configuration A and configuration B, it should be
possible to generate the operations necessary to get from A to B with
minimal state changes and effects on network and systems.
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4.6. Impact on Security Operations
Security Operations (SecOps) is a collaborative approach that
combines security and operational teams to improve the ability of
operators to protect and manage the network effectively and
efficiently [SECOPS]. Security operators detect malicious activity
and respond to threats and are a crucial part of defending against
attacks alongside the management and operation of the network.
Protocol Designers should consider the impacts of a New Protocol or
Protocol Extension on Security Operations in networks that the
protocol will be deployed in.
Security operators extensively rely upon Indicators of Compromise
(IoCs) [RFC9424]. The deployment of New Protocol or Protocol
Extension may change the type, locations, or availability of IoCs.
Protocol Designers should outline such changes to ensure operators
can manage and defend their network consistently. Consider the
operators' requirement for digital forensics from the network or
endpoints with critical information found in logs. Logging events
schema and guidance for operators should be considered when designing
a New Protocol or Protocol Extension to ensure that operators have
the information they need. [I-D.ietf-quic-qlog-main-schema] is an
example of extensible structured logging.
Tooling required by security operators should be documented in the
design and deployment of a New Protocol or Protocol Extension.
Operators may require new tooling or methods for managing network
traffic in response to protocol changes to ensure consistent
availability and performance of networks. Similarly, updating and
augmenting existing forensic tools such as protocol dissectors is
expected when a New Protocol is deployed, but having to completely
rebuild such tooling would greatly reduce the effectiveness of
security operators, so protocol extensibility should be considered.
4.7. Verifying Correct Operation
An important function that should be provided is guidance on how to
verify the correct operation of a protocol. A Protocol Designer may
suggest testing techniques for qualifying and quantifying the impact
of the protocol on the network before it is partially or fully
deployed, as well as testing techniques for identifying the effects
that the protocol might have on the network after being deployed.
Protocol Designers should consider techniques for testing the effect
that the protocol has had on the infrastructure by sending data
through the infrastructure and observing its behavior (a.k.a., active
monitoring). Protocol Designers should consider how the correct end-
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to-end operation of the New Protocol or Protocol Extension can be
tested actively and passively, and how the correct data or forwarding
plane function of each involved element can be verified to be working
properly with the New Protocol or Protocol Extension. Which metrics
are of interest?
Protocol Designers should consider how to test the correct end-to-end
operation of the service or network, how to verify correct protocol
behavior, and whether such verification is achieved by testing the
service function and/or the forwarding function of each network
element. This may be accomplished through the collection of status
and statistical information gathered from devices.
Having simple protocol status and health indicators on involved
devices is a recommended means to check correct operation.
4.8. Message Formats
Where protocol specifications result in messages (such as errors or
warnings) being carried as text strings or output for consumption by
human operators, consideration should be given to making it possible
for implementations to be configured so that the messages can be
viewed in the local language. In such cases, it may be helpful to
transmit a specific message code (i.e., a number) along with the
default English language message, so that implementations may easily
map the code to a local text string.
Further discussion of Internationalization issues may be found in
[BCP166].
5. How Will the Protocol Be Managed?
The considerations of manageability should start from identifying the
entities to be managed, as well as how the managed protocol is
supposed to be installed, configured, and monitored.
Considerations for management should include a discussion of what
needs to be managed, and how to achieve various management tasks.
For example, these considerations include where the managers are and
what type of interfaces and protocols will be needed.
The management model should take into account factors such as:
* What type of management entities will be involved (agents, network
management systems)?
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* What is the possible architecture (client-server, manager-agent,
poll-driven or event-driven, auto-configuration, two levels or
hierarchical)?
* What are the management operations (initial configuration, dynamic
configuration, alarm and exception reporting, logging, performance
monitoring, performance reporting, debugging)?
* How are these operations performed (locally, remotely, atomic
operation, scripts)? Are they performed immediately or are they
time scheduled, or event triggered?
Protocol Designers should consider how the New Protocol or Protocol
Extension will be managed in different deployment scales. It might
be sensible to use a local management interface to manage the New
Protocol or Protocol Extension on a single device, but in a large
network, remote management using a centralized server and/or using
distributed management functionality might make more sense. Auto-
configuration and default parameters might be possible for some New
Protocols or Protocol Extensions.
Management needs to be considered not only from the perspective of a
device, but also from the perspective of network and service
management. A service might be network and operational functionality
derived from the implementation and deployment of a New Protocol or
Protocol Exension. Often an individual network element is not aware
of the service being delivered.
WGs should consider how to configure multiple related/co-operating
devices and how to back off if one of those configurations fails or
causes trouble. NETCONF addresses this in a generic manner by
allowing an operator to lock the configuration on multiple devices,
perform the configuration settings/changes, check that they are OK
(undo if not), and then unlock the devices.
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Techniques for debugging protocol interactions in a network must be
part of the network management discussion. Implementation source
code should be debugged before ever being added to a network, so
asserts and memory dumps do not normally belong in management data
models. However, debugging on-the-wire interactions is a protocol
issue: while the messages can be seen by sniffing, it is enormously
helpful if a protocol specification supports features that make
debugging of network interactions and behaviors easier. There could
be alerts issued when messages are received or when there are state
transitions in the protocol state machine. However, the state
machine is often not part of the on-the-wire protocol; the state
machine explains how the protocol works so that an implementer can
decide, in an implementation-specific manner, how to react to a
received event.
In a client/server protocol, it may be more important to instrument
the server end of a protocol than the client end, since the
performance of the server might impact more nodes than the
performance of a specific client.
5.1. Available Management Technologies
The IETF provides several standardized management protocols suitable
for various operational purposes, for example as outlined in
[RFC6632].
Readers seeking more in-depth definitions or explanations should
consult the referenced materials.
5.2. Interoperability
Management interoperability is critical for enabling information
exchange and operations across diverse network devices and management
applications, regardless of vendor, model, or software release. It
facilitates the use of third-party applications and outsourced
management services.
While individual device management via Proprietary Interfaces may
suffice for small deployments, large-scale networks comprising
equipment from multiple vendors necessitate consistent, automated
management. Relying on vendor- and model-specific interfaces for
extensive deployments, such as hundreds of branch offices, severely
impedes scalability and automation of operational processes. The
primary goal of management interoperability is to enable the scalable
deployment and lifecycle management of new network functions and
services, while ensuring a clear understanding of their operational
impact and total cost of ownership.
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Achieving universal agreement on a single management syntax and
protocol is challenging. However, the IETF has significantly evolved
its approach to network management, moving beyond SMIv2 and SNMP.
Modern IETF management solutions primarily leverage YANG [RFC7950]
for Data Modeling and NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040] for
protocol interactions. This shift, as further elaborated in
[RFC6632], emphasizes structured Data Models and programmatic
interfaces to enhance automation and interoperability. Other
protocols, such as IPFIX [RFC7011] for flow accounting and syslog
[RFC5424] for logging, continue to play specific roles in
comprehensive network management.
Interoperability must address both syntactic and semantic aspects.
While syntactic variations across implementations can often be
handled through adaptive processing, semantic differences pose a
greater challenge, as the meaning of data is intrinsically tied to
the managed entity.
Information Models (IMs) enable and provide the foundation for
semantic interoperability. An IM defines the conceptual
understanding of managed information, independent of specific
protocols or vendor implementations. This allows for consistent
interpretation and correlation of data across different data models
(and hence management protocols), such as a YANG Data Model and IPFIX
Information Elements concerning the same event. For instance, an IM
can standardize how error conditions are counted, ensuring that a
counter has the same meaning whether collected via NETCONF or
exported via IPFIX.
Protocol Designers should consider developing an IM, when multiple
Data Model (DM) representations (e.g., YANG and/or IPFIX) are
required, to ensure lossless semantic mapping. IMs are also
beneficial for complex or numerous DMs. As illustrated in Figure 1,
an IM serves as a conceptual blueprint for designers and operators,
from which concrete DMs are derived for implementers. [RFC3444]
provides further guidance on distinguishing IMs from DMs.
IM --> conceptual/abstract model
| for designers & operators
+----------+---------+
| | |
DM DM DM --> concrete/detailed model
for implementers
Figure 1: Information Models (IMs) and Data Models (DMs)
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Protocol Designers must identify the essential operational,
configuration, state, and statistical information required for
effective monitoring, control, and troubleshooting of New Protocols
or Protocol Extensions and their extensions. This includes defining
relevant parameters, performance metrics, error indicators, and
contextual data crucial for diagnostics and lifecycle management.
To ensure interoperability, management protocol and Data Model
standards should incorporate clear compliance clauses, specifying the
expected level of support.
5.3. Management Information
Languages used to describe an Information Model can influence the
nature of the model. Using a particular data modeling language, such
as YANG, influences the model to use certain types of structures, for
example, hierarchical trees, groupings, and reusable types. YANG, as
described in [RFC6020] and [RFC7950], provides advantages for
expressing network information, including clear separation of
configuration data and operational state, support for constraints and
dependencies, and extensibility for evolving requirements. Its
ability to represent relationships and dependencies in a structured
and modular way makes it an effective choice for defining management
information models.
Although this document recommends using English text (the official
language for IETF specifications) to describe an Information Model,
including a complementary YANG module helps translate abstract
concepts into implementation-specific Data Models. This ensures
consistency between the high-level design and practical deployment.
A management Information Model should include a discussion of what is
manageable, which aspects of the protocol need to be configured, what
types of operations are allowed, what protocol-specific events might
occur, which events can be counted, and for which events an operator
should be notified.
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Operators find it important to be able to make a clear distinction
between configuration data, operational state, and statistics. They
need to determine which parameters were administratively configured
and which parameters have changed since configuration as the result
of mechanisms such as routing protocols or network management
protocols. It is important to be able to separately fetch current
configuration information, initial configuration information,
operational state information, and statistics from devices; to be
able to compare current state to initial state; and to compare
information between devices. So, when deciding what information
should exist, do not conflate multiple information elements into a
single element.
What is typically difficult to work through are relationships between
abstract objects. Ideally, an Information Model would describe the
relationships between the objects and concepts in the information
model.
Is there always just one instance of this object or can there be
multiple instances? Does this object relate to exactly one other
object, or may it relate to multiple? When is it possible to change
a relationship?
Do objects (such as instances in lists) share fate? For example, if
an instance in list A must exist before a related instance in list B
can be created, what happens to the instance in list B if the related
instance in list A is deleted? Does the existence of relationships
between objects have an impact on fate sharing? YANG's relationships
and constraints can help express and enforce these relationships.
5.3.1. Information Model Design
This document recommends keeping the Information Model as simple as
possible by applying the following criteria:
1. Start with a small set of essential objects and make additions
only as further objects are needed with the objective of keeping
the absolute number of objects as small as possible while still
delivering the required function such that there is no
duplication between objects and where one piece of information
can be derived from the other pieces of information, it is not
itself represented as an object.
2. Require that all objects be essential for management.
3. Consider evidence of current use of the managed protocol, and the
perceived utility of objects added to the Information Model.
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4. Exclude objects that can be derived from others in this or other
information models.
5. Avoid causing critical sections to be heavily instrumented. A
guideline is one counter per critical section per layer.
6. When defining an Information Model using YANG Data Structure
Extensions [RFC8791] (thereby keeping it abstract and
implementation-agnostic per [RFC3444]) ensure that the
Information Model remains simple, modular, and clear by following
the authoring guidelines in [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis].
7. When illustrating the abstract Information Model, use YANG Tree
Diagrams [RFC8340] to provide a simple, standardized, and
implementation-neutral model structure.
5.3.2. YANG Data Model Considerations
When considering YANG Data Models for a new specification, there are
multiple types of Data Models that may be applicable. The hierarchy
and relationship between these types is described in Section 3.5.1 of
[I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis]. A new specification may require or
benefit from one or more of these YANG Data Model types.
* Device Models - Also called Network Element Models, represent the
configuration, operational state, and notifications of individual
devices. These models are designed to distinguish between these
types of data and support querying and updating device-specific
parameters. Consideration should be given to how device-level
models might fit with broader network and service Data Models.
* Network Models - Also called Network Service Models, define
abstractions for managing the behavior and relationships of
multiple devices and device subsystems within a network. As
described in [RFC8199], these models are used to manage network-
wide. These abstractions are useful to network operators and
applications that interface with network controllers. Examples of
network models include the L3VPN Network Model (L3NM) [RFC9182]
and the L2VPN Network Model (L2VPN) [RFC9291].
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* Service Models - Also called Customer Service Models, defined in
[RFC8309], are designed to abstract the customer interface into a
service. They consider customer-centric parameters such as
Service Level Agreement (SLA) and high-level policy (e.g., network
intent). Given that different operators and different customers
may have widely-varying business processes, these models should
focus on common aspects of a service with strong multi-party
consensus. Examples of service models include the L3VPN Service
Model (L3SM) [RFC8299] and the L2VPN Service Model (L2SM)
[RFC8466].
A common challenge in YANG Data Model development lies in defining
the relationships between abstract service or network constructs and
the underlying device models. Therefore, when designing YANG
modules, it is important to go beyond simply modeling configuration
and operational data (i.e., leaf nodes), and also consider how the
status and relationships of abstract or distributed constructs can be
reflected based on parameters available in the network.
For example, the status of a service may depend on the operational
state of multiple network elements to which the service is attached.
In such cases, the YANG Data Model (and its accompanying
documentation) should clearly describe how service-level status is
derived from underlying device-level information. Similarly, it is
beneficial to define events (and relevant triggered notifications)
that indicate changes in an underlying state, enabling reliable
detection and correlation of service-affecting conditions. Including
such mechanisms improves the robustness of integrations and helps
ensure consistent behavior across implementations.
Specific guidelines to consider when authoring any type of YANG
modules are described in [I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis].
5.4. Fault Management
Protocol Designers should identify and document essential Faults,
health indicators, alarms, and events that must be propagated to
management applications or exposed through a Data Model. It is also
recommended to describe how the Protocol Extension will affect the
existing alarms and notification structure of the base Protocol, and
to outline the potential impact of misconfigurations of the Protocol
Extensions.
Protocol Designers should consider how fault information will be
propagated. Will it be done using asynchronous notifications or
polling of health indicators?
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If notifications are used to alert operators to certain conditions,
then Protocol Designers should discuss mechanisms to throttle
notifications to prevent congestion and duplications of event
notifications. Will there be a hierarchy of Faults, and will the
Fault reporting be done by each Fault in the hierarchy, or will only
the lowest Fault be reported and the higher levels be suppressed?
Should there be aggregated status indicators based on concatenation
of propagated Faults from a given domain or device?
Notifications (e.g., SNMP traps and informs, syslog, or New Protocol
specific mechanisms) can alert an operator when an aspect of the New
Protocol or Protocol Extension fails or encounters an error or
failure condition. Should the event reporting provide guaranteed
accurate delivery of the event information within a given (high)
margin of confidence? Can we poll the latest events in the box?
5.4.1. Liveness Detection and Monitoring
Protocol Designers should always build in basic testing features
(e.g., ICMP echo, UDP/TCP echo service, NULL RPCs (remote procedure
calls)) that can be used to test for liveness, with an option to
enable and disable them.
Mechanisms for monitoring the liveness of the protocol and for
detecting Faults in protocol connectivity are usually built into
protocols. In some cases, mechanisms already exist within other
protocols responsible for maintaining lower-layer connectivity (e.g.,
ICMP echo), but often new procedures are required to detect failures
and to report rapidly, allowing remedial action to be taken.
These liveness monitoring mechanisms do not typically require
additional management capabilities. However, when a system detects a
Fault, there is often a requirement to coordinate recovery action
through management applications or at least to record the fact in an
event log.
5.4.2. Fault Determination
It can be helpful to describe how Faults can be pinpointed using
management information. For example, counters might record instances
of error conditions. Some Faults might be able to be pinpointed by
comparing the outputs of one device and the inputs of another device,
looking for anomalies. Protocol Designers should consider what
counters should count. If a single counter provided by vendor A
counts three types of error conditions, while the corresponding
counter provided by vendor B counts seven types of error conditions,
these counters cannot be compared effectively -- they are not
interoperable counters.
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How do you distinguish between faulty messages and good messages?
Would some threshold-based mechanisms be usable to help determine
error conditions? Are notifications for all events needed, or are
there some "standard" notifications that could be used? Or can
relevant counters be polled as needed?
Remote Monitoring (RMON) events/alarms is an example of threshold-
based mechanism.
5.4.3. Probable Root Cause Analysis
Probable Root Cause analysis is about working out where the
foundational Fault or Problem might be. Since one Fault may give
rise to another Fault or Problem, a probable root cause is commonly
meant to describe the original, source event or combination of
circumstances that is the foundation of all related Faults.
For example, if end-to-end data delivery is failing (e.g.,
reported by a notification), Probable Root Cause analysis can help
find the failed link or node, or mis-configuration, within the
end-to-end path.
5.4.4. Fault Isolation
It might be useful to isolate or quarantine Faults, such as isolating
a device that emits malformed messages that are necessary to
coordinate connections properly. This might be able to be done by
configuring next-hop devices to drop the faulty messages to prevent
them from entering the rest of the network.
5.5. Configuration Management
A Protocol Designer should document the basic configuration
parameters that need to be instrumented for a New Protocol or
Protocol Extensions, as well as default values and modes of
operation.
What information should be maintained across reboots of the device,
or restarts of the management system?
"Requirements for Configuration Management of IP-based Networks"
[RFC3139] discusses requirements for configuration management,
including discussion of different levels of management, high-level
policies, network-wide configuration data, and device-local
configuration. Network configuration extends beyond simple multi-
device push or pull operations. It also involves ensuring that the
configurations being pushed are semantically compatible across
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devices and that the resulting behavior of all involved devices
corresponds to the intended behavior. Is the attachment between them
configured compatibly on both ends? Is the IS-IS metric the same?
... Now answer those questions for 1,000 devices.
Several efforts have existed in the IETF to develop policy-based
configuration management. "Terminology for Policy-Based Management"
[RFC3198] was written to standardize the terminology across these
efforts.
Implementations should not arbitrarily modify configuration data. In
some cases (such as Access Control Lists (ACLs)), the order of data
items is significant and comprises part of the configured data. If a
Protocol Designer defines mechanisms for configuration, it would be
preferable to standardize the order of elements for consistency of
configuration and of reporting across vendors and across releases
from vendors.
There are two parts to this:
1. A Network Management System (NMS) could optimize ACLs for
performance reasons.
2. Unless the device or NMS is configured with adequate rules and
guided by administrators with extensive experience, reordering
ACLs can introduce significant security risks.
Network-wide configurations may be stored in central master databases
and transformed into readable formats that can be pushed to devices,
either by generating sequences of CLI commands or complete textual
configuration files that are pushed to devices. There is no common
database schema for network configuration, although the models used
by various operators are probably very similar. It is operationally
beneficial to extract, document, and standardize the common parts of
these network-wide configuration database schemas. A Protocol
Designer should consider how to standardize the common parts of
configuring the New Protocol, while recognizing that vendors may also
have proprietary aspects of their configurations.
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It is important to enable operators to concentrate on the
configuration of the network or service as a whole, rather than
individual devices. Support for configuration transactions across
several devices could significantly simplify network configuration
management. The ability to distribute configurations to multiple
devices, or to modify candidate configurations on multiple devices,
and then activate them in a near-simultaneous manner might help.
Protocol Designers can consider how it would make sense for their
protocol to be configured across multiple devices. Configuration
templates might also be helpful.
Consensus of the 2002 IAB Workshop [RFC3535] was that textual
configuration files should be able to contain international
characters. Human-readable strings should utilize UTF-8, and
protocol elements should be in case-insensitive ASCII.
A mechanism to dump-and-restore configurations is a primitive
operation needed by operators. Standards for pulling and pushing
configurations from/to devices are highly beneficial.
Given configuration A and configuration B, it should be possible to
generate the operations necessary to get from A to B with minimal
state changes and effects on network and systems. It is important to
minimize the impact caused by configuration changes.
A Protocol Designer should consider the configurable items that exist
for the control of function via the protocol elements described in
the protocol specification. For example, sometimes the protocol
requires that timers can be configured by the operator to ensure
specific policy-based behavior by the implementation. These timers
should have default values suggested in the protocol specification
and may not need to be otherwise configurable.
5.6. Accounting Management
A Protocol Designer should consider whether it would be appropriate
to collect usage information related to this protocol and, if so,
what usage information would be appropriate to collect.
"Introduction to Accounting Management" [RFC2975] discusses a number
of factors relevant to monitoring usage of protocols for purposes of
capacity and trend analysis, cost allocation, auditing, and billing.
The document also discusses how some existing protocols can be used
for these purposes. These factors should be considered when
designing a protocol whose usage might need to be monitored or when
recommending a protocol to do usage accounting.
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5.7. Performance Management
From a manageability point of view, it is important to determine how
well a network deploying the protocol or technology defined in the
document is doing. In order to do this, the network operators need
to consider information that would be useful to determine the
performance characteristics of a deployed system using the target
protocol.
The IETF, via the Benchmarking Methodology WG (BMWG), has defined
recommendations for the measurement of the performance
characteristics of various internetworking technologies in a
laboratory environment, including the systems or services that are
built from these technologies. Each benchmarking recommendation
describes the class of equipment, system, or service being addressed;
discusses the performance characteristics that are pertinent to that
class; clearly identifies a set of metrics that aid in the
description of those characteristics; specifies the methodologies
required to collect said metrics; and lastly, presents the
requirements for the common, unambiguous reporting of benchmarking
results. Search for "benchmark" in the RFC search tool.
Performance metrics may be useful in multiple environments and for
different protocols. The IETF, via the IP Performance Measurement
(IPPM) WG, has developed a set of standard metrics that can be
applied to the quality, performance, and reliability of Internet data
delivery services. These metrics are designed such that they can be
performed by network operators, end users, or independent testing
groups. The existing metrics might be applicable to the new
protocol. Search for "metric" in the RFC search tool. In some
cases, new metrics need to be defined. It would be useful if the
protocol documentation identified the need for such new metrics. For
performance management, it is often more important to report the time
spent in a state rather than just the current state. Snapshots alone
are typically of less value.
There are several parts to performance management to be considered:
protocol monitoring, device monitoring (the impact of the new
protocol / service activation on the device), network monitoring, and
service monitoring (the impact of service activation on the network).
Hence, it is recommended that, if the implementation of the New
Protocol or Protocol Extension has any hardware/software performance
implications (e.g., increased CPU utilization, memory consumption, or
forwarding performance degradation), the Protocol Designers should
clearly describe these impacts in the specification, along with any
conditions under which they may occur and possible mitigation
strategies.
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5.7.1. Monitoring the Protocol
Certain properties of protocols are useful to monitor. The number of
protocol packets received, the number of packets sent, and the number
of packets dropped are usually very helpful to operators.
Packet drops should be reflected in counter variable(s) somewhere
that can be inspected -- both from the security point of view and
from the troubleshooting point of view.
Counter definitions should be unambiguous about what is included in
the count and what is not included in the count.
Consider the expected behaviors for counters -- what is a reasonable
maximum value for expected usage? Should they stop counting at the
maximum value and retain it, or should they rollover? Guidance
should explain how rollovers are detected, including multiple
occurrences.
Consider whether multiple management applications will share a
counter; if so, then no one management application should be allowed
to reset the value to zero since this will impact other applications.
Could events, such as hot-swapping a blade in a chassis, cause
discontinuities in counter? Does this make any difference in
evaluating the performance of a protocol?
The protocol specification should clearly define any inherent
limitations and describe expected behavior when those limits are
exceeded. These considerations should be made independently of any
specific management protocol or data modeling language. In other
words, focus on what makes sense for the protocol being managed, not
the protocol used for management. If a constraint is not specific to
a management protocol, then it should be left to Data Model designers
of that protocol to determine how to handle it.
For example, VLAN identifiers are defined by standard to range
from 1 to 4094. Therefore, a YANG "vlan-id" definition
representing the 12-bit VLAN ID used in the VLAN Tag header uses a
range of "1..4094".
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5.7.2. Monitoring the Device
Consider whether device performance will be affected by the number of
protocol entities being instantiated on the device. Designers of an
Information Model should include information, accessible at runtime,
about the maximum number of instances an implementation can support,
the current number of instances, and the expected behavior when the
current instances exceed the capacity of the implementation or the
capacity of the device.
Designers of an Information Model should provide runtime information
about the maximum supported instances, the current number of
instances, and expected behavior when capacity is exceeded.
5.7.3. Monitoring the Network
Consider whether network performance will be affected by the number
of protocol entities being deployed.
Consider the capability of determining the operational activity, such
as the number of messages in and the messages out, the number of
received messages rejected due to format Problems, and the expected
behaviors when a malformed message is received.
What are the principal performance factors that need to be considered
when measuring the operational performance of a network built using
the protocol? Is it important to measure setup times, end-to-end
connectivity, hop-by-hop connectivity, or network throughput?
5.7.4. Monitoring the Service
What are the principal performance factors that need to be considered
when measuring the performance of a service using the protocol? Is
it important to measure application-specific throughput, client-
server associations, end-to-end application quality, service
interruptions, or user experience (UX)?
5.8. Security Management
Protocol Designers should consider how to monitor and manage security
aspects and vulnerabilities of the New Protocol or Protocol
Extension.
There will be security considerations related to the New Protocol or
Protocol Extension. To make it possible for operators to be aware of
security-related events, it is recommended that system logs should
record events, such as failed logins, but the logs must be secured.
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Should a system automatically notify operators of every event
occurrence, or should an operator-defined threshold control when a
notification is sent to an operator?
Should certain statistics be collected about the operation of the New
Protocol that might be useful for detecting attacks, such as the
receipt of malformed messages, messages out of order, or messages
with invalid timestamps? If such statistics are collected, is it
important to count them separately for each sender to help identify
the source of attacks?
Security-oriented manageability topics may include risks of
insufficient monitoring, regulatory issues with missing audit trails,
log capacity limits, and security exposures in recommended management
mechanisms.
Consider security threats that may be introduced by management
operations.
For example, Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) [RFC5415] breaks the structure of monolithic Access
Points (APs) into Access Controllers and Wireless Termination
Points (WTPs). By using a control protocol or management
protocol, internal information that was previously not accessible
is now exposed over the network and to management applications and
may become a source of potential security threats.
The granularity of access control needed on management interfaces
needs to match operational needs. Typical requirements are a role-
based access control model and the principle of least privilege,
where a user can be given only the minimum access necessary to
perform a required task.
Some operators wish to do consistency checks of ACLs across devices.
Protocol Designers should consider Information Models to promote
comparisons across devices and across vendors to permit checking the
consistency of security configurations.
Protocol Designers should consider how to provide a secure transport,
authentication, identity, and access control that integrates well
with existing key and credential management infrastructure. It is a
good idea to start with defining the threat model for the protocol,
and from that deducing what is required.
Protocol Designers should consider how ACLs are maintained and
updated.
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Notifications (e.g., syslog messages) might already exist, or can be
defined, to alert operators to the conditions identified in the
security considerations for the New Protocol.
For example, you can log all the commands entered by the operator
using syslog (giving you some degree of audit trail), or you can
see who has logged on/off using the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
[RFC4251] and from where; failed SSH logins can be logged using
syslog, etc.
An analysis of existing counters might help operators recognize the
conditions identified in the security considerations for the new
protocol before they can impact the network.
Different management protocols use different assumptions about
message security and data-access controls. A Protocol Designer that
recommends using different protocols should consider how security
will be applied in a balanced manner across multiple management
interfaces. SNMP authority levels and policy are data-oriented,
while CLI authority levels and policy are usually command-oriented
(i.e., task-oriented). Depending on the management function,
sometimes data-oriented or task-oriented approaches make more sense.
Protocol Designers should consider both data-oriented and task-
oriented authority levels and policy. Refer also to [RFC8341] for
more details on access control types and rules.
6. Operational and Management Tooling Considerations
The operational community's ability to effectively adopt and use new
specifications is significantly influenced by the availability and
adaptability of appropriate tooling. In this context, "tools" refers
to software systems or utilities used by network operators to deploy,
configure, monitor, troubleshoot, and manage networks or network
protocols in real-world operational environments. While the
introduction of a new specification does not automatically mandate
the development of entirely new tools, careful consideration must be
given to how existing tools can be leveraged or extended to support
the management and operation of these new specifications.
The [NEMOPS] workshop highlighted a consistent theme applicable
beyond network management protocols: the "ease of use" and
adaptability of existing tools are critical factors for successful
adoption. Therefore, a new specification should provide examples
using existing, common tooling, or running code that demonstrate how
to perform key operational tasks.
Specifically, the following tooling-related aspects should be
considered, prioritizing the adaptation of existing tools:
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* Leveraging Existing Tooling: Before considering new tools, assess
whether existing tooling, such as monitoring systems, logging
platforms, configuration management systems, and/or orchestration
frameworks, can be adapted to support the new specification. This
may involve developing plugins, modules, or drivers that enable
these tools to interact with the new specification.
* Extending Existing Tools: Identify areas where existing tools can
be extended to provide the necessary visibility and control over
the new specification. For example, if a new transport protocol
is introduced, consider whether existing network monitoring tools
can be extended to track its performance metrics or whether
existing security tools can be adapted to analyze its traffic
patterns.
* New Tools: Only when existing tools are demonstrably inadequate
for managing and operating the elements of the new specification
should the development of new tools be considered. In such cases,
carefully define the specific requirements for these new tools,
focusing on the functionalities that cannot be achieved through
adaptation or extension of existing solutions.
* IETF Hackathons for Manageability Testing: IETF Hackathons
[IETF-HACKATHONS] provide an opportunity to test the
functionality, interoperability, and manageability of New
Protocols or Protocol Extensions. These events can be
specifically leveraged to assess the operational (including
manageability) implications of a New Protocol or Protocol
Extension by focusing tasks on:
- Adapting existing tools to interact with the new specification.
- Developing example management scripts or modules for existing
management platforms.
- Testing the specification's behavior under various operational
conditions.
- Identifying potential tooling gaps and areas for improvement.
- Creating example flows and use cases for manageability.
* Open-Source for Tooling: If new tools are deemed necessary, or if
significant adaptations to existing tools are required, prioritize
open-source development with community involvement. Open-source
tools lower the barrier to entry, encourage collaboration, and
provide operators with the flexibility to customize and extend the
tools to meet their specific needs.
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6.1. AI Tooling Considerations
With the increasing adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in
network operations, Protocol Designers must consider the implication
such functions may have on New Protocols and Protocol Extensions. AI
models often require extensive and granular data for training and
inference, requiring efficient, scalable, and secure mechanisms for
telemetry, logging, and state information collection. Protocol
Designers should anticipate that AI-powered management tools may
generate frequent and potentially aggressive querying patterns on
network devices and controllers. Therefore, protocols should be
designed with Data Models and mechanisms intended to prevent overload
from automated interactions, while also accounting for AI-specific
security considerations such as data integrity and protection against
adversarial attacks on management interfaces. These considerations
are also relevant to Performance Management (Section 5.7) and
Security Management (Section 5.8).
7. IANA Considerations
This document does not have any IANA actions required.
8. Operational Considerations
Although this document focuses on operations and manageability
guidance, it does not define a New Protocol, a Protocol Extension, or
an architecture. As such, there are no new operations or
manageability requirements introduced by this document.
9. Security Considerations
This document provides guidelines for considering manageability and
operations. It introduces no new security concerns.
The provision of a management portal to a network device provides a
doorway through which an attack on the device may be launched.
Making the protocol under development be manageable through a
management protocol creates a vulnerability to a new source of
attacks. Only management protocols with adequate security
mechanisms, such as state-of-the-art encryption, mutual
authentication, message-integrity protection, and authorization,
should be used.
The security implications of password-based authentication should be
taken into account when designing a New Protocol or Protocol
Extension.
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While a standard description of a protocol's manageable parameters
facilitates legitimate operation, it may also inadvertently simplify
an attacker's efforts to understand and manipulate the protocol.
A well-designed protocol is usually more stable and secure. A
protocol that can be managed and inspected offers the operator a
better chance of spotting and quarantining any attacks. Conversely,
making a protocol easy to inspect is a risk if the wrong person
inspects it.
If security events cause logs and/or notifications/alerts, a
concerted attack might be able to be mounted by causing an excess of
these events. In other words, the security-management mechanisms
could constitute a security vulnerability. The management of
security aspects is important (Section 5.8).
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[BCP22] Best Current Practice 22,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp22>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Scott, G., "Guide for Internet Standards Writers", BCP 22,
RFC 2360, DOI 10.17487/RFC2360, June 1998,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2360>.
10.2. Informative References
[BCP133] Best Current Practice 133,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp133>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Duke, M., Ed. and G. Fairhurst, Ed., "Specifying New
Congestion Control Algorithms", BCP 133, RFC 9743,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9743, March 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9743>.
[BCP14] Best Current Practice 14,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp14>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[BCP166] Best Current Practice 166,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp166>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.
[BCP186] Best Current Practice 186,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp186>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Gont, F., Atkinson, R., and C. Pignataro, "Recommendations
on Filtering of IPv4 Packets Containing IPv4 Options",
BCP 186, RFC 7126, DOI 10.17487/RFC7126, February 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7126>.
[BCP72] Best Current Practice 72,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp72>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
Gont, F. and I. Arce, "Security Considerations for
Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network
Protocols", BCP 72, RFC 9416, DOI 10.17487/RFC9416, July
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9416>.
[CHECKLIST]
"Operations and Management Review Checklist", 2025,
<https://github.com/IETF-OPS-DIR/Review-Template/tree/
main>.
[I-D.ietf-core-dns-over-coap]
Lenders, M. S., Amsüss, C., Gündoğan, C., Schmidt, T. C.,
and M. Wählisch, "DNS over CoAP (DoC)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-dns-over-coap-20, 16
September 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-core-dns-over-coap-20>.
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[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]
Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -
Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital
Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-13, 30
September 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-13>.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-rfc8407bis]
Bierman, A., Boucadair, M., and Q. Wu, "Guidelines for
Authors and Reviewers of Documents Containing YANG Data
Models", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netmod-rfc8407bis-28, 5 June 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netmod-
rfc8407bis-28>.
[I-D.ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang]
Hu, T., Contreras, L. M., Wu, Q., Davis, N., and C. Feng,
"A YANG Data Model for Network Incident Management", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-nmop-network-
incident-yang-06, 12 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nmop-
network-incident-yang-06>.
[I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology]
Davis, N., Farrel, A., Graf, T., Wu, Q., and C. Yu, "Some
Key Terms for Network Fault and Problem Management", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-nmop-terminology-
23, 18 August 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nmop-
terminology-23>.
[I-D.ietf-opsawg-oam-characterization]
Pignataro, C., Farrel, A., and T. Mizrahi, "Guidelines for
Characterizing "OAM"", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-opsawg-oam-characterization-14, 16 December
2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
opsawg-oam-characterization-14>.
[I-D.ietf-quic-qlog-main-schema]
Marx, R., Niccolini, L., Seemann, M., and L. Pardue,
"qlog: Structured Logging for Network Protocols", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-quic-qlog-main-
schema-13, 20 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-quic-
qlog-main-schema-13>.
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[I-D.ietf-suit-mti]
Moran, B., Rønningstad, O., and A. Tsukamoto,
"Cryptographic Algorithms for Internet of Things (IoT)
Devices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
suit-mti-23, 22 July 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-suit-
mti-23>.
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-prr-rfc6937bis]
Mathis, M., Cardwell, N., Cheng, Y., and N. Dukkipati,
"Proportional Rate Reduction", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-tcpm-prr-rfc6937bis-21, 22 June 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-
prr-rfc6937bis-21>.
[IESG-STATEMENT]
IESG, "Writable MIB Module IESG Statement", 2 March 2014,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/statement-iesg-writable-
mib-module-iesg-statement-20140302/>.
[IETF-HACKATHONS]
IETF, "IETF Hackathons", 1 May 2025,
<https://www.ietf.org/meeting/hackathons/>.
[IETF-OPS-Dir]
"Ops Directorate (opsdir)", 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/opsdir/about/>.
[NEMOPS] Hardaker, W. and D. Dhody, "Report from the IAB Workshop
on the Next Era of Network Management Operations
(NEMOPS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-iab-
nemops-workshop-report-04, 29 August 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-iab-nemops-
workshop-report-04>.
[NEMOPS-WORKSHOP]
IAB, "IAB workshop on the Next Era of Network Management
Operations", December 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/nemopsws/about/>.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034>.
[RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1958>.
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[RFC2113] Katz, D., "IP Router Alert Option", RFC 2113,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2113, February 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2113>.
[RFC2205] Braden, R., Ed., Zhang, L., Berson, S., Herzog, S., and S.
Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1
Functional Specification", RFC 2205, DOI 10.17487/RFC2205,
September 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2205>.
[RFC2439] Villamizar, C., Chandra, R., and R. Govindan, "BGP Route
Flap Damping", RFC 2439, DOI 10.17487/RFC2439, November
1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2439>.
[RFC2711] Partridge, C. and A. Jackson, "IPv6 Router Alert Option",
RFC 2711, DOI 10.17487/RFC2711, October 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2711>.
[RFC2975] Aboba, B., Arkko, J., and D. Harrington, "Introduction to
Accounting Management", RFC 2975, DOI 10.17487/RFC2975,
October 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2975>.
[RFC3139] Sanchez, L., McCloghrie, K., and J. Saperia, "Requirements
for Configuration Management of IP-based Networks",
RFC 3139, DOI 10.17487/RFC3139, June 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3139>.
[RFC3198] Westerinen, A., Schnizlein, J., Strassner, J., Scherling,
M., Quinn, B., Herzog, S., Huynh, A., Carlson, M., Perry,
J., and S. Waldbusser, "Terminology for Policy-Based
Management", RFC 3198, DOI 10.17487/RFC3198, November
2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3198>.
[RFC3444] Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference between
Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3444, January 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3444>.
[RFC3535] Schoenwaelder, J., "Overview of the 2002 IAB Network
Management Workshop", RFC 3535, DOI 10.17487/RFC3535, May
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3535>.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4251>.
[RFC5218] Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes for a Successful
Protocol?", RFC 5218, DOI 10.17487/RFC5218, July 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5218>.
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[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321>.
[RFC5415] Calhoun, P., Ed., Montemurro, M., Ed., and D. Stanley,
Ed., "Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
(CAPWAP) Protocol Specification", RFC 5415,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5415, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5415>.
[RFC5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5424, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5424>.
[RFC5706] Harrington, D., "Guidelines for Considering Operations and
Management of New Protocols and Protocol Extensions",
RFC 5706, DOI 10.17487/RFC5706, November 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5706>.
[RFC5884] Aggarwal, R., Kompella, K., Nadeau, T., and G. Swallow,
"Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for MPLS Label
Switched Paths (LSPs)", RFC 5884, DOI 10.17487/RFC5884,
June 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5884>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC6291] Andersson, L., van Helvoort, H., Bonica, R., Romascanu,
D., and S. Mansfield, "Guidelines for the Use of the "OAM"
Acronym in the IETF", BCP 161, RFC 6291,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6291, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6291>.
[RFC6298] Paxson, V., Allman, M., Chu, J., and M. Sargent,
"Computing TCP's Retransmission Timer", RFC 6298,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6298, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6298>.
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[RFC6390] Clark, A. and B. Claise, "Guidelines for Considering New
Performance Metric Development", BCP 170, RFC 6390,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6390, October 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6390>.
[RFC6632] Ersue, M., Ed. and B. Claise, "An Overview of the IETF
Network Management Standards", RFC 6632,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6632, June 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6632>.
[RFC6709] Carpenter, B., Aboba, B., Ed., and S. Cheshire, "Design
Considerations for Protocol Extensions", RFC 6709,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6709, September 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6709>.
[RFC7011] Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,
"Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,
RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7011>.
[RFC7574] Bakker, A., Petrocco, R., and V. Grishchenko, "Peer-to-
Peer Streaming Peer Protocol (PPSPP)", RFC 7574,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7574, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7574>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7950>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8170] Thaler, D., Ed., "Planning for Protocol Adoption and
Subsequent Transitions", RFC 8170, DOI 10.17487/RFC8170,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8170>.
[RFC8199] Bogdanovic, D., Claise, B., and C. Moberg, "YANG Module
Classification", RFC 8199, DOI 10.17487/RFC8199, July
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8199>.
[RFC8299] Wu, Q., Ed., Litkowski, S., Tomotaki, L., and K. Ogaki,
"YANG Data Model for L3VPN Service Delivery", RFC 8299,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8299, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8299>.
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[RFC8309] Wu, Q., Liu, W., and A. Farrel, "Service Models
Explained", RFC 8309, DOI 10.17487/RFC8309, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8309>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8340>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8341>.
[RFC8466] Wen, B., Fioccola, G., Ed., Xie, C., and L. Jalil, "A YANG
Data Model for Layer 2 Virtual Private Network (L2VPN)
Service Delivery", RFC 8466, DOI 10.17487/RFC8466, October
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8466>.
[RFC8791] Bierman, A., Björklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
Structure Extensions", RFC 8791, DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,
June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8791>.
[RFC8799] Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, July 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8799>.
[RFC9182] Barguil, S., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Ed., Boucadair, M.,
Ed., Munoz, L., and A. Aguado, "A YANG Network Data Model
for Layer 3 VPNs", RFC 9182, DOI 10.17487/RFC9182,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9182>.
[RFC9291] Boucadair, M., Ed., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Ed., Barguil,
S., and L. Munoz, "A YANG Network Data Model for Layer 2
VPNs", RFC 9291, DOI 10.17487/RFC9291, September 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9291>.
[RFC9424] Paine, K., Whitehouse, O., Sellwood, J., and A. Shaw,
"Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and Their Role in Attack
Defence", RFC 9424, DOI 10.17487/RFC9424, August 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9424>.
[RFC9552] Talaulikar, K., Ed., "Distribution of Link-State and
Traffic Engineering Information Using BGP", RFC 9552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9552, December 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9552>.
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[RFC9805] Bonica, R., "Deprecation of the IPv6 Router Alert Option
for New Protocols", RFC 9805, DOI 10.17487/RFC9805, June
2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9805>.
[RFC9877] Singh, J. and T. Harrison, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Extension for Geofeed Data", RFC 9877,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9877, October 2025,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9877>.
[SECOPS] "NICCS Glossary", August 2025,
<https://niccs.cisa.gov/resources/glossary>.
Appendix A. Operational Considerations Checklist
This appendix provides a concise checklist of key questions that
Protocol Designers should address in the "Operational Considerations"
section of their specifications. Each item references the relevant
section of this document for detailed guidance.
The decision to incorporate all or part of these items into their
work remains with Protocol Designers and WGs themselves. ##
Documentation Requirements
* Does the specification include an "Operational Considerations"
section? (Section 3.1)
* Is this section placed immediately before the Security
Considerations section? (Section 3.3)
* If there are no new considerations, does the section include the
appropriate boilerplate with explanation? (Section 3.2)
A.1. Operational Fit
* How does this protocol operate "out of the box"? (Section 4.1,
Section 4.2)
- What are the default values, modes, timers, and states?
(Section 4.2)
- What is the rationale for chosen default values, especially if
they affect operations or are expected to change over time?
(Section 4.2)
* What is the migration path for existing deployments?
(Section 4.3)
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- How will deployments transition from older versions or
technologies? (Section 4.3)
- Does the protocol require infrastructure changes, and how can
these be introduced? (Section 4.3)
* What are the requirements or dependencies on other protocols and
functional components? (Section 4.4)
* What is the impact on network operation? (Section 4.5)
- What are the scaling implications and interactions with other
protocols? (Section 4.5)
- What are the impacts on traffic patterns or performance (e.g.,
delay, jitter)? (Section 4.5)
* What is the impact on Security Operations? (Section 4.6)
- How does deployment affect Indicators of Compromise or their
availability? (Section 4.6)
- What logging is needed for digital forensics? (Section 4.6)
* How can correct operation be verified? (Section 4.7)
- What status and health indicators does the protocol provide?
(Section 4.7)
* How are human-readable messages handled? (Section 4.8)
- Do messages support internationalization with message codes for
local language mapping? (Section 4.8)
A.2. Management Information
* What needs to be managed? (Section 5)
- What are the manageable entities (e.g., protocol endpoints,
network elements, services)? (Section 5)
* Which standardized management technologies are applicable?
(Section 5.1)
* What essential information is required? (Section 5.2,
Section 5.3)
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- What operational, configuration, state, and statistical
information is needed? (Section 5.2)
- Is an Information Model needed, especially if multiple Data
Model representations are required? (Section 5.2)
- What is manageable, what needs configuration, and what
protocol-specific events might occur? (Section 5.3)
- How are configuration data, operational state, and statistics
distinguished? (Section 5.3)
* If YANG Data Models are defined, what type is appropriate?
(Section 5.3.2)
- Should Device Models, Network Models, or Service Models be
specified? (Section 5.3.2)
A.3. Fault Management
* What faults and events should be reported? (Section 5.4)
- What essential faults, health indicators, alarms, and events
should be exposed? (Section 5.4)
- How will fault information be propagated? (Section 5.4)
* How is liveness monitored? (Section 5.4.1)
- What testing and liveness detection features are built into the
protocol? (Section 5.4.1)
* How are faults determined? (Section 5.4.2)
- What error counters or diagnostics help pinpoint faults?
(Section 5.4.2)
- What distinguishes faulty from correct messages?
(Section 5.4.2)
A.4. Configuration Management
* What configuration parameters are defined? (Section 5.5)
- What parameters need to be configurable, including their
defaults and valid ranges? (Section 5.5)
- What information persists across reboots? (Section 5.5)
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A.5. Performance Management
* What are the performance implications? (Section 5.7)
- What are the hardware/software performance impacts (e.g., CPU,
memory, forwarding)? (Section 5.7)
* What performance information should be available? (Section 5.7.1)
- What protocol counters are defined (e.g., packets received,
sent, dropped)? (Section 5.7.1)
- What is the counter behavior at maximum values?
(Section 5.7.1)
- What are the protocol limitations and behavior when limits are
exceeded? (Section 5.7.1)
A.6. Security Management
* What security-related monitoring is needed? (Section 5.8)
- What security events should be logged? (Section 5.8)
- What statistics help detect attacks? (Section 5.8)
- What security threats do management operations introduce?
(Section 5.8)
Appendix B. Changes Since RFC 5706
The following changes have been made to the guidelines published in
[RFC5706]:
* Change intended status from Informational to Best Current Practice
* Move the "Operational Considerations" Appendix A to a Checklist
[CHECKLIST] maintained in GitHub
* Add a concise "Operational Considerations Checklist" appendix
(Appendix A) with key questions that should be addressed in
protocol specifications
* Add a requirement for an "Operational Considerations" section in
all new Standard Track RFCs, along with specific guidance on its
content.
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* Update the operational and manageability-related technologies to
reflect over 15 years of advancements
- Provide focus and details on YANG-based standards,
deprioritizing MIB Modules.
- Add a "YANG Data Model Considerations" section
- Update the "Available Management Technologies" landscape
* Add an "Operational and Management Tooling Considerations" section
B.1. TO DO LIST
See the list of open issues at https://github.com/IETF-OPSAWG-WG/
draft-opsarea-rfc5706bis/issues
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the following individuals and groups, whose efforts
have helped to improve this document:
The IETF Ops Directorate (OpsDir): The IETF OpsDir [IETF-OPS-Dir]
reviewer team, which has been providing document reviews for more
than a decade, and its Chairs past and present: Gunter Van de
Velde, Carlos Pignataro, Bo Wu, and Daniele Ceccarelli.
The AD championing the update: Med Boucadair, who initiated and
championed the effort to refresh RFC 5706, 15 years after its
publication, building on an idea originally suggested by Carlos
Pignataro.
Reviewers of this document, in chronological order: Mahesh
Jethanandani, Chongfeng Xie, Alvaro Retana, Michael P., Scott
Hollenbeck, Ron Bonica, Italo Busi, Brian Trammel, Aijun Wang, and
Richard Shockey for their review, comments, and contributions.
The author of RFC 5706: David Harrington
Acknowledgments from RFC 5706: This document started from an earlier
document edited by Adrian Farrel, which itself was based on work
exploring the need for Manageability Considerations sections in
all Internet-Drafts produced within the Routing Area of the IETF.
That earlier work was produced by Avri Doria, Loa Andersson, and
Adrian Farrel, with valuable feedback provided by Pekka Savola and
Bert Wijnen.
Some of the discussion about designing for manageability came from
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private discussions between Dan Romascanu, Bert Wijnen, Jürgen
Schönwälder, Andy Bierman, and David Harrington.
Thanks to reviewers who helped fashion this document, including
Harald Alvestrand, Ron Bonica, Brian Carpenter, Benoît Claise,
Adrian Farrel, David Kessens, Dan Romascanu, Pekka Savola, Jürgen
Schönwälder, Bert Wijnen, Ralf Wolter, and Lixia Zhang.
Contributors
Thomas Graf
Swisscom
Email: thomas.graf@swisscom.com
Authors' Addresses
Benoit Claise
Everything OPS
Email: benoit@everything-ops.net
Joe Clarke
Cisco
Email: jclarke@cisco.com
Adrian Farrel
Old Dog Consulting
Email: adrian@olddog.co.uk
Samier Barguil
Nokia
Email: samier.barguil_giraldo@nokia.com
Carlos Pignataro
Blue Fern Consulting
Email: carlos@bluefern.consulting, cpignata@gmail.com
URI: https://bluefern.consulting
Ran Chen
ZTE
Email: chen.ran@zte.com.cn
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