DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers
draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-02

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (opsec WG)
Last updated 2014-02-03
Replaces draft-gont-opsec-dhcpv6-shield
Stream IETF
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opsec                                                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                    SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Intended status: Best Current Practice                            W. Liu
Expires: August 8, 2014                              Huawei Technologies
                                                         G. Van de Velde
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                        February 4, 2014

         DHCPv6-Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers
                   draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-02

Abstract

   This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to
   a broadcast network against rogue DHCPv6 servers.  The aforementioned
   mechanism is based on DHCPv6 packet-filtering at the layer-2 device
   at which the packets are received.  The aforementioned mechanism has
   been widely deployed in IPv4 networks ('DHCP snooping'), and hence it
   is desirable that similar functionality be provided for IPv6
   networks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 8, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DHCPv6-Shield Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  DHCPv6-Shield Implementation Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies a mechanism for protecting hosts connected to
   a broadcast network against rogue DHCPv6 servers [RFC3315].  This
   mechanism is analogous to the RA-Guard mechanism [RFC6104] [RFC6105]
   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation] intended for protection
   against rogue Router Advertisement [RFC4861] messages.

   The basic concept behind DHCPv6-Shield is that a layer-2 device
   filters DHCPv6 messages meant to DHCPv6 clients (henceforth
   "DHCPv6-server messages"), according to a number of different
   criteria.  The most basic filtering criterion is that DHCPv6-server
   messages are discarded by the layer-2 device unless they are received
   on a specified port of the layer-2 device.

   Before the DCHPv6-Shield device is deployed, the administrator
   specifies the layer-2 port(s) on which DHCPv6-server messages are to
   be allowed.  Only those ports to which a DHCPv6 server is to be
   connected should be specified as such.  Once deployed, the
   DHCPv6-Shield device inspects received packets, and allows (i.e.
   passes) DHCPv6-server messages only if they are received on layer-2
   ports that have been explicitly configured for such purpose.

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2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
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