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Local Trust Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (sidr WG)
Expired & archived
Authors Mark Reynolds , Stephen Kent , Matt Lepinski
Last updated 2013-10-07 (Latest revision 2013-04-05)
Replaces draft-reynolds-rpki-ltamgmt, draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-ltamgmt
RFC stream Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Intended RFC status (None)
Additional resources Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state Dead WG Document
Document shepherd (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:


This document describes a facility to enable a relying party (RP) to manage trust anchors (TAs) in the context of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). It is common in RP software (not just in the RPKI) to allow an RP to import TA material in the form of self-signed certificates. However, this approach to incorporating TAs is potentially dangerous. (These self-signed certificates rarely incorporate any extensions that impose constraints on the scope of the imported public keys, and the RP is not able to impose such constraints.) The facility described in this document allows an RP to impose constraints on such TAs. Because this mechanism is designed to operate in the RPKI context, the most important constraints are the Internet Number Resources (INRs) expressed via RFC 3779 extensions. These extentions bind address spaces and/or autonomous system (AS) numbers to entities. The primary motivation for the facility described in this document is to enable an RP to ensure that INR information that it has acquired via some trusted channel is not overridden by the information acquired from the RPKI repository system or by the putative TAs that the RP imports. Specifically, the mechanism allows an RP to specify a set of overriding bindings between public key identifiers and INR data. These bindings take precedence over any conflicting bindings acquired by the putative TAs and the certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. This mechanism is designed for local use by an RP, but any entity that is accorded administrative control over a set of RPs may use this mechanism to convey its view of the RPKI to RPs within its jurisdiction. The means by which this latter use case is effected is outside the scope of this document.


Mark Reynolds
Stephen Kent
Matt Lepinski

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)