A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-22

[Ballot discuss]
[Updated as per Sam Hartman's SecDir review discussion and a further discussion with Sam]

This is a well written document and I generally support its publication.

I was originally planning to file a DISCUSS on this issue, but though that the WG knows better. However Sam's SecDir review has changed my mind:

Sam wrote:

I do not believe the concerns I raised in my secdir review have been
addressed and I still have a deep architectural concern with the
decision to prevent relying parties from accepting unknown non-critical
extensions.

There seems to be agreement with several points I raised:

1) The profile does prohibit unknown extensions.

2) I think there is agreement that before we can start using an error
correction or new feature, we have to upgrade all software in the wild
that might see the certificates.

3) Everyone including me thinks that strong restrictions  on what
certificates are created is good for this profile. The question is what
about restrictions on what people receive. If the IETF changes the
standard in the future do we want to have to upgrade issuers and
consumers or just issuers before we start using the new spec in what we
issue.

4) We may find ourself in a situation where we made a mistake or need to
expand what the RPKI does.

Adding from myself:

I think there is no disagreement that extensions not listed in this profile SHOULD NOT (or even MUST NOT) be generated. However I think the WG is shooting itself in the foot by making receivers reject certificates with unrecognized non critical extensions. A much better architectural approach would be to say that such non critical extensions "MUST be ignored". This is a pretty standard trick in the Apps Area and allows for safe extensibility.

[Ballot comment]
From Ari Keränen's review:

1.  Introduction

  o  a conformation of a public key match between the CRL issuer and
      the Resource Certificate issuer is required, and

Should that be "confirmation"?

[Ballot comment]
Although I am provisionally balloting "No Objection" pending discussion within the IESG, I too am concerned about the issues raised in Alexey Melnikov's DISCUSS.

[Ballot comment]
I support Alexey's discuss-discuss: the upgrade path for sidr-res-certs is not typical for IETF publications.  It would be good for the IESG to discuss the merits and drawbacks of the wg's consensus approach.

However, I should note that I personally am comfortable with the approach based on the unique attributes of its intended deployment and application.  Various aspects of this problem have been actively discussed since Stockholm.

[Ballot discuss]
[Updated as per Sam Hartman's SecDir review discussion and a further discussion with Sam]

This is a well written document and I generally support its publication.

I was originally planning to file a DISCUSS on this issue, but though that the WG knows better. However Sam's SecDir review has changed my mind:

Sam wrote:

I do not believe the concerns I raised in my secdir review have been
addressed and I still have a deep architectural concern with the
decision to prevent relying parties from accepting unknown non-critical
extensions.

There seems to be agreement with several points I raised:

1) The profile does prohibit unknown extensions.

2) I think there is agreement that before we can start using an error
correction or new feature, we have to upgrade all software in the wild
that might see the certificates.

3) Everyone including me thinks that strong restrictions  on what
certificates are created is good for this profile. The question is what
about restrictions on what people receive. If the IETF changes the
standard in the future do we want to have to upgrade issuers and
consumers or just issuers before we start using the new spec in what we
issue.

4) We may find ourself in a situation where we made a mistake or need to
expand what the RPKI does.

Adding from myself:

I think there is no disagreement that extensions not listed in this profile SHOULD NOT (or even MUST NOT) be generated. However I think the WG is shooting itself in the foot by making receivers reject certificates with unrecognized non critical extensions. A much better architectural approach would be to say that such non critical extensions "MUST be ignored". This is a pretty standard trick in the Apps Area and allows for safe extensibility.

I also have a small list of [nearly] nit-picking items which I think need to be addressed before it is approved for publication:

4.9.6.  CRL Distribution Points

  The CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP) extension identifies the
  location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this
  Issuer.  The RPKI uses the URI form of object identification.

This needs a Normative reference to the URI RFC.

  The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
  DistributionPoint.  The DistributionPoint MAY contain more than one
  URI value.  An RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be present in the

This makes the reference Normative (and it is a DownRef).

  DistributionPoint, and reference the most recent instance of this
  Issuer's CRL.  Other access form URIs MAY be used in addition to the
  RSYNC URI, representing alternate access mechanisms for this CRL.

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested.

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Last Call:  (A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
(sidr) to consider the following document:
- 'A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'
  as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2011-03-29. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs/

This IETF Last Call is to draw the attention of the IETF to an additional
downref in the draft that was noted during IESG review.

Section 4.9.6 contains a reference to RFC5781. This reference has not been
added to the references section of the draft, but will need to be a normative
reference.

As was noted in the previous IETF Last call this document also has a downref
to RFC2986.

[Ballot comment]
4.4.  Issuer

  The value of this field is a valid X.501 distinguished name.

A reference to the document defining DNs is needed here. (One of the LDAP documents might do.)

  An Issuer name MUST contain one instance of the Common Name attribute
  and MAY contain one instance of the Serial Number attribute.  If both
  attributes are present, it is RECOMMENDED that they appear as a set.
  The Common Name attribute MUST be encoded as a printable string.

Similarly, a reference for printable string is needed.

  Issuer names are not intended to be descriptive of the identity of
  Issuer.

4.9.8.1.  SIA for CA Certificates

  The ordering of URIs
  in this accessDescription sequence reflect the CA's relative
  preferences for access methods to be used by RPs, with he first

s/he/the

  element of the sequence being the most preferred by the CA.


6.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

      version
        This field SHOULD be omitted.  If present, it MUST specify a
        request for a Version 3 Certificate.  It

Unfinished sentence?

[Ballot discuss]
This is a well written document and I generally support its publication. I do however have a small list of [nearly] nit-picking items which I think need to be addressed before it is approved for publication:

4.9.6.  CRL Distribution Points

  The CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP) extension identifies the
  location(s) of the CRL(s) associated with certificates issued by this
  Issuer.  The RPKI uses the URI form of object identification.

This needs a Normative reference to the URI RFC.

  The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
  DistributionPoint.  The DistributionPoint MAY contain more than one
  URI value.  An RSYNC URI [RFC5781] MUST be present in the

This makes the reference Normative (and it is a DownRef).

  DistributionPoint, and reference the most recent instance of this
  Issuer's CRL.  Other access form URIs MAY be used in addition to the
  RSYNC URI, representing alternate access mechanisms for this CRL.

[Ballot comment]
Need to add normative reference to RFC 2119 as per: http://www.rfc-editor.org/policy.html#policy.2119ref

"Valid From" should be "Not Before" and "Valid To" should be "Not After" to match the name of fields in RFC 5280.

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested.

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: IETF-Announce
CC:
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Last Call:  (A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
(sidr) to consider the following document:
- 'A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates'
  as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2011-02-21. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs/

Please note that this document contains a downref to RFC 2986

  (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
        Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
        document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
        version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

The document shepherd is Sandra Murphy, sidr co-chair.  The document
shepherd has personally reviewed the document.  No issues were
discovered that would prevent advancement.  This document is ready
for forwarding to the IESG.

  (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
        and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
        any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
        have been performed? 

The document has had adequate review.  It was presented at working
group meetings at the IETF70, IETF72, IETF73, IETF76, and IETF79
meetings and went through last call (the last time, it has been
through last call before) in Nov 2010 in the working group. 
Comments received were addressed on the list.  There was adequate
support from the working group to indicate broad interest.

  (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
        needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
        e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
        AAA, internationalization or XML?

No, the document shepherd has no concerns about this document.

  (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
        issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
        and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
        or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
        has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
        event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
        that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
        concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
        been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
        disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
        this issue.

The document shepherd has no concerns with advancing this document. No
IPR claims have been filed against this document.

  (1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
        represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
        others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
        agree with it? 

This draft was the first draft presented to the working group.  Over
the years, portions have been extracted to become independent drafts
and the language has become more concise as a result of detailed
reviews.
Implementation experience conveyed by several independent implementors
has been a force in the evolution of the draft.  The components described
here are major components in the RPKI, so authors of any other draft in
the working group are certain to have reviewed this draft.  The working
group as a whole understands the concepts of this draft.

  (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
        discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
        separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
        should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
        entered into the ID Tracker.)

No appeals have been issued or threatened for this document.

  (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
        document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist
        and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
        not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
        met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
        Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

The tools site reports the following for this draft:

    Summary: 1 error (**), 9 warnings (==), 3 comments (--).

The error is a downref to 2986.  As this is intended to be a standards
track document and 2986 is Informational, that is a downref.  See below.

The warnings have to do with absence of 5378 disclaimers (overall
issue discussed with ADs) and with outdated references (to overtaken
versions of drafts).  There is one warning about non-rfc3330 compliant
ipv4 addresses.  The references are in an example certificate, but as
the certificate is supposed to be demonstrating an allocation of
addresses and the example IP addresses would not be the subject of an
allocation and therefore never incorporated into a certificate, using
one of the IPv4 addresses reserved for examples would produce an
impossible certificate.

There are no formal reviews required for this document.  The document
mandates a particular URI access mechanism, "rsync".  That access
mechanism is defined in RFC5781.

  (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
        informative? Are there normative references to documents that
        are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
        state? If such normative references exist, what is the
        strategy2 for their completion? Are there normative references
        that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
        so, list these downward references to support the Area
        Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

Yes, the document has split its references into normative and informative
sections.  This document relies normatively on several other
working group documents that are either advancing at the same time or
have been through last call and are awaiting final versions addressing
minor comments in order to advance.  This document is intended for
Standards status; one of the references is a downward reference to
an Informational RFC: RFC 2986.  That RFC notes that it is "a
republication of PKCS #10 v1.7 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key
Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained
within the PKCS process."  In that circumstance, the downref is
appropriate.

  (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
        consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
        of the document? If the document specifies protocol
        extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
        registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
        the document creates a new registry, does it define the
        proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
        procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
        reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the
        document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
        conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
        can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

The IANA Considerations section exists, is consistent with the document,
and does not create a new registry or entries in an existing registry.

  (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
        document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
        code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
        an automated checker?

This document uses ASN.1 in describing portions of the certificate.
The syntax was checked using asn1Parser from the libtasn1-tools package
(v2.7.1) and passed.

  (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
        Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
        Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
        "Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
        announcement contains the following sections:

    Technical Summary
        Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract
        and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be
        an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract
        or introduction.

    Working Group Summary
        Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For
        example, was there controversy about particular points or
        were there decisions where the consensus was particularly
        rough?

    Document Quality
        Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a
        significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
        implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that
        merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
        e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
        conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
        there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
        what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
        review, on what date was the request posted?

Technical Summmary

This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use"
of Resources (INRs).  The certificates issued under this profile are
used to convey the Issuer's authorisation of the Subject to be
regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that
are described in the certificate.  This document contains the
normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
The document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate
requests.  The document also specifies the Relying Party RPKI
certificate path validation procedure.

Working Group Summary

This draft was the first draft presented to the working group and has
been a basis for other work in the working group.  Several implementators
of this certificate profile have conveyed implementation experience that
has been incorporated into the draft. 

Document Quality

This document is well written and clear.  Over the years, portions have
been extracted to become independent drafts and the language has become
more concise as a result of detailed reviews.  Although this profile
does not define a protocol, several independent implementations of this
certificate profile exist, indicating careful review.

There have been careful reviews by X.509 PKI experts and by ASN.1 experts
and their comments have been addressed.

There is no MIB and there is no Media Type.