Technical Summary
This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE
being sent across external BGP (EBGP) sessions. Annotating routes
with BGP Path Attributes carried across EBGP sessions signaling
validation states may cause needless flooding of BGP UPDATE messages
through the global Internet routing system, for example when Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are issued, or are revoked, or when
RPKI-To-Router sessions are terminated.
Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not
signaled in BGP Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE
being sent across EBGP sessions. Specifically, operators should not
associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes using any
form of BGP Communities carried across EBGP session.
Working Group Summary & Document Quality
Working Group Last Call has shown a broad support for this
document.
Refer to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp/shepherdwriteup/
for more details.
Personnel
The Document Shepherd for this document is Luigi Iannone.
The Responsible Area Director is Mohamed Boucadair.