Technical Summary
This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in transitive Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes. Annotating routes with
transitive attributes signaling validation states may cause needless
flooding of BGP UPDATE messages through the global Internet routing
system, for example when Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are
issued, or are revoked, or when RPKI-To-Router sessions are
terminated.
Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not
signaled in transitive BGP Path Attributes. Specifically, Operators
should not associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes
using transitive BGP Communities.
Working Group Summary & Document Quality
Working Group Last Call has shown a broad support for this
document.
Refer to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp/shepherdwriteup/
for more details.
Personnel
The Document Shepherd for this document is Luigi Iannone.
The Responsible Area Director is Mohamed Boucadair.