The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-02
Network Working Group Y. Gilad
Internet-Draft S. Goldberg
Intended status: Best Current Practice Boston University
Expires: October 26, 2019 K. Sriram
USA NIST
J. Snijders
NTT
B. Maddison
Workonline Communications
April 24, 2019
The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-02
Abstract
This document recommends ways to reduce forged-origin attack surface
by prudently limiting the address space that is included in Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs). One recommendation is to avoid using
the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The
recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115. The
document also discusses creation of ROAs for facilitating Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services. Considerations related
to ROAs and origin validation for the case of destination-based
Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH) filtering are also highlighted.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 26, 2019.
Gilad, et al. Expires October 26, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength April 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Forged-Origin Subprefix Hijack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Measurements of Today's RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Recommendations about Minimal ROAs and Maxlength . . . . . . 6
5.1. Creation of ROAs Facilitating DDoS Mitigation Service . . 7
6. ROAs and Origin Validation for RTBH Filtering Scenario . . . 9
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
The RPKI [RFC6480] uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to create
a cryptographically verifiable mapping from an IP prefix to a set of
autonomous systems (ASes) that are authorized to originate this
prefix. Each ROA contains a set of IP prefixes, and an AS number of
an AS authorized originate all the IP prefixes in the set [RFC6482].
The ROA is cryptographically signed by the party that holds a
certificate for the set of IP prefixes.
The ROA format also supports a maxLength attribute. According to
[RFC6482], "When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length
of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise."
Thus, rather than requiring the ROA to list each prefix the AS is
authorized to originate, the maxLength attribute provides a shorthand
that authorizes an AS to originate a set of IP prefixes.
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