The Use of maxLength in the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-09
Network Working Group Y. Gilad
Internet-Draft Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Intended status: Best Current Practice S. Goldberg
Expires: 26 May 2022 Boston University
K. Sriram
USA NIST
J. Snijders
Fastly
B. Maddison
Workonline Communications
22 November 2021
The Use of maxLength in the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-09
Abstract
This document recommends ways to reduce forged-origin hijack attack
surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are
included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation
is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some
specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in
RFC 7115. The document also discusses creation of ROAs for
facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
mitigation services. Considerations related to ROAs and origin
validation in the context of destination-based Remote Triggered Black
Hole (RTBH) filtering are also highlighted.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 May 2022.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Documentation Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Forged-Origin Subprefix Hijack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Measurements of the RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Recommendations about Minimal ROAs and maxLength . . . . . . 7
5.1. Facilitating Ad-hoc Routing Changes and DDoS
Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Defensive de-aggregation in response to prefix hijacks . 10
6. Considerations for RTBH Filtering Scenarios . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
The RPKI [RFC6480] uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to create
a cryptographically verifiable mapping from an IP prefix to a set of
autonomous systems (ASes) that are authorized to originate that
prefix. Each ROA contains a set of IP prefixes, and an AS number of
an AS authorized to originate all the IP prefixes in the set
[RFC6482]. The ROA is cryptographically signed by the party that
holds a certificate for the set of IP prefixes.
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The ROA format also supports a maxLength attribute. According to
[RFC6482], "When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length
of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise."
Thus, rather than requiring the ROA to list each prefix the AS is
authorized to originate, the maxLength attribute provides a shorthand
that authorizes an AS to originate a set of IP prefixes.
However, measurements of RPKI deployments have found that use of the
maxLength in ROAs tends to lead to security problems. In particular,
measurements taken in June 2017 showed that 84% of the prefixes
specified in ROAs that use the maxLength attribute, were vulnerable
to a forged-origin subprefix hijack [HARMFUL]. The forged-origin
prefix or subprefix hijack involves inserting the legitimate AS as
specified in the ROA as the origin AS in the AS_PATH, and can be
launched against any IP prefix/subprefix that has a ROA. Consider a
prefix/subprefix that has a ROA but is unused, i.e., not announced in
BGP by a legitimate AS. A forged origin hijack involving such a
prefix/subprefix can propagate widely throughout the Internet. On
the other hand, if the prefix/subprefix were announced by the
legitimate AS, then the propagation of the forged-origin hijack is
somewhat limited because of its increased AS_PATH length relative to
the legitimate announcement. Of course, forged-origin hijacks are
harmful in both cases but the extent of harm is greater for
unannounced prefixes.
For this reason, this document recommends that, whenever possible,
operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" that authorize only those IP
prefixes that are actually originated in BGP, and no other prefixes.
Further, it recommends ways to reduce forged-origin attack surface by
prudently limiting the address space that is included in Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs). One recommendation is to avoid using the
maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The
recommendations complement and extend those in [RFC7115]. The
document also discusses creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services.
Considerations related to ROAs and origin validation in the context
of destination-based Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH) filtering are
also highlighted.
One ideal place to implement the ROA related recommendations is in
the user interfaces for configuring ROAs. Thus, this document
further recommends that designers and/or providers of such user
interfaces SHOULD provide warnings to draw the user's attention to
the risks of using the maxLength attribute.
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Best current practices described in this document require no changes
to the RPKI specification and will not increase the number of signed
ROAs in the RPKI, because ROAs already support lists of IP prefixes
[RFC6482].
1.1. Requirements
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Documentation Prefixes
The documentation prefixes recommended in [RFC5737] are insufficient
for use as example prefixes in this document. Therefore, this
document uses [RFC1918] address space for constructing example
prefixes.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], RPKI
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], RPKI-based
Prefix Validation [RFC6811], and BGPsec [RFC8205].
3. Forged-Origin Subprefix Hijack
A detailed description and discussion of forged-origin subprefix
hijacks are presented here, especially considering the case when the
subprefix is not announced in BGP. The forged-origin subprefix
hijack is relevant to a scenario in which:
(1) the RPKI [RFC6480] is deployed, and
(2) routers use RPKI origin validation to drop invalid routes
[RFC6811], but
(3) BGPsec [RFC8205] (or any similar method to validate the
truthfulness of the BGP AS_PATH attribute) is not deployed.
Note that this set of assumptions accurately describes a substantial,
and growing, number of large Internet networks at the time of
writing.
The forged-origin subprefix hijack [RFC7115] [GCHSS] is described
here using a running example.
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Consider the IP prefix 192.168.0.0/16 which is allocated to an
organization that also operates AS 64496. In BGP, AS 64496
originates the IP prefix 192.168.0.0/16 as well as its subprefix
192.168.225.0/24. Therefore, the RPKI should contain a ROA
authorizing AS 64496 to originate these two IP prefixes.
Suppose, however, the organization issues and publishes a ROA
including a maxLength value of 24:
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16-24, AS 64496)
We refer to the above as a "loose ROA" since it authorizes AS 64496
to originate any subprefix of 192.168.0.0/16 up to and including
length /24, rather than only those prefixes that are intended to be
announced in BGP.
Because AS 64496 only originates two prefixes in BGP: 192.168.0.0/16
and 192.168.225.0/24, all other prefixes authorized by the "loose
ROA" (for instance, 192.168.0.0/24), are vulnerable to the following
forged-origin subprefix hijack [RFC7115] [GCHSS]:
The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement "192.168.0.0/24: AS
64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is a neighbor of
AS 64496 and falsely claiming that AS 64496 originates the IP
prefix 192.168.0.0/24. In fact, the IP prefix 192.168.0.0/24 is
not originated by AS 64496.
The hijacker's BGP announcement is valid according to the RPKI
since the ROA (192.168.0.0/16-24, AS 64496) authorizes AS 64496 to
originate BGP routes for 192.168.0.0/24.
Because AS 64496 does not actually originate a route for
192.168.0.0/24, the hijacker's route is the *only* route to the
192.168.0.0/24. Longest-prefix-match routing ensures that the
hijacker's route to the subprefix 192.168.0.0/24 is always
preferred over the legitimate route to 192.168.0.0/16 originated
by AS 64496.
Thus, the hijacker's route propagates through the Internet, the
traffic destined for IP addresses in 192.168.0.0/24 will be delivered
to the hijacker.
The forged-origin *subprefix* hijack would have failed if a "minimal
ROA" described below was used instead of the "loose ROA". In this
example, a "minimal ROA" would be:
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16, 192.168.225.0/24, AS 64496)
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This ROA is "minimal" because it includes only those IP prefixes that
AS 64496 originates in BGP, but no other IP prefixes [RFC6907].
The "minimal ROA" renders AS 64511's BGP announcement invalid,
because:
(1) this ROA "covers" the attacker's announcement (since
192.168.0.0/24 is a subprefix of 192.168.0.0/16), and
(2) there is no ROA "matching" the attacker's announcement (there
is no ROA for AS 64511 and IP prefix 192.168.0.0/24) [RFC6811].
If routers ignore invalid BGP announcements, the minimal ROA above
ensures that the subprefix hijack will fail.
Thus, if a "minimal ROA" had been used, the attacker would be forced
to launch a forged-origin *prefix* hijack in order to attract
traffic, as follows:
The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement "192.168.0.0/16: AS
64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is a neighbor of
AS 64496.
This forged-origin *prefix* hijack is significantly less damaging
than the forged-origin *subprefix* hijack:
AS 64496 legitimately originates 192.168.0.0/16 in BGP, so the
hijacker AS 64511 is not presenting the *only* route to
192.168.0.0/16.
Moreover, the path originated by AS 64511 is one hop longer than
the path originated by the legitimate origin AS 64496.
As discussed in [LSG16], this means that the hijacker will attract
less traffic than he would have in the forged-origin *subprefix*
hijack, where the hijacker presents the *only* route to the hijacked
subprefix.
In summary, a forged-origin subprefix hijack has the same impact as a
regular subprefix hijack, despite the increased AS_PATH length of the
illegitimate route. A forged-origin *subprefix* hijack is also more
damaging than forged-origin *prefix* hijack.
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4. Measurements of the RPKI
Network measurements taken in June 2017 showed that 12% of the IP
prefixes authorized in ROAs have a maxLength longer than their prefix
length. Of these, the vast majority (84%) were non-minimal, as they
included subprefixes that are not announced in BGP by the legitimate
AS, and were thus vulnerable to forged origin subprefix hijacks. See
[GSG17] for details.
These measurements suggest that operators commonly misconfigure the
maxLength attribute, and unwittingly open themselves up to forged-
origin subprefix hijacks. That is, they are exposing a much larger
attack surface for forged-origin hijacks than necessary.
5. Recommendations about Minimal ROAs and maxLength
Operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" whenever possible. A minimal ROA
contains only those IP prefixes that are actually originated by an AS
in BGP and no other IP prefixes. (See Section 3 for an example.)
In general, except in some special cases, operators SHOULD avoid
using the maxLength attribute in their ROAs, since its inclusion will
usually make the ROA non-minimal.
One such exception may be when all more specific prefixes permitted
by the maxLength are actually announced by the AS in the ROA.
Another exception is where: (a) the maxLength is substantially larger
compared to the specified prefix length in the ROA, and (b) a large
number of more specific prefixes in that range are announced by the
AS in the ROA. This case should occur rarely in practice (if at
all). Operator discretion is necessary in this case.
This practice requires no changes to the RPKI specification and need
not increase the number of signed ROAs in the RPKI, because ROAs
already support lists of IP prefixes [RFC6482]. See also [GSG17] for
further discussion of why this practice will have minimal impact on
the performance of the RPKI ecosystem.
Operators that have existing ROAs published in the RPKI system SHOULD
perform a review of such objects, especially where they make use of
the maxLength attribute, to ensure that the set of included prefixes
is "minimal" with respect to the current BGP origination and routing
policies, and replace the published ROAs as necessary. Such an
exercise SHOULD be repeated whenever the operator makes changes to
either policy.
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5.1. Facilitating Ad-hoc Routing Changes and DDoS Mitigation
Operational requirements may require that a route for an IP prefix be
originated on an ad-hoc basis, with little or no prior warning. An
example of such a situation arises where an operator wishes to make
use of DDoS mitigation services that use BGP to redirect traffic via
a "scrubbing center".
In order to ensure that such ad-hoc routing changes are effective,
there should exist a ROA validating the new route. However a
difficulty arises due to the fact that newly created objects in the
RPKI are made visible to relying parties considerably more slowly
than routing updates in BGP.
Ideally, it would not be necessary to pre-create the ROA which
validates the ad-hoc route, and instead create it "on-the-fly" as
required. However, this is practical only if the latency imposed by
the propagation of RPKI data is guaranteed to be within acceptable
limits in the circumstances. For time-critical interventions such as
responding to a DDoS attack, this is unlikely to be the case.
Thus, the ROA in question will usually need to be created well in
advance of the routing intervention, but such a ROA will be non-
minimal, since it includes an IP prefix that is sometimes (but not
always) originated in BGP.
In this case, the ROA SHOULD include only:
(1) the set of IP prefixes that are always originated in BGP, and
(2) the set of IP prefixes that are sometimes, but not always,
originated in BGP.
The ROA SHOULD NOT include any IP prefixes that the operator knows
will not be originated in BGP. In general, the ROA SHOULD NOT make
use of the maxLength attribute unless doing so has no impact on the
set of included prefixes.
The running example is now extended to illustrate one situation where
it is not possible to issue a minimal ROA.
Consider the following scenario prior to deployment of RPKI. Suppose
AS 64496 announced 192.168.0.0/16 and has a contract with a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation service provider that
holds AS 64500. Further, assume that the DDoS mitigation service
contract applies to all IP addresses covered by 192.168.0.0/22. When
a DDoS attack is detected and reported by AS 64496, AS 64500
immediately originates 192.168.0.0/22, thus attracting all the DDoS
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traffic to itself. The traffic is scrubbed at AS 64500 and then sent
back to AS 64496 over a backhaul data link. Notice that, during a
DDoS attack, the DDoS mitigation service provider AS 64500 originates
a /22 prefix that is longer than AS 64496's /16 prefix, and so all
the traffic (destined to addresses in 192.168.0.0/22) that normally
goes to AS 64496 goes to AS 64500 instead. In some deployments, the
origination of the /22 route is performed by AS 64496 and announced
only to AS 64500, which then announces transit for that prefix. This
variation does not change the properties considered here.
First, suppose the RPKI only had the minimal ROA for AS 64496, as
described in Section 3. But if there is no ROA authorizing AS 64500
to announce the /22 prefix, then the DDoS mitigation (and traffic
scrubbing) scheme would not work. That is, if AS 64500 originates
the /22 prefix in BGP during DDoS attacks, the announcement would be
invalid [RFC6811].
Therefore, the RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one
for AS 64500.
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16, 192.168.225.0/24, AS 64496)
ROA:(192.168.0.0/22, AS 64500)
Neither ROA uses the maxLength attribute. But the second ROA is not
"minimal" because it contains a /22 prefix that is not originated by
anyone in BGP during normal operations. The /22 prefix is only
originated by AS 64500 as part of its DDoS mitigation service during
a DDoS attack.
Notice, however, that this scheme does not come without risks.
Namely, all IP addresses in 192.168.0.0/22 are vulnerable to a
forged-origin subprefix hijack during normal operations, when the /22
prefix is not originated. (The hijacker AS 64511 would send the BGP
announcement "192.168.0.0/22: AS 64511, AS 64500", falsely claiming
that AS 64511 is a neighbor of AS 64500 and falsely claiming that AS
64500 originates 192.168.0.0/22.)
In some situations, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 might
want to limit the amount of DDoS traffic that it attracts and scrubs.
Suppose that a DDoS attack only targets IP addresses in
192.168.0.0/24. Then, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 only
wants to attract the traffic designated for the /24 prefix that is
under attack, but not the entire /22 prefix. To allow for this, the
RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one for AS 64500.
ROA:(192.168.0.0/16, 192.168.225.0/24, AS 64496)
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ROA:(192.168.0.0/22-24, AS 64500)
The second ROA uses the maxLength attribute because it is designed to
explicitly enable AS 64500 to originate *any* /24 subprefix of
192.168.0.0/22.
As before, the second ROA is not "minimal" because it contains
prefixes that are not originated by anyone in BGP during normal
operations. As before, all IP addresses in 192.168.0.0/22 are
vulnerable to a forged-origin subprefix hijack during normal
operations, when the /22 prefix is not originated.
The use of maxLength in this second ROA also comes with an additional
risk. While it permits the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 to
originate prefix 192.168.0.0/24 during a DDoS attack in that space,
it also makes the *other* /24 prefixes covered by the /22 prefix
(i.e., 192.168.1.0/24, 192.168.2.0/24, 192.168.3.0/24) vulnerable to
a forged-origin subprefix attacks.
5.2. Defensive de-aggregation in response to prefix hijacks
In responding to certain classes of prefix hijack, in particular the
forged-origin subprefix hijack described above, it may be desirable
for the victim to perform "defensive de-aggregation". That is: to
begin originating more-specific prefixes in order to compete with the
hijack routes for selection as best path in networks that are not
performing RPKI-based route origin validation [RFC6811].
In some topologies, where at least one AS on every path between the
victim and hijacker filters ROV invalid prefixes, it may be the case
that the existence of a minimal ROA issued by the victim prevents the
defensive more- specific prefixes being propagated to the networks
topologically close to the attacker, thus hampering the effectiveness
of this response.
Nevertheless, this document recommends that where possible, network
operators publish minimal ROAs even in the face of this risk. This
is because:
* Minimal ROAs offer the best possible protection against the
immediate impact of such an attack, rendering the need for such a
response less likely;
* Increasing ROV adoption by network operators will, over time,
decrease the size of the neighborhoods in which this risk exists;
and
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* Other methods for reducing the size of such neighborhoods are
available to potential victims, such as establishing direct eBGP
adjacencies with networks from whom the defensive routes would
otherwise be hidden.
6. Considerations for RTBH Filtering Scenarios
Considerations related to ROAs and origin validation [RFC6811] for
the case of destination-based Remote Triggered Black Hole (RTBH)
filtering are addressed here. In RTBH filtering, highly specific
prefixes (greater than /24 in IPv4 and greater than /48 in IPv6;
possibly even /32 (IPv4) and /128 (IPv6)) are announced in BGP.
These announcements are tagged with a BLACKHOLE Community [RFC7999].
It is obviously not desirable to use large maxLength or include any
such highly specific prefixes in the ROAs to accommodate destination-
based RTBH filtering, for the reasons set out above.
As a result, RPKI based route origin validation [RFC6811] is a poor
fit for the validation of RTBH routes. Specification of new
procedures to address this use case through the use of the RPKI is
outside the scope of this document.
Therefore:
* Operators SHOULD NOT create non-minimal ROAs (either by creating
additional ROAs, or through the use of maxLength) for the purpose
of advertising RTBH routes; and
* Operators providing a means for operators of neighboring
autonomous systems to advertise RTBH routes via BGP MUST NOT make
the creation of non-minimal ROAs a pre-requisite for its use.
7. Security Considerations
This document makes recommendations regarding the use of RPKI based
origin validation as defined in [RFC6811], and as such introduces no
additional security considerations beyond those set out therein.
The recommendations set out in this document, in particular those in
Section 5, involve trade-offs between operational agility and
security. Operators are encouraged to carefully review the issues
highlighted in light of their specific operational requirements.
Failure to do so could, in the worst case, result in a self-inflicted
denial of service.
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8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the following people for their review
and contributions to this document: Omar Sagga and Aris Lambrianidis.
Thanks are also due to Matthias Waehlisch, Ties de Kock, and Amreesh
Phokeer for comments and suggestions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.
J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918,
February 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
9.2. Informative References
[GSG17] Gilad, Y., Sagga, O., and S. Goldberg, "Maxlength
Considered Harmful to the RPKI", in ACM CoNEXT 2017,
December 2017, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1015.pdf>.
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[LSG16] Lychev, R., Shapira, M., and S. Goldberg, "Rethinking
Security for Internet Routing", in Communications of the
ACM, October 2016, <http://cacm.acm.org/
magazines/2016/10/207763-rethinking-security-for-internet-
routing/>.
[GCHSS] Gilad, Y., Cohen, A., Herzberg, A., Schapira, M., and H.
Shulman, "Are We There Yet? On RPKI's Deployment and
Security", in NDSS 2017, February 2017,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1010.pdf>.
[HARMFUL] Gilad, Y., Sagga, O., and S. Goldberg, "MaxLength
Considered Harmful to the RPKI", 2017,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1015.pdf>.
[NIST-800-189]
Sriram, K. and D. Montgomery, "Resilient Interdomain
Traffic Exchange: BGP Security and DDoS Mitigation", NIST
Special Publication, NIST SP 800-189, December 2019,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-189.pdf>.
[RFC5737] Arkko, J., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IPv4 Address Blocks
Reserved for Documentation", RFC 5737,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5737, January 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5737>.
[RFC6907] Manderson, T., Sriram, K., and R. White, "Use Cases and
Interpretations of Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) Objects for Issuers and Relying Parties", RFC 6907,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6907, March 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6907>.
[RFC7115] Bush, R., "Origin Validation Operation Based on the
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185,
RFC 7115, DOI 10.17487/RFC7115, January 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7115>.
[RFC7999] King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G.
Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
Gilad, et al. Expires 26 May 2022 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft RPKI maxLength November 2021
Authors' Addresses
Yossi Gilad
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Rothburg Family Buildings, Edmond J. Safra Campus
Jerusalem 9190416
Israel
Email: yossigi@cs.huji.ac.il
Sharon Goldberg
Boston University
111 Cummington St, MCS135
Boston, MA 02215
United States of America
Email: goldbe@cs.bu.edu
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America
Email: kotikalapudi.sriram@nist.gov
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com
Ben Maddison
Workonline Communications
114 West St
Johannesburg
2196
South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa
Gilad, et al. Expires 26 May 2022 [Page 14]