End-to-middle Security in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
draft-ietf-sip-e2m-sec-06

Approval announcement
Draft of message to be sent after approval:

Announcement

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@iab.org>,
    RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, 
    sip mailing list <sip@ietf.org>, 
    sip chair <sip-chairs@tools.ietf.org>
Subject: Protocol Action: 'End-to-middle Security in the Session 
         Initiation Protocol (SIP)' to Proposed Standard 

The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'End-to-middle Security in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) '
   <draft-ietf-sip-e2m-sec-06.txt> as a Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Session Initiation Protocol Working 
Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Cullen Jennings and Jon Peterson.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-sip-e2m-sec-06.txt

Ballot Text

Technical Summary:

Some services provided by intermediaries depend on their ability to
inspect a message body in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). When
sensitive information is included in the message body, a SIP User Agent
(UA) needs to protect it from other intermediaries than those that the UA
agreed to disclose it to.  This document provides a mechanism for securing
information passed between an end user and intermediaries using S/MIME. 
It also provides mechanisms for a UA to discover intermediaries which need
to inspect an S/MIME-secured message body, or to receive the message body
with data integrity.

The protection mechanism provided by this document is a straightforward
application of S/MIME to convey the message body securely to the intended
recipient. An addressing mechanism is used to indicate which intermediary
is expected to receive the message body.

Intermediary discover works either by error messages from the
intermediaries or by the use of the policy-discovery mechanism provided by
other SIP documents.



Working Group Summary:

There was not a strong initial consensus on the requirement for this
mechanism, but there was no real opposition to doing the work. Rather, it
was more a case of uncertainty as to the real-world utility. The working
group was essentially divided into two camps: those who had a strong
interest in this work, and those who didn't really care. Once the
requirements were established by RFC 4189, the design alternatives were
relatively limited and the approach taken in this document was fairly
obvious. The working group is not aware of any dissent relative to the
design choices made in this document. However, we lack significant
deployment experience with this approach and with the session-policy and
S/MIME message-body protection mechanisms upon which it is dependent, so
we consider the entire spectrum of work to be effectively "experimental"
at this time.

 
Protocol Quality
 
 David Black did GEN ART review.

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