Delegated Credentials for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-09

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
Last updated 2020-08-14 (latest revision 2020-06-26)
Replaces draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
Formats plain text pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Additional Resources
- GitHub Repository
- Mailing list discussion
Stream WG state Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead (wg milestone: Sep 2020 - Submit "Delegated Cr... )
Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC
Document shepherd Joseph Salowey
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
Network Working Group                                          R. Barnes
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track                              S. Iyengar
Expires: 28 December 2020                                       Facebook
                                                             N. Sullivan
                                                              Cloudflare
                                                             E. Rescorla
                                                                 Mozilla
                                                            26 June 2020

                     Delegated Credentials for TLS
                       draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-09

Abstract

   The organizational separation between the operator of a TLS endpoint
   and the certification authority can create limitations.  For example,
   the lifetime of certificates, how they may be used, and the
   algorithms they support are ultimately determined by the
   certification authority.  This document describes a mechanism by
   which operators may delegate their own credentials for use in TLS,
   without breaking compatibility with peers that do not support this
   specification.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts (https://github.com/tlswg/tls-
   subcerts).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

Barnes, et al.          Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft        Delegated Credentials for TLS            June 2020

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 December 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Related Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Delegated Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Client and Server Behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.1.  Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       4.1.2.  Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.3.  Validating a Delegated Credential . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Certificate Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Operational Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  Client Clock Skew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.1.  Security of Delegated Credential's Private Key  . . . . .  13
     7.2.  Re-use of Delegated Credentials in Multiple
           Contexts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.3.  Revocation of Delegated Credentials . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.4.  Interactions with Session Resumption  . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.5.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.6.  The Impact of Signature Forgery Attacks . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
Show full document text