Delegated Credentials for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-05
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Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
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2019-11-04
(latest revision 2019-11-03)
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draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts
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Proposed Standard
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Network Working Group R. Barnes
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track S. Iyengar
Expires: May 6, 2020 Facebook
N. Sullivan
Cloudflare
E. Rescorla
Mozilla
November 03, 2019
Delegated Credentials for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-05
Abstract
The organizational separation between the operator of a TLS endpoint
and the certification authority can create limitations. For example,
the lifetime of certificates, how they may be used, and the
algorithms they support are ultimately determined by the
certification authority. This document describes a mechanism by
which operators may delegate their own credentials for use in TLS,
without breaking compatibility with peers that do not support this
specification.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Barnes, et al. Expires May 6, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Delegated Credentials for TLS November 2019
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Delegated Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Client and Server behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.1. Server authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1.2. Client authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.3. Validating a Delegated Credential . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Certificate Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Security of delegated private key . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Re-use of delegated credentials in multiple contexts . . 11
5.3. Revocation of delegated credentials . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.4. Interactions with session resumption . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.5. Privacy considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Typically, a TLS server uses a certificate provided by some entity
other than the operator of the server (a "Certification Authority" or
CA) [RFC8446] [RFC5280]. This organizational separation makes the
TLS server operator dependent on the CA for some aspects of its
operations, for example:
o Whenever the server operator wants to deploy a new certificate, it
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