Delegated Credentials for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-09
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Active Internet-Draft (tls WG)
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2020-08-14
(latest revision 2020-06-26)
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draft-rescorla-tls-subcerts
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IETF
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Intended RFC status |
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Proposed Standard
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plain text
pdf
htmlized (tools)
htmlized
bibtex
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WG state
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Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead
(wg milestone:
Sep 2020 - Submit "Delegated Cr...
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Revised I-D Needed - Issue raised by WGLC
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Document shepherd |
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Joseph Salowey
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IESG state |
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I-D Exists
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Consensus Boilerplate |
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Yes
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Telechat date |
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Responsible AD |
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(None)
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Send notices to |
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Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
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Network Working Group R. Barnes
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track S. Iyengar
Expires: 28 December 2020 Facebook
N. Sullivan
Cloudflare
E. Rescorla
Mozilla
26 June 2020
Delegated Credentials for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-subcerts-09
Abstract
The organizational separation between the operator of a TLS endpoint
and the certification authority can create limitations. For example,
the lifetime of certificates, how they may be used, and the
algorithms they support are ultimately determined by the
certification authority. This document describes a mechanism by
which operators may delegate their own credentials for use in TLS,
without breaking compatibility with peers that do not support this
specification.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/tlswg/tls-subcerts (https://github.com/tlswg/tls-
subcerts).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Barnes, et al. Expires 28 December 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Delegated Credentials for TLS June 2020
This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 December 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Delegated Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Client and Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.1. Server Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.2. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.3. Validating a Delegated Credential . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2. Certificate Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Client Clock Skew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Security of Delegated Credential's Private Key . . . . . 13
7.2. Re-use of Delegated Credentials in Multiple
Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.3. Revocation of Delegated Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4. Interactions with Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.6. The Impact of Signature Forgery Attacks . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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