Token Binding over HTTP
draft-ietf-tokbind-https-03

The information below is for an old version of the document
Document Type Active Internet-Draft (tokbind WG)
Authors Andrei Popov  , Magnus Nystrom  , Dirk Balfanz  , Adam Langley  , Jeff Hodges 
Last updated 2016-03-21
Replaces draft-balfanz-https-token-binding
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Proposed Standard
Formats pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex
Reviews
Stream WG state WG Document
Document shepherd No shepherd assigned
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Internet Engineering Task Force                                 A. Popov
Internet-Draft                                               M. Nystroem
Intended status: Standards Track                         Microsoft Corp.
Expires: September 22, 2016                              D. Balfanz, Ed.
                                                              A. Langley
                                                             Google Inc.
                                                               J. Hodges
                                                                  Paypal
                                                          March 21, 2016

                        Token Binding over HTTP
                      draft-ietf-tokbind-https-03

Abstract

   This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP
   servers to cryptographically bind authentication tokens (such as
   cookies and OAuth tokens) to a TLS [RFC5246] connection.

   We describe both _first-party_ as well as _federated_ scenarios.  In
   a first-party scenario, an HTTP server issues a security token (such
   as a cookie) to a client, and expects the client to send the security
   token back to the server at a later time in order to authenticate.
   Binding the token to the TLS connection between client and server
   protects the security token from theft, and ensures that the security
   token can only be used by the client that it was issued to.

   Federated token bindings, on the other hand, allow servers to
   cryptographically bind security tokens to a TLS [RFC5246] connection
   that the client has with a _different_ server than the one issuing
   the token.

   This Internet-Draft is a companion document to The Token Binding
   Protocol [TBPROTO]

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any

Popov, et al.          Expires September 22, 2016               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Token Binding over HTTP              March 2016

   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2016.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  The Sec-Token-Binding Header  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Federation Use Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  HTTP Redirects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.5.  Federation Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.3.  Sensitivity of the Sec-Token-Binding Header . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols  . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  Scoping of Token Binding Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.2.  Life Time of Token Binding Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

Popov, et al.          Expires September 22, 2016               [Page 2]
Internet-Draft           Token Binding over HTTP              March 2016
Show full document text