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User-Defined Errors for RSVP
draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-user-error-spec-08

Yes

(David Ward)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Ron Bonica)

No Objection

(Cullen Jennings)
(Jari Arkko)
(Jon Peterson)
(Lars Eggert)
(Lisa Dusseault)
(Ross Callon)
(Russ Housley)
(Tim Polk)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 08 and is now closed.

Chris Newman Former IESG member
(was No Objection, No Record, Discuss) Yes
Yes (2008-06-26) Unknown
For AUTH48:

The new text has a number of typos, like "strngs" and "Descriprion".
David Ward Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
Yes
Yes () Unknown

                            
Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
(was Discuss) No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Jon Peterson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Lars Eggert Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Lisa Dusseault Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Pasi Eronen Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2008-05-05) Unknown
Based on Stephen Hanna's SecDir review: especially since RSVP packets 
don't usually contain ASCII strings, it might be a good idea to say in
security considerations that the received string must be processed
carefully (as it could contain e.g. control characters, printf format
strings, SQL injection, or whatever). Stephen's suggested text:

Like any other data received from a partially trusted party, the
recipient MUST carefully check the USER_ERROR_SPEC object and its
contents to make sure that it does not contain any malformed or
illegal values and will not cause any buffer overruns or other
processing errors that could cause reliability or security problems.
The Error Description should be examined especially carefully if it is
to be logged or displayed since it may eventually be processed by
other code with poor error handling. Any control characters (bytes
with values 0-31 and 127 decimal) or non-ASCII characters (128-255
decimal) MUST be removed. Other characters may need to be removed from
the string, depending on the logging system in use and the range of
characters that it can accept.  If the logging or display system has
escaping or another post-processing step that could give special
meaning to the characters in the string, protection against injection
attacks SHOULD be included in the RSVP code.

Typos:

In section 3, "Criticial" should be "Critical".
In section 4.2, "display of logging" should be "display or logging".
Ross Callon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown

                            
Tim Polk Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection () Unknown