IP Address Privacy Considerations
draft-ip-address-privacy-considerations-02
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| Authors | Matthew Finkel , Bradford Lassey , Luigi Iannone , Brad Chen | ||
| Last updated | 2021-11-09 (Latest revision 2021-07-26) | ||
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draft-ip-address-privacy-considerations-02
Network Working Group M. Finkel
Internet-Draft The Tor Project
Intended status: Informational B. Lassey
Expires: 14 May 2022 Google
L. Iannone
Huawei
J.B. Chen
Google
10 November 2021
IP Address Privacy Considerations
draft-ip-address-privacy-considerations-02
Abstract
This document provides an overview of privacy considerations related
to user IP addresses. It includes an analysis of some current use
cases for tracking of user IP addresses, mainly in the context of
anti-abuse. It discusses the privacy issues associated with such
tracking and provides input on mechanisms to improve the privacy of
this existing model. It then captures requirements for proposed
'replacement signals' for IP addresses from this analysis. In
addition, existing and under-development techniques are evaluated for
fulfilling these requirements.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the mailing list (), which
is archived at .
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ShivanKaul/draft-ip-address-privacy.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 May 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Categories of Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. IP address tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. IP address use cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Anti-abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. DDoS and Botnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.3. Multi-platform threat models . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.4. Rough Geolocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Implications of IP addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Next-User Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. Privacy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. IP Privacy Protection and Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Mitigations for IP address tracking . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Replacement signals for IP addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.1. Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1.3. Provenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.4. Applying Appropriate Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Evaluation of existing technologies . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Potential new technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
The initial intention of this draft is to capture an overview of the
problem space and research on proposed solutions concerning privacy
considerations related to user IP addresses (informally, IP privacy).
The draft is likely to evolve significantly over time and may well
split into multiple drafts as content is added.
Tracking of IP addresses is common place on the Internet today, and
is particularly widely used in the context of anti-abuse, e.g. anti-
fraud, DDoS management, and child protection activities. IP
addresses are currently used in determining "reputation" [RFC5782] in
conjunction with other signals to protect against malicious traffic,
since these addresses are usually a relatively stable identifier of a
request's origin. Servers use these reputations in determining
whether or not a given packet, connection, or flow likely corresponds
to malicious traffic. In addition, IP addresses are used in
investigating past events and attributing responsibility.
However, identifying the activity of users based on IP addresses has
clear privacy implications ([WEBTRACKING1], [WEBTRACKING2]), e.g.
user fingerprinting and cross-site identity linking. Many
technologies exist today that allow users to obfuscate their external
IP address to avoid such tracking, e.g. VPNs ([VPNCMP1], [VPNCMP2])
and Tor ([TOR], [VPNTOR]). Several new technologies are emerging, as
well, in the landscape, e.g. Apple iCloud Private Relay [APPLEPRIV],
Gnatcatcher [GNATCATCHER], and Oblivious technologies (ODoH
[I-D.pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh], OHTTP [I-D.thomson-ohai-ohttp]).
General consideration about privacy for Internet protocols can be
found in [RFC6973]. This document builds upon [RFC6973] and more
specifically attempts to capture the following aspects of the tension
between valid use cases for user identification and the related
privacy concerns, including:
* An analysis of the current use cases, attempting to categorize/
group such use cases where commonalities exist.
* Find ways to enhance the privacy of existing uses of IP addresses.
* Generating requirements for proposed 'replacement signals' from
this analysis (these could be different for each category/group of
use cases).
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* Research to evaluate existing technologies or propose new
mechanisms for such signals.
With the goal of replacing IP addresses as a fundemental signal, the
following sections enumerate existing use cases and describe
applicable substitution signals. This description may not be
exhaustive due to the breadth of IP address usage.
2. Terminology
(Work in progress)
This section defines basic terms used in this document, with
references to pre-existing definitions as appropriate. As in
[RFC4949] and [RFC6973], each entry is preceded by a dollar sign ($)
and a space for automated searching.
* $ Identity: Extending [RFC6973], an individual's attributes may
only identify an individual up to an anonymity set within a given
context.
* $ Reputation: A random variable with some distribution. A
reputation can either be "bad" or "good" with some probability
according to the distribution.
* $ Reputation context: The context in which a given reputation
applies.
* $ Reputation proof: A non-interactive zero knowledge proof of a
reputation signal.
* $ Reputation signal: A representative of a reputation.
* $ Service provider: An entity that provides a service on the
Internet; examples services include hosted e-mail, e-commerce
sites, and cloud computing platforms.
2.1. Categories of Interaction
Interactions between parties on the Internet may be classified into
one (or more) of three categories:
* $ Private Interaction: An interaction occuring between mutually
consenting parties, with a mutual expectation of privacy.
* $ Public Interaction: An interaction occuring between multiple
parties that are not engaged in a Private Interaction.
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* $ Consumption: An interaction where one party primarily receives
information from other parties.
3. IP address tracking
3.1. IP address use cases
3.1.1. Anti-abuse
IP addresses are a passive identifier used in defensive operations.
They allow correlating requests, attribution, and recognizing
numerous attacks, including:
* account takeover
* advertising fraud (e.g., click-fraud)
* disinformation operations (e.g., detecting scaled and/or
coordinated attacks)
* financial fraud (e.g., stolen credit cards, email account
compromise)
* malware/ransomware (e.g., detecting C2 connections)
* phishing
* real-world harm (e.g., child abuse)
* scraping (e.g., e-commerce, search)
* spam (e.g., email, comments)
* vulnerability exploitation (e.g., "hacking")
Malicious activity recognized by one service provider may be shared
with other services [RFC5782] as a way of limiting harm.
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3.1.2. DDoS and Botnets
Cyber-attackers can leverage the good reputation of an IP address to
carry out specific attacks that wouldn't work otherwise. Main
examples are Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks carried out
by spoofing a trusted (i.e., having good reputation) IP address
(which may or may not be the victim of the attack) so that the
servers used to generate the DDoS traffic actually respond to the
attackers trigger (i.e., spoofed packets). Similarly botnets may use
spoofed addresses in order to gain access and attack services that
otherwise would not be reachable.
3.1.3. Multi-platform threat models
As siloed (single-platform) abuse defenses improve, abusers have
moved to multi-platform threat models. For example, a public
discussion platform with a culture of anonymity may redirect traffic
to YouTube as a video library, bypassing YouTube defenses that
otherwise reduce exposure of potentially harmful content. Similarly,
a minor could be solicited by an adult impersonating a child on a
popular social media platform, then redirected to a smaller, less
established and less defended platform where illegal activity could
occur. Phishing attacks are also common. There are many such cross-
platform abuse models and they cause significant public harm. IP
addresses are commonly used to investigate, understand and
communicate these cross-platform threats. There are very few
alternatives for cross-platform signals.
3.1.4. Rough Geolocation
A rough geolocation can be inferred from a client's IP address, which
is commonly known as either IP-Geo or Geo-IP. This information can
have several useful implications. When abuse extends beyond attacks
in the digital space, IP addresses may help identify the physical
location of real-world harm, such as child exploitation.
3.1.4.1. Legal compliance
Legal and regulatory compliance often needs to take the jurisdiction
of the client into account. This is especially important in cases
where regulations are mutually contradictory (i.e. there is no way to
be in legal compliance universally). Because Geo-IP is often bound
to the IP addresses a given ISP uses, and ISPs tend to operate within
national borders, Geo-IP tends to be a good fit for server operators
to comply with local laws and regulations
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3.1.4.2. Contractual obligations
Similar to legal compliance, some content and media has licensing
terms that are valid only for certain locations. The rough
geolocation derived from IP addresses allow this content to be hosted
on the web.
3.1.4.3. Locally relevant content
Rough geolocation can also be useful to tailor content to the
client's location simply to improve their experience. A search for
"coffee shop" can include results of coffee shops within reasonable
travel distance from a user rather than generic information about
coffee shops, a merchant's website could show brick and mortar stores
near the user and a news site can surface locally relevant news
stories that wouldn't be as interesting to visitors from other
locations.
3.2. Implications of IP addresses
3.2.1. Next-User Implications
When an attacker uses IP addresses with "good" reputations, the
collateral damage poses a serious risk to legitimate service
providers, developers, and end users. IP addresses may become
assocaited with a "bad" reputation from temporal abuse, and
legitimate users may be affected by blocklists as a result. This
unintended impact may hurt the reputation of a service or an end user
[RFC6269].
3.2.2. Privacy Implications
IP addresses are sent in the clear throughout the packet journey over
the Internet. As such, any observer along the path can pick it up
and use it for various tracking purposes. Beside basic information
about the network or the device, it is possible to associate an IP
address to an end user, hence, the relevance of IP addresses for user
privacy. A very short list of information about user, device, and
network that can be obtained via the IP address.
* Determine who owns and operates the network. Searching the WHOIS
database using an IP address can provide a range of information
about the organization to which the address is assigned, including
a name, phone number, and civic address;
* Through a reverse DNS lookup and/or traceroute the computer name
can be obtained, which often contains clues to logical and
physical location;
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* Geo-localisation of the device (hence the user) through various
techniques [GEOIP]. Depending on the lookup tool used, this could
include country, region/state, city, latitude/longitude, telephone
area code and a location-specific map;
* Search the Internet using the IP address or computer names. The
results of these searches might reveal peer-to-peer (P2P)
activities (e.g., file sharing), records in web server log files,
or glimpses of the individual's web activities (e.g., Wikipedia
edits). These bits of individuals' online history may reveal
their political inclinations, state of health, sexuality,
religious sentiments and a range of other personal
characteristics, preoccupations and individual interests;
* Seek information on any e-mail addresses used from a particular IP
address which, in turn, could be the subject of further requests
for subscriber information.
3.3. IP Privacy Protection and Law
This section aim at providing some basic information about main
example of laws adopted worldwide and related to IP address privacy
(usually these laws area by product of the broader user privacy
protection).
Possible content (to focus only on technical IP address related
aspects):
* GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) - EUROPE: Europe
considers IP addresses as personal identification information that
should be treated like any other personal information e.g. social
security number.
* The United States has opted for a different approach to data
protection. Instead of formulating one all-encompassing
regulation such as the EU's GDPR, the US chose to implement
sector-specific privacy and data protection regulations that work
together with state laws to safeguard American citizens' data.
* In 2020, China released the first draft of Personal Information
Protection Law (PIPL). The PIPL is the equivalent of European
GDPR and will have significant influence.
* Japan Protection of Personal Information (APPI) Act (recent
changes put the act close to the GDPR model).
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3.4. Mitigations for IP address tracking
The ability to track individual people by IP address has been well
understood for decades. Commercial VPNs and Tor are the most common
methods of mitigating IP address-based tracking.
* Commerical VPNs offer a layer of indirection between the user and
the destination, however if the VPN endpoint's IP address is
static then this simply substitutes one address for another. In
addition, commerial VPNs replace tracking across sites with a
single company that may track their users' activities.
* Tor is another mitigation option due to its dynamic path selection
and distributed network of relays, however its current design
suffers from degraded performance. In addition, correct
application integration is difficult and not common.
* Address anonymization (e.g. [GNATCATCHER] and similar):
- [GNATCATCHER] is a single-hop proxy system providing more
protection against third-party tracking than a traditional
commercial VPN. However, its design maintains the industry-
standard reliance on IP addresses for anti-abuse purposes and
it provides near backwards compatibility for select services
that submit to periodic audits.
- [APPLEPRIV] iCloud Private Relay is described as using two
proxies between the client and server, and it would provide a
level of protection somewhere between a commercial VPN and Tor.
* Recent interest has resulted in new protocols such as Oblivious
DNS (ODoH ({{I-D.pauly-oblivious-doh-02.html}})) and Oblivious
HTTP (OHTTP ({{I-D.thomson-http-oblivious}})). While they both
prevent tracking by individual parties, they are not intended for
the general-purpose web browsing use case.
* Temporary addresses
4. Replacement signals for IP addresses
Fundamentally, the current ecosystem operates by making the immediate
peer of a connection accountable for bad traffic, rather than the
source of the traffic itself. This is problematic because in some
network architectures the peer node of the connection is simply
routing traffic for other clients, and any client's use of that node
may be only temporary. Ideally, clients could present appropriate
identification end-to-end that is separate from the IP address, and
uniquely bound to a given connection.
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4.1. Signals
There are 7 classes of signals identified in this document that may
be used in place of IP addresses. A signal's provenance is a
critical property and will be discussed in Section 4.1.3.
* $ ADDRESS_ESCROW: Provides sufficient information for
retroactively obtaining a client's IP address.
* $ IDENTITY_TRANSPARENCY: Reveals a person's identity within a
context.
* $ IS_HUMAN: Informs the recipient that, most likely, a human
recently proved their presence on the opposite end of the
connection.
* $ PEER_INTEGRITY: Provides a secure, remote attestation of
hardware and/or software state.
* $ REIDENTIFICATION: Provides a mechanism for identifying the same
user across different connections within a time period.
* $ REPUTATION: Provides the recipient with a proof of reputation
from a reputation provider.
* $ SOURCE_ASN: Reveals the ASN from which the client is connecting.
In some situations one of the above signals may be a sufficient
replacement signal in isolation, or more than one signal may be
needed in combination.
Separately, there are three signal categories that are out-of-scope
for this document but are important improvements for mitigating abuse
on platforms.
* $ publisher norms: Standard expections of publishers including
identity transparency and conflicts of interest.
* $ protocol improvements: Increasing security of existing
protocols.
* $ ecosystem improvements: Reducing reliance on less secure
systems, for example, migrating user authentication from password-
based to WebAuthn [WEBAUTHN] and relying on multiple factors
(MFA).
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4.1.1. Adoption
Adoption of replacement signals requires coordination between user
agents, service providers, and proxy services. Some user agents and
proxy services may support only a subset of these signals, while
service providers may require additional signals. A mechanism of
negotiation may be needed for communicating these requirements.
In addition, service providers should only require a signal within
the scope it will be used. In the same way that service provides
only require user authentication when the user requests access to a
non-public resource, a signal should not be pre-emptively requested
before it is needed. The categories of interaction described above
may help define scopes within a service, and they may help
communicate to the user the reasoning for requiring a signal.
4.1.2. Privacy Considerations
A signal should not be required without clear justification, service
providers should practice data minimization [RFC6973] wherever
possible. Requiring excessive signals may be more harmful to user
privacy than requiring IP address transparency. This section
provides a more details analysis of some signals.
ADDRESS_ESCROW gives service providers a time period within which
they may obtain the client's IP address, but the information-in-
escrow is not immediately available. Service providers should not
gain access to the information in secret. A service provider may
misuse the information-in-escrow for tracking and privacy-invasion
purposes.
PEER_INTEGRITY partitions users into two groups with valid and
invalid hardware/software state, at a minimum. If the signal reveals
more information, then it may allow more granular tracking of small
sets of devices.
IDENTITY_TRANSPARENCY may expose significant information about a user
to a service provider; the resulting privacy invasion may be
significantly worse than IP address transparency causes.
IS_HUMAN depends on the mechanism used for proving humanness.
REIDENTIFICATION explicitly allows a service provider to associate
requests across unlinkable connections. This signal allows for
profiling user behavior and tracking user activity without requesting
more identifying information. First-party reidentification is a use
case for this signal.
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REPUTATION partitions users into a set based on their reputation.
The privacy invasion associated with this signal is intentionally
small.
SOURCE_ASN allows for identifying request patterns originating from
an ASN without providing IP address transparency. However, ASNs are
not guaranteed to serve large populations, therefore revealing the
source ASN of a request may reveal more information about the user
than intended.
4.1.3. Provenance
Replacement signals are only useful if they are trustworthy.
XXX TODO
4.1.4. Applying Appropriate Signals
As previous discussed, IP addresses are used for various reasons;
therefore, describing a one-size-fits-all replacement signal is not
appropriate. In addition, the quality and quantity of replacement
signals needed by a service depends on the category of interaction of
its users and potential attacks on the service.
As an example, the attacks listed above in Section 3.1.1 can be
organized into six groups based on the signals that may sufficiently
replace IP addresses:
1. IS_HUMAN, REPUTATION, REIDENTIFICATION, PEER_INTEGRITY
* advertising fraud (e.g., click-fraud)
* phishing
* scraping (e.g., e-commerce, search)
* spam (e.g., email, comments)
2. IS_HUMAN, REPUTATION, REIDENTIFICATION, ecosystem improvements
* account takeover
3. IS_HUMAN, REPUTATION, SOURCE_ASN
* influence (e.g., brigading, astroturfing)
4. publisher norms, (publisher) IDENTITY_TRANSPARENCY,
PEER_INTEGRITY
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* disinformation operations (e.g., detecting scaled and/or
coordinated attacks)
5. publisher norms, (publisher) IDENTITY_TRANSPARENCY,
ADDRESS_ESCROW
* real-world harm (e.g., child abuse)
6. IDENTITY_TRANSPARENCY, protocol improvements
* financial fraud (e.g., stolen credit cards, email account
compromise)
The remaining two attack categories fall outside of the scope of this
document.
* malware/ransomware (e.g., detecting C2 connections)
* vulnerability exploitation (e.g., "hacking")
Note, IP addresses do not provide a perfect signal in their existing
usage, and the above replacement signals do not provide a better
signal in all cases.
4.2. Evaluation of existing technologies
Technologies exist that are designed to solve some of the problems
described in this document.
Privacy Pass [I-D.ietf-privacypass-protocol] is a useful building
block for solving numerous problems. Its design involves an
interaction between a client and server where, at the end, the client
is issued a set of anonymous tokens. These tokens may be redeemed at
a later time, and this redemption should not be linkable with the
initial issuance interaction. One existing use case is substituting
a CAPTCHA challenge with a token, where successfully solving a
CAPTCHA challenge results in a client being issued a set of anonymous
tokens, and these tokens may be used in the future to bypass solving
another CAPTCHA challenge. Therefore, Privacy Pass may be acceptable
as an IS_HUMAN signal by some service providers. The current token
design can't carry additional metadata like a user's reputation or an
expiration date, and the tokens are not bound to an identity. The
unlinkability property of the tokens is dependent on the
implementation of key consistency [I-D.wood-key-consistency].
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Trust Token [TRUSTTOKEN] is an extension of Privacy Pass where the
issuance and redemption functionality are provided in the browser
setting. The tokens are allowed to carry public and private metadata
as extensions.
Private Access Tokens [I-D.private-access-tokens] provide a technique
for partitioning clients based on a per-origin policy within a time
period. Its use cases include rate-limiting access to content and
geo-location. PATs could be used as a REIDENTIFICATION signal or a
replacement signal for GeoIP, depending on requirements.
4.3. Potential new technologies
5. Security Considerations
TODO
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949>.
[RFC5782] Levine, J., "DNS Blacklists and Whitelists", RFC 5782,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5782, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5782>.
[RFC6269] Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6269>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.
7.2. Informative References
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[APPLEPRIV]
"Apple iCloud Private Relay", n.d.,
<https://appleinsider.com/articles/21/06/10/how-apple-
icloud-private-relay-works>.
[GEOIP] Dan, O., Parikh, V., and B. Davison, "IP Geolocation Using
Traceroute Location Propagation and IP Range Location
Interpolation", Companion Proceedings of the Web
Conference 2021, DOI 10.1145/3442442.3451888, April 2021,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3442442.3451888>.
[GNATCATCHER]
"Global Network Address Translation Combined with Audited
and Trusted CDN or HTTP-Proxy Eliminating
Reidentification", n.d.,
<https://github.com/bslassey/ip-blindness>.
[I-D.ietf-privacypass-protocol]
Celi, S., Davidson, A., and A. Faz-Hernandez, "Privacy
Pass Protocol Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol-01, 22 February
2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
privacypass-protocol-01>.
[I-D.pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh]
Kinnear, E., McManus, P., Pauly, T., Verma, T., and C. A.
Wood, "Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-07, 2
September 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh-07>.
[I-D.private-access-tokens]
Hendrickson, S., Iyengar, J., Pauly, T., Valdez, S., and
C. A. Wood, "Private Access Tokens", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-private-access-tokens-01, 25 October
2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
private-access-tokens-01>.
[I-D.thomson-ohai-ohttp]
Thomson, M. and C. A. Wood, "Oblivious HTTP", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-thomson-ohai-ohttp-00, 25
October 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-thomson-ohai-ohttp-00>.
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[I-D.wood-key-consistency]
Davidson, A., Finkel, M., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood,
"Key Consistency and Discovery", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-wood-key-consistency-01, 19 August
2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wood-
key-consistency-01>.
[TOR] "The Tor Project", n.d., <https://www.torproject.org/>.
[TRUSTTOKEN]
"Trust Token API Explainer", n.d.,
<https://github.com/WICG/trust-token-api>.
[VPNCMP1] Osswald, L., Haeberle, M., and M. Menth, "Performance
Comparison of VPN Solutions", Universität
Tübingen article, DOI 10.15496/PUBLIKATION-41810, May
2020, <https://doi.org/10.15496/PUBLIKATION-41810>.
[VPNCMP2] Khanvilkar, S. and A. Khokhar, "Virtual private networks:
an overview with performance evaluation", IEEE
Communications Magazine Vol. 42, pp. 146-154,
DOI 10.1109/mcom.2004.1341273, October 2004,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/mcom.2004.1341273>.
[VPNTOR] Ramadhani, E., "Anonymity communication VPN and Tor: A
comparative study", n.d., <Journal of Physics Conference
Series>.
[WEBAUTHN] "Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key
Credentials Level 2", n.d.,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/>.
[WEBTRACKING1]
Bujlow, T., Carela-Espanol, V., Lee, B., and P. Barlet-
Ros, "A Survey on Web Tracking: Mechanisms, Implications,
and Defenses", Proceedings of the IEEE Vol. 105, pp.
1476-1510, DOI 10.1109/jproc.2016.2637878, August 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2016.2637878>.
[WEBTRACKING2]
Mishra, V., Laperdrix, P., Vastel, A., Rudametkin, W.,
Rouvoy, R., and M. Lopatka, "Don’t Count Me Out: On the
Relevance of IP Address in the Tracking Ecosystem",
Proceedings of The Web Conference 2020,
DOI 10.1145/3366423.3380161, April 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3366423.3380161>.
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Acknowledgments
TODO
Authors' Addresses
Matthew Finkel
The Tor Project
Email: sysrqb@torproject.org
Bradford Lassey
Google
Email: lassey@chromium.org
Luigi Iannone
Huawei Technologies France S.A.S.U
Email: luigi.iannone@huawei.com
J. Bradley Chen
Google
Email: bradchen@google.com
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