The BBS Signature Scheme
draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-02
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| Authors | Tobias Looker , Vasilis Kalos , Andrew Whitehead , Mike Lodder | ||
| Last updated | 2023-03-11 | ||
| Replaces | draft-looker-cfrg-bbs-signatures | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) | ||
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draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-02
CFRG T. Looker
Internet-Draft V. Kalos
Intended status: Informational MATTR
Expires: 12 September 2023 A. Whitehead
Portage
M. Lodder
CryptID
11 March 2023
The BBS Signature Scheme
draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-02
Abstract
BBS is a digital signature scheme categorized as a form of short
group signature that supports several unique properties. Notably,
the scheme supports signing multiple messages whilst producing a
single output digital signature. Through this capability, the
possessor of a signature is able to generate proofs that selectively
disclose subsets of the originally signed set of messages, whilst
preserving the verifiable authenticity and integrity of the messages.
Furthermore, these proofs are said to be zero-knowledge in nature as
they do not reveal the underlying signature; instead, what they
reveal is a proof of knowledge of the undisclosed signature.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/decentralized-identity/bbs-signature.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 September 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. Organization of this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Scheme Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.1. Subgroup Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.4. Serializing to octet strings . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3. Key Generation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.1. KeyGen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.2. SkToPk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4. Core Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.1. Sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4.2. Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4.3. ProofGen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4.4. ProofVerify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Utility Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1. Random scalars computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2. Generator point computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3. MapMessageToScalar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3.1. MapMessageToScalarAsHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4. Hash to Scalar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.5. Domain Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.6. Challenge Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.7. Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.7.1. Serialize . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
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4.7.2. SignatureToOctets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.7.3. OctetsToSignature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.7.4. ProofToOctets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.7.5. OctetsToProof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.7.6. OctetsToPublicKey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1. Validating public keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.2. Point de-serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.3. Skipping membership checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.4. Side channel attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.5. Randomness considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5.6. Presentation header selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.7. Implementing hash_to_curve_g1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.8. Choice of underlying curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.9. Security of proofs generated by ProofGen . . . . . . . . 39
5.10. Randomness requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6.1. Ciphersuite Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1.1. Ciphersuite ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1.2. Additional Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2. BLS12-381 Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.2.1. BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2.2. BLS12-381-SHA-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.1. Mocked random scalars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.2. Key Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.3. Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
7.4. BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.4.1. Map Messages to Scalars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.4.2. Message Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.4.3. Signature Fixtures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7.4.4. Proof fixtures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7.5. BLS12381-SHA-256 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.5.1. Map Messages to Scalars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.5.2. Message Generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7.5.3. Signature Fixtures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.5.4. Proof fixtures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Appendix A. BLS12-381 hash_to_curve definition using
SHAKE-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.1. BLS12-381 G1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Appendix B. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B.1. Non-correlating Security Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B.2. Improved Bearer Security Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B.3. Selectively Disclosure Enabled Identity Credentials . . . 61
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Appendix C. Additional Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.1. BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 Ciphersuite . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.1.1. Modified Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C.1.2. Extra Unsigned Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . 62
C.1.3. Missing Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
C.1.4. Reordered Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
C.1.5. Wrong Public Key Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.1.6. Wrong Header Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.1.7. Hash to Scalar Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
C.2. BLS12-381-SHA-256 Ciphersuite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
C.2.1. Modified Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
C.2.2. Extra Unsigned Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . 65
C.2.3. Missing Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
C.2.4. Reordered Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
C.2.5. Wrong Public Key Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
C.2.6. Wrong Header Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
C.2.7. Hash to Scalar Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix D. Proof Generation and Verification Algorithmic
Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
1. Introduction
A digital signature scheme is a fundamental cryptographic primitive
that is used to provide data integrity and verifiable authenticity in
various protocols. The core premise of digital signature technology
is built upon asymmetric cryptography where-by the possessor of a
private key is able to sign a message, where anyone in possession of
the corresponding public key matching that of the private key is able
to verify the signature.
The name BBS is derived from the authors of the original academic
work of Dan Boneh, Xavier Boyen, and Hovav Shacham, where the scheme
was first described.
Beyond the core properties of a digital signature scheme, BBS
signatures provide multiple additional unique properties, three key
ones are:
*Selective Disclosure* - The scheme allows a signer to sign multiple
messages and produce a single -constant size- output signature. A
holder/prover then possessing the messages and the signature can
generate a proof whereby they can choose which messages to disclose,
while revealing no-information about the undisclosed messages. The
proof itself guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the
disclosed messages (e.g. that they were originally signed by the
signer).
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*Unlinkable Proofs* - The proofs generated by the scheme are known as
zero-knowledge, proofs-of-knowledge of the signature, meaning a
verifying party in receipt of a proof is unable to determine which
signature was used to generate the proof, removing a common source of
correlation. In general, each proof generated is indistinguishable
from random even for two proofs generated from the same signature.
*Proof of Possession* - The proofs generated by the scheme prove to a
verifier that the party who generated the proof (holder/prover) was
in possession of a signature without revealing it. The scheme also
supports binding a presentation header to the generated proof. The
presentation header can include arbitrary information such as a
cryptographic nonce, an audience/domain identifier and or time based
validity information.
Refer to the Appendix B for an elaboration on situations where these
properties are useful
Below is a basic diagram describing the main entities involved in the
scheme
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(1) sign (3) ProofGen
+----- +-----
| | | |
| | | |
| \ / | \ /
+----------+ +-----------+
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Signer |---(2)* Send signature + msgs----->| Holder/ |
| | | Prover |
| | | |
| | | |
+----------+ +-----------+
|
|
|
(4)* Send proof + disclosed msgs
|
|
\ /
+-----------+
| |
| |
| |
| Verifier |
| |
| |
| |
+-----------+
| / \
| |
| |
+-----
(5) ProofVerify
Figure 1: Basic diagram capturing the main entities involved in
using the scheme
*Note* The protocols implied by the items annotated by an asterisk
are out of scope for this specification
1.1. Terminology
The following terminology is used throughout this document:
SK The secret key for the signature scheme.
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PK The public key for the signature scheme.
L The total number of signed messages.
R The number of message indexes that are disclosed (revealed) in a
proof-of-knowledge of a signature.
U The number of message indexes that are undisclosed in a proof-of-
knowledge of a signature.
msg An input message to be signed by the signature scheme.
generator A valid point on the selected subgroup of the curve being
used that is employed to commit a value.
scalar An integer between 0 and r-1, where r is the prime order of
the selected groups, defined by each ciphersuite (see also
Notation (#notation)).
signature The digital signature output.
nonce A cryptographic nonce
presentation_header (ph) A payload generated and bound to the
context of a specific spk.
nizk A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof from the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic.
dst The domain separation tag.
I2OSP An operation that transforms a non-negative integer into an
octet string, defined in Section 4 of [RFC8017]. Note, the output
of this operation is in big-endian order.
OS2IP An operation that transforms a octet string into an non-
negative integer, defined in Section 4 of [RFC8017]. Note, the
input of this operation must be in big-endian order.
1.2. Notation
The following notation and primitives are used:
a || b Denotes the concatenation of octet strings a and b.
I \ J For sets I and J, denotes the difference of the two sets i.e.,
all the elements of I that do not appear in J, in the same order
as they were in I.
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X[a..b] Denotes a slice of the array X containing all elements from
and including the value at index a until and including the value
at index b. Note when this syntax is applied to an octet string,
each element in the array X is assumed to be a single byte.
range(a, b) For integers a and b, with a <= b, denotes the ascending
ordered list of all integers between a and b inclusive (i.e., the
integers "i" such that a <= i <= b).
length(input) Takes as input either an array or an octet string. If
the input is an array, returns the number of elements of the
array. If the input is an octet string, returns the number of
bytes of the inputted octet string.
Terms specific to pairing-friendly elliptic curves that are relevant
to this document are restated below, originally defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves]
E1, E2 elliptic curve groups defined over finite fields. This
document assumes that E1 has a more compact representation than
E2, i.e., because E1 is defined over a smaller field than E2.
G1, G2 subgroups of E1 and E2 (respectively) having prime order r.
GT a subgroup, of prime order r, of the multiplicative group of a
field extension.
e G1 x G2 -> GT: a non-degenerate bilinear map.
r The prime order of the G1 and G2 subgroups.
P1, P2 points on G1 and G2 respectively. For a pairing-friendly
curve, this document denotes operations in E1 and E2 in additive
notation, i.e., P + Q denotes point addition and x * P denotes
scalar multiplication. Operations in GT are written in
multiplicative notation, i.e., a * b is field multiplication.
Identity_G1, Identity_G2, Identity_GT The identity element for the
G1, G2, and GT subgroups respectively.
hash_to_curve_g1(ostr, dst) -> P A cryptographic hash function that
takes an arbitrary octet string as input and returns a point in
G1, using the hash_to_curve operation defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] and the inputted dst as the domain
separation tag for that operation (more specifically, the inputted
dst will become the DST parameter for the hash_to_field operation,
called by hash_to_curve).
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point_to_octets_g1(P) -> ostr, point_to_octets_g2(P) -> ostr returns
the canonical representation of the point P for the respective
subgroup as an octet string. This operation is also known as
serialization.
octets_to_point_g1(ostr) -> P, octets_to_point_g2(ostr) -> P returns
the point P for the respective subgroup corresponding to the
canonical representation ostr, or INVALID if ostr is not a valid
output of the respective point_to_octets_g* function. This
operation is also known as deserialization.
subgroup_check(P) -> VALID or INVALID returns VALID when the point P
is an element of the subgroup of order r, and INVALID otherwise.
This function can always be implemented by checking that r * P is
equal to the identity element. In some cases, faster checks may
also exist, e.g., [Bowe19].
1.3. Organization of this document
This document is organized as follows:
* Scheme Definition (#scheme-definition) defines the core operations
and parameters for the BBS signature scheme.
* Utility Operations (#utility-operations) defines utilities used by
the BBS signature scheme.
* Security Considerations (#security-considerations) describes a set
of security considerations associated to the signature scheme.
* Ciphersuites (#ciphersuites) defines the format of a ciphersuite,
alongside a concrete ciphersuite based on the BLS12-381 curve.
2. Conventions
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Scheme Definition
This section defines the BBS signature scheme, including the
parameters required to define a concrete ciphersuite.
3.1. Parameters
The schemes operations defined in this section depend on the
following parameters:
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* A pairing-friendly elliptic curve, plus associated functionality
given in Section 1.2 (#notation).
* A hash-to-curve suite as defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve],
using the aforementioned pairing-friendly curve. This defines the
hash_to_curve and expand_message operations, used by this
document.
* get_random(n): returns a random octet string with a length of n
bytes, sampled uniformly at random using a cryptographically
secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) or a pseudo random
function. See [RFC4086] for recommendations and requirements on
the generation of random numbers.
3.2. Considerations
3.2.1. Subgroup Selection
In definition of this signature scheme there are two possible
variations based upon the sub-group selection, namely where public
keys are defined in G2 and signatures in G1 OR the opposite where
public keys are defined in G1 and signatures in G2. Some pairing
cryptography based digital signature schemes such as
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-bls-signature] elect to allow for both variations,
because they optimize for different things. However, in the case of
this scheme, due to the operations involved in both signature and
proof generation being computational in-efficient when performed in
G2 and in the pursuit of simplicity, the scheme is limited to a
construction where public keys are in G2 and signatures in G1.
3.2.2. Messages
Each of the core operations of the BBS signature scheme expect the
inputted messages to be scalar values within a given range
(specifically 1 and r-1, where r is the prime order of the G1 and G2
subgroups, defined by each ciphersuite, see Notation (#notation)).
There are multiple ways to transform a message from an octet string
to a scalar value. This document defines the
MapMessageToScalarAsHash operation, which hashes an octet string to a
scalar (see MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalarashash)).
An application can use a different MapMessageToScalar operation, but
it MUST be clearly and unambiguously defined, for all parties
involved. Before using the core operations, all messages MUST be
mapped to their respective scalars using the same operation. The
defined MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalarashash) is the
RECOMMENDED way of mapping octet strings to scalar values.
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3.2.3. Generators
Throughout the operations of this signature scheme, each message that
is signed is paired with a specific generator (point in G1).
Specifically, if a generator H_1 is multiplied with msg_1 during
signing, then H_1 MUST be multiplied with msg_1 in all other
operations (signature verification, proof generation and proof
verification).
Aside from the message generators, the scheme uses two additional
generators: Q_1 and Q_2. The first (Q_1), is used for the blinding
value (s) of the signature. The second generator (Q_2), is used to
sign the signature's domain, which binds both the signature and
generated proofs to a specific context and cryptographically protects
any potential application-specific information (for example, messages
that must always be disclosed etc.).
3.2.4. Serializing to octet strings
When serializing one or more values to produce an octet string, each
element will be encoded using a specific operation determined by its
type. More concretely,
* Points in G* will be serialized using the point_to_octets_g*
implementation for a particular ciphersuite.
* Non-negative integers will be serialized using I2OSP with an
output length of 8 bytes.
* Scalars will be serialized using I2OSP with a constant output
length defined by a particular ciphersuite.
We also use strings in double quotes to represent ASCII-encoded
literals. For example "BBS" will be used to refer to the octet
string, 010000100100001001010011.
Those rules will be used explicitly on every operation. See also
Serialize (#serialize).
3.3. Key Generation Operations
3.3.1. KeyGen
This operation generates a secret key (SK) deterministically from a
secret octet string (IKM).
KeyGen uses an HKDF [RFC5869] instantiated with the hash function
hash.
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For security, IKM MUST be infeasible to guess, e.g. generated by a
trusted source of randomness.
IKM MUST be at least 32 bytes long, but it MAY be longer.
Because KeyGen is deterministic, implementations MAY choose either to
store the resulting SK or to store IKM and call KeyGen to derive SK
when necessary.
KeyGen takes an optional parameter, key_info. This parameter MAY be
used to derive multiple independent keys from the same IKM. By
default, key_info is the empty string.
SK = KeyGen(IKM, key_info)
Inputs:
- IKM (REQUIRED), a secret octet string. See requirements above.
- key_info (OPTIONAL), an octet string. if this is not supplied, it
MUST default to an empty string.
Definitions:
- HKDF-Extract is as defined in [@!RFC5869], instantiated with hash function hash.
- HKDF-Expand is as defined in [@!RFC5869], instantiated with hash function hash.
- I2OSP and OS2IP are as defined in [@!RFC8017], Section 4.
- L is the integer given by ceil((3 * ceil(log2(r))) / 16).
- INITSALT is the ASCII string "BBS-SIG-KEYGEN-SALT-".
Outputs:
- SK, a uniformly random integer such that 0 < SK < r.
Procedure:
1. salt = INITSALT
2. SK = 0
3. while SK == 0:
4. salt = hash(salt)
5. PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM || I2OSP(0, 1))
6. OKM = HKDF-Expand(PRK, key_info || I2OSP(L, 2), L)
7. SK = OS2IP(OKM) mod r
8. return SK
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*Note* This operation is the RECOMMENDED way of generating a secret
key, but its use is not required for compatibility, and
implementations MAY use a different KeyGen procedure. For security,
such an alternative MUST output a secret key that is statistically
close to uniformly random in the range 0 < SK < r.
3.3.2. SkToPk
This operation takes a secret key (SK) and outputs a corresponding
public key (PK).
PK = SkToPk(SK)
Inputs:
- SK (REQUIRED), a secret integer such that 0 < SK < r.
Outputs:
- PK, a public key encoded as an octet string.
Procedure:
1. W = SK * P2
2. return point_to_octets_g2(W)
3.4. Core Operations
The operations of this section make use of functions and sub-routines
defined in Utility Operations (#utility-operations). More
specifically,
* hash_to_scalar is defined in Section 4.3 (#hash-to-scalar)
* calculate_domain and calculate_challenge are defined in
Section 4.4 (#domain-calculation) and Section 4.5 (#challenge-
calculation) correspondingly.
* serialize, signature_to_octets, octets_to_signature,
proof_to_octets, octets_to_proof and octets_to_pubkey are defined
in Section 4.6 (#serialization)
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The following operations also make use of the create_generators
operation defined in Section 4.1 (#generator-point-computation), to
create generator points on G1 (see Messages and Generators
(#messages-and-generators)). Note that the values of those points
depends only on a cipheruite defined seed. As a result, the output
of that operation can be cached to avoid unnecessary calls to the
create_generators procedure. See Section 4.1 (#generator-point-
computation) for more details.
3.4.1. Sign
This operation computes a deterministic signature from a secret key
(SK) and optionally over a header and or a vector of messages (as
scalar values, see Messages (#messages)).
signature = Sign(SK, PK, header, messages)
Inputs:
- SK (REQUIRED), a non negative integer mod r outputted by the KeyGen
operation.
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation provided the above SK as input.
- header (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing context and application
specific information. If not supplied, it defaults
to an empty string.
- messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied, it defaults
to the empty array "()".
Parameters:
- P1, fixed point of G1, defined by the ciphersuite.
- expand_message, the expand_message operation defined by the suite
specified by the hash_to_curve_suite parameter.
- octet_scalar_length, non-negative integer. The length of a scalar
octet representation, defined by the ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- L, is the non-negative integer representing the number of messages to
be signed.
- expand_dst, an octet string representing the domain separation tag:
utf8(ciphersuite_id || "SIG_DET_DST_"), where
ciphersuite_id is defined by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- signature, a signature encoded as an octet string.
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Deserialization:
1. L = length(messages)
2. (msg_1, ..., msg_L) = messages
Procedure:
1. (Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L) = create_generators(L+2)
2. domain = calculate_domain(PK, Q_1, Q_2, (H_1, ..., H_L), header)
3. if domain is INVALID, return INVALID
4. e_s_octs = serialize((SK, domain, msg_1, ..., msg_L))
5. if e_s_octs is INVALID, return INVALID
6. e_s_len = octet_scalar_length * 2
7. e_s_expand = expand_message(e_s_octs, expand_dst, e_s_len)
8. if e_s_expand is INVALID, return INVALID
9. e = hash_to_scalar(e_s_expand[0..(octet_scalar_length - 1)])
10. s = hash_to_scalar(e_s_expand[octet_scalar_length..(e_s_len - 1)])
11. if e or s is INVALID, return INVALID
12. B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
13. A = B * (1 / (SK + e))
14. return signature_to_octets(A, e, s)
*Note* When computing step 12 of the above procedure there is an
extremely small probability (around 2^(-r)) that the condition (SK +
e) = 0 mod r will be met. How implementations evaluate the inverse
of the scalar value 0 may vary, with some returning an error and
others returning 0 as a result. If the returned value from the
inverse operation 1/(SK + e) does evaluate to 0 the value of A will
equal Identity_G1 thus an invalid signature. Implementations MAY
elect to check (SK + e) = 0 mod r prior to step 9, and or A !=
Identity_G1 after step 9 to prevent the production of invalid
signatures.
3.4.2. Verify
This operation checks that a signature is valid for a given header
and vector of messages against a supplied public key (PK). The
messages MUST be supplied in this operation in the same order they
were supplied to Sign (#sign) when creating the signature.
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result = Verify(PK, signature, header, messages)
Inputs:
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation.
- signature (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the
Sign operation.
- header (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing context and application
specific information. If not supplied, it defaults
to an empty string.
- messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied, it defaults
to the empty array "()".
Parameters:
- P1, fixed point of G1, defined by the ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- L, is the non-negative integer representing the number of messages to
be signed.
Outputs:
- result, either VALID or INVALID.
Deserialization:
1. signature_result = octets_to_signature(signature)
2. if signature_result is INVALID, return INVALID
3. (A, e, s) = signature_result
4. W = octets_to_pubkey(PK)
5. if W is INVALID, return INVALID
6. L = length(messages)
7. (msg_1, ..., msg_L) = messages
Procedure:
1. (Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L) = create_generators(L+2)
2. domain = calculate_domain(PK, Q_1, Q_2, (H_1, ..., H_L), header)
3. if domain is INVALID, return INVALID
4. B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
5. if e(A, W + P2 * e) * e(B, -P2) != Identity_GT, return INVALID
6. return VALID
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3.4.3. ProofGen
This operation computes a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of a
signature, while optionally selectively disclosing from the original
set of signed messages. The "prover" may also supply a presentation
header, see Presentation header selection (#presentation-header-
selection) for more details.
The messages supplied in this operation MUST be in the same order as
when supplied to Sign (#sign). To specify which of those messages
will be disclosed, the prover can supply the list of indexes
(disclosed_indexes) that the disclosed messages have in the array of
signed messages. Each element in disclosed_indexes MUST be a non-
negative integer, in the range from 1 to length(messages).
The operation calculates multiple random scalars using the
calculate_random_scalars utility operation defined in Section 4.1
(#random-scalars-computation). See also Section 5.10 (#randomness-
requirements) for considerations and requirements on random scalars
generation.
To allow for flexibility in implementations, although ProofGen
defines a specific value for expand_len, applications may use any
value larger than ceil((ceil(log2(r))+k)/8) (for example, for the
BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 and BLS12-381-SHA-256 ciphersuites, an
implementation can elect to use a value of 64, instead of 48, as to
allow for certain optimizations).
proof = ProofGen(PK, signature, header, ph, messages, disclosed_indexes)
Inputs:
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation.
- signature (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the
Sign operation.
- header (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing context and application
specific information. If not supplied, it defaults
to an empty string.
- ph (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing the presentation header. If not
supplied, it defaults to an empty string.
- messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied, it defaults
to the empty array "()".
- disclosed_indexes (OPTIONAL), vector of unsigned integers in ascending
order. Indexes of disclosed messages. If
not supplied, it defaults to the empty
array "()".
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Parameters:
- P1, fixed point of G1, defined by the ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- L, is the non-negative integer representing the number of messages.
- R, is the non-negative integer representing the number of disclosed
(revealed) messages.
- U, is the non-negative integer representing the number of undisclosed
messages, i.e., U = L - R.
Outputs:
- proof, an octet string; or INVALID.
Deserialization:
1. signature_result = octets_to_signature(signature)
2. if signature_result is INVALID, return INVALID
3. (A, e, s) = signature_result
4. L = length(messages)
5. R = length(disclosed_indexes)
6. U = L - R
7. (i1, ..., iR) = disclosed_indexes
8. (j1, ..., jU) = range(1, L) \ disclosed_indexes
9. (msg_1, ..., msg_L) = messages
10. (msg_i1, ..., msg_iR) = (messages[i1], ..., messages[iR])
11. (msg_j1, ..., msg_jU) = (messages[j1], ..., messages[jU])
Procedure:
1. (Q_1, Q_2, MsgGenerators) = create_generators(L+2)
2. (H_1, ..., H_L) = MsgGenerators
3. (H_j1, ..., H_jU) = (MsgGenerators[j1], ..., MsgGenerators[jU])
4. domain = calculate_domain(PK, Q_1, Q_2, (H_1, ..., H_L), header)
5. if domain is INVALID, return INVALID
6. random_scalars = calculate_random_scalars(6+U)
7. (r1, r2, e~, r2~, r3~, s~, m~_j1, ..., m~_jU) = random_scalars
8. B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
9. r3 = r1 ^ -1 mod r
10. A' = A * r1
11. Abar = A' * (-e) + B * r1
12. D = B * r1 + Q_1 * r2
13. s' = r2 * r3 + s mod r
14. C1 = A' * e~ + Q_1 * r2~
15. C2 = D * (-r3~) + Q_1 * s~ + H_j1 * m~_j1 + ... + H_jU * m~_jU
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16. c = calculate_challenge(A', Abar, D, C1, C2, (i1, ..., iR),
(msg_i1, ..., msg_iR), domain, ph)
17. if c is INVALID, return INVALID
18. e^ = c * e + e~ mod r
19. r2^ = c * r2 + r2~ mod r
20. r3^ = c * r3 + r3~ mod r
21. s^ = c * s' + s~ mod r
22. for j in (j1, ..., jU): m^_j = c * msg_j + m~_j mod r
23. proof = (A', Abar, D, c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, (m^_j1, ..., m^_jU))
24. return proof_to_octets(proof)
3.4.4. ProofVerify
This operation checks that a proof is valid for a header, vector of
disclosed messages (along side their index corresponding to their
original position when signed) and presentation header against a
public key (PK).
The operation accepts the list of messages the prover indicated to be
disclosed. Those messages MUST be in the same order as when supplied
to Sign (#sign) (as a subset of the signed messages list). The
operation also requires the total number of signed messages (L).
Lastly, it also accepts the indexes that the disclosed messages had
in the original array of messages supplied to Sign (#sign) (i.e., the
disclosed_indexes list supplied to ProofGen (#proofgen)). Every
element in this list MUST be a non-negative integer in the range from
1 to L, in ascending order.
result = ProofVerify(PK, proof, header, ph,
disclosed_messages,
disclosed_indexes)
Inputs:
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation.
- proof (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the
ProofGen operation.
- header (OPTIONAL), an optional octet string containing context and
application specific information. If not supplied,
it defaults to an empty string.
- ph (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing the presentation header. If not
supplied, it defaults to an empty string.
- disclosed_messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied,
it defaults to the empty array "()".
- disclosed_indexes (OPTIONAL), vector of unsigned integers in ascending
order. Indexes of disclosed messages. If
not supplied, it defaults to the empty
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array "()".
Parameters:
- P1, fixed point of G1, defined by the ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- R, is the non-negative integer representing the number of disclosed
(revealed) messages.
- U, is the non-negative integer representing the number of undisclosed
messages.
- L, is the non-negative integer representing the number of total,
messages i.e., L = U + R.
Outputs:
- result, either VALID or INVALID.
Deserialization:
1. proof_result = octets_to_proof(proof)
2. if proof_result is INVALID, return INVALID
3. (A', Abar, D, c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, commitments) = proof_result
4. W = octets_to_pubkey(PK)
5. if W is INVALID, return INVALID
6. U = length(commitments)
7. R = length(disclosed_indexes)
8. L = R + U
9. (i1, ..., iR) = disclosed_indexes
10. (j1, ..., jU) = range(1, L) \ disclosed_indexes
11. (msg_i1, ..., msg_iR) = disclosed_messages
12. (m^_j1, ...., m^_jU) = commitments
Preconditions:
1. for i in (i1, ..., iR), if i < 1 or i > L, return INVALID
2. if length(disclosed_messages) != R, return INVALID
Procedure:
1. (Q_1, Q_2, MsgGenerators) = create_generators(L+2)
2. (H_1, ..., H_L) = MsgGenerators
3. (H_i1, ..., H_iR) = (MsgGenerators[i1], ..., MsgGenerators[iR])
4. (H_j1, ..., H_jU) = (MsgGenerators[j1], ..., MsgGenerators[jU])
5. domain = calculate_domain(PK, Q_1, Q_2, (H_1, ..., H_L), header)
6. if domain is INVALID, return INVALID
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7. C1 = (Abar - D) * c + A' * e^ + Q_1 * r2^
8. T = P1 + Q_2 * domain + H_i1 * msg_i1 + ... + H_iR * msg_iR
9. C2 = T * c - D * r3^ + Q_1 * s^ + H_j1 * m^_j1 + ... + H_jU * m^_jU
10. cv = calculate_challenge(A', Abar, D, C1, C2, (i1, ..., iR),
(msg_i1, ..., msg_iR), domain, ph)
11. if cv is INVALID, return INVALID
12. if c != cv, return INVALID
13. if A' == Identity_G1, return INVALID
14. if e(A', W) * e(Abar, -P2) != Identity_GT, return INVALID
15. return VALID
4. Utility Operations
4.1. Random scalars computation
This operation returns the requested number of pseudo-random scalars,
using the get_random operation (see Parameters (#parameters)). The
operation makes multiple calls to get_random. It is REQUIRED that
each call will be independent from each other, as to ensure
independence of the returned pseudo-random scalars.
The required length of the get_random output is defined as
expand_len. Each value returned by the get_random function is
reduced modulo the group order r. To avoid biased results when
creating the random scalars, the output of get_random MUST be at
least (ceil(log2(r))+k bytes long, where k is the targeted security
level specified by the ciphersuite (see Section 5 in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] for more details). ProofGen defines
expand_len = ceil((ceil(log2(r))+k)/8). For both the
BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 (#bls12-381-shake-256) and BLS12-381-SHA-256
(#bls12-381-sha-256) ciphersuites, log2(r) = 255 and k = 128
resulting to expand_len = 48. See Section 5.10 (#randomness-
requirements) for further security considerations and requirements
around the generated randomness.
*Note*: The security of the proof generation algorithm (ProofGen
(#proofgen)) is highly dependant on the quality of the get_random
function. Care must be taken to ensure that a cryptographically
secure pseudo-random generator is chosen, and that its outputs are
not leaked to an adversary. See also Section 5.10 (#randomness-
requirements) for more details.
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random_scalars = calculate_random_scalars(count)
Inputs:
- count (REQUIRED), non negative integer. The number of pseudo random
scalars to return.
Parameters:
- get_random, a pseudo random function with extendable output, returning
uniformly distributed pseudo random bytes.
- expand_len = ceil((ceil(log2(r))+k)/8), where r and k are defined by
the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- random_scalars, a list of pseudo random scalars,
Procedure:
1. for i in (1, ..., count):
2. r_i = OS2IP(get_random(expand_len)) mod r
3. return (r_1, r_2, ..., r_count)
4.2. Generator point computation
This operation defines how to create a set of generators that form a
part of the public parameters used by the BBS Signature scheme to
accomplish operations such as Sign (#sign), Verify (#verify),
ProofGen (#proofgen) and ProofVerify (#proofverify). It takes one
input, the number of generator points to create, which is determined
in part by the number of signed messages.
As an optimization, implementations MAY cache the result of
create_generators for a specific generator_seed (determined by the
ciphersuite) and count (which can be arbitrarily large, depending on
the application). Then, during the execution of one of the Core
Operations (#core-operations), if K generators are needed with K <=
count, the application can use the K first of the cached generators
(in place of the direct call to create_generators(K)).
*NOTE*: If the generator points are retrieved from cache, the order
in which they are retrieved MUST be the same as the order they were
originally returned by the create_generators operation.
For example, an application can save 100 generator points H_1, H_2,
..., H_100 returned from create_generators(100). Then if one of the
core operations needs 30 of them, the application instead of calling
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create_generators again, can just retrieve the 30 first generators
H_1, H_2, ..., H_30 from the cache instead, in the same order they
where originally created (starting from the first one).
The values n and v MAY also be cached in order to efficiently extend
an existing list of cached generator points.
generators = create_generators(count)
Inputs:
- count (REQUIRED), unsigned integer. Number of generators to create.
Parameters:
- hash_to_curve_suite, the hash to curve suite id defined by the
ciphersuite.
- hash_to_curve_g1, the hash_to_curve operation for the G1 subgroup,
defined by the suite specified by the
hash_to_curve_suite parameter.
- expand_message, the expand_message operation defined by the suite
specified by the hash_to_curve_suite parameter.
- generator_seed, an octet string. A seed value selected by the
ciphersuite.
- P1, fixed point of G1, defined by the ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- seed_dst, an octet string representing the domain separation tag:
ciphersuite_id || "SIG_GENERATOR_SEED_" where
ciphersuite_id is defined by the ciphersuite and
"SIG_GENERATOR_SEED_" is an ASCII string comprised of 19
bytes.
- generator_dst, an octet string representing the domain separation tag:
ciphersuite_id || "SIG_GENERATOR_DST_", where
ciphersuite_id is defined by the ciphersuite and
"SIG_GENERATOR_DST_" is an ASCII string comprised of
18 bytes.
- seed_len = ceil((ceil(log2(r)) + k)/8), where r and k are defined by
the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- generators, an array of generators.
Procedure:
1. v = expand_message(generator_seed, seed_dst, seed_len)
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2. n = 1
3. for i in range(1, count):
4. v = expand_message(v || I2OSP(n, 4), seed_dst, seed_len)
5. n = n + 1
6. generator_i = Identity_G1
7. candidate = hash_to_curve_g1(v, generator_dst)
8. if candidate in (generator_1, ..., generator_i):
9. go back to step 4
10. generator_i = candidate
11. return (generator_1, ..., generator_count)
4.3. MapMessageToScalar
There are multiple ways in which messages can be mapped to their
respective scalar values, which is their required form to be used
with the Sign (#sign), Verify (#verify), ProofGen (#proofgen) and
ProofVerify (#proofverify) operations.
4.3.1. MapMessageToScalarAsHash
This operation takes an input message and maps it to a scalar value
via a cryptographic hash function for the given curve. The operation
takes also as an optional input a domain separation tag (dst). If a
dst is not supplied, its value MUST default to the octet string
returned from ciphersuite_id || "MAP_MSG_TO_SCALAR_AS_HASH_", where
ciphersuite_id is the ASCII string representing the unique ID of the
ciphersuite "MAP_MSG_TO_SCALAR_AS_HASH_" is an ASCII string comprised
of 26 bytes.
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msg_scalar = MapMessageToScalarAsHash(msg, dst)
Inputs:
- msg (REQUIRED), an octet string.
- dst (OPTIONAL), an octet string representing a domain separation tag.
If not supplied, it default to the octet string
ciphersuite_id || "MAP_MSG_TO_SCALAR_AS_HASH_" where
ciphersuite_id is defined by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- msg_scalar, a scalar value.
Procedure:
1. if length(msg) > 2^64 - 1 or length(dst) > 255 return INVALID
2. msg_scalar = hash_to_scalar(msg, dst)
3. if msg_scalar is INVALID, return INVALID
4. return msg_scalar
4.4. Hash to Scalar
This operation describes how to hash an arbitrary octet string to n
scalar values in the multiplicative group of integers mod r (i.e.,
values in the range [1, r-1]). This procedure acts as a helper
function, used internally in various places within the operations
described in the spec. To hash a message to a scalar that would be
passed as input to the Sign (#sign), Verify (#verify), ProofGen
(#proofgen) and ProofVerify (#proofverify) functions, one must use
MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalar) instead.
This operation makes use of expand_message defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve], in a similar way used by the
hash_to_field operation of Section 5 from the same document (with the
additional checks for getting a scalar that is 0). If an implementer
wants to use hash_to_field instead, they MUST use the multiplicative
group of integers mod r (Fr), as the target group (F). Note however,
that the hash_to_curve document, makes use of hash_to_field with the
target group being the multiplicative group of integers mod p (Fp).
For this reason, we don’t directly use hash_to_field here, rather we
define a similar operation (hash_to_scalar), making direct use of the
expand_message function, that will be defined by the hash-to-curve
suite used (i.e., either expand_message_xmd or expand_message_xof).
If someone also has a hash_to_field implementation available, with
the target group been Fr, they can use this instead (adding the check
for a scalar been 0).
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The operation takes as input an octet string representing the message
to hash (msg), the number of the scalars to return (count) as well as
an optional domain separation tag (dst). If a dst is not supplied,
its value MUST default to the octet string returned from
ciphersuit_id || "H2S_", where ciphersuite_id is the octet string
representing the unique ID of the ciphersuite and "H2S_" is an ASCII
string comprised of 4 bytes.
*Note* It is possible that the hash_to_scalar procedure will return
an error, if the underlying expand_message operation aborts. See
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve], Section 5.3, for more details on the
cases that expand_message will abort (note that the input term
len_in_bytes of expand_message in the Hash-to-Curve document equals
count * expand_len in our case).
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hashed_scalar = hash_to_scalar(msg_octets, dst)
Inputs:
- msg_octets (REQUIRED), an octet string. The message to be hashed.
- dst (OPTIONAL), an octet string representing a domain separation tag.
If not supplied, it defaults to the octet string given
by ciphersuite_id || "H2S_", where ciphersuite_id is
defined by the ciphersuite.
Parameters:
- hash_to_curve_suite, the hash to curve suite id defined by the
ciphersuite.
- expand_message, the expand_message operation defined by the suite
specified by the hash_to_curve_suite parameter.
Definitions:
- expand_len = ceil((ceil(log2(r))+k)/8), where r and k are defined by
the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- hashed_scalar, a non-zero scalar mod r.
Procedure:
1. counter = 0
2. hashed_scalar = 0
3. while hashed_scalar == 0:
4. if counter > 255, return INVALID
5. msg_prime = msg_octets || I2OSP(counter, 1)
6. uniform_bytes = expand_message(msg_prime, dst, expand_len)
7. if uniform_bytes is INVALID, return INVALID
8. hashed_scalar = OS2IP(uniform_bytes) mod r
9. counter = counter + 1
10. return hashed_scalar
4.5. Domain Calculation
This operation calculates the domain value, a scalar representing the
distillation of all essential contextual information for a signature.
The same domain value must be calculated by all parties (the signer,
the prover, and the verifier) for both the signature and proofs to be
validated.
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The input to the domain value includes an octet string called the
header, chosen by the signer and meant to encode any information that
is required to be revealed by the prover (such as an expiration date,
or an identifier for the target audience). This is in contrast to
the signed message values, which may be withheld during a proof.
When a signature is calculated, the domain value is combined with a
specific generator point (Q_2, see Sign (#sign)) to protect the
integrity of the public parameters and the header.
This operation makes use of the serialize function, defined in
Section 4.6.1 (#serialize).
domain = calculate_domain(PK, Q_1, Q_2, H_Points, header)
Inputs:
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string, representing the public key of the
Signer of the form outputted by the SkToPk operation.
- (Q_1, Q_2) (REQUIRED), points of G1 (the first 2 points returned from
create_generators).
- H_Points (REQUIRED), array of points of G1.
- header (OPTIONAL), an octet string. If not supplied, it must default to
the empty octet string ("").
Parameters:
- ciphersuite_id, an octet string. The unique ID of the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- domain, a scalar value or INVALID.
Procedure:
1. L = length(H_Points)
2. if length(header) > 2^64 - 1 or L > 2^64 - 1, return INVALID
3. (H_1, ..., H_L) = H_Points
4. dom_array = (L, Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L)
5. dom_octs = serialize(dom_array) || ciphersuite_id
6. if dom_octs is INVALID, return INVALID
7. dom_input = PK || dom_octs || I2OSP(length(header), 8) || header
8. domain = hash_to_scalar(dom_input)
9. if domain is INVALID, return INVALID
10. return domain
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*Note*: If the header is not supplied in calculate_domain, it
defaults to the empty octet string (""). This means that in the
concatenation step of the above procedure (step 7), 8 bytes
representing a length of 0 (i.e., 0x0000000000000000), will still
need to be appended at the end, even though a header value is not
provided.
4.6. Challenge Calculation
This operation calculates the challenge scalar value, used during
ProofGen (#proofgen) and ProofVerify (#proofverify), as part of the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic, for making the proof protocol non-interactive
(in a interactive sating, the challenge would be a random value
supplied by the verifier).
This operation makes use of the serialize function, defined in
Section 4.6.1 (#serialize).
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challenge = calculate_challenge(A', Abar, D, C1, C2, i_array,
msg_array, domain, ph)
Inputs:
- (A', Abar, D, C1, C2) (REQUIRED), points of G1, as calculated in
ProofGen.
- i_array (REQUIRED), array of non-negative integers (the indexes of
the disclosed messages).
- msg_array (REQUIRED), array of scalars (the disclosed messages).
- domain (REQUIRED), a scalar.
- ph (OPTIONAL), an octet string. If not supplied, it must default to the
empty octet string ("").
Outputs:
- challenge, a scalar or INVALID.
Procedure:
1. R = length(i_array)
2. if R > 2^64 - 1 or R != length(msg_array), return INVALID
3. if length(ph) > 2^64 - 1, return INVALID
4. (i1, ..., iR) = i_array
5. (msg_i1, ..., msg_iR) = msg_array
6. c_array = (A', Abar, D, C1, C2, R, i1, ..., iR,
msg_i1, ..., msg_iR, domain)
7. c_octs = serialize(c_array)
8. if c_octs is INVALID, return INVALID
9. c_input = c_octs || I2OSP(length(ph), 8) || ph
10. challenge = hash_to_scalar(c_input)
11. if challenge is INVALID, return INVALID
12. return challenge
*Note*: Similarly to the header value in Domain Calculation (#domain-
calculation), if the presentation header (ph) is not supplied in
calculate_challenge, 8 bytes representing a length of 0 (i.e.,
0x0000000000000000), must still be appended after the c_octs value,
during the concatenation step of the above procedure (step 9).
4.7. Serialization
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4.7.1. Serialize
This operation describes how to transform multiple elements of
different types (i.e., elements that are not already in a octet
string format) to a single octet string (see Section 3.2.3
(#serializing-to-octet-strings)). The inputted elements can be
points, scalars (see Terminology (#terminology)) or integers between
0 and 2^64-1. The resulting octet string will then either be used as
an input to a hash function (i.e., in Sign (#sign), ProofGen
(#proofgen) etc.), or to serialize a signature or proof (see
SignatureToOctets (#signaturetooctets) and ProofToOctets
(#prooftooctets)).
octets_result = serialize(input_array)
Inputs:
- input_array (REQUIRED), an array of elements to be serialized. Each
element must be either a point of G1 or G2, a
scalar, an ASCII string or an integer value
between 0 and 2^64 - 1.
Parameters:
- octet_scalar_length, non-negative integer. The length of a scalar
octet representation, defined by the ciphersuite.
- r, the prime order of the subgroups G1 and G2, defined by the
ciphersuite.
- point_to_octets_g*, operations that serialize a point of G1 or G2 to
an octet string of fixed length, defined by the
ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- octets_result, a scalar value or INVALID.
Procedure:
1. let octets_result be an empty octet string.
2. for el in input_array:
3. if el is a point of G1: el_octs = point_to_octets_g1(el)
4. else if el is a point of G2: el_octs = point_to_octets_g2(el)
5. else if el is a scalar: el_octs = I2OSP(el, octet_scalar_length)
6. else if el is an integer between 0 and 2^64 - 1:
7. el_octs = I2OSP(el, 8)
8. else: return INVALID
9. octets_result = octets_result || el_octs
10. return octets_result
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4.7.2. SignatureToOctets
This operation describes how to encode a signature to an octet
string.
_Note_ this operation deliberately does not perform the relevant
checks on the inputs A, e and s because its assumed these are done
prior to its invocation, e.g as is the case with the Sign (#sign)
operation.
signature_octets = signature_to_octets(signature)
Inputs:
- signature (REQUIRED), a valid signature, in the form (A, e, s), where
A a point in G1 and e, s non-zero scalars mod r.
Outputs:
- signature_octets, an octet string or INVALID.
Procedure:
1. (A, e, s) = signature
2. return serialize((A, e, s))
4.7.3. OctetsToSignature
This operation describes how to decode an octet string, validate it
and return the underlying components that make up the signature.
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signature = octets_to_signature(signature_octets)
Inputs:
- signature_octets (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form output from
signature_to_octets operation.
Outputs:
signature, a signature in the form (A, e, s), where A is a point in G1
and e and s are non-zero scalars mod r.
Procedure:
1. expected_len = octet_point_length + 2 * octet_scalar_length
2. if length(signature_octets) != expected_len, return INVALID
3. A_octets = signature_octets[0..(octet_point_length - 1)]
4. A = octets_to_point_g1(A_octets)
5. if A is INVALID, return INVALID
6. if A == Identity_G1, return INVALID
7. index = octet_point_length
8. end_index = index + octet_scalar_length - 1
9. e = OS2IP(signature_octets[index..end_index])
10. if e = 0 OR e >= r, return INVALID
11. index += octet_scalar_length
12. end_index = index + octet_scalar_length - 1
13. s = OS2IP(signature_octets[index..end_index])
14. if s = 0 OR s >= r, return INVALID
15. return (A, e, s)
4.7.4. ProofToOctets
This operation describes how to encode a proof, as computed at step
25 in ProofGen (#proofgen), to an octet string. The input to the
operation MUST be a valid proof.
The inputted proof value must consist of the following components, in
that order:
1. Three (3) valid points of the G1 subgroup, different from the
identity point of G1 (i.e., A', Abar, D, in ProofGen)
2. Five (5) integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to r-1
inclusive (i.e., c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, in ProofGen).
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3. A number of integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to
r-1 inclusive, corresponding to the undisclosed from the proof
messages (i.e., m^_j1, ..., m^_jU, in ProofGen, where U the
number of undisclosed messages).
proof_octets = proof_to_octets(proof)
Inputs:
- proof (REQUIRED), a BBS proof in the form calculated by ProofGen in
step 27 (see above).
Parameters:
- octet_scalar_length (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The length of
a scalar octet representation, defined
by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- proof_octets, an octet string or INVALID.
Procedure:
1. (A', Abar, D, c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, (m^_1, ..., m^_U)) = proof
2. return serialize((A', Abar, D, c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, m^_1, ..., m^_U))
4.7.5. OctetsToProof
This operation describes how to decode an octet string representing a
proof, validate it and return the underlying components that make up
the proof value.
The proof value outputted by this operation consists of the following
components, in that order:
1. Three (3) valid points of the G1 subgroup, each of which must not
equal the identity point.
2. Five (5) integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to r-1
inclusive.
3. A set of integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to r-1
inclusive, corresponding to the undisclosed from the proof
message commitments. This set can be empty (i.e., "()").
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proof = octets_to_proof(proof_octets)
Inputs:
- proof_octets (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted from the
proof_to_octets operation.
Parameters:
- r (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The prime order of the G1 and
G2 groups, defined by the ciphersuite.
- octet_scalar_length (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The length of
a scalar octet representation, defined
by the ciphersuite.
- octet_point_length (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The length of
a point in G1 octet representation,
defined by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- proof, a proof value in the form described above or INVALID
Procedure:
1. proof_len_floor = 3 * octet_point_length + 5 * octet_scalar_length
2. if length(proof_octets) < proof_len_floor, return INVALID
// Points (i.e., (A', Abar, D) in ProofGen) de-serialization.
3. index = 0
4. for i in range(0, 2):
5. end_index = index + octet_point_length - 1
6. A_i = octets_to_point_g1(proof_octets[index..end_index])
7. if A_i is INVALID or Identity_G1, return INVALID
8. index += octet_point_length
// Scalars (i.e., (c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, (m^_j1, ..., m^_jU)) in
// ProofGen) de-serialization.
9. j = 0
10. while index < length(proof_octets):
11. end_index = index + octet_scalar_length - 1
12. s_j = OS2IP(proof_octets[index..end_index])
13. if s_j = 0 or if s_j >= r, return INVALID
14. index += octet_scalar_length
15. j += 1
16. if index != length(proof_octets), return INVALID
17. msg_commitments = ()
18. If j > 5, set msg_commitments = (s_5, ..., s_(j-1))
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19. return (A_0, A_1, A_2, s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, msg_commitments)
4.7.6. OctetsToPublicKey
This operation describes how to decode an octet string representing a
public key, validates it and returns the corresponding point in G2.
Steps 2 to 5 check if the public key is valid. As an optimization,
implementations MAY cache the result of those steps, to avoid
unnecessarily repeating validation for known public keys.
W = octets_to_pubkey(PK)
Inputs:
- PK, an octet string. A public key in the form outputted by the SkToPK
operation
Outputs:
- W, a valid point in G2 or INVALID
Procedure:
1. W = octets_to_point_g2(PK)
2. If W is INVALID, return INVALID
3. if subgroup_check(W) is INVALID, return INVALID
4. If W == Identity_G2, return INVALID
5. return W
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Validating public keys
It is RECOMENDED for any operation in Core Operations (#core-
operations) involving public keys, that they deserialize the public
key first using the OctetsToPublicKey (#octetstopublickey) operation,
even if they only require the octet-string representation of the
public key. If the octets_to_pubkey procedure (see the
OctetsToPublicKey (#octetstopublickey) section) returns INVALID, the
calling operation should also return INVALID and abort. An example
of where this recommendation applies is the Sign (#sign) operation.
An example of where an explicit invocation to the octets_to_pubkey
operation is already defined and therefore required is the Verify
(#verify) operation.
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5.2. Point de-serialization
This document makes use of octet_to_point_g* to parse octet strings
to elliptic curve points (either in G1 or G2). It is assumed (even
if not explicitly described) that the result of this operation will
not be INVALID. If octet_to_point_g* returns INVALID, then the
calling operation should immediately return INVALID as well and abort
the operation. Note that the only place where the output is assumed
to be VALID implicitly is in the EncodingForHash (#encodingforhash)
section.
5.3. Skipping membership checks
Some existing implementations skip the subgroup_check invocation in
Verify (#verify), whose purpose is ensuring that the signature is an
element of a prime-order subgroup. This check is REQUIRED of
conforming implementations, for two reasons.
1. For most pairing-friendly elliptic curves used in practice, the
pairing operation e Section 1.2 is undefined when its input
points are not in the prime-order subgroups of E1 and E2. The
resulting behavior is unpredictable, and may enable forgeries.
2. Even if the pairing operation behaves properly on inputs that are
outside the correct subgroups, skipping the subgroup check breaks
the strong unforgeability property [ADR02].
5.4. Side channel attacks
Implementations of the signing algorithm SHOULD protect the secret
key from side-channel attacks. One method for protecting against
certain side-channel attacks is ensuring that the implementation
executes exactly the same sequence of instructions and performs
exactly the same memory accesses, for any value of the secret key.
In other words, implementations on the underlying pairing-friendly
elliptic curve SHOULD run in constant time.
5.5. Randomness considerations
The IKM input to KeyGen MUST be infeasible to guess and MUST be kept
secret. One possibility is to generate IKM from a trusted source of
randomness. Guidelines on constructing such a source are outside the
scope of this document.
Secret keys MAY be generated using other methods; in this case they
MUST be infeasible to guess and MUST be indistinguishable from
uniformly random modulo r.
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BBS proofs are nondeterministic, meaning care must be taken against
attacks arising from using bad randomness, for example, the nonce
reuse attack on ECDSA [HDWH12]. It is RECOMMENDED that the
presentation header used in this specification contain a nonce chosen
at random from a trusted source of randomness, see the Section 5.6
for additional considerations.
When a trusted source of randomness is used, signatures and proofs
are much harder to forge or break due to the use of multiple nonces.
5.6. Presentation header selection
The signature proofs of knowledge generated in this specification are
created using a specified presentation header. A verifier-specified
cryptographically random value (e.g., a nonce) featuring in the
presentation header provides strong protections against replay
attacks, and is RECOMMENDED in most use cases. In some settings,
proofs can be generated in a non-interactive fashion, in which case
verifiers MUST be able to verify the uniqueness of the presentation
header values.
5.7. Implementing hash_to_curve_g1
The security analysis models hash_to_curve_g1 as random oracles. It
is crucial that these functions are implemented using a
cryptographically secure hash function. For this purpose,
implementations MUST meet the requirements of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
In addition, ciphersuites MUST specify unique domain separation tags
for hash_to_curve. Some guidance around defining this can be found
in Section 6.
5.8. Choice of underlying curve
BBS signatures can be implemented on any pairing-friendly curve.
However care MUST be taken when selecting one that is appropriate,
this specification defines a ciphersuite for using the BLS12-381
curve in Section 6 which as a curve achieves around 117 bits of
security according to a recent NCC ZCash cryptography review
[ZCASH-REVIEW].
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5.9. Security of proofs generated by ProofGen
The proof, as returned by ProofGen, is a zero-knowledge proof-of-
knowledge [CDL16]. This guarantees that no information will be
revealed about the signature itself or the undisclosed messages, from
the output of ProofGen. Note that the security proofs in [CDL16]
work on type 3 pairing setting. This means that G1 should be
different from G2 and with no efficient isomorphism between them.
5.10. Randomness requirements
ProofGen (#proofgen) is by its nature a randomized algorithm,
requiring the generation of multiple uniformly distributed, pseudo
random scalars. This makes ProofGen vulnerable to bad entropy in
certain applications. As an example of such application, consider
systems that need to monitor and potentially restrict outbound
traffic, in order to minimize data leakage during a breach. In such
cases, the attacker could manipulate couple of bits in the output of
the get_random function to create an undetected chanel out of the
system. Although the applicability of such attacks is limited for
most of the targeted use cases of the BBS scheme, some applications
may want to take measures towards mitigating them. To that end, it
is RECOMMENDED to use a deterministic RNG (like a ChaCha20 based
deterministic RNG), seeded with a unique, uniformly random, single
seed [DRBG]. This will limit the amount of bits the attacker can
manipulate (note that some randomness is always needed).
In any case, the randomness used in ProofGen MUST be unique in each
call and MUST have a distribution that is indistinguishable from
uniform. If the random scalars are re-used, are created from "bad
randomness" (for example with a known relationship to each other) or
are in any way predictable, an adversary will be able to unveil the
undisclosed from the proof messages or the hidden signature value.
Naturally, a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator
or pseudo random function is REQUIRED to implement the get_random
functionality. See also [RFC8937], for recommendations on generating
good randomness in cases where the Prover has direct or in-direct
access to a secret key.
6. Ciphersuites
This section defines the format for a BBS ciphersuite. It also gives
concrete ciphersuites based on the BLS12-381 pairing-friendly
elliptic curve [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves].
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6.1. Ciphersuite Format
6.1.1. Ciphersuite ID
The following section defines the format of the unique identifier for
the ciphersuite denoted ciphersuite_id, which will be represented as
an ASCII encoded octet string. The REQUIRED format for this string
is
"BBS_" || H2C_SUITE_ID || ADD_INFO
* H2C_SUITE_ID is the suite ID of the hash-to-curve suite used to
define the hash_to_curve function.
* ADD_INFO is an optional octet string indicating any additional
information used to uniquely qualify the ciphersuite. When
present this value MUST only contain ASCII encoded characters with
codes between 0x21 and 0x7e (inclusive) and MUST end with an
underscore (ASCII code: 0x5f), other than the last character the
string MUST not contain any other underscores (ASCII code: 0x5f).
6.1.2. Additional Parameters
The parameters that each ciphersuite needs to define are generally
divided into three main categories; the basic parameters (a hash
function etc.,), the serialization operations (point_to_octets_g1
etc.,) and the generator parameters. See below for more details.
*Basic parameters*:
* hash: a cryptographic hash function.
* octet_scalar_length: Number of bytes to represent a scalar value,
in the multiplicative group of integers mod r, encoded as an octet
string. It is RECOMMENDED this value be set to ceil(log2(r)/8).
* octet_point_length: Number of bytes to represent a point encoded
as an octet string outputted by the point_to_octets_g* function.
It is RECOMMENDED that this value is set to ceil(log2(p)/8).
* hash_to_curve_suite: The hash-to-curve ciphersuite id, in the form
defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. This defines the
hash_to_curve_g1 (the hash_to_curve operation for the G1 subgroup,
see the Notation (#notation) section) and the expand_message
(either expand_message_xmd or expand_message_xof) operations used
in this document.
* P1: A fixed point in the G1 subgroup.
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*Serialization functions*:
* point_to_octets_g1: a function that returns the canonical
representation of the point P for the G1 subgroup as an octet
string.
* point_to_octets_g2: a function that returns the canonical
representation of the point P for the G2 subgroup as an octet
string.
* octets_to_point_g1: a function that returns the point P in the
subgroup G1 corresponding to the canonical representation ostr, or
INVALID if ostr is not a valid output of point_to_octets_g1.
* octets_to_point_g2: a function that returns the point P in the
subgroup G2 corresponding to the canonical representation ostr, or
INVALID if ostr is not a valid output of point_to_octets_g2.
*Generator parameters*:
* generator_seed: The seed used to determine the generator points
which form part of the public parameters used by the BBS signature
scheme. Note there are multiple possible scopes for this seed,
including: a globally shared seed (where the resulting message
generators are common across all BBS signatures); a signer
specific seed (where the message generators are specific to a
signer); and a signature specific seed (where the message
generators are specific per signature). The ciphersuite MUST
define this seed OR how to compute it as a pre-cursor operation to
any others.
6.2. BLS12-381 Ciphersuites
The following two ciphersuites are based on the BLS12-381 elliptic
curves defined in Section 4.2.1 of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves]. The targeted security level
of both suites in bits is k = 128.
The first ciphersuite makes use of an extendable output function, and
most specifically of SHAKE-256, as defined in Section 6.2 of [SHA3].
It also uses the hash-to-curve suite defined by this document in
Appendix A.1 (#bls12-381-hash_to_curve-def), which also makes use of
the SHAKE-256 function.
The second ciphersuite uses SHA-256, as defined in Section 6.2 of
[SHA2] and the BLS12-381 G1 hash-to-curve suite defined in
Section 8.8.1 of the [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] document.
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Note that these two ciphersuites differ only in the hash function
(SHAKE-256 vs SHA-256) and in the hash-to-curve suites used. The
hash-to-curve suites differ in the expand_message variant and
underlying hash function. More concretely, the BLS12-381-SHAKE-256
(#bls12-381-shake-256) ciphersuite makes use of expand_message_xof
with SHAKE-256, while BLS12-381-SHA-256 (#bls12-381-sha-256) makes
use of expand_message_xmd with SHA-256. Curve parameters are common
between the two ciphersuites.
6.2.1. BLS12-381-SHAKE-256
*Basic parameters*:
* ciphersuite_id: "BBS_BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_RO_"
* hash: SHAKE-256 as defined in [SHA3].
* octet_scalar_length: 32, based on the RECOMMENDED approach of
ceil(log2(r)/8).
* octet_point_length: 48, based on the RECOMMENDED approach of
ceil(log2(p)/8).
* hash_to_curve_suite: "BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_RO_" as
defined in Appendix A.1 (#bls12-381-hash-to-curve-definition-
using-shake-256) for the G1 subgroup.
* P1: The G1 point returned from the create_generators procedure,
with generator_seed = "BBS_BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-
256_SSWU_RO_BP_MESSAGE_GENERATOR_SEED". More specifically,
P1 = {{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.BP }}
*Serialization functions*:
* point_to_octets_g1: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G1
subgroup, using compression (i.e., setting C_bit = 1).
* point_to_octets_g2: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G2
subgroup, using compression (i.e., setting C_bit = 1).
* octets_to_point_g1: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G1
subgroup.
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* octets_to_point_g2: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G2
subgroup.
*Generator parameters*:
* generator_seed: A global seed value of "BBS_BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-
256_SSWU_RO_MESSAGE_GENERATOR_SEED" (an ASCII string comprised of
59 bytes) which is used by the create_generators (#generator-
point-computation) operation to compute the required set of
message generators.
6.2.2. BLS12-381-SHA-256
*Basic parameters*:
* Ciphersuite_ID: "BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_"
* hash: SHA-256 as defined in [SHA2].
* octet_scalar_length: 32, based on the RECOMMENDED approach of
ceil(log2(r)/8).
* octet_point_length: 48, based on the RECOMMENDED approach of
ceil(log2(p)/8).
* hash_to_curve_suite: "BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_" as defined
in Section 8.8.1 of the [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] for the G1
subgroup.
* P1: The G1 point returned from the create_generators procedure,
with generator_seed = "BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-
256_SSWU_RO_BP_MESSAGE_GENERATOR_SEED". More specifically,
P1 = {{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.BP }}
*Serialization functions*:
* point_to_octets_g1: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G1
subgroup, using compression (i.e., setting C_bit = 1).
* point_to_octets_g2: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G2
subgroup, using compression (i.e., setting C_bit = 1).
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* octets_to_point_g1: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G1
subgroup.
* octets_to_point_g2: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G2
subgroup.
*Generator parameters*:
* generator_seed: A global seed value of "BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-
256_SSWU_RO_MESSAGE_GENERATOR_SEED" (an ASCII string comprised of
57 bytes) which is used by the create_generators (#generator-
point-computation) operation to compute the required set of
message generators.
7. Test Vectors
The following section details a basic set of test vectors that can be
used to confirm an implementations correctness
*NOTE* All binary data below is represented as octet strings in big
endian order, encoded in hexadecimal format.
*NOTE* These fixtures are a work in progress and subject to change.
7.1. Mocked random scalars
For the purpose of presenting fixtures for the ProofGen (#proofgen)
operation we describe here a way to mock the calculate_random_scalars
operation (Random scalars computation (#random-scalars-computation)),
used by ProofGen to create all the necessary random scalars.
To that end, the seeded_random_scalars(SEED) operation is defined,
which will deterministically calculate count random-looking scalars
from a single SEED. The proof test vector will then define a SEED
(as a nothing-up-my-sleeve value) and set
mocked_calculate_random_scalars(count) :=
seeded_random_scalars(SEED, count)
The mocked_calculate_random_scalars operation will then be used in
place of calculate_random_scalars during the ProofGen (#proofgen)
operation's procedure.
*Note* For the BLS12-381-SHA-256 (#bls12-381-sha-256) ciphersuite if
more than 170 mocked random scalars are required, the operation will
return INVALID. Similarly, for the BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 (#bls12-381-
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shake-256) ciphersuite, if more than 1365 mocked random scalars are
required, the operation will return INVALID. For the purpose of
describing ProofGen (#proofgen) test vectors, those limits are
inconsequential.
seeded_scalars = seeded_random_scalars(SEED, count)
Inputs:
- count (REQUIRED), non negative integer. The number of scalars to
return.
- SEED (REQUIRED), an octet string. The random seed from which to generate
the scalars.
Parameters:
- expand_message, the expand_message operation defined by the
ciphersuite.
- expand_len = ceil((ceil(log2(r))+k)/8), where r and k are defined by
the ciphersuite.
- dst = utf8(ciphersuite_id || "MOCK_RANDOM_SCALARS_DST_"), where
ciphersuite_id is defined by teh ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- mocked_random_scalars, a list of "count" pseudo random scalars
Preconditions:
1. if count * expand_len > 65535, return INVALID
Procedure:
1. out_len = expand_len * count
2. v = expand_message(SEED, dst, out_len)
3. if v is INVALID, return INVALID
4. for i in (1, ..., count):
5. start_idx = (i-1) * expand_len
6. end_idx = i * expand_len - 1
7. r_i = OS2IP(v[start_idx..end_idx]) mod r
8. return (r_1, ...., r_count)
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7.2. Key Pair
The following key pair will be used for the test vectors of both
ciphersuites. Note that it is made based on the BLS12-381-SHA-356
(#bls12-381-sha-256) ciphersuite, meaning that it uses SHA-256 as a
hash function. Although KeyGen (#keygen) is not REQUIRED for
ciphersuite compatibility, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations
will NOT re-use keys across different ciphersuites (even if they are
based on the same curve).
*NOTE*: this is work in progress and in the future, we may add
different key pairs per ciphersuite for the test vectors.
Following the procedure defined in Section 3.3.1 with an input IKM
value as follows
{{ $keyPair.ikm }}
and the following key_info value
{{ $keyPair.keyInfo }}
Outputs the following SK value
{{ $keyPair.keyPair.secretKey }}
Following the procedure defined in Section 3.3.2 with an input SK
value as above produces the following PK value
{{ $keyPair.keyPair.publicKey }}
7.3. Messages
The following messages are used by the test vectors of both
ciphersuites (unless otherwise stated).
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{{ $messages[0] }}
{{ $messages[1] }}
{{ $messages[2] }}
{{ $messages[3] }}
{{ $messages[4] }}
{{ $messages[5] }}
{{ $messages[6] }}
{{ $messages[7] }}
{{ $messages[8] }}
{{ $messages[9] }}
7.4. BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 Test Vectors
Test vectors of the BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 (#bls12-381-shake-
256-ciphersuite) ciphersuite. Further fixtures are available in
additional BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 test vectors (#additional-bls12-381-
shake-256-ciphersuite-test-vectors).
7.4.1. Map Messages to Scalars
The messages in Section 3.2.2 must be mapped to scalars before passed
to the Sign, Verify, ProofGen and ProofVerify operations. For the
purpose of the test vectors presented in this document we are using
the MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalarashash) operation to
map each message to a scalar. For the BLS12-381-SHAKE-256
(#bls12-381-shake-256-ciphersuite) ciphersuite, on input each message
in Section 3.2.2 and the following default dst
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.dst }}
The output scalars, encoded to octets using I2OSP and represented in
big endian order, are the following,
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{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[0].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[1].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[2].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[3].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[4].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[5].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[6].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[7].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[8].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[9].scalar }}
Note that in both the following test vectors, as well as the
additional BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 (#bls12-381-shake-256) test vectors in
Appendix C.1, when we are referring to a message that will be passed
to one of the Sign, Verify, ProofGen or ProofVerify operations, we
assume that it will first be mapped into one of the above scalars,
using the MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalarashash)
operation.
7.4.2. Message Generators
Following the procedure defined in Section 4.2 with an input count
value of 12, for the BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 (#bls12-381-shake-256)
suite, outputs the following values (note that the first 2 correspond
to Q_1 and Q_2, while the next 10, to the message generators H_1,
..., H_10).
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{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.Q1 }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.Q2 }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[0] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[1] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[2] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[3] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[4] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[5] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[6] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[7] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[8] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.generators.MsgGenerators[9] }}
7.4.3. Signature Fixtures
7.4.3.1. Valid Single Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature001.header }}
And the following message (the first message defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature001.messages[0] }}
After it is mapped to the first scalar in Section 7.4.1, along with
the SK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the Sign
operations, yields the following output signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature001.signature }}
7.4.3.2. Valid Multi-Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature004.header }}
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And the messages defined in Section 3.2.2 (*Note* the ordering of the
messages MUST be preserved), after they are mapped to the scalars in
Section 7.4.1, along with the SK value as defined in Section 7.2 as
inputs into the Sign operations, yields the following output
signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature004.signature }}
7.4.4. Proof fixtures
For the generation of the following fixtures the
mocked_calculate_random_scalars defined in Mocked Random Scalars
(#mocked-random-scalars) is used, in place of the
calculate_random_scalars operation, with the following seed value
(hex encoding of utf8("<30 first digits of pi>"))
SEED = "332e313431353932363533353839373933323338343632363433333833323739"
Given the above seed the first 10 scalars returned by the
mocked_calculate_random_scalars operation will be,
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[0] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[1] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[2] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[3] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[4] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[5] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[6] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[7] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[8] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[9] }}
7.4.4.1. Valid Single Message Proof
Using the header, message and signature used in Valid Single Message
Signature (#valid-single-message-signature) to create a proof
disclosing the message, with the following presentation header
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof001.presentationHeader }}
will result to the following proof value
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof001.proof }}
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7.4.4.2. Valid Multi-Message, All Messages Disclosed Proof
Using the header, messages and signature used in Valid Multi Message
Signature (#valid-multi-message-signature) to create a proof
disclosing all the messages, with the following presentation header
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof002.presentationHeader }}
will result to the following proof value
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof002.proof }}
7.4.4.3. Valid Multi-Message, Half of Messages Disclosed Proof
Using the same header, messages and signature as in Multi-Message,
All Messages Disclosed Proof (#valid-multi-message-all-messages-
disclosed-proof) but this time with only every other messages
disclosed (messages in index 0, 2, 4 and 6, in that order), with the
following presentation header
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof003.presentationHeader }}
will result to the following proof value
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof003.proof }}
7.5. BLS12381-SHA-256 Test Vectors
Test vectors of the BLS12-381-SHA-256 (#bls12-381-sha-
256-ciphersuite) ciphersuite. Further fixtures are available in
additional BLS12-381-SHA-256 test vectors (#additional-bls12-381-sha-
256-ciphersuite-test-vectors).
7.5.1. Map Messages to Scalars
Similarly to how messages are mapped to scalars in BLS12381-SHAKE-256
Test Vectors (#bls12381-sha-256-test-vectors), we are using the
MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalarashash) operation to map
each message to a scalar. For the BLS12-381-SHA-256 (#bls12-381-
shake-256-ciphersuite) ciphersuite, on input each message in
Section 3.2.2 and the following default dst
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.dst }}
The output scalars, encoded to octets using I2OSP and represented in
big endian order, are the following,
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{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[0].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[1].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[2].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[3].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[4].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[5].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[6].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[7].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[8].scalar }}
{{ $MapMessageToScalarFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.MapMessageToScalarAsHash.cases[9].scalar }}
Note that in both the following test vectors, as well as the
additional BLS12-381-SHA-256 (#bls12-381-shake-256) test vectors in
Appendix C.2, when we are referring to a message that will be passed
to one of the Sign, Verify, ProofGen or ProofVerify operations, we
assume that it will first be mapped into one of the above scalars,
using the MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalarashash)
operation.
7.5.2. Message Generators
Following the procedure defined in Section 4.2 with an input count
value of 12, for the BLS12-381-SHA-256 (#bls12-381-sha-256) suite,
outputs the following values (note that the first 2 correspond to Q_1
and Q_2, while the next 10, to the message generators H_1, ...,
H_10).
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{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.Q1 }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.Q2 }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[0] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[1] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[2] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[3] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[4] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[5] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[6] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[7] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[8] }}
{{ $generatorFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.generators.MsgGenerators[9] }}
7.5.3. Signature Fixtures
7.5.3.1. Valid Single Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature001.header }}
And the following message (the first message defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature001.messages[0] }}
After it is mapped to the first scalar in Section 7.5.1, along with
the SK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the Sign
operations, yields the following output signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature001.signature }}
7.5.3.2. Valid Multi-Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature004.header }}
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And the messages defined in Section 3.2.2 (*Note* the ordering of the
messages MUST be preserved), after they are mapped to the scalars in
Section 7.5.1, along with the SK value as defined in Section 7.2 as
inputs into the Sign operations, yields the following output
signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature004.signature }}
7.5.4. Proof fixtures
Similarly to the proof fixtures for the BLS12381-SHA-256 ciphersuite,
the generation of the following fixtures uses the
mocked_calculate_random_scalars defined in Mocked Random Scalars
(#mocked-random-scalars), in place of the calculate_random_scalars
operation, with the following seed value (hex encoding of utf8("<30
first digits of pi>"))
SEED = "332e313431353932363533353839373933323338343632363433333833323739"
Given the above seed the first 10 scalars returned by the
mocked_calculate_random_scalars operation will be,
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[0] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[1] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[2] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[3] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[4] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[5] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[6] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[7] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[8] }}
{{ $MockRngFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.mockedRng.mockedScalars[9] }}
7.5.4.1. Valid Single Message Proof
Using the header, message and signature used in Valid Single Message
Signature (#valid-single-message-signature-1) to create a proof
disclosing the message, with the following presentation header
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.proof001.presentationHeader }}
will result to the following proof value
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.proof001.proof }}
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7.5.4.2. Valid Multi-Message, All Messages Disclosed Proof
Using the header, messages and signature used in Valid Multi Message
Signature (#valid-multi-message-signature-1) to create a proof
disclosing all the messages, with the following presentation header
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof002.presentationHeader }}
will result to the following proof value
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.proof002.proof }}
7.5.4.3. Valid Multi-Message, Half of Messages Disclosed Proof
Using the same header, messages and signature as in Multi-Message,
All Messages Disclosed Proof (#valid-multi-message-all-messages-
disclosed-proof-1) but this time with only every other messages
disclosed (messages in index 0, 2, 4 and 6, in that order), with the
following presentation header
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.proof003.presentationHeader }}
will result to the following proof value
{{ $proofFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.proof003.proof }}
8. IANA Considerations
This document does not make any requests of IANA.
9. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the significant amount of
academic work that preceeded the development of this document. In
particular the original work of [BBS04] which was subsequently
developed in [ASM06] and in [CDL16]. This last academic work is the
one mostly used by this document.
The current state of this document is the product of the work of the
Decentralized Identity Foundation Applied Cryptography Working group,
which includes numerous active participants. In particular, the
following individuals contributed ideas, feedback and wording that
influenced this specification:
Orie Steele, Christian Paquin, Alessandro Guggino and Tomislav
Markovski
10. Normative References
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[DRBG] NIST, "Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators",
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]
Faz-Hernandez, A., Scott, S., Sullivan, N., Wahby, R. S.,
and C. A. Wood, "Hashing to Elliptic Curves", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-
16, 15 June 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves]
Sakemi, Y., Kobayashi, T., Saito, T., and R. S. Wahby,
"Pairing-Friendly Curves", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-11, 6
November 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-11>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8937] Cremers, C., Garratt, L., Smyshlyaev, S., Sullivan, N.,
and C. Wood, "Randomness Improvements for Security
Protocols", RFC 8937, DOI 10.17487/RFC8937, October 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8937>.
[SHA2] NIST, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)",
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
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[SHA3] NIST, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
Extendable-Output Functions",
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
11. Informative References
[ADR02] An, J. H., Dodis, Y., and T. Rabin, "On the Security of
Joint Signature and Encryption", pages 83-107, April 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46035-7_6>.
[ASM06] Au, M. H., Susilo, W., and Y. Mu, "Constant-Size Dynamic
k-TAA", Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006,
<https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11832072_8>.
[BBS04] Boneh, D., Boyen, X., and H. Shacham, "Short Group
Signatures", pages 41-55, 2004,
<https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-28628-8_3>.
[Bowe19] Bowe, S., "Faster subgroup checks for BLS12-381", July
2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/814>.
[CDL16] Camenisch, J., Drijvers, M., and A. Lehmann, "Anonymous
Attestation Using the Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption
Revisited", Springer, Cham, 2016,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/663.pdf>.
[HDWH12] Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J.A.
Halderman, "Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of widespread
weak keys in network devices", pages 205-220, August 2012,
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/
usenixsecurity12/sec12-final228.pdf>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-bls-signature]
Boneh, D., Gorbunov, S., Wahby, R. S., Wee, H., Wood, C.
A., and Z. Zhang, "BLS Signatures", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-05, 16 June
2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-
cfrg-bls-signature-05>.
[ZCASH-REVIEW]
NCC Group, "Zcash Overwinter Consensus and Sapling
Cryptography Review", <https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/
NCC_Group_Zcash2018_Public_Report_2019-01-30_v1.3.pdf>.
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Appendix A. BLS12-381 hash_to_curve definition using SHAKE-256
The following defines a hash_to_curve suite
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] for the BLS12-381 curve for both the G1
and G2 subgroups using the extendable output function (xof) of
SHAKE-256 as per the guidance defined in section 8.9 of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
Note the notation used in the below definitions is sourced from
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
A.1. BLS12-381 G1
The suite of BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_RO_ is defined as follows:
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* encoding type: hash_to_curve (Section 3 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve])
* E: y^2 = x^3 + 4
* p: 0x1a0111ea397fe69a4b1ba7b6434bacd764774b84f38512bf6730d2a0f6b0f624
1eabfffeb153ffffb9feffffffffaaab
* r: 0x73eda753299d7d483339d80809a1d80553bda402fffe5bfeffffffff00000001
* m: 1
* k: 128
* expand_message: expand_message_xof (Section 5.3.2 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve])
* hash: SHAKE-256
* L: 64
* f: Simplified SWU for AB == 0 (Section 6.6.3 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve])
* Z: 11
* E': y'^2 = x'^3 + A' * x' + B', where
- A' = 0x144698a3b8e9433d693a02c96d4982b0ea985383ee66a8d8e8981aef
d881ac98936f8da0e0f97f5cf428082d584c1d
- B' = 0x12e2908d11688030018b12e8753eee3b2016c1f0f24f4070a0b9c14f
cef35ef55a23215a316ceaa5d1cc48e98e172be0
* iso_map: the 11-isogeny map from E' to E given in Appendix E.2 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]
* h_eff: 0xd201000000010001
Note that the h_eff values for this suite are copied from that
defined for the BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_ suite defined in
section 8.8.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
An optimized example implementation of the Simplified SWU mapping to
the curve E' isogenous to BLS12-381 G1 is given in Appendix F.2
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
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Appendix B. Use Cases
B.1. Non-correlating Security Token
In the most general sense BBS signatures can be used in any
application where a cryptographically secured token is required but
correlation caused by usage of the token is un-desirable.
For example in protocols like OAuth2.0 the most commonly used form of
the access token leverages the JWT format alongside conventional
cryptographic primitives such as traditional digital signatures or
HMACs. These access tokens are then used by a relying party to prove
authority to a resource server during a request. However, because
the access token is most commonly sent by value as it was issued by
the authorization server (e.g in a bearer style scheme), the access
token can act as a source of strong correlation for the relying
party. Relevant prior art can be found here
(https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-private-access-tokens-
01.html).
BBS Signatures due to their unique properties removes this source of
correlation but maintains the same set of guarantees required by a
resource server to validate an access token back to its relevant
authority (note that an approach to signing JSON tokens with BBS that
may be of relevance is the JWP (https://json-web-proofs.github.io/
json-web-proofs/draft-jmiller-json-web-proof.html) format and
serialization). In the context of a protocol like OAuth2.0 the
access token issued by the authorization server would feature a BBS
Signature, however instead of the relying party providing this access
token as issued, in their request to a resource server, they generate
a unique proof from the original access token and include that in the
request instead, thus removing this vector of correlation.
B.2. Improved Bearer Security Token
Bearer based security tokens such as JWT based access tokens used in
the OAuth2.0 protocol are a highly popular format for expressing
authorization grants. However their usage has several security
limitations. Notably a bearer based authorization scheme often has
to rely on a secure transport between the authorized party (client)
and the resource server to mitigate the potential for a MITM attack
or a malicious interception of the access token. The scheme also has
to assume a degree of trust in the resource server it is presenting
an access token to, particularly when the access token grants more
than just access to the target resource server, because in a bearer
based authorization scheme, anyone who possesses the access token has
authority to what it grants. Bearer based access tokens also suffer
from the threat of replay attacks.
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Improved schemes around authorization protocols often involve adding
a layer of proof of cryptographic key possession to the presentation
of an access token, which mitigates the deficiencies highlighted
above as well as providing a way to detect a replay attack. However,
approaches that involve proof of cryptographic key possession such as
DPoP (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04))
suffer from an increase in protocol complexity. A party requesting
authorization must pre-generate appropriate key material, share the
public portion of this with the authorization server alongside
proving possession of the private portion of the key material. The
authorization server must also be-able to accommodate receiving this
information and validating it.
BBS Signatures ofter an alternative model that solves the same
problems that proof of cryptographic key possession schemes do for
bearer based schemes, but in a way that doesn't introduce new up-
front protocol complexity. In the context of a protocol like
OAuth2.0 the access token issued by the authorization server would
feature a BBS Signature, however instead of the client providing this
access token as issued, in their request to a resource server, they
generate a unique proof from the original access token and include
that in the request instead. Because the access token is not shared
in a request to a resource server, attacks such as MITM are
mitigated. A resource server also obtains the ability to detect a
replay attack by ensuring the proof presented is unique.
B.3. Selectively Disclosure Enabled Identity Credentials
BBS signatures when applied to the problem space of identity
credentials can help to enhance user privacy. For example a digital
drivers license that is cryptographically signed with a BBS
signature, allows the holder or subject of the license to disclose
different claims from their drivers license to different parties.
Furthermore, the unlinkable presentations property of proofs
generated by the scheme remove an important possible source of
correlation for the holder across multiple presentations.
Appendix C. Additional Test Vectors
*NOTE* These fixtures are a work in progress and subject to change
C.1. BLS12-381-SHAKE-256 Ciphersuite
C.1.1. Modified Message Signature
Using the following header
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{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature002.header }}
And the following message (the first message defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature002.messages[0] }}
After is mapped to the first scalar in Section 7.4.1, and with the
following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature002.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to the message
value being different from what was signed
C.1.2. Extra Unsigned Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature003.header }}
And the following messages (the two first messages defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature003.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature003.messages[1] }}
After they are mapped to the first 2 scalars in Section 7.4.1, and
with the following signature (which is a signature to only the first
of the above two messages)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature003.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to an
additional message being supplied that was not signed.
C.1.3. Missing Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature005.header }}
And the following messages (the two first messages defined in
Section 3.2.2)
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{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature005.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature005.messages[1] }}
After they are mapped to the first 2 scalars in Section 7.4.1, and
with the following signature (which is a signature on all the
messages defined in Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature005.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to missing
messages that were originally present during the signing.
C.1.4. Reordered Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.header }}
And the following messages (re-ordering of the messages defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[1] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[2] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[3] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[4] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[5] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[6] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[7] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[8] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.messages[9] }}
After they are mapped to the corresponding scalars in Section 7.4.1,
and with the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature006.signature }}
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Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to messages
being re-ordered from the order in which they were signed
C.1.5. Wrong Public Key Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature007.header }}
And the messages as defined in Section 3.2.2, mapped to the scalars
in Section 7.4.1 and with the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature007.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to public key
used to verify is in-correct
C.1.6. Wrong Header Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature008.header }}
And the messages as defined in Section 3.2.2, mapped to the scalars
in Section 7.4.1 and with the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-shake-256.signature008.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to header value
being modified from what was originally signed
C.1.7. Hash to Scalar Test Vectors
Using the following input message,
{{ $H2sFixture.bls12-381-shake-256.h2s.message }}
And the default dst defined in hash_to_scalar (#hash-to-scalar),
i.e.,
{{ $H2sFixture.bls12-381-shake-256.h2s.dst }}
We get the following scalar, encoded with I2OSP and represented in
big endian order,
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{{ $H2sFixture.bls12-381-shake-256.h2s.scalar }}
C.2. BLS12-381-SHA-256 Ciphersuite
C.2.1. Modified Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature002.header }}
And the following message (the first message defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature002.messages[0] }}
After is maped to the first scalar in Section 7.5.1, and with the
following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature002.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to the message
value being different from what was signed.
C.2.2. Extra Unsigned Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature003.header }}
And the following messages (the two first messages defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature003.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature003.messages[1] }}
After they are mapped to the first 2 scalars in Section 7.5.1, and
with the following signature (which is a signature to only the first
of the above two messages)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature003.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to an
additional message being supplied that was not signed.
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C.2.3. Missing Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature005.header }}
And the following messages (the two first messages defined in
Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature005.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature005.messages[1] }}
After they are mapped to the first 2 scalars in Section 7.5.1, and
with the following signature (which is a signature on all the
messages defined in Section 3.2.2)
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature005.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to missing
messages that were originally present during the signing.
C.2.4. Reordered Message Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.header }}
And the following messages (re-ordering of the messages defined in
Section 3.2.2)
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{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[1] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[2] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[3] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[4] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[5] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[6] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[7] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[8] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.messages[9] }}
After they are mapped to the corresponding scalars in Section 7.5.1,
and with the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature006.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to messages
being re-ordered from the order in which they were signed.
C.2.5. Wrong Public Key Signature
Using the following header
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature007.header }}
And the messages as defined in Section 3.2.2, mapped to the scalars
in Section 7.5.1 and with the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature007.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to public key
used to verify is in-correct.
C.2.6. Wrong Header Signature
Using the following header
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{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature008.header }}
And the messages as defined in Section 3.2.2, mapped to the scalars
in Section 7.5.1 and with the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.bls12-381-sha-256.signature008.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 7.2 as inputs into the
Verify operation should fail signature validation due to header value
being modified from what was originally signed.
C.2.7. Hash to Scalar Test Vectors
Using the following input message,
{{ $H2sFixture.bls12-381-sha-256.h2s.message }}
And the default dst defined in hash_to_scalar (#hash-to-scalar),
i.e.,
{{ $H2sFixture.bls12-381-sha-256.h2s.dst }}
We get the following scalar, encoded with I2OSP and represented in
big endian order,
{{ $H2sFixture.bls12-381-sha-256.h2s.scalar }}
Appendix D. Proof Generation and Verification Algorithmic Explanation
The following section provides an explanation of how the ProofGen and
ProofVerify operations work.
Let the prover be in possession of a BBS signature (A, e, s) on
messages msg_1, ..., msg_L and a domain value (see Sign (#sign)).
Let A = B * (1/(e + SK)) where SK the signer's secret key and,
B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
Let (i1, ..., iR) be the indexes of generators corresponding to
messages the prover wants to disclose and (j1, ..., jU) be the
indexes corresponding to undisclosed messages (i.e., (j1, ..., jU) =
range(1, L) \ (i1, ..., iR)). To prove knowledge of a signature on
the disclosed messages, work as follows,
* Hide the signature by randomizing it. To randomize the signature
(A, e, s), take uniformly random r1, r2 in [1, r-1], and
calculate,
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1. A' = A * r1,
2. Abar = A' * (-e) + B * r1
3. D = B * r1 + Q_1 * r2.
Also set,
4. r3 = r1 ^ -1 mod r
5. s' = r2 * r3 + s mod r.
The values (A', Abar, D) will be part of the proof and are used to
prove possession of a BBS signature, without revealing the
signature itself. Note that; e(A', PK) = e(Abar, P2) where PK the
signer's public key and P2 the base element in G2 (used to create
the signer’s PK, see SkToPk (#sktopk)). This also serves to bind
the proof to the signer's PK.
* Set the following,
1. C1 = Abar - D
2. C2 = P1 + Q_2 * domain + H_i1 * msg_i1 + ... + H_iR * msg_iR
Create a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge (nizk)
of the values e, r2, r3, s' and msg_j1, ..., msg_jU (the
undisclosed messages) so that both of the following equalities
hold,
EQ1. C1 = A' * (-e) - Q_1 * r2
EQ2. C2 = Q_1 * s' - D * r3 + H_j1 * msg_j1 + ... + H_jU * msg_jU.
Note that the verifier will know the elements in the left side of the
above equations (i.e., C1 and C2) but not in the right side (i.e.,
s', r3 and the undisclosed messages: msg_j1, ..., msg_jU). However,
using the nizk, the prover can convince the verifier that they (the
prover) know the elements that satisfy those equations, without
disclosing them. Then, if both EQ1 and EQ2 hold, and e(A', PK) =
e(Abar, P2), an extractor can return a valid BBS signature from the
signer's SK, on the disclosed messages. The proof returned is (A',
Abar, D, nizk). To validate the proof, a verifier checks that e(A',
PK) = e(Abar, P2) and verifies the nizk. Validating the proof, will
guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the disclosed messages,
as well as ownership of the undisclosed messages and of the
signature.
Appendix E. Document History
-00
* Initial version
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-01
* Populated fixtures
* Added SHA-256 based ciphersuite
* Fixed typo in ProofVerify
* Clarify ASCII string usage in DST
* Added MapMessageToScalar test vectors
* Fix typo in ciphersuite name
-02
* Variety of editiorial clarifications
* Clarified integer endianness
* Revised the encode for hash operation
* Shifted to using CSPRNG instead of PRF
* Removed total number of messages from proof verify operation
* Added deterministic proof fixtures
* Shifted to multiple CSPRNG calls to calculate random elements,
instead of expand_message
* Updated hash_to_scalar to a single output
Authors' Addresses
Tobias Looker
MATTR
Email: tobias.looker@mattr.global
Vasilis Kalos
MATTR
Email: vasilis.kalos@mattr.global
Andrew Whitehead
Portage
Email: andrew.whitehead@portagecybertech.com
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Mike Lodder
CryptID
Email: redmike7@gmail.com
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