AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-05
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CFRG S. Gueron
Internet-Draft University of Haifa and Amazon Web Services
Intended status: Informational A. Langley
Expires: November 22, 2017 Google
Y. Lindell
Bar Ilan University
May 21, 2017
AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-05
Abstract
This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are
nonce misuse-resistant - that is that they do not fail
catastrophically if a nonce is repeated.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 22, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
Gueron, et al. Expires November 22, 2017 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft aes-gcm-siv May 2017
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. POLYVAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. AEADs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Field operation examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Worked example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. The relationship between POLYVAL and GHASH . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Additional comparisons with AES-GCM . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix C. Test vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C.1. AEAD_AES_128_GCM_SIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C.2. AEAD_AES_256_GCM_SIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
C.3. Counter wrap tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction
The concept of "Authenticated encryption with additional data" (AEAD
[RFC5116]) couples confidentiality and integrity in a single
operation that is easier for practitioners to use correctly. The
most popular AEAD, AES-GCM [GCM], is seeing widespread use due to its
attractive performance.
However, most AEADs suffer catastrophic failures of confidentiality
and/or integrity when two distinct messages are encrypted with the
same nonce. While the requirements for AEADs specify that the pair
of (key, nonce) shall only ever be used once, and thus prohibit this,
in practice this is a worry.
Nonce misuse-resistant AEADs do not suffer from this problem. For
this class of AEADs, encrypting two messages with the same nonce only
discloses whether the messages were equal or not. This is the
minimum amount of information that a deterministic algorithm can leak
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