XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures
draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-10

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (cfrg RG)
Last updated 2017-07-24
Replaces draft-huelsing-cfrg-hash-sig-xmss
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Crypto Forum Research Group                                  A. Huelsing
Internet-Draft                                              TU Eindhoven
Intended status: Informational                                  D. Butin
Expires: January 25, 2018                                   TU Darmstadt
                                                               S. Gazdag
                                                              genua GmbH
                                                            J. Rijneveld
                                                      Radboud University
                                                             A. Mohaisen
                                                            SUNY Buffalo
                                                           July 24, 2017

                  XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures
             draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-10

Abstract

   This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a
   hash-based digital signature system.  It follows existing
   descriptions in scientific literature.  The note specifies the WOTS+
   one-time signature scheme, a single-tree (XMSS) and a multi-tree
   variant (XMSS^MT) of XMSS.  Both variants use WOTS+ as a main
   building block.  XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures
   without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems.
   Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of
   cryptographic hash functions.  XMSS provides strong security
   guarantees and is even secure when the collision resistance of the
   underlying hash function is broken.  It is suitable for compact
   implementations, relatively simple to implement, and naturally
   resists side-channel attacks.  Unlike most other signature systems,
   hash-based signatures can withstand so far known attacks using
   quantum computers.

Status of This Memo

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Huelsing, et al.        Expires January 25, 2018                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures         July 2017

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 25, 2018.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  CFRG Note on Post-Quantum Cryptography  . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.2.  Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Data Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.4.  Integer to Byte Conversion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.5.  Hash Function Address Scheme  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.6.  Strings of Base w Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     2.7.  Member Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   3.  Primitives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     3.1.  WOTS+ One-Time Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.1.1.  WOTS+ Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
         3.1.1.1.  WOTS+ Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       3.1.2.  WOTS+ Chaining Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.1.3.  WOTS+ Private Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       3.1.4.  WOTS+ Public Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       3.1.5.  WOTS+ Signature Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
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