Bootstrapping a Symmetric IPv6 Handover Key from SEND
draft-irtf-mobopts-handover-key-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(mobopts RG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Rajeev Koodli | ||
| Last updated | 2005-02-04 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | IRTF state | (None) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Multiple IPv6 handover optimization protocols (for example, Fast Mobile IPv6 and Context Transfer Protocol) require an Access Router to verify that signaling received to perform an IP handover operation originated from a Mobile Node having authorization to claim a particular address on the Access Router's wireless subnet. In this document, a method for securing such signaling is defined. The method utilizes a secret key sent from the Access Router to the Mobile Node prior to handover, encrypted with an RSA public key that the Mobile Node used to generate its Cryptographically Generated Address. The ability of the Mobile Node to decrypt the secret key verifies its possession of the private key corresponding to the public key used to generate the address. This allows the Mobile Node to use the secret key to sign and authorize signaling causing changes affecting traffic to and from that address. The use of symmetric cryptography avoids the time consuming public key operation associated with using the RSA key directly during performance-sensitive IP subnet handover.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)