End-to-end Security for Media over QUIC
draft-jennings-moq-e2ee-mls-03
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Cullen Fluffy Jennings , Suhas Nandakumar , Richard Barnes | ||
| Last updated | 2026-01-01 (Latest revision 2025-06-30) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The Media over QUIC system allows relays to assist in the delivery of real-time media. While these relays are trusted to facilitate media delivery, they are not trusted to access the media content. The document describes an end-to-end security system that prevents relays from accessing media content. MLS is used to establish keys that are available only to legitimate participants in a session, which are then used to protect media data using SFrame.
Authors
Cullen Fluffy Jennings
Suhas Nandakumar
Richard Barnes
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)