Basic Support for Security and Privacy in IP-Based Vehicular Networks
draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2019-11-04
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
IPWAVE Working Group                                       J. Jeong, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Y. Shen
Intended status: Standards Track                 Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: May 7, 2020                                             J. Park
                                                                    ETRI
                                                        November 4, 2019

 Basic Support for Security and Privacy in IP-Based Vehicular Networks
                 draft-jeong-ipwave-security-privacy-00

Abstract

   This document describes possible attacks of security and privacy in
   IP Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (IPWAVE).  It also
   proposes countermeasures for those attacks.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Jeong, et al.              Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft   Basic Support for Security and Privacy    November 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  False Information Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Impersonation Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Denial-of-Service Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Message Suspension Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.5.  Tampering Attack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.6.  Tracking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Security Countermeasures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Identification and Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Integrity and Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Non-Repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Remote Attestation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.5.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   Vehicular networking has become popular by the enhancement of
   Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) [ISO-ITS-IPv6].  The
   vehicular networking can work based on Dedicated Short-Range
   Communications (DSRC) [DSRC].  This DSRC is realized by the IEEE
   Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [WAVE-1609.0].
   Especially, IEEE 802.11-OCB (Outside the Context of Basic Support
   Set) [IEEE-802.11-OCB] provides the Media Access Control (MAC) for
   vehicles in vehicular networks.  IP-based vehicular networking can be
   supported with IPv6 over IEEE 802.11-OCB [ID-IPv6-802.11-OCB], which
   defines the IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND), Maximum Transmission Unit
   (MTU), and MAC layer adaptation.

   Vehicles can construct Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANET) by
   themselves without any infrastructure node such as a Road-Side Unit
   (RSU).  Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control and Autonomous Driving
   (i.e., Self-Driving) services can take advantage of this vehicular
   networking for safe driving through the wireless communications among
   vehicles.

   When using IP-based vehicular networks in self-driving environments,
Show full document text