OSPF Security Vulnerabilities Analysis
draft-jones-ospf-vuln-01
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Kathy Jones Repage , Emanuele Jones , Olivier Le Moigne | ||
| Last updated | 2003-10-23 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Internet infrastructure protocols were designed at the very early stages of computer networks when 'cyberspace' was still perceived as a benign environment. As a consequence, malicious attacks were not considered to be a major risk when these protocols were designed, leaving today's Internet vulnerable. This paper provides an analysis of OSPF vulnerabilities that could be exploited to modify the normal routing process across a single domain together with an assessment of when internal OSPF mechanisms can or cannot be leveraged to better secure a domain.
Authors
Kathy Jones Repage
Emanuele Jones
Olivier Le Moigne
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)