Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(ipsecme WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Panos Kampanakis , Gerardo Ravago | ||
| Last updated | 2025-04-25 (Latest revision 2024-11-04) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
NIST recently standardized ML-KEM, a new key encapsulation mechanism, which can be used for quantum-resistant key establishment. This draft specifies how to use ML-KEM as an additional key exchange in IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges. This Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism approach allows for negotiating IKE and Child SA keys which are safe against cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers and theoretical weaknesses in ML-KEM.
Authors
Panos Kampanakis
Gerardo Ravago
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)